Michael E. Porter
This article has benefited greatly from the assistance of many individuals and
companies. The author gives special thanks to Jan Rivkin, the coauthor of a
related paper. Substantial research contributions have been made by Nicolaj
Siggelkow, Dawn Sylvester, and Lucia Marshall. Tarun Khanna, Roger Martin, and
Anita McGahan have provided especially extensive comments.
I. Operational Effectiveness Is Not Strategy
For almost two decades, managers have been learning to play by a new set of
rules. Companies must be flexible to respond rapidly to competitive and market
changes. They must benchmark continuously to achieve best practice. They must
outsource aggressively to gain efficiencies. And they must nurture a few core
competencies in race to stay ahead of rivals.
Positioning once the heart of strategy is rejected as too static for today s
dynamic markets and changing technologies. According to the new dogma, rivals
can quickly copy any market position, and competitive advantage is, at best,
temporary.
But those beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and they are leading more and more
companies down the path of mutually destructive competition. True, some
barriers to competition are falling as regulation eases and markets become
global. True, companies have properly invested energy in becoming leaner and
more nimble. In many industries, however, what some call hypercompetition is a
self-inflicted wound, not the inevitable outcome of a changing paradigm of
competition.
The root of the problem is the failure to distinguish between operational
effectiveness and strategy. The quest for productivity, quality, and speed has
spawned a remarkable number of management tools and techniques: total quality
management, benchmarking, time-based competition, outsourcing, partnering,
reengineering, change management. Although the resulting operational
improvements have often been dramatic, many companies have been frustrated by
their inability to translate those gains into sustainable profitability. And
bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, management tools have taken the place of
strategy. As managers push to improve on all fronts, they move farther away
from viable competitive positions.
Operational Effectiveness: Necessary but Not Sufficient
Operational effectiveness and strategy are both essential to superior
performance, which, after all, is the primary goal of any enterprise. But they
work in very different ways.
A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it
can preserve. It must deliver greater value to customers or create comparable
value at a lower cost, or do both. The arithmetic of superior profitability
then follows: delivering greater value allows a company to charge higher
average unit prices; greater efficiency results in lower average unit costs.
A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it
can preserve.
Ultimately, all differences between companies in cost or price derive from the
hundreds of activities required to create, produce, sell, and deliver their
products or services, such as calling on customers, assembling final products,
and training employees. Cost is generated by performing activities, and cost
advantage arises from performing particular activities more efficiently than
competitors. Similarly, differentiation arises from both the choice of
activities and how they are performed. Activities, then are the basic units of
competitive advantage. Overall advantage or disadvantage results from all a
company s activities, not only a few.1
Operational effectiveness (OE) means performing similar activities better than
rivals perform them. Operational effectiveness includes but is not limited to
efficiency. It refers to any number of practices that allow a company to better
utilize its inputs by, for example, reducing defects in products or developing
better products faster. In contrast, strategic positioning means performing
different activities from rivals or performing similar activities in different
ways.
Differences in operational effectiveness among companies are pervasive. Some
companies are able to get more out of their inputs than others because they
eliminate wasted effort, employ more advanced technology, motivate employees
better, or have greater insight into managing particular activities or sets of
activities. Such differences in operational effectiveness are an important
source of differences in profitability among competitors because they directly
affect relative cost positions and levels of differentiation.
Differences in operational effectiveness were at the heart of the Japanese
challenge to Western companies in the 1980s. The Japanese were so far ahead of
rivals in operational effectiveness that they could offer lower cost and
superior quality at the same time. It is worth dwelling on this point, because
so much recent thinking about competition depends on it. Imagine for a moment a
productivity frontier that constitutes the sum of all existing best practices
at any given time. Think of it as the maximum value that a company delivering a
particular product or service can create at a given cost, using the best
available technologies, skills, management techniques, and purchased inputs.
The productivity frontier can apply to individual activities, to groups of
linked activities such as order processing and manufacturing, and to an entire
company s activities. When a company improves its operational effectiveness, it
moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require capital investment, different
personnel, or simply new ways of managing.
The productivity frontier is constantly shifting outward as new technologies
and management approaches are developed and as new inputs become available.
Laptop computers, mobile communications, the Internet, and software such as
Lotus Notes, for example, have redefined the productivity frontier for
sales-force operations and created rich possibilities for linking sales with
such activities as order processing and after-sales support. Similarly, lean
production, which involves a family of activities, has allowed substantial
improvements in manufacturing productivity and asset utilization.
