2023-08-12
AUGUST 3, 1977
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Human Resources
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-4080 WASHINGTON : 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402
Stock No. 052-070-04357-1
(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d sess.)
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Vice Chairman
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana CLIFFORD P. CAISE, New Jersey ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois JAKE GARN, Utah WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana GARY HART, Colorado MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio fember.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Minority Staff Director
AUDREY H. HATRY, Chief Clerk
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS Ja., New Jersey, Chairman
JENNINGS RANDOLPH, West Virginia JACOB K. JAVITS, New York 'CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island RICHARD S. S'CHWEIKER, Pennsylvania EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont GAYLORD NELSON, Wisconsin ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri JOHN H. CHAPEE, Rhode Island ALAN CRANSTON, California S. I. HAYAKAWA, California WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine DONALD W. RIEGLE, S., Michigan
STEPHEN J. PARADISE, General Counsel and Staff Director
MARJORIE M. WHITTAKER, Chief Clerk
DON A. ZIMMERMAN, Minority Counsel
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania GAYLORD NELSON, Wisconsin JACOB K. JAVITS, New York WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine JOHN H. iCHAFEE, Rhode Island HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., New Jersey (ex officlio)
LAWRENCE HOROWITZ, Professional Staff Member
DAVID WINSTON, Minority Counsel
Statements of: Page
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; ac-
companied by; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Services, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency; Al Brody, Office of Inspector General,
Central Intelligence Agency; Ernest Mayerfield, Office of General
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, and George Cary, Legislative
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency ———————————————————————————————————— 8
Philip Goldman, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency ————————————— 50
John Gittinger, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency ————————————— 51
Appendix A.-XVII. Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents
by the Intelligence Community ———————————————————————————————————————————— 65
Appendix B.-Documents Referring to Discovery of Additional MKULTRA
Material ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 103
Appendix C.-Documents Referring to Subprojects ———————————————————————————— 109
Material Submitted for the Record:
Psychological Assessments —————————————————————————————————————————————————— 17
"Truth" Drugs in Interrogation ————————————————————————————————————————————— 25
Construction of Gorman Annex ——————————————————————————————————————————————— 39
Subproject 54 —————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 41
Drug Testing in Foreign Countries —————————————————————————————————————————— 43
MKSEARCH, OFTEN/CHICKWIT —————————————————————————————————————————————————— 169
Employees Terminated Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA
Subproject 3 ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 170
QKHILLTOP Definition —————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 171
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye-(chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh, Hathaway, Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence; Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research; and professional staff members of both committees.
_Senator INOUYE._ The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both committees. We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.
It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago. It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.
I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing
that this issue needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.
The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program. and reports of other previously unknown drug programs and projects for behavioral control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures both in the executive branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working very closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral Turner and his associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States.
In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United States shall be organized. This committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in placing this new structure under the law and to develop effective oversight procedures.
It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must be full and forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and forcefully.
One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public an understanding of what new information has been discovered that adds to the knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to hear the reasons why these documents were not available to the Church and Kennedy committees. It is also the purpose of this hearing to address the issues raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files and to develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring again.
Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed by any of these improper or illegal activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will work with this committee to see that this will be done.
I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are delighted to join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.
Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling testimony about the human experimentation activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 30 universities and institutions were involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" program which included covert drug tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels, high and low, native Americans and foreign." Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects in social situations."
At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen, resulted from these activities. The Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers. The test subjects were seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. In a number of instances, the test subject became ill for hours or days, and effective followup was impossible.
Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin addicts were enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order to get a reward - heroin.
Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation on human subjects was unknown. The records of all these activities were destroyed in January 1973, at the instruction of then CIA Director Richard Helms. In spite of persistent inquiries by both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no additional records or information were forthcoming. And no one — no single individual — could be found who remembered the details, not the Director of the CIA, who ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program, nor any of his associates.
We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not. He spurred the agency into finding additional records per taining to the CIA's program of experimentation with human subjects. These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their existence was not made known to the Congress until July.
The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved. NeV instances of unethical behavior were revealed.
The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the American people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixties violated that trust. It was violated again on the day the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future is a complete public accounting of the abuses of the past.
I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15, 20 years ago, but they are front page news today, as we see in the major newspapers and on the television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month, and the best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.
The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, oftenwithout their knowledge.
These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they are and how and when they were used. As of today, the Agency itself refuses to declassify the names of those institutions and individuals, quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to the individuals under the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the Agency. Many researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our most outstanding members of our scientific community, involved in this network, now really do not know whether they were involved or not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in terms of our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to that response.
So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very least, officially inform those institutions and individuals involved.
Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced legislation, with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any similar abuses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all federally funded research involving human subjects. The research initially was just directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation covered DOD as well as the CIA.
This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none. It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for the past 3 years a system for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none, and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value. Today's hearings and the record already established underscore the need to expand its jurisdiction.
The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate unanimously last year. I believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve and have every right to expect.
_Senator INOUITE._ Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the hearings.. Admiral Turner?
[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held CIA project conducted from 1953-1964. As you may recall, MKULTRA was an "umbrella project" under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things research on drugs and behavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations in 1975, the cryptonym became publicly known when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Olson were publicized. In 1953 Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death from a hotel room window in New York City about a week after having unwittingly consumed LSD administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD researchers called by CIA.
Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral drugs during the investigations in 1975 was contained in a report on Project MKULTRA prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963. As a result of that report's recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was subsequently discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to the Church Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the then DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any connection with the aspects of the project which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the MKULTRA subprojects available to CIA during the Church Committee investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs."
When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had anopportunity to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been accomplished, and I am in a position to give you a description of the contents of the recovered material. I believe you will be most interested in the following aspects of the recent discovery:
How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
The nature of this recently located material;
How much new information there is in the material which may not have been previously known and reported to Senate investigators; and
What we believe the most significant aspects of this find to be.
To begin, as to how we discovered these materials. The material had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered there as a result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church Committee investigation in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active and retired records of all branches of CIA considered at all likely to have had association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Branch responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section. In the case at hand, however, the newly located material was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as part of its own retired holdings. The reason for this departure from normal procedure is not known. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in 1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section and, thus, discovered the MKULTRA-related documnents which had been missed in the previous searches. In sum, the Agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them; it similarly failed to locate them in 1975 in response to the Church Committee hearings. I am convinced that there was no attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.
Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to realize that the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the like—most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that were undertaken. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations or progress in the various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear. The recovered documents fall roughly into three categories:
First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.
Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e., intermediary) funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do either with behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.
We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:
1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
17 subprojects probably not involving human testing;
14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;
19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not
known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting sub-
jects as well;
6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.
2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and
drugs in combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operatibns: e.g., surreptitious
delivery of drug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences
on behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.
7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training
techniques: 23 subprojects.
8. Polygraph research : 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities:
3 subprojects.
10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue; provision of
exotic pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective
delivery systems: 6 subprojects.
11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documen-
tation : 3 subprojects.
12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected
with the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md. This
activity is outline in Book I of the Church Oommittee Report, pp. 388-389.
