Updated by:
Obsoleted by:
Keywords: [--------], NAT, TURN, STUN, ICE
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Mahy
Request for Comments: 5766 Unaffiliated
Category: Standards Track P. Matthews
ISSN: 2070-1721 Alcatel-Lucent
J. Rosenberg
jdrosen.net
April 2010
Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN):
Relay Extensions to Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
Abstract
If a host is located behind a NAT, then in certain situations it can
be impossible for that host to communicate directly with other hosts
(peers). In these situations, it is necessary for the host to use
the services of an intermediate node that acts as a communication
relay. This specification defines a protocol, called TURN (Traversal
Using Relays around NAT), that allows the host to control the
operation of the relay and to exchange packets with its peers using
the relay. TURN differs from some other relay control protocols in
that it allows a client to communicate with multiple peers using a
single relay address.
The TURN protocol was designed to be used as part of the ICE
(Interactive Connectivity Establishment) approach to NAT traversal,
though it also can be used without ICE.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5766.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Overview of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Send Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5. Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6. Unprivileged TURN Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7. Avoiding IP Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8. RTP Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.9. Anycast Discovery of Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. General Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Creating an Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1. Sending an Allocate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.2. Receiving an Allocate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.3. Receiving an Allocate Success Response . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.4. Receiving an Allocate Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Refreshing an Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. Sending a Refresh Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2. Receiving a Refresh Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.3. Receiving a Refresh Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9. CreatePermission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.1. Forming a CreatePermission Request . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.2. Receiving a CreatePermission Request . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.3. Receiving a CreatePermission Response . . . . . . . . . . 35
10. Send and Data Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
10.1. Forming a Send Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
10.2. Receiving a Send Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
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10.3. Receiving a UDP Datagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10.4. Receiving a Data Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
11. Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
11.1. Sending a ChannelBind Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11.2. Receiving a ChannelBind Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11.3. Receiving a ChannelBind Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11.4. The ChannelData Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
11.5. Sending a ChannelData Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
11.6. Receiving a ChannelData Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11.7. Relaying Data from the Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
12. IP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
13. New STUN Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
14. New STUN Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
14.1. CHANNEL-NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
14.2. LIFETIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14.3. XOR-PEER-ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14.4. DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14.5. XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14.6. EVEN-PORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14.7. REQUESTED-TRANSPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
14.8. DONT-FRAGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
14.9. RESERVATION-TOKEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
15. New STUN Error Response Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
16. Detailed Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
17. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
17.1. Outsider Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
17.1.1. Obtaining Unauthorized Allocations . . . . . . . . . 55
17.1.2. Offline Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
17.1.3. Faked Refreshes and Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . 56
17.1.4. Fake Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
17.1.5. Impersonating a Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
17.1.6. Eavesdropping Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
17.1.7. TURN Loop Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
17.2. Firewall Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
17.2.1. Faked Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
17.2.2. Blacklisted IP Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
17.2.3. Running Servers on Well-Known Ports . . . . . . . . . 60
17.3. Insider Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
17.3.1. DoS against TURN Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
17.3.2. Anonymous Relaying of Malicious Traffic . . . . . . . 61
17.3.3. Manipulating Other Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . 61
17.4. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
18. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
19. IAB Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
20. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
21. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
21.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
21.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
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1. Introduction
A host behind a NAT may wish to exchange packets with other hosts,
some of which may also be behind NATs. To do this, the hosts
involved can use "hole punching" techniques (see [RFC5128]) in an
attempt discover a direct communication path; that is, a
communication path that goes from one host to another through
intervening NATs and routers, but does not traverse any relays.
As described in [RFC5128] and [RFC4787], hole punching techniques
will fail if both hosts are behind NATs that are not well behaved.
For example, if both hosts are behind NATs that have a mapping
behavior of "address-dependent mapping" or "address- and port-
dependent mapping", then hole punching techniques generally fail.
When a direct communication path cannot be found, it is necessary to
use the services of an intermediate host that acts as a relay for the
packets. This relay typically sits in the public Internet and relays
packets between two hosts that both sit behind NATs.
This specification defines a protocol, called TURN, that allows a
host behind a NAT (called the TURN client) to request that another
host (called the TURN server) act as a relay. The client can arrange
for the server to relay packets to and from certain other hosts
(called peers) and can control aspects of how the relaying is done.
The client does this by obtaining an IP address and port on the
server, called the relayed transport address. When a peer sends a
packet to the relayed transport address, the server relays the packet
to the client. When the client sends a data packet to the server,
the server relays it to the appropriate peer using the relayed
transport address as the source.
A client using TURN must have some way to communicate the relayed
transport address to its peers, and to learn each peer's IP address
and port (more precisely, each peer's server-reflexive transport
address, see Section 2). How this is done is out of the scope of the
TURN protocol. One way this might be done is for the client and
peers to exchange email messages. Another way is for the client and
its peers to use a special-purpose "introduction" or "rendezvous"
protocol (see [RFC5128] for more details).
If TURN is used with ICE [RFC5245], then the relayed transport
address and the IP addresses and ports of the peers are included in
the ICE candidate information that the rendezvous protocol must
carry. For example, if TURN and ICE are used as part of a multimedia
solution using SIP [RFC3261], then SIP serves the role of the
rendezvous protocol, carrying the ICE candidate information inside
the body of SIP messages. If TURN and ICE are used with some other
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
rendezvous protocol, then [MMUSIC-ICE-NONSIP] provides guidance on
the services the rendezvous protocol must perform.
Though the use of a TURN server to enable communication between two
hosts behind NATs is very likely to work, it comes at a high cost to
the provider of the TURN server, since the server typically needs a
high-bandwidth connection to the Internet. As a consequence, it is
best to use a TURN server only when a direct communication path
cannot be found. When the client and a peer use ICE to determine the
communication path, ICE will use hole punching techniques to search
for a direct path first and only use a TURN server when a direct path
cannot be found.
TURN was originally invented to support multimedia sessions signaled
using SIP. Since SIP supports forking, TURN supports multiple peers
per relayed transport address; a feature not supported by other
approaches (e.g., SOCKS [RFC1928]). However, care has been taken to
make sure that TURN is suitable for other types of applications.
TURN was designed as one piece in the larger ICE approach to NAT
traversal. Implementors of TURN are urged to investigate ICE and
seriously consider using it for their application. However, it is
possible to use TURN without ICE.
TURN is an extension to the STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for
NAT) protocol [RFC5389]. Most, though not all, TURN messages are
STUN-formatted messages. A reader of this document should be
familiar with STUN.
2. Overview of Operation
This section gives an overview of the operation of TURN. It is non-
normative.
In a typical configuration, a TURN client is connected to a private
network [RFC1918] and through one or more NATs to the public
Internet. On the public Internet is a TURN server. Elsewhere in the
Internet are one or more peers with which the TURN client wishes to
communicate. These peers may or may not be behind one or more NATs.
The client uses the server as a relay to send packets to these peers
and to receive packets from these peers.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
Peer A
Server-Reflexive +---------+
Transport Address | |
192.0.2.150:32102 | |
| /| |
TURN | / ^| Peer A |
Client's Server | / || |
Host Transport Transport | // || |
Address Address | // |+---------+
10.1.1.2:49721 192.0.2.15:3478 |+-+ // Peer A
| | ||N| / Host Transport
| +-+ | ||A|/ Address
| | | | v|T| 192.168.100.2:49582
| | | | /+-+
+---------+| | | |+---------+ / +---------+
| || |N| || | // | |
| TURN |v | | v| TURN |/ | |
| Client |----|A|----------| Server |------------------| Peer B |
| | | |^ | |^ ^| |
| | |T|| | || || |
+---------+ | || +---------+| |+---------+
| || | |
| || | |
+-+| | |
| | |
| | |
Client's | Peer B
Server-Reflexive Relayed Transport
Transport Address Transport Address Address
192.0.2.1:7000 192.0.2.15:50000 192.0.2.210:49191
Figure 1
Figure 1 shows a typical deployment. In this figure, the TURN client
and the TURN server are separated by a NAT, with the client on the
private side and the server on the public side of the NAT. This NAT
is assumed to be a "bad" NAT; for example, it might have a mapping
property of "address-and-port-dependent mapping" (see [RFC4787]).
The client talks to the server from a (IP address, port) combination
called the client's HOST TRANSPORT ADDRESS. (The combination of an
IP address and port is called a TRANSPORT ADDRESS.)
The client sends TURN messages from its host transport address to a
transport address on the TURN server that is known as the TURN SERVER
TRANSPORT ADDRESS. The client learns the TURN server transport
address through some unspecified means (e.g., configuration), and
this address is typically used by many clients simultaneously.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
Since the client is behind a NAT, the server sees packets from the
client as coming from a transport address on the NAT itself. This
address is known as the client's SERVER-REFLEXIVE transport address;
packets sent by the server to the client's server-reflexive transport
address will be forwarded by the NAT to the client's host transport
address.
The client uses TURN commands to create and manipulate an ALLOCATION
on the server. An allocation is a data structure on the server.
This data structure contains, amongst other things, the RELAYED
TRANSPORT ADDRESS for the allocation. The relayed transport address
is the transport address on the server that peers can use to have the
server relay data to the client. An allocation is uniquely
identified by its relayed transport address.
Once an allocation is created, the client can send application data
to the server along with an indication of to which peer the data is
to be sent, and the server will relay this data to the appropriate
peer. The client sends the application data to the server inside a
TURN message; at the server, the data is extracted from the TURN
message and sent to the peer in a UDP datagram. In the reverse
direction, a peer can send application data in a UDP datagram to the
relayed transport address for the allocation; the server will then
encapsulate this data inside a TURN message and send it to the client
along with an indication of which peer sent the data. Since the TURN
message always contains an indication of which peer the client is
communicating with, the client can use a single allocation to
communicate with multiple peers.
When the peer is behind a NAT, then the client must identify the peer
using its server-reflexive transport address rather than its host
transport address. For example, to send application data to Peer A
in the example above, the client must specify 192.0.2.150:32102 (Peer
A's server-reflexive transport address) rather than 192.168.100.2:
49582 (Peer A's host transport address).
Each allocation on the server belongs to a single client and has
exactly one relayed transport address that is used only by that
allocation. Thus, when a packet arrives at a relayed transport
address on the server, the server knows for which client the data is
intended.
The client may have multiple allocations on a server at the same
time.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
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2.1. Transports
TURN, as defined in this specification, always uses UDP between the
server and the peer. However, this specification allows the use of
any one of UDP, TCP, or Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP to
carry the TURN messages between the client and the server.
+----------------------------+---------------------+
| TURN client to TURN server | TURN server to peer |
+----------------------------+---------------------+
| UDP | UDP |
| TCP | UDP |
| TLS over TCP | UDP |
+----------------------------+---------------------+
If TCP or TLS-over-TCP is used between the client and the server,
then the server will convert between these transports and UDP
transport when relaying data to/from the peer.
Since this version of TURN only supports UDP between the server and
the peer, it is expected that most clients will prefer to use UDP
between the client and the server as well. That being the case, some
readers may wonder: Why also support TCP and TLS-over-TCP?
TURN supports TCP transport between the client and the server because
some firewalls are configured to block UDP entirely. These firewalls
block UDP but not TCP, in part because TCP has properties that make
the intention of the nodes being protected by the firewall more
obvious to the firewall. For example, TCP has a three-way handshake
that makes in clearer that the protected node really wishes to have
that particular connection established, while for UDP the best the
firewall can do is guess which flows are desired by using filtering
rules. Also, TCP has explicit connection teardown; while for UDP,
the firewall has to use timers to guess when the flow is finished.
TURN supports TLS-over-TCP transport between the client and the
server because TLS provides additional security properties not
provided by TURN's default digest authentication; properties that
some clients may wish to take advantage of. In particular, TLS
provides a way for the client to ascertain that it is talking to the
correct server, and provides for confidentiality of TURN control
messages. TURN does not require TLS because the overhead of using
TLS is higher than that of digest authentication; for example, using
TLS likely means that most application data will be doubly encrypted
(once by TLS and once to ensure it is still encrypted in the UDP
datagram).
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
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There is a planned extension to TURN to add support for TCP between
the server and the peers [TURN-TCP]. For this reason, allocations
that use UDP between the server and the peers are known as UDP
allocations, while allocations that use TCP between the server and
the peers are known as TCP allocations. This specification describes
only UDP allocations.
TURN, as defined in this specification, only supports IPv4. All IP
addresses in this specification must be IPv4 addresses. There is a
planned extension to TURN to add support for IPv6 and for relaying
between IPv4 and IPv6 [TURN-IPv6].
In some applications for TURN, the client may send and receive
packets other than TURN packets on the host transport address it uses
to communicate with the server. This can happen, for example, when
using TURN with ICE. In these cases, the client can distinguish TURN
packets from other packets by examining the source address of the
arriving packet: those arriving from the TURN server will be TURN
packets.
2.2. Allocations
To create an allocation on the server, the client uses an Allocate
transaction. The client sends an Allocate request to the server, and
the server replies with an Allocate success response containing the
allocated relayed transport address. The client can include
attributes in the Allocate request that describe the type of
allocation it desires (e.g., the lifetime of the allocation). Since
relaying data has security implications, the server requires that the
client authenticate itself, typically using STUN's long-term
credential mechanism, to show that it is authorized to use the
server.
Once a relayed transport address is allocated, a client must keep the
allocation alive. To do this, the client periodically sends a
Refresh request to the server. TURN deliberately uses a different
method (Refresh rather than Allocate) for refreshes to ensure that
the client is informed if the allocation vanishes for some reason.