For at least the past decade, managers have been preoccupied with improving
operational effectiveness. Through programs such as TQM, time-based
competition, and benchmarking, they have changed how they perform activities in
order to eliminate inefficiencies, improve customer satisfaction, and achieve
best practice. Hoping to keep up with shifts in the productivity frontier,
managers have embraced continuous improvement, empowerment, change management,
and the so-called learning organization. The popularity of outsourcing and the
virtual corporation reflect the growing recognition that it is difficult to
perform all activities as productively as specialists.
As companies move to the frontier, they can often improve on multiple
dimensions of performance at the same time. For example, manufacturers that
adopted the Japanese practice of rapid changeovers in the 1980s were able to
lower cost and improve differentiation simultaneously. What were once believed
to be real trade-offs between defects and costs, for example turned out to be
illusions created by poor operational effectiveness. Managers have learned to
reject such false trade-offs.
Constant improvement in operational effectiveness is necessary to achieve
superior profitability. However, it is not usually sufficient. Few companies
have competed successfully on the basis of operational effectiveness over an
extended period, and staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day. The most
obvious reason for that is the rapid diffusion of best practices. Competitors
can quickly imitate management techniques, new technologies, input
improvements, and superior ways of meeting customers needs. The most generic
solutions those that can be used in multiple settings diffuse the fastest.
Witness the proliferation of OE techniques accelerated by support from
consultants.
OE competition shifts the productivity frontier outward, effectively raising
the bar for everyone. But although such competition produces absolute
improvement in operational effectiveness, it leads to relative improvement for
no one. Consider the $5 billion-plus U.S. commercial-printing industry. The
major players R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, Quebecor, World Color Press, and
Big Flower Press are competing head to head, serving all types of customers,
offering the same array of printing technologies (gravure and web offset),
investing heavily in the same new equipment, running their presses faster, and
reducing crew sizes. But the resulting major productivity gains are being
captured by customers and equipment suppliers, not retained in superior
profitability. Even industry-leader Donnelley s profit margin, consistently
higher than 7% in the 1980s, fell to less than 4.6% in 1995. This pattern is
playing itself out in industry after industry. Even the Japanese, pioneers of
the new competition, suffer from persistently low profits. (See the insert
Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies. )
The second reason that improved operational effectiveness is insufficient
competitive convergence is more subtle and insidious. The more benchmarking
companies do, the more they look alike. The more that rivals outsource
activities to efficient third parties, often the same ones, the more generic
those activities become. As rivals imitate one another s improvements in
quality, cycle times, or supplier partnerships, strategies converge and
competition becomes a series of races down identical paths that no one can win.
Competition based on operational effectiveness alone is mutually destructive,
leading to wars of attrition that can be arrested only by limiting competition.
The recent wave of industry consolidation through mergers makes sense in the
context of OE competition. Driven by performance pressures but lacking
strategic vision, company after company has had no better idea than to buy up
its rivals. The competitors left standing are often those that outlasted
others, not companies with real advantage.
After a decade of impressive gains in operational effectiveness, many companies
are facing diminishing returns. Continuous improvement has been etched on
managers brains. But its tools unwittingly draw companies toward imitation and
homogeneity. Gradually, managers have let operational effectiveness supplant
strategy. The result is zero-sum competition, static or declining prices, and
pressures on costs that compromise companies ability to invest in the business
for the long term.
II. Strategy Rests on Unique Activities
Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a
different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.
Southwest Airlines Company, for example, offers short-haul, low-cost,
point-to-point service between midsize cities and secondary airports in large
cities. Southwest avoids large airports and does not fly great distances. Its
customers include business travelers, families, and students. Southwest s
frequent departures and low fares attract price-sensitive customers who
otherwise would travel by bus or car, and convenience-oriented travelers who
would choose a full-service airline on other routes.
Most managers describe strategic positioning in terms of their customers:
Southwest Airlines serves price- and convenience-sensitive travelers, for
example. But the essence of strategy is in the activities choosing to perform
activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals.
Otherwise, a strategy is nothing more than a marketing slogan that will not
withstand competition.
A full-service airline is configured to get passengers from almost any point A
to any point B. To reach a large number of destinations and serve passengers
with connecting flights, full-service airlines employ a hub-and-spoke system
centered on major airports. To attract passengers who desire more comfort, they
offer first-class or business-class service. To accommodate passengers who must
change planes, they coordinate schedules and check and transfer baggage.
Because some passengers will be traveling for many hours, full-service airlines
serve meals.