(See Appendix A, pp. 68-69. Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted
CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery
systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops. The
objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified from the recovered
material beyond the fact that the money was to be used where normal funding
channels would require more written or oral justification than appeared
desirable for security reasons or where operational considerations dictated
short lead times for purchases. About $11,000 was involved during this
period 1953-1960: 3 subprojects. 13. Single subprojects in such areas as
effects of electro-shock, harassment tech niques for offensive use,
analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and
four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:
"Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy
storage and transfer in organic systems; and
stimulus and response in biological systems.
15. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to
do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and
research on biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on
human volunteers.
Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimentation and clinical testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the principal types of activities included have, for the most part, either been outlined to some extent or generally described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.
For example:
Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149 numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by CIA and were made available to the Church Committee investigators in August or September 1975.
The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16) ; covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens(PP. 7, 10-12) ; the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. 7, 9) ; and the fact that the Tech-nical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior between 1953-1963 (p. 21).
The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication (p. 201) ; discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered (pp 201-202) ; studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations (p. 202) ; specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of CIA (pp. 202-203, 205) ; research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance, and hypnotism (p. 203) ; research on LSD (p. 204) ; anti-personnel harassment and assassination delivery systems including aerosol generators andother spray devices (pp. 206-208) ; the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological/Chemical Warfare capability (p. 208) ; and material sabotage research(p. 209). Much of this material is reflected in the Church Committee Report,Book I, pp. 385-422. (See Appendix A, pp. 65-102).
The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchersand institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly, apossibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. We are now inpossession of the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants whoare identified in the recovered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. Then ames of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these people wereaffiliated are also mentioned.
The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations orchemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, thediscovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows: One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical Institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then DCI, and concurred in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have col laborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were involved In this undertaking as opposed to the previously reported one person. We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients.
These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their government in a legitimate and proper purpose. I believe we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent. This is especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA-sponsored activities.
Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary, I am providing your Committee with all of the names on a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals and institutions involved. Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 25 years in the past. I assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on. this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he may elect to undertake. We are working with both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence to attempt to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records, but we are working to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if so, how to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilities in the matter.
(p. 8)
_Admiral TURNER._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this
morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need into the record quickly.
I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24-years old. They in no way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.
What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we now have and which we did not previously have on a subject known as Project MKULTRA, a project which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and behavioral modification. What the new material that we offer today is a sup plement to the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church committee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research.
At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it had available. The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount of information on this subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in 1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 13 years ago.
The information available in 1975 to the various investigatinggroups was indeed sparse, first because of the destruction of material that took place in 1973. as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago, with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Tntelliaence and under the supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical Services that supervised Project MKULTRA.
The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people who had been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Agency. I would further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detailed records in this category.
For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes: -
Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs.
In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of 1973.
What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I will start by describing how the material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered. The material in question, some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject.
During the Church committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the branch itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.
In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as part of its own retired holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the branch itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply not known, and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request, or several of them, in fact. He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.
In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973, in the process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed to locate them in 1975, in response to the Church committee hearings. I am personally persuaded that there is no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches. Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is such that there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having disclosed what it did in 1975.
Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material. It is important to remember what I have just noted, that these folders that were discovered are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for the advance of funds, vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations, or to the progress on various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear from time to time.
There are roughly three categories of projects. First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing, or administering drugs surreptitiously.
Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which
have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.
We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the contents of these files. The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided these into.
First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol. Within this, there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojects definitely involving testing on human volunteers. There are 19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting human beings.
Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including two involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.
Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.
Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful in covert operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials.
Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral change during psychotherapy.
Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modifications.
Seventh, there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessments of behavior and training techniques.
Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA's external research activities.
Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems.
Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be determined.
Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the Church committee report, pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp.68-69). Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems-for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.
Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems.
Finally, 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active materials.
Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and
to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators.
For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church committee and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances, covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the searchfor new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior.
For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector Generalreport was also made available to the Church committee staff, and that report discusses the techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication, discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.
The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of researchers and institutions who participated in MKULTRA projects, and second, a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution. We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with these 149 subprojects.
There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these people were affiliated. The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.
While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows. One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been reviewed by the Church committee staff.
The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it ap-
pear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution was then matched by Federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's top management including the then General Counsel, who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the scope of the unwitting nature of the drug testing, but contribute little more than that. We now do have corroborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known in the intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we previously reported there was only one person.
We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with research to develop painkillers for cancer patients.
These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification research is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions whichcooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their Government in a legitimate andproper purpose.
I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassmentor damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent.
This is especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.
Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail you consider necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions involved.
Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past, and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigations that he may elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have not identified the individuals to whom drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so how best to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilities in this matter.
Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep both of these committees fully advised. I thank you, sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you very much, Admiral Turner. Your spirit of cooperation is much appreciated. I would like to announce to the committee that in order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.
Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA. Who or what committee or commission or agency was responsible for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project and was the President of the United States aware of this?
_Admiral TURNER._ Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in
more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Church committee and is contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency. I have asked the question you just asked me, and have been assured that there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval. That does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please?
_Mr. BRODY._ Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that. To my knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this project at the time. It was a CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt to counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using drugs against us. Most of what else we know about it is in the Senate Church committee report.
_Senator INOUYE._ Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of this project through the budgetary process?
_Mr. BRODY._ We have no knowledge of that, sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the Congress and the President of the United States?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There are no records to indicate.
_Senator INOUYE._ Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by actual investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away from the Senate of the United States ?
_Admiral TURNER._ I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conviction from everything I have seen of it.
_Senator INOUYE._ Now, we have been advised that these documents were initially discovered in March of this year, and you were notified in July of this year, or June of this year, and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Act requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under what would be the expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that conducted this type of activity had any conceivable connection.
Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. He arranged to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washing-
ton, to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought it would take him to go through these and screen them appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.
There are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now think that was an underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages. He estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that. He was told to proceed, and as be did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had already been given to the Church committee, some details, but no major revelations.
He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of urgency. There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his time also. He was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it, and there did not appear to be cause for a great rush here. We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of Information Act request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.
In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related to K drugs and the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had substantial new information, and he immediately reported this to his superiors.
Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of Information Act requestor that we would have substantial new material and that it would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a memorandum up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate Select Comimittee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of these two documents.
As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we hadto go through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each echelon about the same question was asked of him: Have you gone through all of this, so that when we notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important relevations and not the other half? The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way tobe on any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates, much to my pleasure, had each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we are not going to uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?
By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He notified me after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first I knew of it. I began reading into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have been working, many people, many hours since then, to be sure that what we are telling you today does include all the relevant material.
_Senator INOUYE._ I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger for his diligence and expertise, but was this diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or could this diligence have been exercised during the Church hearings? Why was it not exercised?
_Admiral TURNER._ There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have been exercised at any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Act has made us more aware of this. Would you speak for yourself, please.
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence so much as thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to respond, which I think the CIA did at the time of the Church committee hearings, the hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center. Every box that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It was one of a frantic effort to comply. When the pressure of that situation cools down, and you can start looking at things systematically, you are apt to find things that you wouldn't under the heat of a crash program, and that is what happened here.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that you give to the American Congress and to the American people today. Granted, it happened many years ago, but what we are basically talking about is an activity which took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some of our top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.
Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps any number of Americans who are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant and severe indeed.
I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country that would be more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed this important responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support, obviously, of the Congress, under this set of circumstances.
I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your statement here this morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do, but could you comment upon that question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it cannot happen again?
