*************************************************************** * * * * * Phreaks * * * * Long Distance Phone Thieves * * * * OR * * * * The Phreaker's Handbook * * * *************************************************************** MCI MCI is the Queen Mother of the long distance companys. There are only a handful of companys that are "networked". This means they've built their system to a point where travelers (or phreaks can call into a local phone number and be in the "network" even if they're three thousand miles from home. The exception is when you're in an area that isn't serviced. Most LD services utilize 800 numbers so that you can connect even if you're out in the boonies. Here we have two different code formats, one for the so called "executive" user, primarily business , the other for the average person. Executive class entails using the 950-1022 dialup. To make a call you need to enter no less than thirty two digits. You dial zero plus the area code and phone number that you want, then the area code and phone number with a four digit "security code" at the end. It'll look like this, 9501022 (the dialup) 02125551212 (zero plus the area code and phone number ) then 7045551212xxxx (your area code,phone number and security code). Many years ago I saw a piece of graffiti on the bathroom wall of the Cotton Bowl. It went like this, "I've shit in England - I've shit in France - But before I shit here again - I'll shit in my pants." I feel the same way about this format. As a businessman, I wouldn't waste my time trying to dial all this garbage. A real pain in the ass. Hackers, don't find the format that tough. With the exception of the user's telephone number and code the rest are known quantities. You're left with fourteen numbers to hack out. This can be reduced even further. MCI's 950 codes are good anywhere in the country. Experienced phreaks pick an area that is known to have an extremely high population density. New York City is a case in points, area code 212. The number of digits has just been reduced to eleven. The phreak will choose a prefix that is occupied predominantly by business and cut the number down to eight digits, which is one less than Sprint's code. I've seen 425,943,344,964,269,422,820,227,635,747,486,668,686,233,248,532, 732,306,938,255,925,678,and 564 posted on hacker boards. It seems that Wall Street is a juicy target. The interesting thing about hacking MCI's 950 numbers is that the phreak also gets the number �j܌of the person who's going to be getting the bill. It's not unusual for the hacker to call the victim on some pretense just to find out who it is. If it's a large company who might not notice a few additional phone calls, he'll use the code sparingly so as not to attract attention. The end result will be years of free long distance. MCI's second format is pretty standard. A local dialup and a five digit code followed by the area code and number you wish to speak with. They've recently instituted a new "security measure". One phreak hacked out eight codes in about an hour. He let them sit a day before he got around to using one of them, some phreaks let them sit as long as a month. In that twenty four hour period all but one of them went bad. It isn't unusual to see codes go bad. A few of them fall by the wayside due to natural attrition, people not paying their bills or cancelling service. To see seven fall with one blow is mathematically improbable. It means they've been reprogramming the computers to scan the dialups and check for activity. If a node has an activity average of fifty calls an hour and the hacker pumps the actual amount over that average, it'll trigger a feature in the programming that'll generate an activity report for a system operator to read. Furthermore, the computer will list all the phone numbers called and the codes that connected them to the system. If the phone numbers are identical it can safely be assumed they're being telephucked. The report will also show a time lag of about fifteen seconds between calls. Isn't technology wonderful? The hacker's solution to their solution is obvious. Don't keep dialing the same phone number over and over. The first generation of hacker programs did (and still do) use a one number destination. Consequently, they've set a pattern that, after four or five years, the phone companies have finally noticed. It takes about twenty minutes of reprogramming to beat it. Hacks have now started using large files dialups similar to the one in the appendix. It's not too difficult to blitz the call counter feature either. MCI doesn't publish their dialup numbers except to their customers and then they only give them one at a time. Their ratio seems to be figured at around one dialup for two hundred thousand of population. To find other dialups all one needs to do is scan the prefix surrounding a known node. Hacks are now rewriting their software to spread their hacks out over a wider area. Fifty to one hundred hacks on one node and then they move to another. The five digit code hacked on a local dialup is good only on that node. A New York code won't be good in Cleveland. It took MCI several years and a ton of money in losses and programming time to come up with this little security wonder. It'll take a fifteen year old phreak twenty minutes of reprogramming