Southwest, in contrast, tailors all its activities to deliver low-cost,
convenient service on its particular type of route. Through fast turnarounds at
the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able to keep planes flying longer
hours than rivals and provide frequent departures with fewer aircraft.
Southwest does not offer meals, assigned seats, interline baggage checking, or
premium classes of service. Automated ticketing at the gate encourages
customers to bypass travel agents, allowing Southwest to avoid their
commissions. A standardized fleet of 737 aircraft boosts the efficiency of
maintenance.
The essence of strategy is choosing to perform activities differently than
rivals do.
Southwest has staked out a unique and valuable strategic position based on a
tailored set of activities. On the routes served by Southwest, a full-service
airline could never be as convenient or as low cost.
Ikea, the global furniture retailer based in Sweden, also has a clear strategic
positioning. Ikea targets young furniture buyers who want style at low cost.
What turns this marketing concept into a strategic positioning is the tailored
set of activities that make it work. Like Southwest, Ikea has chosen to perform
activities differently from its rivals.
Consider the typical furniture store. Showrooms display samples of the
merchandise. One area might contain 25 sofas; another will display five dining
tables. But those items represent only a fraction of the choices available to
customers. Dozens of books displaying fabric swatches or wood samples or
alternate styles offer customers thousands of product varieties to choose from.
Salespeople often escort customers through the store, answering questions and
helping them navigate this maze of choices. Once a customer makes a selection,
the order is relayed to a third-party manufacturer. With luck, the furniture
will be delivered to the customer s home within six to eight weeks. This is a
value chain that maximizes customization and service but does so at high cost.
In contrast, Ikea serves customers who are happy to trade off service for cost.
Instead of having a sales associate trail customers around the store, Ikea uses
a self-service model based on clear, in-store displays. Rather than rely solely
on third-party manufacturers, Ikea designs its own low-cost, modular,
ready-to-assemble furniture to fit its positioning. In huge stores, Ikea
displays every product it sells in room-like settings, so customers don t need
a decorator to help them imagine how to put the pieces together. Adjacent to
the furnished showrooms is a warehouse section with the products in boxes on
pallets. Customers are expected to do their own pickup and delivery, and Ikea
will even sell you a roof rack for your car that you can return for a refund on
your next visit.
Although much of its low-cost position comes from having customers do it
themselves, Ikea offers a number of extra services that its competitors do
not. In-store child care is one. Extended hours are another. Those services are
uniquely aligned with the needs of its customers, who are young, not wealthy,
likely to have children (but no nanny), and, because they work for a living,
have a need to shop at odd hours.
The Origins of Strategic Positions
Strategic positions emerge from three distinct sources, which are not mutually
exclusive and often overlap. First, positioning can be based on producing a
subset of an industry s products or services. I call this variety-based
positioning because it is based on the choice of product or service varieties
rather than customer segments. Variety-based positioning makes economic sense
when a company can best produce particular products or services using
distinctive sets of activities.
Strategic positions can be based on customers needs, customers accessibility,
or the variety of a company s products or services.
Jiffy Lube International, for instance, specializes in automotive lubricants
and does not offer other car repair or maintenance services. Its value chain
produces faster service at a lower cost than broader line repair shops, a
combination so attractive that many customers subdivide their purchases, buying
oil changes from the focused competitor, Jiffy Lube, and going to rivals for
other services.
The Vanguard Group, a leader in the mutual fund industry, is another example of
variety-based positioning. Vanguard provides an array of common stock, bond,
and money market funds that offer predictable performance and rock-bottom
expenses. The company s investment approach deliberately sacrifices the
possibility of extraordinary performance in any one year for good relative
performance in every year. Vanguard is known, for example, for its index funds.
It avoids making bets on interest rates and steers clear of narrow stock
groups. Fund managers keep trading levels low, which holds expenses down; in
addition, the company discourages customers from rapid buying and selling
because doing so drives up costs and can force a fund manager to trade in order
to deploy new capital and raise cash for redemptions. Vanguard also takes a
consistent low-cost approach to managing distribution, customer service, and
marketing. Many investors include one or more Vanguard funds in their
portfolio, while buying aggressively managed or specialized funds from
competitors.
The people who use Vanguard or Jiffy Lube are responding to a superior value
chain for a particular type of service. A variety-based positioning can serve a
wide array of customers, but for most it will meet only a subset of their
needs.
A second basis for positioning is that of serving most or all the needs of a
particular group of customers. I call this needs-based positioning, which comes
closer to traditional thinking about targeting a segment of customers. It
arises when there are groups of customers with differing needs, and when a
tailored set of activities can serve those needs best. Some groups of customers
are more price sensitive than others, demand different product features, and
need varying amounts of information, support, and services. Ikea s customers
are a good example of such a group. Ikea seeks to meet all the home furnishing
needs of its target customers, not just a subset of them.