_Admiral TURNER._ Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a human being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health, no matter how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors, but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.
I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to insure that such things are not continuing today.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Could you tell us a little bit about that?
_Admiral TURNER._ I have asked for a special report assuring me that. there are no drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve experimentation. Obviously, we collect intelligence about drugs and druo use in other countries, but there are no experimentations being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had a special check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA. I have had an actual inspection made of the storage places and the certification from the people in charge of those that there are no such chemical biological materials present in our keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.
Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed to you in this regard.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I think that is very commendable.
_Admiral TURNER._ Thank you, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I think it is important that the American people understand that.
You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that was being done by the Agency and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Agency, I am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research programs of the National Institutes of Mental Health, other sponsored activities. I mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where these things could have been.
Let me ask you specifically, on the followup of MKULTRA, are there now—I think you have answered, but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations that are being done on human beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or patterns or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in terms of any experimentation on human beings.
_Admiral TURNER._ There is no experimentation with drugs on human beings, witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean, are you contracted out?
_Admiral TURNER._ Or being in any way supported.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right. How about the nondrug experimentation our Committee has seen-psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?
_Admiral TURNER._ We are continually involved in what we call assessment of behavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph procedures to, you know, assess whether a person is lying or not. This does not involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves studying records of people's behavior under different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an experimental thing.
Have I described that accurately, Al?
_Mr. BRODY._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, it is limited to those areas?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. It only involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying to actively modify it, as was one of the objectives of MKULTRA.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested in the other areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe you can either respond now or submit it for the record, if you would do that. Would you provide that for the record?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
[The material on psychological assessments follows:]
Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations directorate who recruit and/or handle agents. Except for people involved in training courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessments are generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the subject to accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and truthfulness.
A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom are stationed overseas. The assessments they do may be either direct or indirect. Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist. When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is actually a disguised psychological test. Individuals being assessed are not given drugs, nor are they subjected to physical harassment or torture. When operating conditions are such that a face-to-face interview is not possible, the psychologist may do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by others, interviews with people who knowhim, specimens of his writings, etc.
The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological assessment. The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small number of measurement technicians. They generally require at least a page of handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about 30 different writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the graphologist for assessments.
The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of the training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each student. The students are witting participants, and results are discussed with them.
It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the operations officers. In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the operations officer to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgement as to whether any agent is telling the truth.
_Admiral TURNER._ The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect from people we approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very specific listing of these.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Would you do that for the committee?
In the followups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT, could you give us also a report on those particular programs?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ None of them?
_Admiral TURNER._ Let me say this, that CHICKWIT program is the code name for the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This program was summarized and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not had time to go through and personally review them. I have ascertained that all of the files that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch them without my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and they are available.
I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply haven't read into that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when we want to get into that we should get the Department of Defense in with us.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, you will supply that information to theIntelligence Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we are interested in?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?
_Admiral TURNER._ I will be happy to.
[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]
_Senator KENNEDY._ Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you support the extension of the protection of human subjects legislation to include the CIA and the DOD? You commented favorably on that before, and I am hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in September, and that is our strong interest.
_Admiral TURNER._ The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of it.
_Senator KENNEDY._ As a personal matter, since you have reviewed these subjects, would you comment? I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand what we are attempting to do.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ From your own experience in the agency, you can understand the value of it.
Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project in terms of the responsible CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony.
Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty clear that you can track that whole program in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you would want to get to the bottom of it, as the Congress does as well. I will come back to that in my next round. Thank you very much.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Goldwater?
_Senator GOLDWATER._ I have no questions.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Schweiker?
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12, where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee. My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG's report. My question to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?
_Admiral TURNER._ The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Only certain sections of the report were made available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying, because the only record we have are the notes that the staff took on anything that was of significance.
_Admiral TURNER._ My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the report, we have a situation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to follow. We were limited by notetaking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective oversight.
I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own people? Because as I understand what you are saying, while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA money.
Isn't there something basically wrong with that?
_Admiral TURNER._ I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and revisit the atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would occur to me if it happened today as a very questionable activity.
_Senator SCH1WEIKER._ Well, I think those of us who worked on and amended the Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for this.
It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was on the Church committee. The Public Health Service was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health money. Here we are using general hospital construction money to carry on a series of drug experiments.
_Admiral TURNER._ Excuse me, sir. If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for experimentation.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were they not?
_Admiral TURNER._ We do not have positive evidence that they were. It certainly would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw inferences here—
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, why else would they give this money for the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?
_Admiral TURNER._ I certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benefit from it, and some of the wording says the General Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if the CIA was going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no evidence of what benefit was derived.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake. The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the cost, and when they backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at two different points there were indications that CIA decisionmakers thought there was great benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of that facility.
_Admiral TURNER._ You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ The agreement documents say that the CIA would have access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction of the wing, so how would you enter into an agreement that specifically says that you will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space? I cannot believe it was empty.
_Admiral TURNER._ Sir, I am not disputing you at all, but both of us are saying that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done, and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that payment or what went on in that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.
_Senator SCHTWEIKER._ Admiral Turner, one other—
_Senator KENNEDY._ Would the Senator yield on that point?
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ I understand that in the agency's documents on the agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiar—
_Mr. BRODY._ Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There are no subsequent reports as to what happened after the construction took place.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and San Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there and how it was carried out? I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don't believe your statement went into much detail.
_Admiral TURNER._ I did mention the safe house operation in my statement, sir, and that is how these were carried out. What we have learned from the new documentation is the location and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the CIA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those safe houses. We know something about the construction work that was done in them because there were contracts for this. Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing inferences as to the things that went on as to what you are saying here.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can infer that much, right?
_Admiral TURNER._ Right.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place and time, you got it.
_Mr. BRODY._ Senator, that would be—contacts were made, as we understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.
_Admiral TURNER._ We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 here we have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly voluntary.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether informed consent means anything to a- person in a bar anyway.
_Admiral TURNER._ Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that as an ambiguous incident.
_Senator INOUYE._ Your time is up, Senator.
Senator Huddleston?
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered docu-
mentation during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before you made that judgment?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in some detail.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ But you have inquired, you think, sufficiently to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person to conceal these records from the previous committee?
_Admiral TURNER._ I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact. which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their deliberately concealing these particular files and revealing the other things that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared with the overall material that was provided.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now or if there were anything similar to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the Select Committee on Intelligence?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir. You mean, if I discovered that something like this were going on without my knowledge? Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to—
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you report it to the committee? I assume you would.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What
provision would you suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies?
_Admiral TURNER._ I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and curbs on the intelligence activities.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ In the case of sensitive type operations, which this certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time?
_Admiral TURNER._ Much more so. I mean, I have briefed you, sir, and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ How about the record keeping?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that that is not the case.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Admiral, I was particularly interested in the activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr. Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?
_Admiral TURNER._ Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to confirm or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of individuals here.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ I am just. asking you if you have identified the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to know if you know who he is.
_Admiral TURNER._ No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations.
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir, we have not identified him.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a member of your staff or connected with the Agency in any way. Have you attempted to identify him?
[Pause.]
_Admiral TURNER._ Senator, we have a former employee whose firstname is Ray who may have had some connection with these activities.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ You suspect that but you have not verified that at this time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?
_Admiral TURNER._ That is correct.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Wallopi?