at a cost of zero bucks to bust it. Kinda makes you wonder doesn't it? What of the one code that was still good? The hacker didn't touch it. He realized the system had detected him. It wouldn't be hard recognize his pattern of calling. He knew the good code might be �j܌"trapped". Any activity on it would have been traced (illegally). If he stayed on the code long enough for the security department to process the necessary paperwork he would undoubtedly be busted. He decided that it was wiser to protect himself and those that he called by not using it. He noted the number just in case he should hack it out again at a later date. Some psychologists say that names can affect the development of a child. I knew two kids when I was in school who's names are etched in my memory forever, Jock Strap and Harry Balls. Their parents should have been shot. The president of MCI is Orville Wright. Orville has his work cut out for him. GTE SPRINT Sprint is owned by General Telephone. If you've ever lived in a GTE area you can attest to the absolute crapola you've received as service. Sprint has advertised good connections and rightly so. Their international access is equal to AT&T. Like MCI and all the other LD services, they don't go everywhere. They've concentrated building their network in the metropolitan areas where the money is so you country bumpkins are going to have to wait a little longer. I recently spoke with Sprint's security department. They have a service oriented philosophy. They don't want any restrictions on data line users. A study indicated a respectable percentage of Sprint customers were computer operators. Sprint maintains a considerable number of dialup ports. I estimate the ratio is one port for each forty thousand of population. As of this writing, Sprint has not completed it's national 950-0777 setup. Consequently, she still has a large number of local dialups in the system. Scanning to either side of a local non 950 dialup will yield a wealth of unpublished nodes. Sprint's code format runs 9 digits in length and also uses prefix qualifiers . In this case a three digit coding identifies the physical area of the country the code has been assigned to. The next 4 digits are presumably it's record place within their computer system. Therefore, xxxXXXXxx would translate to a three digit prefix, followed by a four digit record number, with the remaining two digits being what used to be a travel code. Hackers report success rates of one per 300 hacks using the random number approach, a bit on the shabby side. Success ratios on MCI are around seven percent, or seven per hundred hacks,actually pretty good. On Metro three to four percent is about right. Essentially, Sprint is spreading their valid accounts out over a wider area, keeping the density low, thus making them harder to find. The hacker can increase his return ratios by using the prefix and suffix technique. His first time on the system he'll use a random hack, searching for a nine digit code. Then use the first three digits of the code as a prefix, and the last to digits as a suffix. All he needs then to hack is the four digits in between. The return rate is currently one per �j܌two hundred hacks using this approach, a 33% increase in efficiency. Sprint has achieved a reputation for vigorously prosecuting phreaks. Yet, they are as limited as all the other companies. They rely mainly on fear. Occasionally, they'll snare some kid who overstayed his welcome. They make a big deal giving the impression they're busting thousands a day. This just isn't so. Phreaks only get caught when they get stupid or lazy. You can't blame Sprint for capitalizing on some phreak's lack of brains. Conversely, you can't blame the phreak for cashing in on Sprint's lack of smarts. As an update, Sprints 950 dialups require 9 digits. Local nodes used to come in at 7 and 8 digits. As the local dialups disappear the 9 will become the norm. Sprint still has no specialized security systems. The rumors of profound phreak snaring abilities are basically untrue. They win a few and lose a few, although it appears they lose more than they win. Allnet Communications Allnet is a run of the mill telecom company. They utilize the standard 6 digit format and can be found at 950-1044. They appear to have developed or purchased software for analyzing their data much the same way Mci has. Furthermore, they seem to have established a customer profile with which to compare current hacking activities against the record of past calling habits. A hacked code will remain valid for three days. It seems to take that long to run the programming. Additionally, a code that connects for only a few seconds will be invalidated within 24 hours. The obvious solution is stay connected for several minutes. It works. On the user profile strategy, there is no means of defeating it except to rape the hell out of the code from the minute one lays hands on it. Those that adhere to the I C's Rules of Phreaking wouldn't care since they don't stay on a code more than three days any way. Itt is Internation Telephone and Telegraph and operates out of Seacacus New Jersy. They've been the the telcomunications business for many years and have specialized in telix type services. Itt's connections aren't particularly terrific for data transmissions. Phreaks