The frequency of the Refresh transaction is determined by the
lifetime of the allocation. The default lifetime of an allocation is
10 minutes -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that
refreshing is not typically a burden on the client, while expiring
allocations where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely
manner. However, the client can request a longer lifetime in the
Allocate request and may modify its request in a Refresh request, and
the server always indicates the actual lifetime in the response. The
client must issue a new Refresh transaction within "lifetime" seconds
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
of the previous Allocate or Refresh transaction. Once a client no
longer wishes to use an allocation, it should delete the allocation
using a Refresh request with a requested lifetime of 0.
Both the server and client keep track of a value known as the
5-TUPLE. At the client, the 5-tuple consists of the client's host
transport address, the server transport address, and the transport
protocol used by the client to communicate with the server. At the
server, the 5-tuple value is the same except that the client's host
transport address is replaced by the client's server-reflexive
address, since that is the client's address as seen by the server.
Both the client and the server remember the 5-tuple used in the
Allocate request. Subsequent messages between the client and the
server use the same 5-tuple. In this way, the client and server know
which allocation is being referred to. If the client wishes to
allocate a second relayed transport address, it must create a second
allocation using a different 5-tuple (e.g., by using a different
client host address or port).
NOTE: While the terminology used in this document refers to
5-tuples, the TURN server can store whatever identifier it likes
that yields identical results. Specifically, an implementation
may use a file-descriptor in place of a 5-tuple to represent a TCP
connection.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|-- Allocate request --------------->| | |
| | | |
|<--------------- Allocate failure --| | |
| (401 Unauthorized) | | |
| | | |
|-- Allocate request --------------->| | |
| | | |
|<---------- Allocate success resp --| | |
| (192.0.2.15:50000) | | |
// // // //
| | | |
|-- Refresh request ---------------->| | |
| | | |
|<----------- Refresh success resp --| | |
| | | |
Figure 2
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
In Figure 2, the client sends an Allocate request to the server
without credentials. Since the server requires that all requests be
authenticated using STUN's long-term credential mechanism, the server
rejects the request with a 401 (Unauthorized) error code. The client
then tries again, this time including credentials (not shown). This
time, the server accepts the Allocate request and returns an Allocate
success response containing (amongst other things) the relayed
transport address assigned to the allocation. Sometime later, the
client decides to refresh the allocation and thus sends a Refresh
request to the server. The refresh is accepted and the server
replies with a Refresh success response.
2.3. Permissions
To ease concerns amongst enterprise IT administrators that TURN could
be used to bypass corporate firewall security, TURN includes the
notion of permissions. TURN permissions mimic the address-restricted
filtering mechanism of NATs that comply with [RFC4787].
An allocation can have zero or more permissions. Each permission
consists of an IP address and a lifetime. When the server receives a
UDP datagram on the allocation's relayed transport address, it first
checks the list of permissions. If the source IP address of the
datagram matches a permission, the application data is relayed to the
client, otherwise the UDP datagram is silently discarded.
A permission expires after 5 minutes if it is not refreshed, and
there is no way to explicitly delete a permission. This behavior was
selected to match the behavior of a NAT that complies with [RFC4787].
The client can install or refresh a permission using either a
CreatePermission request or a ChannelBind request. Using the
CreatePermission request, multiple permissions can be installed or
refreshed with a single request -- this is important for applications
that use ICE. For security reasons, permissions can only be
installed or refreshed by transactions that can be authenticated;
thus, Send indications and ChannelData messages (which are used to
send data to peers) do not install or refresh any permissions.
Note that permissions are within the context of an allocation, so
adding or expiring a permission in one allocation does not affect
other allocations.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
2.4. Send Mechanism
There are two mechanisms for the client and peers to exchange
application data using the TURN server. The first mechanism uses the
Send and Data methods, the second way uses channels. Common to both
ways is the ability of the client to communicate with multiple peers
using a single allocated relayed transport address; thus, both ways
include a means for the client to indicate to the server which peer
should receive the data, and for the server to indicate to the client
which peer sent the data.
The Send mechanism uses Send and Data indications. Send indications
are used to send application data from the client to the server,
while Data indications are used to send application data from the
server to the client.
When using the Send mechanism, the client sends a Send indication to
the TURN server containing (a) an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute
specifying the (server-reflexive) transport address of the peer and
(b) a DATA attribute holding the application data. When the TURN
server receives the Send indication, it extracts the application data
from the DATA attribute and sends it in a UDP datagram to the peer,
using the allocated relay address as the source address. Note that
there is no need to specify the relayed transport address, since it
is implied by the 5-tuple used for the Send indication.
In the reverse direction, UDP datagrams arriving at the relayed
transport address on the TURN server are converted into Data
indications and sent to the client, with the server-reflexive
transport address of the peer included in an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute and the data itself in a DATA attribute. Since the relayed
transport address uniquely identified the allocation, the server
knows which client should receive the data.
Send and Data indications cannot be authenticated, since the long-
term credential mechanism of STUN does not support authenticating
indications. This is not as big an issue as it might first appear,
since the client-to-server leg is only half of the total path to the
peer. Applications that want proper security should encrypt the data
sent between the client and a peer.
Because Send indications are not authenticated, it is possible for an
attacker to send bogus Send indications to the server, which will
then relay these to a peer. To partly mitigate this attack, TURN
requires that the client install a permission towards a peer before
sending data to it using a Send indication.
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TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
| | | |
|-- CreatePermission req (Peer A) -->| | |
|<-- CreatePermission success resp --| | |
| | | |
|--- Send ind (Peer A)-------------->| | |
| |=== data ===>| |
| | | |
| |<== data ====| |
|<-------------- Data ind (Peer A) --| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|--- Send ind (Peer B)-------------->| | |
| | dropped | |
| | | |
| |<== data ==================|
| dropped | | |
| | | |
Figure 3
In Figure 3, the client has already created an allocation and now
wishes to send data to its peers. The client first creates a
permission by sending the server a CreatePermission request
specifying Peer A's (server-reflexive) IP address in the XOR-PEER-
ADDRESS attribute; if this was not done, the server would not relay
data between the client and the server. The client then sends data
to Peer A using a Send indication; at the server, the application
data is extracted and forwarded in a UDP datagram to Peer A, using
the relayed transport address as the source transport address. When
a UDP datagram from Peer A is received at the relayed transport
address, the contents are placed into a Data indication and forwarded
to the client. Later, the client attempts to exchange data with Peer
B; however, no permission has been installed for Peer B, so the Send
indication from the client and the UDP datagram from the peer are
both dropped by the server.
2.5. Channels
For some applications (e.g., Voice over IP), the 36 bytes of overhead
that a Send indication or Data indication adds to the application
data can substantially increase the bandwidth required between the
client and the server. To remedy this, TURN offers a second way for
the client and server to associate data with a specific peer.
This second way uses an alternate packet format known as the
ChannelData message. The ChannelData message does not use the STUN
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header used by other TURN messages, but instead has a 4-byte header
that includes a number known as a channel number. Each channel
number in use is bound to a specific peer and thus serves as a
shorthand for the peer's host transport address.
To bind a channel to a peer, the client sends a ChannelBind request
to the server, and includes an unbound channel number and the
transport address of the peer. Once the channel is bound, the client
can use a ChannelData message to send the server data destined for
the peer. Similarly, the server can relay data from that peer
towards the client using a ChannelData message.
Channel bindings last for 10 minutes unless refreshed -- this
lifetime was chosen to be longer than the permission lifetime.
Channel bindings are refreshed by sending another ChannelBind request
rebinding the channel to the peer. Like permissions (but unlike
allocations), there is no way to explicitly delete a channel binding;
the client must simply wait for it to time out.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
| | | |
|-- ChannelBind req ---------------->| | |
| (Peer A to 0x4001) | | |
| | | |
|<---------- ChannelBind succ resp --| | |
| | | |
|-- [0x4001] data ------------------>| | |
| |=== data ===>| |
| | | |
| |<== data ====| |
|<------------------ [0x4001] data --| | |
| | | |
|--- Send ind (Peer A)-------------->| | |
| |=== data ===>| |
| | | |
| |<== data ====| |
|<------------------ [0x4001] data --| | |
| | | |
Figure 4
Figure 4 shows the channel mechanism in use. The client has already
created an allocation and now wishes to bind a channel to Peer A. To
do this, the client sends a ChannelBind request to the server,
specifying the transport address of Peer A and a channel number
(0x4001). After that, the client can send application data
encapsulated inside ChannelData messages to Peer A: this is shown as
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"[0x4001] data" where 0x4001 is the channel number. When the
ChannelData message arrives at the server, the server transfers the
data to a UDP datagram and sends it to Peer A (which is the peer
bound to channel number 0x4001).
In the reverse direction, when Peer A sends a UDP datagram to the
relayed transport address, this UDP datagram arrives at the server on
the relayed transport address assigned to the allocation. Since the
UDP datagram was received from Peer A, which has a channel number
assigned to it, the server encapsulates the data into a ChannelData
message when sending the data to the client.
Once a channel has been bound, the client is free to intermix
ChannelData messages and Send indications. In the figure, the client
later decides to use a Send indication rather than a ChannelData
message to send additional data to Peer A. The client might decide
to do this, for example, so it can use the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute
(see the next section). However, once a channel is bound, the server
will always use a ChannelData message, as shown in the call flow.
Note that ChannelData messages can only be used for peers to which
the client has bound a channel. In the example above, Peer A has
been bound to a channel, but Peer B has not, so application data to
and from Peer B would use the Send mechanism.
2.6. Unprivileged TURN Servers
This version of TURN is designed so that the server can be
implemented as an application that runs in user space under commonly
available operating systems without requiring special privileges.
This design decision was made to make it easy to deploy a TURN
server: for example, to allow a TURN server to be integrated into a
peer-to-peer application so that one peer can offer NAT traversal
services to another peer.
This design decision has the following implications for data relayed
by a TURN server:
o The value of the Diffserv field may not be preserved across the
server;
o The Time to Live (TTL) field may be reset, rather than
decremented, across the server;
o The Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) field may be reset by
the server;
o ICMP messages are not relayed by the server;
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o There is no end-to-end fragmentation, since the packet is re-
assembled at the server.
Future work may specify alternate TURN semantics that address these
limitations.
2.7. Avoiding IP Fragmentation
For reasons described in [Frag-Harmful], applications, especially
those sending large volumes of data, should try hard to avoid having
their packets fragmented. Applications using TCP can more or less
ignore this issue because fragmentation avoidance is now a standard
part of TCP, but applications using UDP (and thus any application
using this version of TURN) must handle fragmentation avoidance
themselves.
The application running on the client and the peer can take one of
two approaches to avoid IP fragmentation.
The first approach is to avoid sending large amounts of application
data in the TURN messages/UDP datagrams exchanged between the client
and the peer. This is the approach taken by most VoIP
(Voice-over-IP) applications. In this approach, the application
exploits the fact that the IP specification [RFC0791] specifies that
IP packets up to 576 bytes should never need to be fragmented.
The exact amount of application data that can be included while
avoiding fragmentation depends on the details of the TURN session
between the client and the server: whether UDP, TCP, or TLS transport
is used, whether ChannelData messages or Send/Data indications are
used, and whether any additional attributes (such as the DONT-
FRAGMENT attribute) are included. Another factor, which is hard to
determine, is whether the MTU is reduced somewhere along the path for
other reasons, such as the use of IP-in-IP tunneling.
As a guideline, sending a maximum of 500 bytes of application data in
a single TURN message (by the client on the client-to-server leg) or
a UDP datagram (by the peer on the peer-to-server leg) will generally
avoid IP fragmentation. To further reduce the chance of
fragmentation, it is recommended that the client use ChannelData
messages when transferring significant volumes of data, since the
overhead of the ChannelData message is less than Send and Data
indications.
The second approach the client and peer can take to avoid
fragmentation is to use a path MTU discovery algorithm to determine
the maximum amount of application data that can be sent without
fragmentation.
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Unfortunately, because servers implementing this version of TURN do
not relay ICMP messages, the classic path MTU discovery algorithm
defined in [RFC1191] is not able to discover the MTU of the
transmission path between the client and the peer. (Even if they did
relay ICMP messages, the algorithm would not always work since ICMP
messages are often filtered out by combined NAT/firewall devices).
So the client and server need to use a path MTU discovery algorithm
that does not require ICMP messages. The Packetized Path MTU
Discovery algorithm defined in [RFC4821] is one such algorithm.
The details of how to use the algorithm of [RFC4821] with TURN are
still under investigation. However, as a step towards this goal,
this version of TURN supports a DONT-FRAGMENT attribute. When the
client includes this attribute in a Send indication, this tells the
server to set the DF bit in the resulting UDP datagram that it sends
to the peer. Since some servers may be unable to set the DF bit, the
client should also include this attribute in the Allocate request --
any server that does not support the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute will
indicate this by rejecting the Allocate request.
2.8. RTP Support
One of the envisioned uses of TURN is as a relay for clients and
peers wishing to exchange real-time data (e.g., voice or video) using
RTP. To facilitate the use of TURN for this purpose, TURN includes
some special support for older versions of RTP.
Old versions of RTP [RFC3550] required that the RTP stream be on an
even port number and the associated RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)
stream, if present, be on the next highest port. To allow clients to
work with peers that still require this, TURN allows the client to
request that the server allocate a relayed transport address with an
even port number, and to optionally request the server reserve the
next-highest port number for a subsequent allocation.