_Senator WALLOP._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, not all of the-and in no way trying to excuseyou of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature. Is that a fair statement?
_Admiral TURNER._ That is correct.
_Senator WALLOP._ Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving human testing, aspects of the magician's art, it doesn't seem as though there is anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research, library searches. Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to the process of intelligence gathering?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing or would not do any of the things that were
involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but there are other things.
_Senator WALLOP._ Even with volunteer patients? I mean, I am not trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to conduct various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams? I know in Arizona they have done so.
_Admiral TURNER._ My understanding is, lots of that is authorized. but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's business, and that if we need some information in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate authorities of the Government and ask them to get it for us rather than to in any way—
_Senator WALLOP._ Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now. A President would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probably the case?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator WALLOP._ And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is there any reason to suppose that the President did not know of this project? You said there was no reason to suppose that he did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to suppose that they did not?
_Admiral TURNER._ No.
_Senator WALLOP._ Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it, not informing your superior that these were going on, especially when certain items of it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.
_Admiral TURNER._ Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do a lot more informing today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowledge was.
_Senator WALLOP._ I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times. It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they were trying to find.
_Admiral TURNER._ I am sorry. Your question is, was this vital? Did we view it as vital?
_Senator WALLOP._ Well, your implication at the beginning was that it was a response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and other things. I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United States.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't know how high that permeated the executive branch.
_Senator WALLOP._ But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean, I am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I'm certain it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his behavior.
_Admiral TURNER._ Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our people or agents.
_Senator WALLOP._ Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are there such serums?
_Admiral TURNER._ I don't know of them if there are. I would have to answer that for the record, sir.
_Senator WALLOP._ I would appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows:]
"TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION
The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to obtain information from an uncooperative source and as persistent as his impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883, rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India : "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."
More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are presumed to relax the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truthis he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still occasionally flare into the open.
The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference. in the two procedures lies in their different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with probative truth: the usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psychiatist, on the other hand, using the same "truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with psychological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be the key to recovery.
The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature.
While acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over—the drugs are not sera and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth—journalistic accounts continue to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth" drug successess and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.
Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of "truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive and negative, for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.
This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.
SCOPOLAMINE AS "TRUTH SERUM"
Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of henbane, scopolamine was known to produce sedation and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.
In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he arranged to interview under scopolamine two. prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty.
Enthusiastic at this success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot create a lie . . . and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched upon the public consciousness.
The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922. House resisted the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable increase in polemical zeal as time went on. What had begun as something of a scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements." [11]
Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used it extensively. [2, 16] One police writer claims that the threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.[16]
Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a tractable subject.
THE BARBITURATES
The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.
At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs migh help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, Was using barbiturates on reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed instances.
The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofballs," Luminal, Nembutal, "red devils." "yellow jackets." "pink ladies," etc. Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to alesser extent seconal (secobarbital).
As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the Influence of a barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours. Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are momentarily excited; a few beocme silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.
The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be divided as follows:
I. Sedative stage.
II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
IV. Death.
Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I and II may last only two or three seconds.
The first or sedative stage can be further divided:
Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.
Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)
Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of paniful stimuli.
Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A. Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews, [13] cites 136 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of Intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published experimental studies that he deemed worth reporting.
One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldiers, were at first sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.
The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.
Gerson and Victoroff [12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who, neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.
The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.
Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned first about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the charges pending against him before being questioned about them.
If he did this in a too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.
The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting, the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.
The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had "already described." When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.
Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium, much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist, another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased goods from the participants. Testimony concerning dates and specific places was untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.
As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically aggressive. Occasionally patients had to be forcibly restrained during this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier accounts.
With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and Victoroff conclude that persistent, careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.
At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale[25] administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.
Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were crossexamined on their cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals with strong unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses never actually committed.
In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention, unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7] maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions. Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant, asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls. [13] It is evident that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquilizers), should be further explored.
OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE
J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic personality, in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.
MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time he would request that more amytal be injected."[21]
MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed information.
Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L. Z. Freedman, gave sodium amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts. The subjects were mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign indicates they have committed.[10]
F. G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, who has had considerable experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be able to continue the deception under drugs.
The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narcoanalysis during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel, concluded that in almost all cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they had sufficient time.
The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.
APPLICATION TO CI INTERROGATION
The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough is known about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for their use in interrogations.
It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demands on his skill will be increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output. And the tendency against which he must guard in the interrogate to give the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.
It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton[20] found sodium amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a profession he was trying to hide.
There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a resistance source. The accumulated knowledege about "truth" drug reaction has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence. The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to obtain relief from mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study. Even in police work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however apprehensively; and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician relationship necessarily evolves.
Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of euphoria, ease and confidence, and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and conimunicability."[18] Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.
From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narco-analyst William Sargent recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response and abreaction.[27] In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be responsive.
Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action eminently exploitable in interrogation-the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated 'at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.
POSSIBLE VARIATIONS
In studies by Beecher and his associates, [3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The nonreactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been found.
Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation,[23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware, but this would require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the interrogation setting.
In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.
DEFENSIVE MEASURES
There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.
The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.
Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence service, the trial exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in narcosis.
There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic alcoholics.
Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period, barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.
The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in psychotherapy.
Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25, which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand, an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.
Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appear to lie within the individual.
CONCLUSIONS
The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to combinations of depressants, stimulants, ataraxics.
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_Senator WALLOP._ If they are, I would assume that you would still try to find from either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that kind of activity.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
_Senator WALLOP._ Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Chafee?
_Senator CHAFEE._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, 'but not only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled, amateurish experiments that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, at least from the scanty evidence we have.
It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Agency didn't have the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in a correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can rely on others.
_Senator CHAFEE._ I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this type of experiment, but in preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are convinced that you have this type of people?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator CHAFEE._ The second point I am interested in was the final lines in your testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest as well, and I do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate, but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.
_Admiral TURNER._ Thank you, sir. We will.
_Senator CHAFEE._ Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you very much.
Admiral Turner, MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages of MAKULTRA, the Director of Central Intelligence wrote to the technical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who later committed suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals who were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious administration and had been criticized by the Director of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.
In fact. according to documents, it continued for a number of years. Can you provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have continued under these circumstances?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir, I really can't.
_Senator INOUYE._ Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?
_Admiral TURNER._ I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?
_Senator INOUYE._ Yes.
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years?
_Admiral TURNER._ I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure at the beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some heads.
_Senator INOUYE._ Could you provide this committee with information as to whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled?
_Admiral TURNER._ I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double check that.
[See p. 170 for material referred to.]
_Senator INOUYE._ As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence community. We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic one. Can anything like this occur again?
_Admiral TURNER._ I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second, because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing the whistle on this kind of activity.
I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the new committee in the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop it.
_Senator INOUYE._ A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.
_Admiral TURNER._ All right, sir. I will be happy to.
_Senator GOLDWATER._ Will the Senator yield?
_Senator INOUYE._ Yes, Sir.
_Senator GOLDWATER._ I wonder if he could include in that report for our information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on them, and whether they were'witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case.
I think that would be interesting.
_Admiral TURNER_. Fine. Yes, Sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Kennedy?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Thank you. It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research, is that right,
Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify those individuals?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you intend to notify the universities or research centers as well?