have complained of excessive line loss over relatively short distances. The company's strong point is and will continue to be their telix activities. The code format for this service is different. In an obvious attempt to deter phreaking, they've departed from the usual node, �j܌code, number arrangement. Instead they utilize a reverse arrangement, node, area code and number, then the code. From a practical point of view there is little difference. From an operational viewpoint the phreak must chain together his dialing sting instead of using just one. I others words, instead of punching one macro to output his call, two are required. The coding uses a prefix and suffix as area qualifiers. The first two digits of the code refer to the area of the country the code has been assigned. Consequently, most phreaks prefer to use the prefix in their hack attempts. The object is, of course, to improve effieciency. Itt has no special security considerations as far as traces and traps go. They have instead emphasized getting the phreak disconnected as quickly as possible. Most Itt's will go bad in three days (See Chapter on Updates). Hense it is impossible for a phreak to be on the system long enough to require concern about traps and traces. Itt is expanding it's overseas network and is offering services to Singapore as well as the regular European countries. ITT LOCAL DIALUPS 201-463-0900 305-545-8895 513-228-6506 717-234-0718 201-589-6343 305-764-4522 513-651-1823 717-299-4796 202-565-4110 312-364-6020 515-284-5040 717-347-9135 203-324-1172 312-922-1013 518-462-2068 717-825-2761 203-333-2722 313-662-2041 602-257-8200 803-233-1351 203-527-7389 313-964-2843 608-258-8900 803-256-3060 203-787-0170 314-656-0800 609-338-0340 803-573-7639 203-794-1085 315-471-2900 609-989-1631 803-577-6728 203-866-8411 316-267-1088 612-375-0690 804-355-1433 209-445-9300 317-637-5223 614-224-0024 804-380-9038 212-248-0151 401-273-8263 615-327-2511 804-627-3596 214-651-0609 404-525-0714 615-521-7600 805-395-0123 215-376-4864 405-525-7731 615-697-7000 813-223-5380 215-433-2166 408-280-1301 616-458-2472 817-338-4749 215-563-3256 412-261-4930 617-357-5562 904-358-8522 216-375-9040 414-933-5680 702-323-7191 913-371-1300 216-621-0490 415-495-2816 704-375-4311 916-448-6606 219-237-1700 415-858-2750 713-862-5067 918-585-5001 302-654-2809 502-589-9360 714-973-8032 919-378-9489 303-861-4411 504-566-8300 716-325-1180 919-725-3532 305-425-7791 512-474-4397 716-845-5150 919-832-9438 �`� Listing of Cities Serviced by ITT Allentown Anaheim Annapolis Athens Atlanta Baltimore Boston Brooklyn Cambridge Camden Charlotte Chicago Compton Dallas El Monte Elk Grove Fort Worth Fort Lauderdale Gainesville Galveston Garden City Gardena Gary Glendale Greensboro Greensville Hackensack Houston Inglewood Jacksonville Joliet Kankakee La Plata Long Beach Los Angeles Lynchburg Miami Morristown New Brunswick New York Newark Newport News Norfolk Norristown Northbrook Oak Brook Oakland Orlando Palo Alto Philadelphia Reading Richmond Rochester Rome Rosenberg Sacramento San Jose Santa Monica Santa Ana Scranton Sherman Oaks Spartanburg St. Petersburg Tampa Thousand Oaks Trenton Van Nuys Washington West Palm Beach White Plains Wilkes-Barre Wilmington Winston-Salem Western Union Metrophone Metro was everyone's whore. Metro never said no. Any too bit phreak could bang a metro code. The system was of interest to business primarily due to there method of billing breakdowns. Metro has been raped to the tune of tens of millions in phreak related losses. Metro is currently, for phreaking purposes, offline. It's unknown whether she has changed her code format or has simply closed shop. Her previous code format was a standard 6 digit affair. The equipment used was old and had very poor line quality. This was apparent in 1200 baud data communications but would not necessarily have been noticed on voice transmissions. The listing for her networked dialups is included below. 201-427-1100 201-487-3155 201-531-7900 201-643-2227 201-825-8852 201-828-8660 202-737-2051 �j܌ 203-222-1148 203-323-1468 203-522-0003 203-748-0770 206-382-0910 212-732-7430 212-950-0220 213-202-6117 213-404-4100 213-618-0231 213-624-8884 213-629-1026 214-595-4282 214-742-4500 215-351-0100 215-770-8940 216-374-1001 216-861-5163 219-237-4805 219-420-0011 219-882-8901 301-659-7700 302-429-9439 303-623-5356 305-326-3300 305-462-3530 312-356-4480 312-396-2550 312-450-5875 312-480-8901 312-496-2431 312-578-3900 312-679-8120 312-844-6981 312-853-4700 312-888-5580 312-891-8083 312-981-8870 312-986-0566 313-963-4847 313-996-8900 314-342-1130 315-474-3911 317-635-6284 401-272-0356 402-422-1120 404-223-1000 405-232-9011 408-947-7606 409-833-9331 412-261-5720 414-277-1805 414-633-3636 �j܌415-499-8086 415-579-6001 415-676-1062 415-724-3170 415-794-4800 415-833-9200 415-836-6900 415-852-0900 415-956-0162 419-243-1046 502-561-0900 504-566-8500 512-224-9600 512-474-6057 513-228-1576 513-241-1747 516-933-9700 516-950-0220 518-436-6200 602-254-2930 602-323-0502 606-231-8961 608-251-9596 609-338-0100 609-641-0004 609-989-1900 612-370-9000 614-224-0577 616-242-9580 617-950-1020 618-235-8870 619-233-0327 702-329-1025 707-584-4931 713-224-9417 714-527-7055 714-591-9351 714-594-9311 714-877-6641 714-972-9515 716-852-9200 716-950-1020 717-238-4731 717-348-4300 717-846-6304 