2.9. Anycast Discovery of Servers
This version of TURN has been designed to permit the future
specification of a method of doing anycast discovery of a TURN server
over UDP.
Specifically, a TURN server can reject an Allocate request with the
suggestion that the client try an alternate server. To avoid certain
types of attacks, the client must use the same credentials with the
alternate server as it would have with the initial server.
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3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Readers are expected to be familiar with [RFC5389] and the terms
defined there.
The following terms are used in this document:
TURN: The protocol spoken between a TURN client and a TURN server.
It is an extension to the STUN protocol [RFC5389]. The protocol
allows a client to allocate and use a relayed transport address.
TURN client: A STUN client that implements this specification.
TURN server: A STUN server that implements this specification. It
relays data between a TURN client and its peer(s).
Peer: A host with which the TURN client wishes to communicate. The
TURN server relays traffic between the TURN client and its
peer(s). The peer does not interact with the TURN server using
the protocol defined in this document; rather, the peer receives
data sent by the TURN server and the peer sends data towards the
TURN server.
Transport Address: The combination of an IP address and a port.
Host Transport Address: A transport address on a client or a peer.
Server-Reflexive Transport Address: A transport address on the
"public side" of a NAT. This address is allocated by the NAT to
correspond to a specific host transport address.
Relayed Transport Address: A transport address on the TURN server
that is used for relaying packets between the client and a peer.
A peer sends to this address on the TURN server, and the packet is
then relayed to the client.
TURN Server Transport Address: A transport address on the TURN
server that is used for sending TURN messages to the server. This
is the transport address that the client uses to communicate with
the server.
Peer Transport Address: The transport address of the peer as seen by
the server. When the peer is behind a NAT, this is the peer's
server-reflexive transport address.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
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Allocation: The relayed transport address granted to a client
through an Allocate request, along with related state, such as
permissions and expiration timers.
5-tuple: The combination (client IP address and port, server IP
address and port, and transport protocol (currently one of UDP,
TCP, or TLS)) used to communicate between the client and the
server. The 5-tuple uniquely identifies this communication
stream. The 5-tuple also uniquely identifies the Allocation on
the server.
Channel: A channel number and associated peer transport address.
Once a channel number is bound to a peer's transport address, the
client and server can use the more bandwidth-efficient ChannelData
message to exchange data.
Permission: The IP address and transport protocol (but not the port)
of a peer that is permitted to send traffic to the TURN server and
have that traffic relayed to the TURN client. The TURN server
will only forward traffic to its client from peers that match an
existing permission.
Realm: A string used to describe the server or a context within the
server. The realm tells the client which username and password
combination to use to authenticate requests.
Nonce: A string chosen at random by the server and included in the
message-digest. To prevent reply attacks, the server should
change the nonce regularly.
4. General Behavior
This section contains general TURN processing rules that apply to all
TURN messages.
TURN is an extension to STUN. All TURN messages, with the exception
of the ChannelData message, are STUN-formatted messages. All the
base processing rules described in [RFC5389] apply to STUN-formatted
messages. This means that all the message-forming and message-
processing descriptions in this document are implicitly prefixed with
the rules of [RFC5389].
[RFC5389] specifies an authentication mechanism called the long-term
credential mechanism. TURN servers and clients MUST implement this
mechanism. The server MUST demand that all requests from the client
be authenticated using this mechanism, or that a equally strong or
stronger mechanism for client authentication is used.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
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Note that the long-term credential mechanism applies only to requests
and cannot be used to authenticate indications; thus, indications in
TURN are never authenticated. If the server requires requests to be
authenticated, then the server's administrator MUST choose a realm
value that will uniquely identify the username and password
combination that the client must use, even if the client uses
multiple servers under different administrations. The server's
administrator MAY choose to allocate a unique username to each
client, or MAY choose to allocate the same username to more than one
client (for example, to all clients from the same department or
company). For each allocation, the server SHOULD generate a new
random nonce when the allocation is first attempted following the
randomness recommendations in [RFC4086] and SHOULD expire the nonce
at least once every hour during the lifetime of the allocation.
All requests after the initial Allocate must use the same username as
that used to create the allocation, to prevent attackers from
hijacking the client's allocation. Specifically, if the server
requires the use of the long-term credential mechanism, and if a non-
Allocate request passes authentication under this mechanism, and if
the 5-tuple identifies an existing allocation, but the request does
not use the same username as used to create the allocation, then the
request MUST be rejected with a 441 (Wrong Credentials) error.
When a TURN message arrives at the server from the client, the server
uses the 5-tuple in the message to identify the associated
allocation. For all TURN messages (including ChannelData) EXCEPT an
Allocate request, if the 5-tuple does not identify an existing
allocation, then the message MUST either be rejected with a 437
Allocation Mismatch error (if it is a request) or silently ignored
(if it is an indication or a ChannelData message). A client
receiving a 437 error response to a request other than Allocate MUST
assume the allocation no longer exists.
[RFC5389] defines a number of attributes, including the SOFTWARE and
FINGERPRINT attributes. The client SHOULD include the SOFTWARE
attribute in all Allocate and Refresh requests and MAY include it in
any other requests or indications. The server SHOULD include the
SOFTWARE attribute in all Allocate and Refresh responses (either
success or failure) and MAY include it in other responses or
indications. The client and the server MAY include the FINGERPRINT
attribute in any STUN-formatted messages defined in this document.
TURN does not use the backwards-compatibility mechanism described in
[RFC5389].
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TURN, as defined in this specification, only supports IPv4. The
client's IP address, the server's IP address, and all IP addresses
appearing in a relayed transport address MUST be IPv4 addresses.
By default, TURN runs on the same ports as STUN: 3478 for TURN over
UDP and TCP, and 5349 for TURN over TLS. However, TURN has its own
set of Service Record (SRV) names: "turn" for UDP and TCP, and
"turns" for TLS. Either the SRV procedures or the ALTERNATE-SERVER
procedures, both described in Section 6, can be used to run TURN on a
different port.
To ensure interoperability, a TURN server MUST support the use of UDP
transport between the client and the server, and SHOULD support the
use of TCP and TLS transport.
When UDP transport is used between the client and the server, the
client will retransmit a request if it does not receive a response
within a certain timeout period. Because of this, the server may
receive two (or more) requests with the same 5-tuple and same
transaction id. STUN requires that the server recognize this case
and treat the request as idempotent (see [RFC5389]). Some
implementations may choose to meet this requirement by remembering
all received requests and the corresponding responses for 40 seconds.
Other implementations may choose to reprocess the request and arrange
that such reprocessing returns essentially the same response. To aid
implementors who choose the latter approach (the so-called "stateless
stack approach"), this specification includes some implementation
notes on how this might be done. Implementations are free to choose
either approach or choose some other approach that gives the same
results.
When TCP transport is used between the client and the server, it is
possible that a bit error will cause a length field in a TURN packet
to become corrupted, causing the receiver to lose synchronization
with the incoming stream of TURN messages. A client or server that
detects a long sequence of invalid TURN messages over TCP transport
SHOULD close the corresponding TCP connection to help the other end
detect this situation more rapidly.
To mitigate either intentional or unintentional denial-of-service
attacks against the server by clients with valid usernames and
passwords, it is RECOMMENDED that the server impose limits on both
the number of allocations active at one time for a given username and
on the amount of bandwidth those allocations can use. The server
should reject new allocations that would exceed the limit on the
allowed number of allocations active at one time with a 486
(Allocation Quota Exceeded) (see Section 6.2), and should discard
application data traffic that exceeds the bandwidth quota.
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5. Allocations
All TURN operations revolve around allocations, and all TURN messages
are associated with an allocation. An allocation conceptually
consists of the following state data:
o the relayed transport address;
o the 5-tuple: (client's IP address, client's port, server IP
address, server port, transport protocol);
o the authentication information;
o the time-to-expiry;
o a list of permissions;
o a list of channel to peer bindings.
The relayed transport address is the transport address allocated by
the server for communicating with peers, while the 5-tuple describes
the communication path between the client and the server. On the
client, the 5-tuple uses the client's host transport address; on the
server, the 5-tuple uses the client's server-reflexive transport
address.
Both the relayed transport address and the 5-tuple MUST be unique
across all allocations, so either one can be used to uniquely
identify the allocation.
The authentication information (e.g., username, password, realm, and
nonce) is used to both verify subsequent requests and to compute the
message integrity of responses. The username, realm, and nonce
values are initially those used in the authenticated Allocate request
that creates the allocation, though the server can change the nonce
value during the lifetime of the allocation using a 438 (Stale Nonce)
reply. Note that, rather than storing the password explicitly, for
security reasons, it may be desirable for the server to store the key
value, which is an MD5 hash over the username, realm, and password
(see [RFC5389]).
The time-to-expiry is the time in seconds left until the allocation
expires. Each Allocate or Refresh transaction sets this timer, which
then ticks down towards 0. By default, each Allocate or Refresh
transaction resets this timer to the default lifetime value of 600
seconds (10 minutes), but the client can request a different value in
the Allocate and Refresh request. Allocations can only be refreshed
using the Refresh request; sending data to a peer does not refresh an
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]
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allocation. When an allocation expires, the state data associated
with the allocation can be freed.
The list of permissions is described in Section 8 and the list of
channels is described in Section 11.
6. Creating an Allocation
An allocation on the server is created using an Allocate transaction.
6.1. Sending an Allocate Request
The client forms an Allocate request as follows.
The client first picks a host transport address. It is RECOMMENDED
that the client pick a currently unused transport address, typically
by allowing the underlying OS to pick a currently unused port for a
new socket.
The client then picks a transport protocol to use between the client
and the server. The transport protocol MUST be one of UDP, TCP, or
TLS-over-TCP. Since this specification only allows UDP between the
server and the peers, it is RECOMMENDED that the client pick UDP
unless it has a reason to use a different transport. One reason to
pick a different transport would be that the client believes, either
through configuration or by experiment, that it is unable to contact
any TURN server using UDP. See Section 2.1 for more discussion.
The client also picks a server transport address, which SHOULD be
done as follows. The client receives (perhaps through configuration)
a domain name for a TURN server. The client then uses the DNS
procedures described in [RFC5389], but using an SRV service name of
"turn" (or "turns" for TURN over TLS) instead of "stun" (or "stuns").
For example, to find servers in the example.com domain, the client
performs a lookup for '_turn._udp.example.com',
'_turn._tcp.example.com', and '_turns._tcp.example.com' if the client
wants to communicate with the server using UDP, TCP, or TLS-over-TCP,
respectively.
The client MUST include a REQUESTED-TRANSPORT attribute in the
request. This attribute specifies the transport protocol between the
server and the peers (note that this is NOT the transport protocol
that appears in the 5-tuple). In this specification, the REQUESTED-
TRANSPORT type is always UDP. This attribute is included to allow
future extensions to specify other protocols.
If the client wishes the server to initialize the time-to-expiry
field of the allocation to some value other than the default
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lifetime, then it MAY include a LIFETIME attribute specifying its
desired value. This is just a request, and the server may elect to
use a different value. Note that the server will ignore requests to
initialize the field to less than the default value.
If the client wishes to later use the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute in one
or more Send indications on this allocation, then the client SHOULD
include the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute in the Allocate request. This
allows the client to test whether this attribute is supported by the
server.
If the client requires the port number of the relayed transport
address be even, the client includes the EVEN-PORT attribute. If
this attribute is not included, then the port can be even or odd. By
setting the R bit in the EVEN-PORT attribute to 1, the client can
request that the server reserve the next highest port number (on the
same IP address) for a subsequent allocation. If the R bit is 0, no
such request is made.
The client MAY also include a RESERVATION-TOKEN attribute in the
request to ask the server to use a previously reserved port for the
allocation. If the RESERVATION-TOKEN attribute is included, then the
client MUST omit the EVEN-PORT attribute.
Once constructed, the client sends the Allocate request on the
5-tuple.
6.2. Receiving an Allocate Request
When the server receives an Allocate request, it performs the
following checks:
1. The server MUST require that the request be authenticated. This
authentication MUST be done using the long-term credential
mechanism of [RFC5389] unless the client and server agree to use
another mechanism through some procedure outside the scope of
this document.
2. The server checks if the 5-tuple is currently in use by an
existing allocation. If yes, the server rejects the request with
a 437 (Allocation Mismatch) error.
3. The server checks if the request contains a REQUESTED-TRANSPORT
attribute. If the REQUESTED-TRANSPORT attribute is not included
or is malformed, the server rejects the request with a 400 (Bad
Request) error. Otherwise, if the attribute is included but
specifies a protocol other that UDP, the server rejects the
request with a 442 (Unsupported Transport Protocol) error.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
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4. The request may contain a DONT-FRAGMENT attribute. If it does,
but the server does not support sending UDP datagrams with the DF
bit set to 1 (see Section 12), then the server treats the DONT-
FRAGMENT attribute in the Allocate request as an unknown
comprehension-required attribute.
5. The server checks if the request contains a RESERVATION-TOKEN
attribute. If yes, and the request also contains an EVEN-PORT
attribute, then the server rejects the request with a 400 (Bad
Request) error. Otherwise, it checks to see if the token is
valid (i.e., the token is in range and has not expired and the
corresponding relayed transport address is still available). If
the token is not valid for some reason, the server rejects the
request with a 508 (Insufficient Capacity) error.