_Admiral TURNER._ Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your opening statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities, let's say. If he were witting—if his university had been witting of this activity with us, he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really don't know the equities here.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have information that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.
It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The importance of preserving the independence of our research areas and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.
_Admiral TURNER._ You are saying that you feel that if we identify them privately to themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have not been identified publicly at this point.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I think the universities themselves should be notified. I think then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their setting up the procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a public comment or a public statement on it. I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether they were used or were not used and how they were used.
I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an official of the university that you notify and he wants for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used by it should not have the information as well.
So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to the public. I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the newspapers, and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different than if they know it is confirmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that there is a responsibility there.
_Admiral TURNER._ I have great sympathy with what you are saying. I have already notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves, and I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it seems to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope—I mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible disservice to the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of the universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are developing with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terms of the Congress. Certainly the universities are entitled to the same.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.
_Senator KENNEDY._ That's right.
_Admiral TURNER._ Many of them were witting, and therefore they can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead to the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
_Senator KENNEDY._ That could be done, it seems to me.
_Admiral TURNER._ So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their own decision whether their equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain it—
_Senator KENNEDY._ Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you to announce or indicate?
_Admiral TURNER._ My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I would be doing a disserve to these universities if I notified the public.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Would you meet with some university officials and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity of the universities would be better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out from small, large, private, and public universities' officials how they view the integrity
_Admiral TURNER._ Fine. I will phone several university presidents today who are my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they think the equities would be.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right. You let us know, too.
_Admiral TURNER._ But I am not sure that I see that there is any great benefit in my notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his choice whether he wants-each institution wants to have it made public.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Yes. The fact would remain that the institution's credibility would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny it and the Agency says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and the only way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would get some input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the preservation of the integrity of the universities.
Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the uses of these safe houses, as I understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the nature of the project itself.
Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your knowledge, is that correct?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not go beyond the safe houses located on the east coast and the west coast? I believe I am correct on that.
_Admiral TURNER._ That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected individuals, yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It was just located in those two places?
_Admiral TURNER._ To the best of our knowledge, there were only two locations.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?
_Admiral TURNER._ Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow selected.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right. Do you know from this information how many people were recruited during this period?
_Admiral TURNER._ No idea.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Do you know approximately?
_Admiral TURNER._ I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have—apparently we are very—well, either there were no records kept of the actual numbers and types of people tested or they were destroyed.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have been conducted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:
(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (4) Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions with the full supervision of
and there is a blank, something has been deleted.
It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if you weren't planning to experiment on people in the hospital?
_Admiral TURNER._ I agree with you 100 percent, sir. Those were clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to be defensive, Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and the. ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as," and then there's another deletion.
Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still classified, or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released. It seems to be that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what they were doing, since it says that the activities would "augment and complement other programs" undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't know what was contemplated. Just the fact.that similar programs are referred to in the document, though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the "such as" in the classified version of this document.
_Admiral TURNER._ Senator, I have not said that we don't know what was contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Why did you delete that reference? Why is that still classified, that particular project of whatever it is?
_Admiral TURNER._ I don't know this particular case. We will get you the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other case is unrelated to this in the-well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.
[The material referred to follows:]
Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex was dedicated in March 1959. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent to March 1959. Subproject 45 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final four years (1959-1963) of the subproject could have been spent in the Gorman Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a "new Annex" in Subproject 45 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new location in 1959 or later years.
Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Annex is contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material indicated that Dr. Geschickter continued his research for sleep- and amnesia-producing drugs under Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital. But it is impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.
Was there any indication at all in the records you found that the project ultimately used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?
_Admiral TURNER._ I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was trying to get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Go ahead.
_Admiral TURNER._ QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you, but—
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Can you tell us what that is, or is it still classified?
_Admiral TURNER._ I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted it, it is still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Thank you. I'd like to see that information.
[See p. 171 for material referred to.]
Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?
_Admiral TURNER._ I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am very sorry.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Do you have any indication that some experiments in the facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects? You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clar from other documents that these kinds of experiments were at some point being done somewhere. My question is, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients were experimented with in this wing?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ The other question I had relates to the development of something which has been called the perfect concussion. A series of experiments toward that end were described in the CIA documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.
_Admiral TURNER._ Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving warning and without leaving any clear physical marks. Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion"—maybe that was poetic license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you could just tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?
_Admiral TURNER._ This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried out.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, I do believe the first year of the project in 1955 was carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that you supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point, because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us. So, it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the production of brain concussions with special blackjacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.
_Admiral TURNER._ The data available to me is that this project was never funded by the CIA, but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of the work was.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced below:
_Mr. LAIBINGER._ On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in terms of the.work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked—at least, my memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact, that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ By what?
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It did not happen to be in my head when I testified.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, as I recall, some indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply it to us; there is no argument about that information.
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view, I am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it would have had a project number and identified as such. The thing that threw me was that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the normal contracting process, so that it was not included in MKULTRA as 'any work done under that funding umbrella.
The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however, that a year's work was done through navy funding-a navy funding mechanism—on which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement here that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for the CIA?
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ I think that is correct.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to know how it went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion—total blackout, maximum amnesia, and whatever else it was you were interested in—study and testing.
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the files that were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but actually never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism, a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence that I know of that that project was ever funded.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Well, I am confused, because here again is an-other quote from a document that we have seen, which you have re-leased and supplied to us:
Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract: (a) Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained supporting the resonance-cavilation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary accelerationi threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.
It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory. The document notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date." It describes a special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force with a low unit surface pressure." I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly seems that some testing was done.
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ Senator, you are putting us in the same position.
I think you were stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us, but I believe you are quoting from a proposaLthat someone sent to the Agency to fund this work, and he is referringto past work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of thingslike that, but CIA was not involved with that.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of yourtestimony when you mention projects using magician's art? How do magicians get into the spook business?
_Admiral TURNER._ I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.
_Mr. BRODY._ I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious administration of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's attention while you are doing something else, asI understand it. It was also some type of a covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Huddleston?
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing members of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention described by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation was begun out of a fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs which would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents or members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and which would have resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question clear?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that. In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I am told that that is the case.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Was there any evidence or any indication that there were other motives that the Agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person? Was this part of this kind of experimentation?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ The project continued for some time after it was learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?
_Admiral TURNER._ That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present operations?
_Mr. BRODY._ Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge.
A great deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to Frank here. Do you know of any?
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ So apparently any information that was gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the part of the Agency.
_Mr. LAUBINGER._ I am having difficulty hearing your questions.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ I can hardly hear myself.
_Admiral TURNER._ I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember—
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the Agency or anybody else as far as we know?
_Admiral TURNER._ I think that is basically correct. At the same time, I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time, and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am not saying that—
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Have you detected any sign that any other nation is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar objective?
_Admiral TURNER._ I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head, sir, but I will get it to you.
[The material referred to follows:]
We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in foreign countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense assesments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be employed against Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the possible exception of an occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program. To the best of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?
_Admiral TURNER._ We certainly know of other powers conducting research in these areas, yes.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Do you know how they go about that research?
_Admiral TURNER._ It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Do you know of any other organization in this country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and through unwitting institutions?
_Admiral TURNER._ Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ It is not a normal mode of operation for human research, is it?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Wallop?
_Senator WALLOP._ Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are you, Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification procedures which have been used by foreign powers?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir, I am not.