A variant of needs-based positioning arises when the same customer has
different needs on different occasions or for different types of transactions.
The same person, for example, may have different needs when traveling on
business than when traveling for pleasure with the family. Buyers of cans
beverage companies, for example will likely have different needs from their
primary supplier than from their secondary source.
It is intuitive for most managers to conceive of their business in terms of the
customers needs they are meeting. But a critical element of needs-based
positioning is not at all intuitive and is often overlooked. Differences in
needs will not translate into meaningful positions unless the best set of
activities to satisfy them also differs. If that were not the case, every
competitor could meet those same needs, and there would be nothing unique or
valuable about the positioning.
In private banking, for example, Bessemer Trust Company targets families with a
minimum of $5 million in investable assets who want capital preservation
combined with wealth accumulation. By assigning one sophisticated account
officer for every 14 families, Bessemer has configured its activities for
personalized service. Meetings, for example, are more likely to be held at a
client s ranch or yacht than in the office. Bessemer offers a wide array of
customized services, including investment management and estate administration,
oversight of oil and gas investments, and accounting for racehorses and
aircraft. Loans, a staple of most private banks, are rarely needed by Bessemer
s clients and make up a tiny fraction of its client balances and income.
Despite the most generous compensation of account officers and the highest
personnel cost as a percentage of operating expenses, Bessemer s
differentiation with its target families produces a return on equity estimated
to be the highest of any private banking competitor.
Citibank s private bank, on the other hand, serves clients with minimum assets
of about $250,000 who, in contrast to Bessemer s clients, want convenient
access to loans from jumbo mortgages to deal financing. Citibank s account
managers are primarily lenders. When clients need other services, their account
manager refers them to other Citibank specialists, each of whom handles
prepackaged products. Citibank s system is less customized than Bessemer s and
allows it to have a lower manager-to-client ratio of 1:125. Biannual office
meetings are offered only for the largest clients. Both Bessemer and Citibank
have tailored their activities to meet the needs of a different group of
private banking customers. The same value chain cannot profitably meet the
needs of both groups.
The third basis for positioning is that of segmenting customers who are
accessible in different ways. Although their needs are similar to those of
other customers, the best configuration of activities to reach them is
different. I call this access-based positioning. Access can be a function of
customer geography or customer scale or of anything that requires a different
set of activities to reach customers in the best way.
Segmenting by access is less common and less well understood than the other two
bases. Carmike Cinemas, for example, operates movie theaters exclusively in
cities and towns with populations under 200,000. How does Carmike make money in
markets that are not only small but also won t support big-city ticket prices?
It does so through a set of activities that result in a lean cost structure.
Carmike s small-town customers can be served through standardized, low-cost
theater complexes requiring fewer screens and less sophisticated projection
technology than big-city theaters. The company s proprietary information system
and management process eliminate the need for local administrative staff beyond
a single theater manager. Carmike also reaps advantages from centralized
purchasing, lower rent and payroll costs (because of its locations), and
rock-bottom corporate overhead of 2% (the industry average is 5%). Operating in
small communities also allows Carmike to practice a highly personal form of
marketing in which the theater manager knows patrons and promotes attendance
through personal contacts. By being the dominant if not the only theater in its
markets the main competition is often the high school football team Carmike is
also able to get its pick of films and negotiate better terms with
distributors.
Rural versus urban-based customers are one example of access driving
differences in activities. Serving small rather than large customers or densely
rather than sparsely situated customers are other examples in which the best
way to configure marketing, order processing, logistics, and after-sale service
activities to meet the similar needs of distinct groups will often differ.
Positioning is not only about carving out a niche. A position emerging from any
of the sources can be broad or narrow. A focused competitor, such as Ikea,
targets the special needs of a subset of customers and designs its activities
accordingly. Focused competitors thrive on groups of customers who are
overserved (and hence overpriced) by more broadly targeted competitors, or
underserved (and hence underpriced). A broadly targeted competitor for example,
Vanguard or Delta Air Lines serves a wide array of customers, performing a set
of activities designed to meet their common needs. It ignores or meets only
partially the more idiosyncratic needs of particular customer customer groups.