6. The server checks if the request contains an EVEN-PORT attribute.
If yes, then the server checks that it can satisfy the request
(i.e., can allocate a relayed transport address as described
below). If the server cannot satisfy the request, then the
server rejects the request with a 508 (Insufficient Capacity)
error.
7. At any point, the server MAY choose to reject the request with a
486 (Allocation Quota Reached) error if it feels the client is
trying to exceed some locally defined allocation quota. The
server is free to define this allocation quota any way it wishes,
but SHOULD define it based on the username used to authenticate
the request, and not on the client's transport address.
8. Also at any point, the server MAY choose to reject the request
with a 300 (Try Alternate) error if it wishes to redirect the
client to a different server. The use of this error code and
attribute follow the specification in [RFC5389].
If all the checks pass, the server creates the allocation. The
5-tuple is set to the 5-tuple from the Allocate request, while the
list of permissions and the list of channels are initially empty.
The server chooses a relayed transport address for the allocation as
follows:
o If the request contains a RESERVATION-TOKEN, the server uses the
previously reserved transport address corresponding to the
included token (if it is still available). Note that the
reservation is a server-wide reservation and is not specific to a
particular allocation, since the Allocate request containing the
RESERVATION-TOKEN uses a different 5-tuple than the Allocate
request that made the reservation. The 5-tuple for the Allocate
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
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request containing the RESERVATION-TOKEN attribute can be any
allowed 5-tuple; it can use a different client IP address and
port, a different transport protocol, and even different server IP
address and port (provided, of course, that the server IP address
and port are ones on which the server is listening for TURN
requests).
o If the request contains an EVEN-PORT attribute with the R bit set
to 0, then the server allocates a relayed transport address with
an even port number.
o If the request contains an EVEN-PORT attribute with the R bit set
to 1, then the server looks for a pair of port numbers N and N+1
on the same IP address, where N is even. Port N is used in the
current allocation, while the relayed transport address with port
N+1 is assigned a token and reserved for a future allocation. The
server MUST hold this reservation for at least 30 seconds, and MAY
choose to hold longer (e.g., until the allocation with port N
expires). The server then includes the token in a RESERVATION-
TOKEN attribute in the success response.
o Otherwise, the server allocates any available relayed transport
address.
In all cases, the server SHOULD only allocate ports from the range
49152 - 65535 (the Dynamic and/or Private Port range [Port-Numbers]),
unless the TURN server application knows, through some means not
specified here, that other applications running on the same host as
the TURN server application will not be impacted by allocating ports
outside this range. This condition can often be satisfied by running
the TURN server application on a dedicated machine and/or by
arranging that any other applications on the machine allocate ports
before the TURN server application starts. In any case, the TURN
server SHOULD NOT allocate ports in the range 0 - 1023 (the Well-
Known Port range) to discourage clients from using TURN to run
standard services.
NOTE: The IETF is currently investigating the topic of randomized
port assignments to avoid certain types of attacks (see
[TSVWG-PORT]). It is strongly recommended that a TURN implementor
keep abreast of this topic and, if appropriate, implement a
randomized port assignment algorithm. This is especially
applicable to servers that choose to pre-allocate a number of
ports from the underlying OS and then later assign them to
allocations; for example, a server may choose this technique to
implement the EVEN-PORT attribute.
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The server determines the initial value of the time-to-expiry field
as follows. If the request contains a LIFETIME attribute, then the
server computes the minimum of the client's proposed lifetime and the
server's maximum allowed lifetime. If this computed value is greater
than the default lifetime, then the server uses the computed lifetime
as the initial value of the time-to-expiry field. Otherwise, the
server uses the default lifetime. It is RECOMMENDED that the server
use a maximum allowed lifetime value of no more than 3600 seconds (1
hour). Servers that implement allocation quotas or charge users for
allocations in some way may wish to use a smaller maximum allowed
lifetime (perhaps as small as the default lifetime) to more quickly
remove orphaned allocations (that is, allocations where the
corresponding client has crashed or terminated or the client
connection has been lost for some reason). Also, note that the time-
to-expiry is recomputed with each successful Refresh request, and
thus the value computed here applies only until the first refresh.
Once the allocation is created, the server replies with a success
response. The success response contains:
o An XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS attribute containing the relayed transport
address.
o A LIFETIME attribute containing the current value of the time-to-
expiry timer.
o A RESERVATION-TOKEN attribute (if a second relayed transport
address was reserved).
o An XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute containing the client's IP address
and port (from the 5-tuple).
NOTE: The XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute is included in the response
as a convenience to the client. TURN itself does not make use of
this value, but clients running ICE can often need this value and
can thus avoid having to do an extra Binding transaction with some
STUN server to learn it.
The response (either success or error) is sent back to the client on
the 5-tuple.
NOTE: When the Allocate request is sent over UDP, section 7.3.1 of
[RFC5389] requires that the server handle the possible
retransmissions of the request so that retransmissions do not
cause multiple allocations to be created. Implementations may
achieve this using the so-called "stateless stack approach" as
follows. To detect retransmissions when the original request was
successful in creating an allocation, the server can store the
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transaction id that created the request with the allocation data
and compare it with incoming Allocate requests on the same
5-tuple. Once such a request is detected, the server can stop
parsing the request and immediately generate a success response.
When building this response, the value of the LIFETIME attribute
can be taken from the time-to-expiry field in the allocate state
data, even though this value may differ slightly from the LIFETIME
value originally returned. In addition, the server may need to
store an indication of any reservation token returned in the
original response, so that this may be returned in any
retransmitted responses.
For the case where the original request was unsuccessful in
creating an allocation, the server may choose to do nothing
special. Note, however, that there is a rare case where the
server rejects the original request but accepts the retransmitted
request (because conditions have changed in the brief intervening
time period). If the client receives the first failure response,
it will ignore the second (success) response and believe that an
allocation was not created. An allocation created in this matter
will eventually timeout, since the client will not refresh it.
Furthermore, if the client later retries with the same 5-tuple but
different transaction id, it will receive a 437 (Allocation
Mismatch), which will cause it to retry with a different 5-tuple.
The server may use a smaller maximum lifetime value to minimize
the lifetime of allocations "orphaned" in this manner.
6.3. Receiving an Allocate Success Response
If the client receives an Allocate success response, then it MUST
check that the mapped address and the relayed transport address are
in an address family that the client understands and is prepared to
handle. This specification only covers the case where these two
addresses are IPv4 addresses. If these two addresses are not in an
address family which the client is prepared to handle, then the
client MUST delete the allocation (Section 7) and MUST NOT attempt to
create another allocation on that server until it believes the
mismatch has been fixed.
The IETF is currently considering mechanisms for transitioning
between IPv4 and IPv6 that could result in a client originating an
Allocate request over IPv6, but the request would arrive at the
server over IPv4, or vice versa.
Otherwise, the client creates its own copy of the allocation data
structure to track what is happening on the server. In particular,
the client needs to remember the actual lifetime received back from
the server, rather than the value sent to the server in the request.
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The client must also remember the 5-tuple used for the request and
the username and password it used to authenticate the request to
ensure that it reuses them for subsequent messages. The client also
needs to track the channels and permissions it establishes on the
server.
The client will probably wish to send the relayed transport address
to peers (using some method not specified here) so the peers can
communicate with it. The client may also wish to use the server-
reflexive address it receives in the XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute in
its ICE processing.
6.4. Receiving an Allocate Error Response
If the client receives an Allocate error response, then the
processing depends on the actual error code returned:
o (Request timed out): There is either a problem with the server, or
a problem reaching the server with the chosen transport. The
client considers the current transaction as having failed but MAY
choose to retry the Allocate request using a different transport
(e.g., TCP instead of UDP).
o 300 (Try Alternate): The server would like the client to use the
server specified in the ALTERNATE-SERVER attribute instead. The
client considers the current transaction as having failed, but
SHOULD try the Allocate request with the alternate server before
trying any other servers (e.g., other servers discovered using the
SRV procedures). When trying the Allocate request with the
alternate server, the client follows the ALTERNATE-SERVER
procedures specified in [RFC5389].
o 400 (Bad Request): The server believes the client's request is
malformed for some reason. The client considers the current
transaction as having failed. The client MAY notify the user or
operator and SHOULD NOT retry the request with this server until
it believes the problem has been fixed.
o 401 (Unauthorized): If the client has followed the procedures of
the long-term credential mechanism and still gets this error, then
the server is not accepting the client's credentials. In this
case, the client considers the current transaction as having
failed and SHOULD notify the user or operator. The client SHOULD
NOT send any further requests to this server until it believes the
problem has been fixed.
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o 403 (Forbidden): The request is valid, but the server is refusing
to perform it, likely due to administrative restrictions. The
client considers the current transaction as having failed. The
client MAY notify the user or operator and SHOULD NOT retry the
same request with this server until it believes the problem has
been fixed.
o 420 (Unknown Attribute): If the client included a DONT-FRAGMENT
attribute in the request and the server rejected the request with
a 420 error code and listed the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute in the
UNKNOWN-ATTRIBUTES attribute in the error response, then the
client now knows that the server does not support the DONT-
FRAGMENT attribute. The client considers the current transaction
as having failed but MAY choose to retry the Allocate request
without the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute.
o 437 (Allocation Mismatch): This indicates that the client has
picked a 5-tuple that the server sees as already in use. One way
this could happen is if an intervening NAT assigned a mapped
transport address that was used by another client that recently
crashed. The client considers the current transaction as having
failed. The client SHOULD pick another client transport address
and retry the Allocate request (using a different transaction id).
The client SHOULD try three different client transport addresses
before giving up on this server. Once the client gives up on the
server, it SHOULD NOT try to create another allocation on the
server for 2 minutes.
o 438 (Stale Nonce): See the procedures for the long-term credential
mechanism [RFC5389].
o 441 (Wrong Credentials): The client should not receive this error
in response to a Allocate request. The client MAY notify the user
or operator and SHOULD NOT retry the same request with this server
until it believes the problem has been fixed.
o 442 (Unsupported Transport Address): The client should not receive
this error in response to a request for a UDP allocation. The
client MAY notify the user or operator and SHOULD NOT reattempt
the request with this server until it believes the problem has
been fixed.
o 486 (Allocation Quota Reached): The server is currently unable to
create any more allocations with this username. The client
considers the current transaction as having failed. The client
SHOULD wait at least 1 minute before trying to create any more
allocations on the server.
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o 508 (Insufficient Capacity): The server has no more relayed
transport addresses available, or has none with the requested
properties, or the one that was reserved is no longer available.
The client considers the current operation as having failed. If
the client is using either the EVEN-PORT or the RESERVATION-TOKEN
attribute, then the client MAY choose to remove or modify this
attribute and try again immediately. Otherwise, the client SHOULD
wait at least 1 minute before trying to create any more
allocations on this server.
An unknown error response MUST be handled as described in [RFC5389].
7. Refreshing an Allocation
A Refresh transaction can be used to either (a) refresh an existing
allocation and update its time-to-expiry or (b) delete an existing
allocation.
If a client wishes to continue using an allocation, then the client
MUST refresh it before it expires. It is suggested that the client
refresh the allocation roughly 1 minute before it expires. If a
client no longer wishes to use an allocation, then it SHOULD
explicitly delete the allocation. A client MAY refresh an allocation
at any time for other reasons.
7.1. Sending a Refresh Request
If the client wishes to immediately delete an existing allocation, it
includes a LIFETIME attribute with a value of 0. All other forms of
the request refresh the allocation.
The Refresh transaction updates the time-to-expiry timer of an
allocation. If the client wishes the server to set the time-to-
expiry timer to something other than the default lifetime, it
includes a LIFETIME attribute with the requested value. The server
then computes a new time-to-expiry value in the same way as it does
for an Allocate transaction, with the exception that a requested
lifetime of 0 causes the server to immediately delete the allocation.
7.2. Receiving a Refresh Request
When the server receives a Refresh request, it processes as per
Section 4 plus the specific rules mentioned here.
The server computes a value called the "desired lifetime" as follows:
if the request contains a LIFETIME attribute and the attribute value
is 0, then the "desired lifetime" is 0. Otherwise, if the request
contains a LIFETIME attribute, then the server computes the minimum
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of the client's requested lifetime and the server's maximum allowed
lifetime. If this computed value is greater than the default
lifetime, then the "desired lifetime" is the computed value.
Otherwise, the "desired lifetime" is the default lifetime.
Subsequent processing depends on the "desired lifetime" value:
o If the "desired lifetime" is 0, then the request succeeds and the
allocation is deleted.
o If the "desired lifetime" is non-zero, then the request succeeds
and the allocation's time-to-expiry is set to the "desired
lifetime".
If the request succeeds, then the server sends a success response
containing:
o A LIFETIME attribute containing the current value of the time-to-
expiry timer.
NOTE: A server need not do anything special to implement
idempotency of Refresh requests over UDP using the "stateless
stack approach". Retransmitted Refresh requests with a non-zero
"desired lifetime" will simply refresh the allocation. A
retransmitted Refresh request with a zero "desired lifetime" will
cause a 437 (Allocation Mismatch) response if the allocation has
already been deleted, but the client will treat this as equivalent
to a success response (see below).
7.3. Receiving a Refresh Response
If the client receives a success response to its Refresh request with
a non-zero lifetime, it updates its copy of the allocation data
structure with the time-to-expiry value contained in the response.
If the client receives a 437 (Allocation Mismatch) error response to
a request to delete the allocation, then the allocation no longer
exists and it should consider its request as having effectively
succeeded.