_Senator WALLOP._ I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes.
_Senator WALLOP._ So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of sophistication.
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator WALLOP._ Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise, but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they didn't even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.
I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Chafee?
_Senator CHAFEE._ No questions.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and the magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records that these were used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been considerable. You are unable to determine, at least in your own research, what the numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people
were involved, but it could have been considerable during this period of time.
It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of cash slips that were expended in these areas that itwas considerable, but that is a judgmental factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.
Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy memory about this whole area. He has testified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.
Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there are two additional agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents in your testimony.
Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly what is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project manager know what was being done?
_Admiral TURNER._ Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable to associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to find out who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA employees, and we don't know whether these were false names.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You are tracking that down, as I understand it?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and project?
_Admiral TURNER._ My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the Justice Department.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It will be pursued, though, I understand?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?
_Admiral TURNER._ [Nods in the affirmative.]
_Senator KENNEDY._ Is it plausible that the director of the program would not understand or know about the details of the program?
Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?
_Admiral TURNER._ Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out about this?
_Admiral TURNER._ Not since this revelation has come out.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Not since this revelation? Well, why not?
_Admiral TURNER._ He has left our employ, Senator.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know, covered for lifetime?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out?
You have new information about this program. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb?
_Admiral TURNER._ Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be done by the Justice Department or ourselves.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, are we wrestling around because you and
Attorney General Bell can't agree—
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY_ [continuing]. On who ought to do it?
_Admiral TURNER._ We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to give any impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within the Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975, and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.
_Admiral TURNER._ The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some way trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he can augment anything here in this new information, though I don't think there is much in this new information that he can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow that was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him since the development of this new material.
_Admiral TURNER._ Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved 'here, or to appear in any way to be improper.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice Department about this particular case since the development of this new material about Gottlieb?
_Admiral TURNER._ Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand the difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?
_Admiral TURNER._ Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I am saying these are all the facts we have available.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?
_Admiral TURNER._ We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe, enough new information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.
_Senator KENNEDY._ The importance of it, I think, from our point of view, is, he would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to protect these people and their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.
I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how we can fufill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the materials have been destroyed.
These other two agents, have they talked to them?
_Admiral TURNER._ We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying to track down and see whether these names can be releated to anybody.
_Senator KENNEDY._ That is under active investigation by the Agency?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you have the intention of talking to those people when you locate them. Is that correct?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you have people working on it?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ With regards to the activities that took place in these safe houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used. Is that your understanding?
_Admiral TURNER._ Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to put in two-way mirrors.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.
[Pause.]
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, we have documents
_Admiral TURNER._ I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the details.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand, at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French can-can dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other-red bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks. Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering, and then it is dashed out, and then the other documents, that would suggest, at least with the signature of your principal agent out there, that—"called to the operation, midnight, and climax."
What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these safe houses?
_Admiral TURNER._ No, sir.
[General laughter.]
_Senator KENNEDY._ There is a light side to it, but there is also an enormously serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which are used or were used in terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was about, as well as the constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting these matters together.
When you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that has been tested, tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this, payment mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I think, very important to find out what his understandingis of the nature of that. So, we will hear more about that.
_Admiral TURNER._ I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.
_Senator KENNEDY._ That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is not very satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information and the new documentation and the new memoranda—and he did not have the checks at that time—and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name on it, his memory could be stimulated on that.
Thank you.
_Senator INOUYE._ I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in this hearing. I believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it. It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency. I think the record should also indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimentors.
I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the 8,000 pages, the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the record to show that you have made these papers and documents available to the committee. I thank you for that.
As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.
In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other committee room in any other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency and our intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings with him, such as this. The confirmation hearings were all open. In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate a resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and fundsbeing used for counterintelligence and national intelligence. I would hope that in presenting this issue to the public, the media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that we have learned about this morning is one I hope will never happen again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It is important therefore that we continue in this oversight activity.
So, once again, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us. We will continue to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several questions that the members and staff have prepared. We hope you will look them over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Mr. Chairman ?
_Senator INOUYE._ Yes, sir?
_Senator KENNEDY._ I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness. I have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations, telephone conversations, and private meetings, and I have found him personally to be extremely responsive, and it is a very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this Agency.
I want you to know, personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind us. I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter. So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you, Admiral Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward to working with you.
_Admiral TURNER._ Thank you.
_Senator HUDDLESTON._ Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found. The documentation has been made available to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.
I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and a difference that is very helpful.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.
Do you solemly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I do.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I do.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goldman will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington—he lives in Washington, and was contacted recently—with the intention of testifying this morning. And something—he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a counsel before he would wish to testify.
_Senator INOUYE._ Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.
(p. 50)
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I am Philip Goldman.
_Senator INOUYE._ And you are a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Over 10 years ago.
_Senator INOUYE._ And you were employed at the time when MKULTIRA was in operation?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.
_Senator INOUYE._ And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?
(p. 51)
_Mr. GITINGER._ I am.
_Senator INOUYE._ Are you still an employee?
_Mr. GITINGER._ No.
_Senator INOUYE._ Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in operation?
_Mr. GITINGER._ Yes.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you. Senator Kennedy.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I want to welcome both of you to the committee. If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I know of no safe house in San Francisco.
_Senator KENNEDY._ How about in New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I knew of one facility that was established there, but I didn't know anything of its operation.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on unwitting persons in San Francisco?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, we have a classified document here that was provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would appreciate it if you would look—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I think the misunderstanding arises because I was project officer.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, would you take a look at that?
[Mr. Goldman inspected the document.]
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ This document as it states is correct. However, my—
_Senator KENNEDY._ That document is correct?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ As far as I see on the first page, the project. But my—
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, could I get it back, please.
That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall.
_Senator KENNEDY._ To whom was that?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ To the individual whose name was listed at the top of that document.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you knew that he was running the project in San Francisco?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I knew he was the person who was in charge out there.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what he was doing, because there would be other things involved.
I did receive—
_Senator KENNEDY._ What were you doing?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I was collecting—I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash.
_Senator KENNEDY._ So even though the Agency document indicates that you were a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, Calif., you described your responsibility only as a carrier of money, is that correct?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I would say as a disburser or carrying out—seeing that the moneys were handled properly. There was within that—I don't know what's done or what he did do in conjunction with other people.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I was responsible for turning over the check to him.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And what did you know of the program itself?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ The only thing I knew of the program was what he furnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indulge or concern myself in that.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You still wrote, and I'll let you examine it—it's a classified document—but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963, talking about the experiments, the factual data that had been collected, covert and realistic field trials, about the necessity of those particular—and talked about the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery systems. That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was written.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I am trying to gather what your role was. You've indicated first of all that you didn't know about—you knew about a safe house in New York; now we find out that you're the carrier for the resources as well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now that the CIA put you as a monitor. You're testifying that you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many others that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I am just trying to find out exactly what role you were playing.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ The only thing I can tell you about this and I am drawing completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there conducted these things and reported them back to the Agency. I didn't participate in any of them. All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for things that were done and told of the work that they had done.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, that document covers more than receipts.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes, it tells of what—they had conducted work out there.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ "A numher of covert"—
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, you can't read it, it's a classified document, and I don't know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I am not interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the document, but I think it would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed, that talks about the substance of the program. And what we're interested in is the substance of the program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the Agency, which do indicate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether you're willing to tell us about that.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember.