718-950-0220 804-225-1920 804-623-9004 805-968-0700 806-379-8271 806-762-0004 815-966-2401 816-471-1999 �j܌817-322-1422 817-338-1639 817-565-9202 817-757-2002 818-350-1028 818-954-8699 818-992-8282 913-621-3186 914-684-0268 915-532-0025 915-561-5481 915-658-2943 915-676-0078 916-443-6921 918-587-6770 Thrifty Telephone Exchange TTE is an example of a mom and pop telephone company. It services a very small area and utilizes 800 as its sole source of out of the area access for its customers. The 800's are also more expensive for the customer. TTE offers two dialups in the 818 area, 902-0950 and 908-0951. These are located in Van Nuys, California, a part of the City of Los Angeles. She utilizes the standard 6 digit format. TTE is a good example of a company hackers just won't mess with. Not because of any great security measure or because of some ultra sophisticated phreak catching ability, but simply for the reason they don't have enough customers (valid codes) to make the effort worthwhile. TTE has a rough road to hoe. It seems too small to be of interest for a larger company to gobble up and is unable to compete on the grander scales of Mci or Sprint. She's bound to belly up sooner or later. This situation is not unique in the industry. Access Communications Access is a company in the genre of TTE with the major exception it appears to have the benefit of more capitalization. There operate out of the 801 area and offer a local dialup at 801-359- 3900 as well as national access at 800-548-0003. The code length is identical to ITT, 7 digits. The prefix may safely assume the use of prefix qualifiers. Access' format is standard with one minor exception. Node + code + 1 + area code and destination number. Like ITT's reverse format, the minor deviation from the norm is bound to save the telco money. The problem all these companies have is they must make the format easy enough for an idiot to operate and the MUST �j܌make the dialups and formats public knowledge. In doing both they make their systems vulnerable. U.S. Telecom U.S. Telecom was known as the "Metro" of the 950's. Codes were easily hacked and density varyed in direct proportion to the population of the area serviced. The Director of "Code Abuse" is a fellow named "Frank Porko". It seems one of the prerequisites of being in telecommunications is you have an odd name. Frank was recently promoted to this exaulted position. U.S. Tel isn't making money, so the company has been swallowed up by a bigger fish, Sprint. Frank didn't strike me as overly bright on the subject of phreaking. The company has tried the "Carrier Blast" only to find it worked for a couple of days and the phreaks by passed it. It can still be found at the end of the dialing sequence for their 950. Their latest security gizzy is to limit a caller to four tries before it routes him to a dummy line. Sound familiar? Sprint does it with two tries and it doesn't work for them either. Ironically, phreaks in the military are hurting USTel much worse than the civilian poplulation. It appears government computers are being put to uses other than those intended. U.S. Tel's 950-1033 dialup is already famous among phreaks. They've placed qualifiers on the codes, even so the return rate runs around five per hundred hacks. Five percent - not bad. The node uses the standard six digit format. I spoke with one of their chief programmers who was trying to hack out codes. He complained the only code he could find was his own. This explains why the company's response time is so pathetic. Phreaks and computer engineers thinking at different levels. This supports the old saying of "Set a Theif to Catch a Thief". U.S. Tel sports two 800 numbers, 800-345-0008 and 800-245-0033. These babies are infamous. The 345 number used to have codes packed like sardines, every tenth (fifteenth at the most) number was a good code. How could you lose? After several years of getting their asses kicked they finally changed the format and wised up a bit and went to a 14 digit code, ie. AT&T format. The format is constructed of two sets of three digits followed by two sets of four digits, XXX-XXX-XXXX-XXXX. We can assume the first sets of three are area qualifiers, actually area codes. USTel doesn't use the actual area code as do AT&T and MCI. Area codes 818 and 714 return as 527 and 662 respectively. Additionally, the three digit prefix and suffix are also bastardized. Hackers have deduced this is the product of a mathematical formula indexed from the users area code and phone number. The four digit "security code" is obtained by the same formula. A group of hackers who call themselves the IC (Inner Core) are working on cracking this coding. There are fifty of them. This translates to fifty intellegent people, fifty computers all dedicated to breaking the MCI/Ustel code. It would seem it is only a matter of time before they succeed. It's their belief they will also reap the AT&T formula in the bargain. This stems primarily from �j܌the fact MCI "borrowed" AT&T's format. �� Hackers love a challenge and will rise to one almost at the dropping of a pin. Code cracking is what they love best. I have no doubt that the IC will succeed. Update The 14 digit format is being used for new accounts. Older customers still have their 6 digit codes. US Tel has never had terrific connections