8. Permissions
For each allocation, the server keeps a list of zero or more
permissions. Each permission consists of an IP address and an
associated time-to-expiry. While a permission exists, all peers
using the IP address in the permission are allowed to send data to
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the client. The time-to-expiry is the number of seconds until the
permission expires. Within the context of an allocation, a
permission is uniquely identified by its associated IP address.
By sending either CreatePermission requests or ChannelBind requests,
the client can cause the server to install or refresh a permission
for a given IP address. This causes one of two things to happen:
o If no permission for that IP address exists, then a permission is
created with the given IP address and a time-to-expiry equal to
Permission Lifetime.
o If a permission for that IP address already exists, then the time-
to-expiry for that permission is reset to Permission Lifetime.
The Permission Lifetime MUST be 300 seconds (= 5 minutes).
Each permission's time-to-expiry decreases down once per second until
it reaches 0; at which point, the permission expires and is deleted.
CreatePermission and ChannelBind requests may be freely intermixed on
a permission. A given permission may be initially installed and/or
refreshed with a CreatePermission request, and then later refreshed
with a ChannelBind request, or vice versa.
When a UDP datagram arrives at the relayed transport address for the
allocation, the server extracts the source IP address from the IP
header. The server then compares this address with the IP address
associated with each permission in the list of permissions for the
allocation. If no match is found, relaying is not permitted, and the
server silently discards the UDP datagram. If an exact match is
found, then the permission check is considered to have succeeded and
the server continues to process the UDP datagram as specified
elsewhere (Section 10.3). Note that only addresses are compared and
port numbers are not considered.
The permissions for one allocation are totally unrelated to the
permissions for a different allocation. If an allocation expires,
all its permissions expire with it.
NOTE: Though TURN permissions expire after 5 minutes, many NATs
deployed at the time of publication expire their UDP bindings
considerably faster. Thus, an application using TURN will
probably wish to send some sort of keep-alive traffic at a much
faster rate. Applications using ICE should follow the keep-alive
guidelines of ICE [RFC5245], and applications not using ICE are
advised to do something similar.
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9. CreatePermission
TURN supports two ways for the client to install or refresh
permissions on the server. This section describes one way: the
CreatePermission request.
A CreatePermission request may be used in conjunction with either the
Send mechanism in Section 10 or the Channel mechanism in Section 11.
9.1. Forming a CreatePermission Request
The client who wishes to install or refresh one or more permissions
can send a CreatePermission request to the server.
When forming a CreatePermission request, the client MUST include at
least one XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute, and MAY include more than one
such attribute. The IP address portion of each XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute contains the IP address for which a permission should be
installed or refreshed. The port portion of each XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute will be ignored and can be any arbitrary value. The
various XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attributes can appear in any order.
9.2. Receiving a CreatePermission Request
When the server receives the CreatePermission request, it processes
as per Section 4 plus the specific rules mentioned here.
The message is checked for validity. The CreatePermission request
MUST contain at least one XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute and MAY contain
multiple such attributes. If no such attribute exists, or if any of
these attributes are invalid, then a 400 (Bad Request) error is
returned. If the request is valid, but the server is unable to
satisfy the request due to some capacity limit or similar, then a 508
(Insufficient Capacity) error is returned.
The server MAY impose restrictions on the IP address allowed in the
XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute -- if a value is not allowed, the server
rejects the request with a 403 (Forbidden) error.
If the message is valid and the server is capable of carrying out the
request, then the server installs or refreshes a permission for the
IP address contained in each XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute as described
in Section 8. The port portion of each attribute is ignored and may
be any arbitrary value.
The server then responds with a CreatePermission success response.
There are no mandatory attributes in the success response.
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NOTE: A server need not do anything special to implement
idempotency of CreatePermission requests over UDP using the
"stateless stack approach". Retransmitted CreatePermission
requests will simply refresh the permissions.
9.3. Receiving a CreatePermission Response
If the client receives a valid CreatePermission success response,
then the client updates its data structures to indicate that the
permissions have been installed or refreshed.
10. Send and Data Methods
TURN supports two mechanisms for sending and receiving data from
peers. This section describes the use of the Send and Data
mechanisms, while Section 11 describes the use of the Channel
mechanism.
10.1. Forming a Send Indication
The client can use a Send indication to pass data to the server for
relaying to a peer. A client may use a Send indication even if a
channel is bound to that peer. However, the client MUST ensure that
there is a permission installed for the IP address of the peer to
which the Send indication is being sent; this prevents a third party
from using a TURN server to send data to arbitrary destinations.
When forming a Send indication, the client MUST include an XOR-PEER-
ADDRESS attribute and a DATA attribute. The XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute contains the transport address of the peer to which the
data is to be sent, and the DATA attribute contains the actual
application data to be sent to the peer.
The client MAY include a DONT-FRAGMENT attribute in the Send
indication if it wishes the server to set the DF bit on the UDP
datagram sent to the peer.
10.2. Receiving a Send Indication
When the server receives a Send indication, it processes as per
Section 4 plus the specific rules mentioned here.
The message is first checked for validity. The Send indication MUST
contain both an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute and a DATA attribute. If
one of these attributes is missing or invalid, then the message is
discarded. Note that the DATA attribute is allowed to contain zero
bytes of data.
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The Send indication may also contain the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute. If
the server is unable to set the DF bit on outgoing UDP datagrams when
this attribute is present, then the server acts as if the DONT-
FRAGMENT attribute is an unknown comprehension-required attribute
(and thus the Send indication is discarded).
The server also checks that there is a permission installed for the
IP address contained in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute. If no such
permission exists, the message is discarded. Note that a Send
indication never causes the server to refresh the permission.
The server MAY impose restrictions on the IP address and port values
allowed in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute -- if a value is not
allowed, the server silently discards the Send indication.
If everything is OK, then the server forms a UDP datagram as follows:
o the source transport address is the relayed transport address of
the allocation, where the allocation is determined by the 5-tuple
on which the Send indication arrived;
o the destination transport address is taken from the XOR-PEER-
ADDRESS attribute;
o the data following the UDP header is the contents of the value
field of the DATA attribute.
The handling of the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute (if present), is
described in Section 12.
The resulting UDP datagram is then sent to the peer.
10.3. Receiving a UDP Datagram
When the server receives a UDP datagram at a currently allocated
relayed transport address, the server looks up the allocation
associated with the relayed transport address. The server then
checks to see whether the set of permissions for the allocation allow
the relaying of the UDP datagram as described in Section 8.
If relaying is permitted, then the server checks if there is a
channel bound to the peer that sent the UDP datagram (see
Section 11). If a channel is bound, then processing proceeds as
described in Section 11.7.
If relaying is permitted but no channel is bound to the peer, then
the server forms and sends a Data indication. The Data indication
MUST contain both an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS and a DATA attribute. The DATA
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attribute is set to the value of the 'data octets' field from the
datagram, and the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute is set to the source
transport address of the received UDP datagram. The Data indication
is then sent on the 5-tuple associated with the allocation.
10.4. Receiving a Data Indication
When the client receives a Data indication, it checks that the Data
indication contains both an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS and a DATA attribute,
and discards the indication if it does not. The client SHOULD also
check that the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute value contains an IP
address with which the client believes there is an active permission,
and discard the Data indication otherwise. Note that the DATA
attribute is allowed to contain zero bytes of data.
NOTE: The latter check protects the client against an attacker who
somehow manages to trick the server into installing permissions
not desired by the client.
If the Data indication passes the above checks, the client delivers
the data octets inside the DATA attribute to the application, along
with an indication that they were received from the peer whose
transport address is given by the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute.
11. Channels
Channels provide a way for the client and server to send application
data using ChannelData messages, which have less overhead than Send
and Data indications.
The ChannelData message (see Section 11.4) starts with a two-byte
field that carries the channel number. The values of this field are
allocated as follows:
0x0000 through 0x3FFF: These values can never be used for channel
numbers.
0x4000 through 0x7FFF: These values are the allowed channel
numbers (16,383 possible values).
0x8000 through 0xFFFF: These values are reserved for future use.
Because of this division, ChannelData messages can be distinguished
from STUN-formatted messages (e.g., Allocate request, Send
indication, etc.) by examining the first two bits of the message:
0b00: STUN-formatted message (since the first two bits of a STUN-
formatted message are always zero).
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0b01: ChannelData message (since the channel number is the first
field in the ChannelData message and channel numbers fall in the
range 0x4000 - 0x7FFF).
0b10: Reserved
0b11: Reserved
The reserved values may be used in the future to extend the range of
channel numbers. Thus, an implementation MUST NOT assume that a TURN
message always starts with a 0 bit.
Channel bindings are always initiated by the client. The client can
bind a channel to a peer at any time during the lifetime of the
allocation. The client may bind a channel to a peer before
exchanging data with it, or after exchanging data with it (using Send
and Data indications) for some time, or may choose never to bind a
channel to it. The client can also bind channels to some peers while
not binding channels to other peers.
Channel bindings are specific to an allocation, so that the use of a
channel number or peer transport address in a channel binding in one
allocation has no impact on their use in a different allocation. If
an allocation expires, all its channel bindings expire with it.
A channel binding consists of:
o a channel number;
o a transport address (of the peer); and
o A time-to-expiry timer.
Within the context of an allocation, a channel binding is uniquely
identified either by the channel number or by the peer's transport
address. Thus, the same channel cannot be bound to two different
transport addresses, nor can the same transport address be bound to
two different channels.
A channel binding lasts for 10 minutes unless refreshed. Refreshing
the binding (by the server receiving a ChannelBind request rebinding
the channel to the same peer) resets the time-to-expiry timer back to
10 minutes.
When the channel binding expires, the channel becomes unbound. Once
unbound, the channel number can be bound to a different transport
address, and the transport address can be bound to a different
channel number. To prevent race conditions, the client MUST wait 5
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minutes after the channel binding expires before attempting to bind
the channel number to a different transport address or the transport
address to a different channel number.
When binding a channel to a peer, the client SHOULD be prepared to
receive ChannelData messages on the channel from the server as soon
as it has sent the ChannelBind request. Over UDP, it is possible for
the client to receive ChannelData messages from the server before it
receives a ChannelBind success response.
In the other direction, the client MAY elect to send ChannelData
messages before receiving the ChannelBind success response. Doing
so, however, runs the risk of having the ChannelData messages dropped
by the server if the ChannelBind request does not succeed for some
reason (e.g., packet lost if the request is sent over UDP, or the
server being unable to fulfill the request). A client that wishes to
be safe should either queue the data or use Send indications until
the channel binding is confirmed.
11.1. Sending a ChannelBind Request
A channel binding is created or refreshed using a ChannelBind
transaction. A ChannelBind transaction also creates or refreshes a
permission towards the peer (see Section 8).
To initiate the ChannelBind transaction, the client forms a
ChannelBind request. The channel to be bound is specified in a
CHANNEL-NUMBER attribute, and the peer's transport address is
specified in an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute. Section 11.2 describes
the restrictions on these attributes.
Rebinding a channel to the same transport address that it is already
bound to provides a way to refresh a channel binding and the
corresponding permission without sending data to the peer. Note
however, that permissions need to be refreshed more frequently than
channels.
11.2. Receiving a ChannelBind Request
When the server receives a ChannelBind request, it processes as per
Section 4 plus the specific rules mentioned here.
The server checks the following:
o The request contains both a CHANNEL-NUMBER and an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute;
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o The channel number is in the range 0x4000 through 0x7FFE
(inclusive);
o The channel number is not currently bound to a different transport
address (same transport address is OK);
o The transport address is not currently bound to a different
channel number.
If any of these tests fail, the server replies with a 400 (Bad
Request) error.
The server MAY impose restrictions on the IP address and port values
allowed in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute -- if a value is not
allowed, the server rejects the request with a 403 (Forbidden) error.
If the request is valid, but the server is unable to fulfill the
request due to some capacity limit or similar, the server replies
with a 508 (Insufficient Capacity) error.
Otherwise, the server replies with a ChannelBind success response.
There are no required attributes in a successful ChannelBind
response.
If the server can satisfy the request, then the server creates or
refreshes the channel binding using the channel number in the
CHANNEL-NUMBER attribute and the transport address in the XOR-PEER-
ADDRESS attribute. The server also installs or refreshes a
permission for the IP address in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute as
described in Section 8.
NOTE: A server need not do anything special to implement
idempotency of ChannelBind requests over UDP using the "stateless
stack approach". Retransmitted ChannelBind requests will simply
refresh the channel binding and the corresponding permission.
Furthermore, the client must wait 5 minutes before binding a
previously bound channel number or peer address to a different
channel, eliminating the possibility that the transaction would
initially fail but succeed on a retransmission.
11.3. Receiving a ChannelBind Response
When the client receives a ChannelBind success response, it updates
its data structures to record that the channel binding is now active.
It also updates its data structures to record that the corresponding
permission has been installed or refreshed.
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If the client receives a ChannelBind failure response that indicates
that the channel information is out-of-sync between the client and
the server (e.g., an unexpected 400 "Bad Request" response), then it
is RECOMMENDED that the client immediately delete the allocation and
start afresh with a new allocation.
11.4. The ChannelData Message
The ChannelData message is used to carry application data between the
client and the server. It has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Channel Number | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Application Data /
/ /
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| |
+-------------------------------+
The Channel Number field specifies the number of the channel on which
the data is traveling, and thus the address of the peer that is
sending or is to receive the data.