_Senator KENNEDY._ But you can't remember anything.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I can't remember the substantive parts of these things, I really can't.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Of the program that was taking place.
Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, no.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you have the same function with regards to New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ The same function with regard to New York.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did you ever go to San Francisco?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did you meet with the agent in charge?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And why did you meet with him?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going along all right for the work that was being done.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What work was being done?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, the reports of these things and whatever wasbeing done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You travel out there to find out about the work that's being done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ He told me that the work that they were doing was going along, progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with you—
_Senator KENNEDY._ But he didn't tell you what the work was?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot remember the things that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company—from the Agency for over 10 years, and that is even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first—
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to your recollection?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I don't recollect it, but if you have it there, then they did.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ He had been head of the division when I was recruited.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did you talk to him about these programs? Did you have anything to do with him during this period of time?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in the sixties.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Just what you see there on the papers.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ That is the request for money and he approves it, and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was going on?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I didn't ask.
_Senator KENNEDY._ But you told him that your impression that what was going on even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess? [Laughter.]
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were given to me while I was there.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What was the money being spent for, do you know?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No; I can't recall that, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and can-can pictures—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Floral pictures and the rest.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Recorders.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Recorders and two-way mirrors.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now.
_Senator KENNEDY._ But you would have authorized those funds,would you not, since you were the—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Did you say two-way mirrors?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Yes.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Where?
_Senator KENNEDY._ In the safe houses.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Where?
_Senator KENNEDY._ San Francisco.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No.
_Senator KENNEDY._ How about New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You remember now that you approved expenditures for New York?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What were those expenditures for?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for their use.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the apartment?
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope—not pushing dope, but selling narcotics and that sort of thing.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that particular program.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ That's correct.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what was going on out there.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ Yes, sir, I did.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now.
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects that they—that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. I simply reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there who—and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.
_Senator KENNEDY._ The report that you examined here is a substantive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think anyone who wasn't familiar with the project—this is a personal evaluation—could write a report on the substance of it without knowing about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect, and that's—
_Mr. GOLDMAN._ No; everything I put down in there is things that I was told while I was out there, and if there was any ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really don't.
At the time—that was some years ago. At the time—a lot of time has passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it at all, I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to certify whether yes, this is so or that is so, I can do that, but I can't recall it mentally.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You just certified the principal. There are others up here.
I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ It's Mr. Gittinger.
_Senator KENNEDY._ How long did you serve with the Agency?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Twenty-six years.
_Senator KENNEDY_. Excuse me?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Twenty-six years.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Twenty-six years.
And at some point you moved into the operational support side, is that correct?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?
_Mr. GiTTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And did he inform you about the research projects involving LSD?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It is my understanding that you were also aware of some of the drug testing projects conducted on unwitting subjects on the west coast using the Bureau of Narcotics people in the operation. Is that true?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I was.
_Senator INOUYE._ Excuse me. Would you speak into the microphone? I cannot hear you.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Sorry.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Do you know which drugs were involved in those tests?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the others. What is the substance of marihuana, cannabis, is that right, that can be delivered by other than smoking?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Cannabis?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ There had been some discussion of that; yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And was heroin also used?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Heroin used by CIA?
_Senator KENNEDY._ No. In the west coast operation.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Absolutely not.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Now, to your knowledge, how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I have no direct knowledge.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Why did you go to the safe houses?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ It's a very complicated story. Just in justification of myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had enough time to get it all straightened in my mind, so I ramble.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, you take your time and tell us in your own words. We've got some time here.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ My responsibilities which would involve any of the period of time that you were talking about really was not directly related to drugs at all. I was a psychologist charged with the responsibility of trying to develop as much information as I could on various cultures, overseas cultures, anthropological type data, if you follow what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means of assessing people and understanding people.
I originally became involved in this through working on Chinese culture, and over a series of time I was introduced to the problem of brainwashing, which is the thing that really was the most compelling thing in relationship to this, and became charged with the responsibility of trying to find out a little bit about interrogation techniques.
And among other things, we decided or I decided that one of the best sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and interview and become involved with experienced police interrogators in the country and experienced people who had real practical knowledge of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well convinced after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming out of China, that it was the techniques of the interrogators that were causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth in relationship to this, rather than any kind of drugging and so forth. So we were very much interested in interrogation techniques, and this led to me being introduced to the agent in the west coast, and I began to talk to him in connection with these interrogation techniques.
_Senator KENNEDY._ OK. Now, that is the agent that ran the tests on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in, correct?
_Mr. GITTlNGER._ If I understand—would you say that again?
_Senator KENNEDY._ The name Morgan Hall has been—that is the name that has been used.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And that is the agent that you met with.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ That is right.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And you met at the safe house.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Whom did you meet with in the safe house?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am sorry that I have to. In connection with some work that we were doing, we needed to have some information on sexual habits. Morgan Hall provided informants for me to talk to in connection with the sex habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one period of time the safe house, as far as I was concerned, was used for just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red curtains.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Those were prostitutes, were they?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ How many different times were you there that you had similar—
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that.Four or five times.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Four or five times.
_Mr. GiTTINGER._ Over—you remember now, the period that I'm talking about when I would have any involvement in this is from about 1956 to 1961. So it's about a 4- or 5-year period which is the only time that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did Morgan Hall make the arrangements for the prostitutes to meet with you?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Did the interviews that you had have anything to do with drugs?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, as I tried to explain earlier when this was being discussed a little bit beforehand, again I think it is pretty hard for most people now to recognize how little there was known about drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of us who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trying to get as much information as we could on the subculture, the subculture drug groups, and obviously the Bureau of Narcotics represented a means of doing this. Consequently, other types of things that were involved in discussions at that time would have to do with the underground use of drugs. When I am talking about this I am talking about the folkways in terms of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that I was talking to have any information about this and on rare instances they were able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would largely turn out to be a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather than anything esoteric.
I also was very much interested because we had relatively little information, believe it or not, at that time, in terms of the various reactions that people were having to drugs. Therefore, these people were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of information about reactions.
_Senator KENNEDY._ At least you gathered-or am I correct in assuming that you gathered the impression that the prostitutes that you had talked to were able to slip the drugs to people as I understand it. Did you form any impression on that?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I certainly did not form the impression that they did this as a rule or—
_Senator KENNEDY._ But they had the knowledge.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ They had the knowledge or some of them had had knowledge of this being done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely in this area of knockout drops.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Looking back now did you form any impression about how the Agency was actually testing the broad spectrum of social classes in these safe houses? With the large disbursal of cash in small quantities, $100 bills and the kinds of elaborate decorations and two-way mirrors in the bedrooms and all the rest, is there any question in your own mind what was going on in the safe houses, or the techniques that were being used to administer these drugs?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I find it very difficult to answer that question, sir. I had absolutely no direct knowledge there was a large number of this. I had no knowledge that anyone other than—than Morgan Hall was in any way involved in the unwitting administration of drugs.
_Senator KENNEDY._ But Gottlieb would know, would he not?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I believe so, yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Could we go into the Human Ecology Foundation and talk about that and how it was used as an instrument in terms of the support of research?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Could you describe it to us? Could you describe the Human Ecology Foundation, how it functioned and how it worked?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ May I tell something about how it evolved, which I think is important?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Sure.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ The Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, so-called, was actually a—I am confused here now as to whether I should name you names.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, we're not interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the institutions.