and under Sprint this has not improved. Two digit prefix qualifers are used. The calling areas are very small. Sprint is still the best bet for away from home phreaking. SBS SKYLINE Each long distance company tries to promote itself in different ways. Skyline's approach is two fold, first price (so what's new), and secondly the fact they use satellites to get their calls to their destinations. This isn't terribly impressive. Never the less, they obviously feel enough people will be impressed it's worth mentioning. Point in fact, most of the LD's use satellites. It would be impractical, not to mention expensive, to use AT&T's network for 100% of their traffic. Skyline has a well established dialup at 950-1088. Her format is the standard 6 digits. Hacks report it is a fairly easy system. It appears she has divided the country in areas which are rather large geographically. A code that originates in one area will be workable two to three hundred miles from its point of origin. The six digit code will also work on her 800-446-4462 dialup. There are reports she also uses a seven digit format collateral to the six. Skyline has a reputation for vigorously calling the destination numbers after more than ten calls have been placed. This is the most they can realistically do. One must assume they will score a certain percentage of people who are willing to give them information about the origin of the calls. Yet, as far as experienced hacks and phreaks go, you can be equally sure the trail will stop there and the possibility of back tracking is nil, if not impossible. This problem is not unique to Skyline. She appears to be your run of the mill long distance carrier without much to make it especially noteworthy. Like all other services, she isn't making money and is playing the merger game. I predict by 1988 you will have three majors in the business, AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. The rest are fish bait waiting to be gobbled up by the larger fish. See Updates for further information. �j܌ Alliance Teleconferencing Alliance is a service of At&t. It provides people, usually business with what is essentially a party line; several people can join in the same conversation at the same time. It's an outstanding tool for business. The phreak approaches Alliance essentially from the same perspective, except that phreakery is the business. As a service of At&t, Alliance is approached indirectly through a PBX or a diverter. The origination phone number of all calls place to Alliance is supplied by the ANI - Automatic Number Identifier. Placing the call through a PBX insures the ANI, and the people receiving the bill, will be someone other than the phreak. AT&T offers two basic conference services, Alliance 1000 and Alliance 2000. The former is your basic voice communication and the later has special graphic abilities. The service operates in all fifty states, Mexico, Canada, Puerto Rico, Bermuda and the Virgin Islands. To make a conference call the phreak will need to have the phone numbers of all the parties. Since this is not always desireable, the controller can route the call through a number of loops, thus insuring the location of the phreak remains unknown (See Loops). The controller will then call 0+700+456-1000 for an audio conference. He'll then dial in the phone numbers as you would any At&t call. When the party answers, he'll tell him to hold on while he connects the rest of the group. He'll hit the # button to continue adding people or the * to cancel his input. He can resume adding callers at any time by hitting the # button. Ending a conference is easy, everyone hangs up. A national conference was held after the 415 bust to discuss added security measures to counteract the sting techniques used by the Fremont Police Department. Elite phreaks from coast to coast were dialed in. The phreaks saw the need for immediate discussion to plan their future actions and to discuss the details of the bust. One of the parties to the conference had actually seen the hacker known as Trask as he was being arrested. Trask's down fall held vital concern to many on that conference as he held many personal phone numbers and names in his data base. The police did not obtain that information nor did Trask make a deal with them. Needless to say he was prosecuted. Other hackers involved in the 415 bust did make bargains with law enforcement which resulted in wide spread arrests. The Fremont Sting has successfully been used in Texas and there is every indication it will be used elsewhere. �j܌ Alliance provided the means for these hacks to meet and discuss their vital concerns. Some company with a PBX was billed for the calls. It would be accurate to say that while the 415 conference was called under "emergency" conditions, most conferences are little more than bullshit sessions. Some pranksters like to play games like dialing six or seven operators and listening to the say, "Operator", "Operator", "No I'm the operator can I help you?". This can go on for five or six minutes before they realize they've been cross connected. Others like to call their favorite software company and taunt them as to how they've cracked their latest security measures. These applications are rather juvenile. At&t Security is a feared aspect of the phreak's existence. With