The Length field specifies the length in bytes of the application
data field (i.e., it does not include the size of the ChannelData
header). Note that 0 is a valid length.
The Application Data field carries the data the client is trying to
send to the peer, or that the peer is sending to the client.
11.5. Sending a ChannelData Message
Once a client has bound a channel to a peer, then when the client has
data to send to that peer it may use either a ChannelData message or
a Send indication; that is, the client is not obligated to use the
channel when it exists and may freely intermix the two message types
when sending data to the peer. The server, on the other hand, MUST
use the ChannelData message if a channel has been bound to the peer.
The fields of the ChannelData message are filled in as described in
Section 11.4.
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Over TCP and TLS-over-TCP, the ChannelData message MUST be padded to
a multiple of four bytes in order to ensure the alignment of
subsequent messages. The padding is not reflected in the length
field of the ChannelData message, so the actual size of a ChannelData
message (including padding) is (4 + Length) rounded up to the nearest
multiple of 4. Over UDP, the padding is not required but MAY be
included.
The ChannelData message is then sent on the 5-tuple associated with
the allocation.
11.6. Receiving a ChannelData Message
The receiver of the ChannelData message uses the first two bits to
distinguish it from STUN-formatted messages, as described above. If
the message uses a value in the reserved range (0x8000 through
0xFFFF), then the message is silently discarded.
If the ChannelData message is received in a UDP datagram, and if the
UDP datagram is too short to contain the claimed length of the
ChannelData message (i.e., the UDP header length field value is less
than the ChannelData header length field value + 4 + 8), then the
message is silently discarded.
If the ChannelData message is received over TCP or over TLS-over-TCP,
then the actual length of the ChannelData message is as described in
Section 11.5.
If the ChannelData message is received on a channel that is not bound
to any peer, then the message is silently discarded.
On the client, it is RECOMMENDED that the client discard the
ChannelData message if the client believes there is no active
permission towards the peer. On the server, the receipt of a
ChannelData message MUST NOT refresh either the channel binding or
the permission towards the peer.
On the server, if no errors are detected, the server relays the
application data to the peer by forming a UDP datagram as follows:
o the source transport address is the relayed transport address of
the allocation, where the allocation is determined by the 5-tuple
on which the ChannelData message arrived;
o the destination transport address is the transport address to
which the channel is bound;
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o the data following the UDP header is the contents of the data
field of the ChannelData message.
The resulting UDP datagram is then sent to the peer. Note that if
the Length field in the ChannelData message is 0, then there will be
no data in the UDP datagram, but the UDP datagram is still formed and
sent.
11.7. Relaying Data from the Peer
When the server receives a UDP datagram on the relayed transport
address associated with an allocation, the server processes it as
described in Section 10.3. If that section indicates that a
ChannelData message should be sent (because there is a channel bound
to the peer that sent to the UDP datagram), then the server forms and
sends a ChannelData message as described in Section 11.5.
12. IP Header Fields
This section describes how the server sets various fields in the IP
header when relaying between the client and the peer or vice versa.
The descriptions in this section apply: (a) when the server sends a
UDP datagram to the peer, or (b) when the server sends a Data
indication or ChannelData message to the client over UDP transport.
The descriptions in this section do not apply to TURN messages sent
over TCP or TLS transport from the server to the client.
The descriptions below have two parts: a preferred behavior and an
alternate behavior. The server SHOULD implement the preferred
behavior, but if that is not possible for a particular field, then it
SHOULD implement the alternative behavior.
Time to Live (TTL) field
Preferred Behavior: If the incoming value is 0, then the drop the
incoming packet. Otherwise, set the outgoing Time to Live/Hop
Count to one less than the incoming value.
Alternate Behavior: Set the outgoing value to the default for
outgoing packets.
Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field [RFC2474]
Preferred Behavior: Set the outgoing value to the incoming value,
unless the server includes a differentiated services classifier
and marker [RFC2474].
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Alternate Behavior: Set the outgoing value to a fixed value, which
by default is Best Effort unless configured otherwise.
In both cases, if the server is immediately adjacent to a
differentiated services classifier and marker, then DSCP MAY be
set to any arbitrary value in the direction towards the
classifier.
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) field [RFC3168]
Preferred Behavior: Set the outgoing value to the incoming value,
UNLESS the server is doing Active Queue Management, the incoming
ECN field is ECT(1) (=0b01) or ECT(0) (=0b10), and the server
wishes to indicate that congestion has been experienced, in which
case set the outgoing value to CE (=0b11).
Alternate Behavior: Set the outgoing value to Not-ECT (=0b00).
IPv4 Fragmentation fields
Preferred Behavior: When the server sends a packet to a peer in
response to a Send indication containing the DONT-FRAGMENT
attribute, then set the DF bit in the outgoing IP header to 1. In
all other cases when sending an outgoing packet containing
application data (e.g., Data indication, ChannelData message, or
DONT-FRAGMENT attribute not included in the Send indication), copy
the DF bit from the DF bit of the incoming packet that contained
the application data.
Set the other fragmentation fields (Identification, More
Fragments, Fragment Offset) as appropriate for a packet
originating from the server.
Alternate Behavior: As described in the Preferred Behavior, except
always assume the incoming DF bit is 0.
In both the Preferred and Alternate Behaviors, the resulting
packet may be too large for the outgoing link. If this is the
case, then the normal fragmentation rules apply [RFC1122].
IPv4 Options
Preferred Behavior: The outgoing packet is sent without any IPv4
options.
Alternate Behavior: Same as preferred.
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13. New STUN Methods
This section lists the codepoints for the new STUN methods defined in
this specification. See elsewhere in this document for the semantics
of these new methods.
0x003 : Allocate (only request/response semantics defined)
0x004 : Refresh (only request/response semantics defined)
0x006 : Send (only indication semantics defined)
0x007 : Data (only indication semantics defined)
0x008 : CreatePermission (only request/response semantics defined
0x009 : ChannelBind (only request/response semantics defined)
14. New STUN Attributes
This STUN extension defines the following new attributes:
0x000C: CHANNEL-NUMBER
0x000D: LIFETIME
0x0010: Reserved (was BANDWIDTH)
0x0012: XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
0x0013: DATA
0x0016: XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS
0x0018: EVEN-PORT
0x0019: REQUESTED-TRANSPORT
0x001A: DONT-FRAGMENT
0x0021: Reserved (was TIMER-VAL)
0x0022: RESERVATION-TOKEN
Some of these attributes have lengths that are not multiples of 4.
By the rules of STUN, any attribute whose length is not a multiple of
4 bytes MUST be immediately followed by 1 to 3 padding bytes to
ensure the next attribute (if any) would start on a 4-byte boundary
(see [RFC5389]).
14.1. CHANNEL-NUMBER
The CHANNEL-NUMBER attribute contains the number of the channel. The
value portion of this attribute is 4 bytes long and consists of a 16-
bit unsigned integer, followed by a two-octet RFFU (Reserved For
Future Use) field, which MUST be set to 0 on transmission and MUST be
ignored on reception.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Channel Number | RFFU = 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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14.2. LIFETIME
The LIFETIME attribute represents the duration for which the server
will maintain an allocation in the absence of a refresh. The value
portion of this attribute is 4-bytes long and consists of a 32-bit
unsigned integral value representing the number of seconds remaining
until expiration.
14.3. XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
The XOR-PEER-ADDRESS specifies the address and port of the peer as
seen from the TURN server. (For example, the peer's server-reflexive
transport address if the peer is behind a NAT.) It is encoded in the
same way as XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS [RFC5389].
14.4. DATA
The DATA attribute is present in all Send and Data indications. The
value portion of this attribute is variable length and consists of
the application data (that is, the data that would immediately follow
the UDP header if the data was been sent directly between the client
and the peer). If the length of this attribute is not a multiple of
4, then padding must be added after this attribute.
14.5. XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS
The XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS is present in Allocate responses. It
specifies the address and port that the server allocated to the
client. It is encoded in the same way as XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS
[RFC5389].
14.6. EVEN-PORT
This attribute allows the client to request that the port in the
relayed transport address be even, and (optionally) that the server
reserve the next-higher port number. The value portion of this
attribute is 1 byte long. Its format is:
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 46]
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0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R| RFFU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value contains a single 1-bit flag:
R: If 1, the server is requested to reserve the next-higher port
number (on the same IP address) for a subsequent allocation. If
0, no such reservation is requested.
The other 7 bits of the attribute's value must be set to zero on
transmission and ignored on reception.
Since the length of this attribute is not a multiple of 4, padding
must immediately follow this attribute.
14.7. REQUESTED-TRANSPORT
This attribute is used by the client to request a specific transport
protocol for the allocated transport address. The value of this
attribute is 4 bytes with the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol | RFFU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Protocol field specifies the desired protocol. The codepoints
used in this field are taken from those allowed in the Protocol field
in the IPv4 header and the NextHeader field in the IPv6 header
[Protocol-Numbers]. This specification only allows the use of
codepoint 17 (User Datagram Protocol).
The RFFU field MUST be set to zero on transmission and MUST be
ignored on reception. It is reserved for future uses.
14.8. DONT-FRAGMENT
This attribute is used by the client to request that the server set
the DF (Don't Fragment) bit in the IP header when relaying the
application data onward to the peer. This attribute has no value
part and thus the attribute length field is 0.
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14.9. RESERVATION-TOKEN
The RESERVATION-TOKEN attribute contains a token that uniquely
identifies a relayed transport address being held in reserve by the
server. The server includes this attribute in a success response to
tell the client about the token, and the client includes this
attribute in a subsequent Allocate request to request the server use
that relayed transport address for the allocation.
The attribute value is 8 bytes and contains the token value.
15. New STUN Error Response Codes
This document defines the following new error response codes:
403 (Forbidden): The request was valid but cannot be performed due
to administrative or similar restrictions.
437 (Allocation Mismatch): A request was received by the server that
requires an allocation to be in place, but no allocation exists,
or a request was received that requires no allocation, but an
allocation exists.
441 (Wrong Credentials): The credentials in the (non-Allocate)
request do not match those used to create the allocation.
442 (Unsupported Transport Protocol): The Allocate request asked the
server to use a transport protocol between the server and the peer
that the server does not support. NOTE: This does NOT refer to
the transport protocol used in the 5-tuple.
486 (Allocation Quota Reached): No more allocations using this
username can be created at the present time.
508 (Insufficient Capacity): The server is unable to carry out the
request due to some capacity limit being reached. In an Allocate
response, this could be due to the server having no more relayed
transport addresses available at that time, having none with the
requested properties, or the one that corresponds to the specified
reservation token is not available.
16. Detailed Example
This section gives an example of the use of TURN, showing in detail
the contents of the messages exchanged. The example uses the network
diagram shown in the Overview (Figure 1).
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For each message, the attributes included in the message and their
values are shown. For convenience, values are shown in a human-
readable format rather than showing the actual octets; for example,
"XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS=192.0.2.15:9000" shows that the XOR-RELAYED-
ADDRESS attribute is included with an address of 192.0.2.15 and a
port of 9000, here the address and port are shown before the xor-ing
is done. For attributes with string-like values (e.g.,
SOFTWARE="Example client, version 1.03" and
NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm"), the value of the attribute
is shown in quotes for readability, but these quotes do not appear in
the actual value.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
| | | |
|--- Allocate request -------------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xA56250D3F17ABE679422DE85 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example client, version 1.03" | |
| LIFETIME=3600 (1 hour) | | |
| REQUESTED-TRANSPORT=17 (UDP) | | |
| DONT-FRAGMENT | | |
| | | |
|<-- Allocate error response --------| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xA56250D3F17ABE679422DE85 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example server, version 1.17" | |
| ERROR-CODE=401 (Unauthorized) | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm" | |
| | | |
|--- Allocate request -------------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xC271E932AD7446A32C234492 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example client 1.03" | | |
| LIFETIME=3600 (1 hour) | | |
| REQUESTED-TRANSPORT=17 (UDP) | | |
| DONT-FRAGMENT | | |
| USERNAME="George" | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm" | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
| | | |
|<-- Allocate success response ------| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xC271E932AD7446A32C234492 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example server, version 1.17" | |
| LIFETIME=1200 (20 minutes) | | |
| XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS=192.0.2.15:50000 | |
| XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS=192.0.2.1:7000 | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 49]
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The client begins by selecting a host transport address to use for
the TURN session; in this example, the client has selected 10.1.1.2:
49721 as shown in Figure 1. The client then sends an Allocate
request to the server at the server transport address. The client
randomly selects a 96-bit transaction id of
0xA56250D3F17ABE679422DE85 for this transaction; this is encoded in
the transaction id field in the fixed header. The client includes a
SOFTWARE attribute that gives information about the client's
software; here the value is "Example client, version 1.03" to
indicate that this is version 1.03 of something called the Example
client. The client includes the LIFETIME attribute because it wishes
the allocation to have a longer lifetime than the default of 10
minutes; the value of this attribute is 3600 seconds, which
corresponds to 1 hour. The client must always include a REQUESTED-
TRANSPORT attribute in an Allocate request and the only value allowed
by this specification is 17, which indicates UDP transport between
the server and the peers. The client also includes the DONT-FRAGMENT
attribute because it wishes to use the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute later
in Send indications; this attribute consists of only an attribute
header, there is no value part. We assume the client has not
recently interacted with the server, thus the client does not include
USERNAME, REALM, NONCE, or MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute. Finally,
note that the order of attributes in a message is arbitrary (except
for the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY and FINGERPRINT attributes) and the client
could have used a different order.