But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it functioned and what its purpose was.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, it was established to undertake research in the general area of the behavioral sciences. It definitely had almost no focus or interest in, say, drug-related type of activities except in a very minor way, because it was largely set up to attempt to gain a certain amount of information and to fund projects which were psychological, sociological, anthropological in character. It was established in the sense of a period of time that a lot of us who are in it wish we could do it over again, but we were interested in trying to get together a panel of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investigation of Hunan Ecology type of program.
The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the projects. Now, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no knowledge that they were getting CIA money.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Over what period of time did this take place?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ As far as I was concerned, it was the period of time ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out in 1965, but I was not involved in this phasing out.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Can you give the range of the different sort of individual projects of the universities in which it was active?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, it would have as many as—I am very fuzzy on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10, 20, 30.
_Senator KENNEDY._ After it made the grants, what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it made the grants to these various research programs.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ And that included eight universities as well as individual researchers?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Yes, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Then what follow-up was there to that, sir?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, in every sense of the word, the organization was run exactly like any other foundation, and it carried with it the same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted, that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out, but there were no strings attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason they couldn't publish anvthing thst thev put out.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What sort of budget are we talking about here?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I honestly do not remember. I would guess we are talking in the realm of about $150,000 a year, but don't hold me to that, because I don't know.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What is your view about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university, sir?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, obviously, sir, insofar as today there is no question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude, and I do know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that it was moving into an area but this would be compromised.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Well, that is commendable, both your attitude and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was involved in behavior research programs, as I understand it.
_Mr. GiTTINGER._ Yes, sir. On its own, in connection with this, it participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects, but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the general knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the Hungarian refugees—obviously, the study of the Hungarian refugees who came to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very useful exercise to try to get information about the personality characteristics of the Communists and so forth.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Were there other foundations that were doing similar kinds of work?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Not to my knowledge, sir.
_Senator KENNEDY._ You believe—
_Mr. GITTINGER._ You mean, CIA, other CIA?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Right.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, my answer is in the sense that I know of no other CIA foundations, no. There were, of course, other foundations doing similar kinds of work in the United States.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Have you heard of the Psychological Assessments Foundation?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I certainly have.
_Senator KENNEDY._ What was that? What function did that have?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was associated with it.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Rather than getting into the work, it was another foundation, was it not? It was another foundation supported by the Agency?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ What, the Psychological Assessment?
_Senator KENNEDY._ Yes.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ No, sir, it was not.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It did not get any support at all from the Agency?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Oh, yes, sir. It did get support, but it was a business firm.
_Senator KENNEDY._ It was a business but it got support from the Agency?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ It got money from it, but it definitely was not in MKULTRA or in any way associated with this.
_Senator KENNEDY._ All right. I want to thank you for your helpful testimony, Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I think you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards now from what they were 25 years ago, and I think you have responded very fairly and completely to the inquiries, and I think with a good deal of feeling about it.
You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's interest, so I want to thank you very much for your statement and for your helpful timeliness.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Thank you, sir.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Case?
_Senator CASE._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had another committee that I had to complete the hearing with this morning before I got here.
I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on one point, and that is, it relates to a story in the press yesterday about part of this program involving the funding of a grant at a foreign university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to the additional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen, if you will.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I will say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money outside the United States when it was CIA money. I can categorically state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the way across of the human ecology functions, but to my knowledge, and this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting money from CIA, and they were not asked to contribute anything to CIA as such.
_Senator CASE._ It would be interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if this happened from a foreign official agency to our own university. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_Senator INOUYE._ Senator Schweiker.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Goldman, I wonder if you would tell us what your training and educational background is?
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ I have already given a biography for the record.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ I have not seen it. Who has it? Is it classified? We may have it for the record, but may I ask you to briefly describe your training and background for us now? I hope it is no secret.
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ Well, I was told if I was asked this to say that. I was told that by your staff people, but I have no objection to telling you. I am a resident from Pennsylvania, southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. I went to Penn State, and I am in nutrition.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ In what?
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ Nutrition.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Were you in charge of a section or segment of the CIA in your past capacity?
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ During the time I was with that organization, I was in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it; yes.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ What was the function or purpose of that section that you headed?
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ To provide support for the other parts of the division.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Where in the chain of command would that put you in relation to Dr. Gottlieb?
_Dr. GOLDMAN._ Pretty far down the line.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Mr. Gittinger, I would just like to ask you a few questions. We appreciate your frankness and candor with the committee, and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not quite clear on two matters that were raised earlier. First, were the safe houses we were talking about here used on occasion by the prostitutes you referred to?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ I really have not the slightest idea.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Were the prostitutes used in any way to slip the customers drugs for observation purposes?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Not to my direct knowledge.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Would you have been in a position to know the answer to either of these questions?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ May I say, probably not, and may I make an aside to explain a little bit of this, please, sir?
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Mr. Gittinger, a moment ago you mentioned brainwashing techniques, as one area that you had, I guess, done some work in. How would you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? Who has the most expertise in this field, and who is or is not doing it in terms of other governments?
During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about brainwashing techniques being used by the North Koreans, and I am interested in finding out what the state of the art is today, as you see it.
_Mr. GITTINGER._ Well, of course, there has been a great deal of work on this, and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that as far as I knew, by 1961, 1962, it was at least proven to my satisfaction that brainwashing, so called, is some kind of an esoteric device where drugs or mind-altering kinds of conditions and so forth were used, did not exist even though "The Manchurian Candidate" as a movie really set us back a long time, because it made something impossible look plausible. Do you follow what I mean ? But by 1962 and 1963, the general idea that we were able to come up with is that brainwashing was largely a process of isolating a human being, keeping him out of contact, putting him under long stress in relationship to interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any change that way without having to resort to any kind of esoteric means.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ Are there ways that we can ascertain this from a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in a photograph, or at a press conference? In other words, are there certain signs that you have learned to recognize from your technical background, to tell when brainwashing has occurred? Or is that very difficult to do?
_Mr. GITTINGER._ It is difficult to do. I think it is posible now in terms of looking at a picture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for a long period of time. We can get some pretty good ideas of what kind of circumstances he has been under, if that is what you mean.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
_Senator INOUYE._ Thank you very much.
Before adjourning the hearings, I would like to have the record show that Dr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.
Gentlemen, I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy one and possibly a painful one. Therefore, we thank you very much for participating this morning. We also realize that the circumstances of that time differed very much from this day, and possibly the national attitude, the national political attitude condoned this type of activity. So, we have not asked you to come here as persons who have committed crimes, but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we
thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working with you further in this case.
Thank you very much.
_Senator KENNEDY._ Mr. Chairman, I would like also to thank the witnesses. These are difficult matters, and I think all of us are very grateful.
_Senator SCHWEIKER._ I think the witnesses should know that though it may not always seem that way, what we are trying to do is to probe the past and look at the policies of the past to affect the future. I think our emphasis really is on the future, not the past, but it is important that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation for the future, I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us voluntarily this morning, including Admiral Turner respect the fact that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it should be looked at in that light.
_Senator KENNEDY._ I think that is the spirit in which we have had these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and others, Gottlieb knows the information and can best respond, and we are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get Mr. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to cooperating with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in getting the final chapter written on this, but we want to thank you very much for your appearance here.
_Senator INOUYE._ The hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the -hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]
(p. 65)
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