1 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
View submission: Why treat "desire" as a propositional attitude?
Hmm, yeah. I guess a lot of folks thinks that all intentional attitudes are propositional.
But I would think one could deny that and say that some intentional attitudes have objects as their contents. So, like, "John is afraid of spiders." Here, the content is "spiders" and a proposition, we might say. And I think you can still get the intensionality from these sorts of things. (So, like, John is not afraid of arachnids, cause he doesn't know spiders are arachnids.)
I'll have to think about it more.
Comment by NausicaaSantiago at 11/02/2017 at 06:48 UTC
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
But then I don't see what's so special about desire.
Maybe your question is: Why are intentional attitudes in general treated as propositional attitudes?, or Can intentional attitudes have non propositional content?