Servers require any request to be authenticated. Thus, when the
server receives the initial Allocate request, it rejects the request
because the request does not contain the authentication attributes.
Following the procedures of the long-term credential mechanism of
STUN [RFC5389], the server includes an ERROR-CODE attribute with a
value of 401 (Unauthorized), a REALM attribute that specifies the
authentication realm used by the server (in this case, the server's
domain "example.com"), and a nonce value in a NONCE attribute. The
server also includes a SOFTWARE attribute that gives information
about the server's software.
The client, upon receipt of the 401 error, re-attempts the Allocate
request, this time including the authentication attributes. The
client selects a new transaction id, and then populates the new
Allocate request with the same attributes as before. The client
includes a USERNAME attribute and uses the realm value received from
the server to help it determine which value to use; here the client
is configured to use the username "George" for the realm
"example.com". The client also includes the REALM and NONCE
attributes, which are just copied from the 401 error response.
Finally, the client includes a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute as the
last attribute in the message, whose value is a Hashed Message
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 50]
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Authentication Code - Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (HMAC-SHA1) hash over
the contents of the message (shown as just "..." above); this HMAC-
SHA1 computation includes a password value. Thus, an attacker cannot
compute the message integrity value without somehow knowing the
secret password.
The server, upon receipt of the authenticated Allocate request,
checks that everything is OK, then creates an allocation. The server
replies with an Allocate success response. The server includes a
LIFETIME attribute giving the lifetime of the allocation; here, the
server has reduced the client's requested 1-hour lifetime to just 20
minutes, because this particular server doesn't allow lifetimes
longer than 20 minutes. The server includes an XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS
attribute whose value is the relayed transport address of the
allocation. The server includes an XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute
whose value is the server-reflexive address of the client; this value
is not used otherwise in TURN but is returned as a convenience to the
client. The server includes a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute to
authenticate the response and to ensure its integrity; note that the
response does not contain the USERNAME, REALM, and NONCE attributes.
The server also includes a SOFTWARE attribute.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|--- CreatePermission request ------>| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xE5913A8F460956CA277D3319 | |
| XOR-PEER-ADDRESS=192.0.2.150:0 | | |
| USERNAME="George" | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm" | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
| | | |
|<-- CreatePermission success resp.--| | |
| Transaction-Id=0xE5913A8F460956CA277D3319 | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
The client then creates a permission towards Peer A in preparation
for sending it some application data. This is done through a
CreatePermission request. The XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute contains
the IP address for which a permission is established (the IP address
of peer A); note that the port number in the attribute is ignored
when used in a CreatePermission request, and here it has been set to
0; also, note how the client uses Peer A's server-reflexive IP
address and not its (private) host address. The client uses the same
username, realm, and nonce values as in the previous request on the
allocation. Though it is allowed to do so, the client has chosen not
to include a SOFTWARE attribute in this request.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 51]
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The server receives the CreatePermission request, creates the
corresponding permission, and then replies with a CreatePermission
success response. Like the client, the server chooses not to include
the SOFTWARE attribute in its reply. Again, note how success
responses contain a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute (assuming the server
uses the long-term credential mechanism), but no USERNAME, REALM, and
NONCE attributes.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|--- Send indication --------------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x1278E9ACA2711637EF7D3328 | |
| XOR-PEER-ADDRESS=192.0.2.150:32102 | |
| DONT-FRAGMENT | | |
| DATA=... | | |
| |-- UDP dgm ->| |
| | data=... | |
| | | |
| |<- UDP dgm --| |
| | data=... | |
|<-- Data indication ----------------| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x8231AE8F9242DA9FF287FEFF | |
| XOR-PEER-ADDRESS=192.0.2.150:32102 | |
| DATA=... | | |
The client now sends application data to Peer A using a Send
indication. Peer A's server-reflexive transport address is specified
in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute, and the application data (shown
here as just "...") is specified in the DATA attribute. The client
is doing a form of path MTU discovery at the application layer and
thus specifies (by including the DONT-FRAGMENT attribute) that the
server should set the DF bit in the UDP datagram to send to the peer.
Indications cannot be authenticated using the long-term credential
mechanism of STUN, so no MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute is included in
the message. An application wishing to ensure that its data is not
altered or forged must integrity-protect its data at the application
level.
Upon receipt of the Send indication, the server extracts the
application data and sends it in a UDP datagram to Peer A, with the
relayed transport address as the source transport address of the
datagram, and with the DF bit set as requested. Note that, had the
client not previously established a permission for Peer A's server-
reflexive IP address, then the server would have silently discarded
the Send indication instead.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 52]
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Peer A then replies with its own UDP datagram containing application
data. The datagram is sent to the relayed transport address on the
server. When this arrives, the server creates a Data indication
containing the source of the UDP datagram in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS
attribute, and the data from the UDP datagram in the DATA attribute.
The resulting Data indication is then sent to the client.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|--- ChannelBind request ----------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x6490D3BC175AFF3D84513212 | |
| CHANNEL-NUMBER=0x4000 | | |
| XOR-PEER-ADDRESS=192.0.2.210:49191 | |
| USERNAME="George" | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm" | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
| | | |
|<-- ChannelBind success response ---| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x6490D3BC175AFF3D84513212 | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
The client now binds a channel to Peer B, specifying a free channel
number (0x4000) in the CHANNEL-NUMBER attribute, and Peer B's
transport address in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute. As before, the
client re-uses the username, realm, and nonce from its last request
in the message.
Upon receipt of the request, the server binds the channel number to
the peer, installs a permission for Peer B's IP address, and then
replies with ChannelBind success response.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|--- ChannelData ------------------->| | |
| Channel-number=0x4000 |--- UDP datagram --------->|
| Data=... | Data=... |
| | | |
| |<-- UDP datagram ----------|
| | Data=... | |
|<-- ChannelData --------------------| | |
| Channel-number=0x4000 | | |
| Data=... | | |
The client now sends a ChannelData message to the server with data
destined for Peer B. The ChannelData message is not a STUN message,
and thus has no transaction id. Instead, it has only three fields: a
channel number, data, and data length; here the channel number field
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 53]
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is 0x4000 (the channel the client just bound to Peer B). When the
server receives the ChannelData message, it checks that the channel
is currently bound (which it is) and then sends the data onward to
Peer B in a UDP datagram, using the relayed transport address as the
source transport address and 192.0.2.210:49191 (the value of the XOR-
PEER-ADDRESS attribute in the ChannelBind request) as the destination
transport address.
Later, Peer B sends a UDP datagram back to the relayed transport
address. This causes the server to send a ChannelData message to the
client containing the data from the UDP datagram. The server knows
to which client to send the ChannelData message because of the
relayed transport address at which the UDP datagram arrived, and
knows to use channel 0x4000 because this is the channel bound to
192.0.2.210:49191. Note that if there had not been any channel
number bound to that address, the server would have used a Data
indication instead.
TURN TURN Peer Peer
client server A B
|--- Refresh request --------------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x0864B3C27ADE9354B4312414 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example client 1.03" | | |
| USERNAME="George" | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="adl7W7PeDU4hKE72jdaQvbAMcr6h39sm" | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
| | | |
|<-- Refresh error response ---------| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x0864B3C27ADE9354B4312414 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example server, version 1.17" | |
| ERROR-CODE=438 (Stale Nonce) | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="npSw1Xw239bBwGYhjNWgz2yH47sxB2j" | |
| | | |
|--- Refresh request --------------->| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x427BD3E625A85FC731DC4191 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example client 1.03" | | |
| USERNAME="George" | | |
| REALM="example.com" | | |
| NONCE="npSw1Xw239bBwGYhjNWgz2yH47sxB2j" | |
| MESSAGE-INTEGRITY=... | | |
| | | |
|<-- Refresh success response -------| | |
| Transaction-Id=0x427BD3E625A85FC731DC4191 | |
| SOFTWARE="Example server, version 1.17" | |
| LIFETIME=600 (10 minutes) | | |
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Sometime before the 20 minute lifetime is up, the client refreshes
the allocation. This is done using a Refresh request. As before,
the client includes the latest username, realm, and nonce values in
the request. The client also includes the SOFTWARE attribute,
following the recommended practice of always including this attribute
in Allocate and Refresh messages. When the server receives the
Refresh request, it notices that the nonce value has expired, and so
replies with 438 (Stale Nonce) error given a new nonce value. The
client then reattempts the request, this time with the new nonce
value. This second attempt is accepted, and the server replies with
a success response. Note that the client did not include a LIFETIME
attribute in the request, so the server refreshes the allocation for
the default lifetime of 10 minutes (as can be seen by the LIFETIME
attribute in the success response).
17. Security Considerations
This section considers attacks that are possible in a TURN
deployment, and discusses how they are mitigated by mechanisms in the
protocol or recommended practices in the implementation.
Most of the attacks on TURN are mitigated by the server requiring
requests be authenticated. Thus, this specification requires the use
of authentication. The mandatory-to-implement mechanism is the long-
term credential mechanism of STUN. Other authentication mechanisms
of equal or stronger security properties may be used. However, it is
important to ensure that they can be invoked in an inter-operable
way.
17.1. Outsider Attacks
Outsider attacks are ones where the attacker has no credentials in
the system, and is attempting to disrupt the service seen by the
client or the server.
17.1.1. Obtaining Unauthorized Allocations
An attacker might wish to obtain allocations on a TURN server for any
number of nefarious purposes. A TURN server provides a mechanism for
sending and receiving packets while cloaking the actual IP address of
the client. This makes TURN servers an attractive target for
attackers who wish to use it to mask their true identity.
An attacker might also wish to simply utilize the services of a TURN
server without paying for them. Since TURN services require
resources from the provider, it is anticipated that their usage will
come with a cost.
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These attacks are prevented using the long-term credential mechanism,
which allows the TURN server to determine the identity of the
requestor and whether the requestor is allowed to obtain the
allocation.
17.1.2. Offline Dictionary Attacks
The long-term credential mechanism used by TURN is subject to offline
dictionary attacks. An attacker that is capable of eavesdropping on
a message exchange between a client and server can determine the
password by trying a number of candidate passwords and seeing if one
of them is correct. This attack works when the passwords are low
entropy, such as a word from the dictionary. This attack can be
mitigated by using strong passwords with large entropy. In
situations where even stronger mitigation is required, TLS transport
between the client and the server can be used.
17.1.3. Faked Refreshes and Permissions
An attacker might wish to attack an active allocation by sending it a
Refresh request with an immediate expiration, in order to delete it
and disrupt service to the client. This is prevented by
authentication of refreshes. Similarly, an attacker wishing to send
CreatePermission requests to create permissions to undesirable
destinations is prevented from doing so through authentication. The
motivations for such an attack are described in Section 17.2.
17.1.4. Fake Data
An attacker might wish to send data to the client or the peer, as if
they came from the peer or client, respectively. To do that, the
attacker can send the client a faked Data Indication or ChannelData
message, or send the TURN server a faked Send Indication or
ChannelData message.
Since indications and ChannelData messages are not authenticated,
this attack is not prevented by TURN. However, this attack is
generally present in IP-based communications and is not substantially
worsened by TURN. Consider a normal, non-TURN IP session between
hosts A and B. An attacker can send packets to B as if they came
from A by sending packets towards A with a spoofed IP address of B.
This attack requires the attacker to know the IP addresses of A and
B. With TURN, an attacker wishing to send packets towards a client
using a Data indication needs to know its IP address (and port), the
IP address and port of the TURN server, and the IP address and port
of the peer (for inclusion in the XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute). To
send a fake ChannelData message to a client, an attacker needs to
know the IP address and port of the client, the IP address and port
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of the TURN server, and the channel number. This particular
combination is mildly more guessable than in the non-TURN case.
These attacks are more properly mitigated by application-layer
authentication techniques. In the case of real-time traffic, usage
of SRTP [RFC3711] prevents these attacks.
In some situations, the TURN server may be situated in the network
such that it is able to send to hosts to which the client cannot
directly send. This can happen, for example, if the server is
located behind a firewall that allows packets from outside the
firewall to be delivered to the server, but not to other hosts behind
the firewall. In these situations, an attacker could send the server
a Send indication with an XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute containing the
transport address of one of the other hosts behind the firewall. If
the server was to allow relaying of traffic to arbitrary peers, then
this would provide a way for the attacker to attack arbitrary hosts
behind the firewall.
To mitigate this attack, TURN requires that the client establish a
permission to a host before sending it data. Thus, an attacker can
only attack hosts with which the client is already communicating,
unless the attacker is able to create authenticated requests.
Furthermore, the server administrator may configure the server to
restrict the range of IP addresses and ports to which it will relay
data. To provide even greater security, the server administrator can
require that the client use TLS for all communication between the
client and the server.
17.1.5. Impersonating a Server
When a client learns a relayed address from a TURN server, it uses
that relayed address in application protocols to receive traffic.
Therefore, an attacker wishing to intercept or redirect that traffic
might try to impersonate a TURN server and provide the client with a
faked relayed address.
This attack is prevented through the long-term credential mechanism,
which provides message integrity for responses in addition to
verifying that they came from the server. Furthermore, an attacker
cannot replay old server responses as the transaction id in the STUN
header prevents this. Replay attacks are further thwarted through
frequent changes to the nonce value.