the exception of the PBX and the Diverter, Ma Bell holds all the cards. Tracing is a snap. Even so, At&t doesn't appear to be a mean mother in the tracking down of her Alliance phreaks. The company with the PBX is going to be stuck with the bill and it appears the phone company has little incentive to follow the scent. Phreaks of fifteen to twenty years pass used to place calls and have them billed to phone booths. ESS has made that game obsolete. However, Ma Bell didn't sit still for the theft. They dropped the billing on the party who received the call. If then didn't pay, they lost their phone service. The obvious option was to give them the name and location of the person that really was responsible for the call. There are no reports that this collection device is still being used. From the phreak's vantage point, Alliance is pretty safe. Another old method of phreaking from payphones, and purported to have dome from Abby Hoffman, was to place a call from a payphone and to reverse the handset of an adjacent payphone to signal the operator that money was being dropped. As the phreak dropped the coins into the phone he wasn't placing the call from, the clinks and cur-chunks would signal her the correct amount had been deposited. This was corrected by simply making the telephone cords shorter. Cur-chunks are out and tones are in. So the technique now has a new twist called the Red Box. the box is a simple, handheld, battery operated tone generator that duplicates the tones used to signal the operator the money has actually been placed into the payphone. Utilizing 1700 hz and 2200 hz (Duel Multi Frequency Tones), the box signals that a nickel has been dropped by pulsing the frequencies at 66ms one time. A dime is recognized by 66ms on once, off once, and on again. This produces two "beeps". The quarter is shown at 33 ms off and on five times. The newest phone technology also brinks greater phreaking opportunities. The Cordless telephone is one example. These units�j� use two frequencies, one to send and the other to receive. the FCC restricts the number of frequencies available so that a trial and error approach in hacking is feasible. Most people don't realize a cordless signal can carry for miles enabling others to hear every word of their conversations. A properly equipped techno-phreak can zero in on the signal, locate the source, and screw around until he find the correct "in" level. The result is a Godzilla of a phone bill for the unsuspecting owner of the cordless phone. Most phreaks wouldn't go to this kind of trouble. Your technoelectrical wiz kids will. Ess, while being the scourge of phreakdom, has also enabled him some benefits. The payphone games and 950 phreaking are just two examples. ESS has, however, completely obliterated the use of the infamous Blue Box. Phone company computers are programmed to be sensitive to the 2600 hz tone needed to seize a trunk line. And 818 system operator (an adult) boxed one call on ESS. He was detected and traced but not arrested. The second time he box, he had a knock on the door and was arrested by the local police who had been accompanied by telco security. It's estimated by the mid 1990's the entire country will be on ESS. Today, only the major metropolitan areas utilize the service. Crossbar is still the norm for the boonies. Ess is a technological marvel, a logical step in the ever evolving future of the phone industry. Yet, it has some very scary aspects. The ability for abuse is tremendous. In the movies you see the cop saying "We didn't have enough time for the trace." Not any longer. Traces, wire taps and much more can be programmed to be automatic. An operator at a console can push a few buttons and Zap, no civil rights. I knew a woman who's brother was a highly placed official in Pac Tel. Her boyfriend had broken up with her and she was livid. The boyfriend's communications were traced and tapped as a "courtesy" by the brother. There is a history of past abuse which spawned the few laws designed to protect the consumer. However, just as there are laws against wire fraud, there are plenty of phreaks breaking those laws. The phreak can hide behind the technology of the computer and use it to break the law. So can your phone company. Murphy's law is applicable here, if it can happen it will. Government has a philosophy of regulating and controlling the hell out of small and medium sized business. Large politically powerful corporations are afforded the convenience of policing themselves. A classic case of the fox watching the hen house. If the public were even remotely aware of the capabilities of ESS the uproar would shatter Washington. Phone services have been taken for granted. The combination of ESS and the Data Services who sell their information over the network makes it impossible for anyone to have true privacy. TRW is a prime target of the hacking community. Hacks abuse that data service and others for their own informational needs. It logically follows that any �j܌ agency with the inclination could use those services to create non existent people or to kill the electronic lives of real ones. The computer gives spying an entirely new dimension. Believe it, Big Brother really is Watching! with the bill and it appears the phone company has little incentive to follow the scent.