1 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
View submission: Why treat "desire" as a propositional attitude?
The main argument is, I think, that ordinary statements about desires are intensional. (A standard example is that Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta, and Jocasta was his mother, but he didn't want to marry his mother)
I don't know how can you explain this feature of statements about desire if you don't assume that desires are intentional attitudes.
Comment by drinka40tonight at 11/02/2017 at 05:19 UTC
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
Hmm, yeah. I guess a lot of folks thinks that all intentional attitudes are propositional.
But I would think one could deny that and say that some intentional attitudes have objects as their contents. So, like, "John is afraid of spiders." Here, the content is "spiders" and a proposition, we might say. And I think you can still get the intensionality from these sorts of things. (So, like, John is not afraid of arachnids, cause he doesn't know spiders are arachnids.)
I'll have to think about it more.