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17.1.6. Eavesdropping Traffic
TURN concerns itself primarily with authentication and message
integrity. Confidentiality is only a secondary concern, as TURN
control messages do not include information that is particularly
sensitive. The primary protocol content of the messages is the IP
address of the peer. If it is important to prevent an eavesdropper
on a TURN connection from learning this, TURN can be run over TLS.
Confidentiality for the application data relayed by TURN is best
provided by the application protocol itself, since running TURN over
TLS does not protect application data between the server and the
peer. If confidentiality of application data is important, then the
application should encrypt or otherwise protect its data. For
example, for real-time media, confidentiality can be provided by
using SRTP.
17.1.7. TURN Loop Attack
An attacker might attempt to cause data packets to loop indefinitely
between two TURN servers. The attack goes as follows. First, the
attacker sends an Allocate request to server A, using the source
address of server B. Server A will send its response to server B,
and for the attack to succeed, the attacker must have the ability to
either view or guess the contents of this response, so that the
attacker can learn the allocated relayed transport address. The
attacker then sends an Allocate request to server B, using the source
address of server A. Again, the attacker must be able to view or
guess the contents of the response, so it can send learn the
allocated relayed transport address. Using the same spoofed source
address technique, the attacker then binds a channel number on server
A to the relayed transport address on server B, and similarly binds
the same channel number on server B to the relayed transport address
on server A. Finally, the attacker sends a ChannelData message to
server A.
The result is a data packet that loops from the relayed transport
address on server A to the relayed transport address on server B,
then from server B's transport address to server A's transport
address, and then around the loop again.
This attack is mitigated as follows. By requiring all requests to be
authenticated and/or by randomizing the port number allocated for the
relayed transport address, the server forces the attacker to either
intercept or view responses sent to a third party (in this case, the
other server) so that the attacker can authenticate the requests and
learn the relayed transport address. Without one of these two
measures, an attacker can guess the contents of the responses without
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needing to see them, which makes the attack much easier to perform.
Furthermore, by requiring authenticated requests, the server forces
the attacker to have credentials acceptable to the server, which
turns this from an outsider attack into an insider attack and allows
the attack to be traced back to the client initiating it.
The attack can be further mitigated by imposing a per-username limit
on the bandwidth used to relay data by allocations owned by that
username, to limit the impact of this attack on other allocations.
More mitigation can be achieved by decrementing the TTL when relaying
data packets (if the underlying OS allows this).
17.2. Firewall Considerations
A key security consideration of TURN is that TURN should not weaken
the protections afforded by firewalls deployed between a client and a
TURN server. It is anticipated that TURN servers will often be
present on the public Internet, and clients may often be inside
enterprise networks with corporate firewalls. If TURN servers
provide a 'backdoor' for reaching into the enterprise, TURN will be
blocked by these firewalls.
TURN servers therefore emulate the behavior of NAT devices that
implement address-dependent filtering [RFC4787], a property common in
many firewalls as well. When a NAT or firewall implements this
behavior, packets from an outside IP address are only allowed to be
sent to an internal IP address and port if the internal IP address
and port had recently sent a packet to that outside IP address. TURN
servers introduce the concept of permissions, which provide exactly
this same behavior on the TURN server. An attacker cannot send a
packet to a TURN server and expect it to be relayed towards the
client, unless the client has tried to contact the attacker first.
It is important to note that some firewalls have policies that are
even more restrictive than address-dependent filtering. Firewalls
can also be configured with address- and port-dependent filtering, or
can be configured to disallow inbound traffic entirely. In these
cases, if a client is allowed to connect the TURN server,
communications to the client will be less restrictive than what the
firewall would normally allow.
17.2.1. Faked Permissions
In firewalls and NAT devices, permissions are granted implicitly
through the traversal of a packet from the inside of the network
towards the outside peer. Thus, a permission cannot, by definition,
be created by any entity except one inside the firewall or NAT. With
TURN, this restriction no longer holds. Since the TURN server sits
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outside the firewall, at attacker outside the firewall can now send a
message to the TURN server and try to create a permission for itself.
This attack is prevented because all messages that create permissions
(i.e., ChannelBind and CreatePermission) are authenticated.
17.2.2. Blacklisted IP Addresses
Many firewalls can be configured with blacklists that prevent a
client behind the firewall from sending packets to, or receiving
packets from, ranges of blacklisted IP addresses. This is
accomplished by inspecting the source and destination addresses of
packets entering and exiting the firewall, respectively.
This feature is also present in TURN, since TURN servers are allowed
to arbitrarily restrict the range of addresses of peers that they
will relay to.
17.2.3. Running Servers on Well-Known Ports
A malicious client behind a firewall might try to connect to a TURN
server and obtain an allocation which it then uses to run a server.
For example, a client might try to run a DNS server or FTP server.
This is not possible in TURN. A TURN server will never accept
traffic from a peer for which the client has not installed a
permission. Thus, peers cannot just connect to the allocated port in
order to obtain the service.
17.3. Insider Attacks
In insider attacks, a client has legitimate credentials but defies
the trust relationship that goes with those credentials. These
attacks cannot be prevented by cryptographic means but need to be
considered in the design of the protocol.
17.3.1. DoS against TURN Server
A client wishing to disrupt service to other clients might obtain an
allocation and then flood it with traffic, in an attempt to swamp the
server and prevent it from servicing other legitimate clients. This
is mitigated by the recommendation that the server limit the amount
of bandwidth it will relay for a given username. This won't prevent
a client from sending a large amount of traffic, but it allows the
server to immediately discard traffic in excess.
Since each allocation uses a port number on the IP address of the
TURN server, the number of allocations on a server is finite. An
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attacker might attempt to consume all of them by requesting a large
number of allocations. This is prevented by the recommendation that
the server impose a limit of the number of allocations active at a
time for a given username.
17.3.2. Anonymous Relaying of Malicious Traffic
TURN servers provide a degree of anonymization. A client can send
data to peers without revealing its own IP address. TURN servers may
therefore become attractive vehicles for attackers to launch attacks
against targets without fear of detection. Indeed, it is possible
for a client to chain together multiple TURN servers, such that any
number of relays can be used before a target receives a packet.
Administrators who are worried about this attack can maintain logs
that capture the actual source IP and port of the client, and perhaps
even every permission that client installs. This will allow for
forensic tracing to determine the original source, should it be
discovered that an attack is being relayed through a TURN server.
17.3.3. Manipulating Other Allocations
An attacker might attempt to disrupt service to other users of the
TURN server by sending Refresh requests or CreatePermission requests
that (through source address spoofing) appear to be coming from
another user of the TURN server. TURN prevents this by requiring
that the credentials used in CreatePermission, Refresh, and
ChannelBind messages match those used to create the initial
allocation. Thus, the fake requests from the attacker will be
rejected.
17.4. Other Considerations
Any relay addresses learned through an Allocate request will not
operate properly with IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] in
transport or tunnel mode. However, tunnel-mode IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] should still operate.
18. IANA Considerations
Since TURN is an extension to STUN [RFC5389], the methods,
attributes, and error codes defined in this specification are new
methods, attributes, and error codes for STUN. IANA has added these
new protocol elements to the IANA registry of STUN protocol elements.
The codepoints for the new STUN methods defined in this specification
are listed in Section 13.
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The codepoints for the new STUN attributes defined in this
specification are listed in Section 14.
The codepoints for the new STUN error codes defined in this
specification are listed in Section 15.
IANA has allocated the SRV service name of "turn" for TURN over UDP
or TCP, and the service name of "turns" for TURN over TLS.
IANA has created a registry for TURN channel numbers, initially
populated as follows:
0x0000 through 0x3FFF: Reserved and not available for use, since
they conflict with the STUN header.
0x4000 through 0x7FFF: A TURN implementation is free to use
channel numbers in this range.
0x8000 through 0xFFFF: Unassigned.
Any change to this registry must be made through an IETF Standards
Action.
19. IAB Considerations
The IAB has studied the problem of "Unilateral Self Address Fixing"
(UNSAF), which is the general process by which a client attempts to
determine its address in another realm on the other side of a NAT
through a collaborative protocol-reflection mechanism [RFC3424]. The
TURN extension is an example of a protocol that performs this type of
function. The IAB has mandated that any protocols developed for this
purpose document a specific set of considerations. These
considerations and the responses for TURN are documented in this
section.
Consideration 1: Precise definition of a specific, limited-scope
problem that is to be solved with the UNSAF proposal. A short-term
fix should not be generalized to solve other problems. Such
generalizations lead to the prolonged dependence on and usage of the
supposed short-term fix -- meaning that it is no longer accurate to
call it "short-term".
Response: TURN is a protocol for communication between a relay (=
TURN server) and its client. The protocol allows a client that is
behind a NAT to obtain and use a public IP address on the relay. As
a convenience to the client, TURN also allows the client to determine
its server-reflexive transport address.
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Consideration 2: Description of an exit strategy/transition plan.
The better short-term fixes are the ones that will naturally see less
and less use as the appropriate technology is deployed.
Response: TURN will no longer be needed once there are no longer any
NATs. Unfortunately, as of the date of publication of this document,
it no longer seems very likely that NATs will go away any time soon.
However, the need for TURN will also decrease as the number of NATs
with the mapping property of Endpoint-Independent Mapping [RFC4787]
increases.
Consideration 3: Discussion of specific issues that may render
systems more "brittle". For example, approaches that involve using
data at multiple network layers create more dependencies, increase
debugging challenges, and make it harder to transition.
Response: TURN is "brittle" in that it requires the NAT bindings
between the client and the server to be maintained unchanged for the
lifetime of the allocation. This is typically done using keep-
alives. If this is not done, then the client will lose its
allocation and can no longer exchange data with its peers.
Consideration 4: Identify requirements for longer-term, sound
technical solutions; contribute to the process of finding the right
longer-term solution.
Response: The need for TURN will be reduced once NATs implement the
recommendations for NAT UDP behavior documented in [RFC4787].
Applications are also strongly urged to use ICE [RFC5245] to
communicate with peers; though ICE uses TURN, it does so only as a
last resort, and uses it in a controlled manner.
Consideration 5: Discussion of the impact of the noted practical
issues with existing deployed NATs and experience reports.
Response: Some NATs deployed today exhibit a mapping behavior other
than Endpoint-Independent mapping. These NATs are difficult to work
with, as they make it difficult or impossible for protocols like ICE
to use server-reflexive transport addresses on those NATs. A client
behind such a NAT is often forced to use a relay protocol like TURN
because "UDP hole punching" techniques [RFC5128] do not work.
20. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the various participants in the
BEHAVE working group for their many comments on this document. Marc
Petit-Huguenin, Remi Denis-Courmont, Jason Fischl, Derek MacDonald,
Scott Godin, Cullen Jennings, Lars Eggert, Magnus Westerlund, Benny
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 63]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
Prijono, and Eric Rescorla have been particularly helpful, with Eric
suggesting the channel allocation mechanism, Cullen suggesting an
earlier version of the EVEN-PORT mechanism, and Marc spending many
hours implementing the preliminary versions to look for problems.
Christian Huitema was an early contributor to this document and was a
co-author on the first few versions. Finally, the authors would like
to thank Dan Wing for both his contributions to the text and his huge
help in restarting progress on this document after work had stalled.
21. References
21.1. Normative References
[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D.
Wing, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT
(STUN)", RFC 5389, October 2008.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field
(DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers",
RFC 2474, December 1998.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The
Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN) to IP", RFC 3168, September 2001.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
October 1989.
21.2. Informative References
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery",
RFC 1191, November 1990.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D.,
Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for
Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918,
February 1996.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 64]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
[RFC3424] Daigle, L. and IAB, "IAB Considerations for
UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across
Network Address Translation", RFC 3424,
November 2002.
[RFC4787] Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for
Unicast UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, January 2007.
[RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity
Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network
Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for
Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April 2010.
[TURN-TCP] Perreault, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP
Allocations", Work in Progress, March 2010.
[TURN-IPv6] Perreault, S., Camarillo, G., and O. Novo,
"Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN)
Extension for IPv6", Work in Progress, March
2010.
[TSVWG-PORT] Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Port Randomization",
Work in Progress, April 2010.
[RFC5128] Srisuresh, P., Ford, B., and D. Kegel, "State of
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Communication across Network
Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 5128,
March 2008.
[RFC1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R.,
Koblas, D., and L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol
Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and
V. Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for
Real-Time Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550,
July 2003.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara,
E., and K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time
Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 3711,
March 2004.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
December 2005.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 65]
RFC 5766 TURN April 2010
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer
Path MTU Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G.,
Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley,
M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation
Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[MMUSIC-ICE-NONSIP] Rosenberg, J., "Guidelines for Usage of
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) by
non Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Protocols", Work in Progress, July 2008.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106,
RFC 4086, June 2005.
[Frag-Harmful] Kent and Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered
Harmful". Proc. SIGCOMM '87, vol. 17, No. 5,
October 1987
[Port-Numbers] "IANA Port Numbers Registry",
<http://www.iana.org>.
[Protocol-Numbers] "IANA Protocol Numbers Registry", 2005,
<http://www.iana.org>.
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 66]
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Authors' Addresses
Rohan Mahy
Unaffiliated
EMail: rohan@ekabal.com
Philip Matthews
Alcatel-Lucent
600 March Road
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
EMail: philip_matthews@magma.ca
Jonathan Rosenberg
jdrosen.net
Monmouth, NJ
USA
EMail: jdrosen@jdrosen.net
URI: http://www.jdrosen.net
Mahy, et al. Standards Track [Page 67]