Whatever the basis variety, needs, access, or some combination of the three
positioning requires a tailored set of activities because it is always a
function of differences on the supply side; that is, of differences in
activities. However, positioning is not always a function of differences on the
demand, or customer, side. Variety and access positionings, in particular, do
not rely on any customer differences. In practice, however, variety or access
differences often accompany needs differences. The tastes that is, the needs of
Carmike s small-town customers, for instance, run more toward comedies,
Westerns, action films, and family entertainment. Carmike does not run any
films rated NC-17.
Having defined positioning, we can now begin to answer the question, What is
strategy? Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position,
involving a different set of activities. If there were only one ideal position,
there would be no need for strategy. Companies would face a simple imperative
win the race to discover and preempt it. The essence of strategic positioning
is to choose activities that are different from rivals . If the same set of
activities were best to produce all varieties, meet all needs, and access all
customers, companies could easily shift among them and operational
effectiveness would determine performance.
III. A Sustainable Strategic Position Requires Trade-offs
Choosing a unique position, however, is not enough to guarantee a sustainable
advantage. A valuable position will attract imitation by incumbents, who are
likely to copy it in one of two ways.
First, a competitor can reposition itself to match the superior performer. J.C.
Penney, for instance, has been repositioning itself from a Sears clone to a
more upscale, fashion-oriented, soft-goods retailer. A second and far more
common type of imitation is straddling. The straddler seeks to match the
benefits of a successful position while maintaining its existing position. It
grafts new features, services, or technologies onto the activities it already
performs.
For those who argue that competitors can copy any market position, the airline
industry is a perfect test case. It would seem that nearly any competitor could
imitate any other airline s activities. Any airline can buy the same planes,
lease the gates, and match the menus and ticketing and baggage handling
services offered by other airlines.
Continental Airlines saw how well Southwest was doing and decided to straddle.
While maintaining its position as a full-service airline, Continental also set
out to match Southwest on a number of point-to-point routes. The airline dubbed
the new service Continental Lite. It eliminated meals and first-class service,
increased departure frequency, lowered fares, and shortened turnaround time at
the gate. Because Continental remained a full-service airline on other routes,
it continued to use travel agents and its mixed fleet of planes and to provide
baggage checking and seat assignments.
But a strategic position is not sustainable unless there are trade-offs with
other positions. Trade-offs occur when activities are incompatible. Simply put,
a trade-off means that more of one thing necessitates less of another. An
airline can choose to serve meals adding cost and slowing turnaround time at
the gate or it can choose not to, but it cannot do both without bearing major
inefficiencies.
Trade-offs create the need for choice and protect against repositioners and
straddlers. Consider Neutrogena soap. Neutrogena Corporation s variety-based
positioning is built on a kind to the skin, residue-free soap formulated for
pH balance. With a large detail force calling on dermatologists, Neutrogena s
marketing strategy looks more like a drug company s than a soap maker s. It
advertises in medical journals, sends direct mail to doctors, attends medical
conferences, and performs research at its own Skincare Institute. To reinforce
its positioning, Neutrogena originally focused its distribution on drugstores
and avoided price promotions. Neutrogena uses a slow, more expensive
manufacturing process to mold its fragile soap.
In choosing this position, Neutrogena said no to the deodorants and skin
softeners that many customers desire in their soap. It gave up the large-volume
potential of selling through supermarkets and using price promotions. It
sacrificed manufacturing efficiencies to achieve the soap s desired attributes.
In its original positioning, Neutrogena made a whole raft of trade-offs like
those, trade-offs that protected the company from imitators.
Trade-offs arise for three reasons. The first is inconsistencies in image or
reputation. A company known for delivering one kind of value may lack
credibility and confuse customers or even undermine its reputation if it
delivers another kind of value or attempts to deliver two inconsistent things
at the same time. For example, Ivory soap, with its position as a basic,
inexpensive everyday soap would have a hard time reshaping its image to match
Neutrogena s premium medical reputation. Efforts to create a new image
typically cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in a major industry
a powerful barrier to imitation.
Second, and more important, trade-offs arise from activities themselves.
Different positions (with their tailored activities) require different product
configurations, different equipment, different employee behavior, different
skills, and different management systems. Many trade-offs reflect
inflexibilities in machinery, people, or systems. The more Ikea has configured
its activities to lower costs by having its customers do their own assembly and
delivery, the less able it is to satisfy customers who require higher levels of
service.
However, trade-offs can be even more basic. In general, value is destroyed if
an activity is overdesigned or underdesigned for its use. For example, even if
a given salesperson were capable of providing a high level of assistance to one
customer and none to another, the salesperson s talent (and some of his or her
cost) would be wasted on the second customer. Moreover, productivity can
improve when variation of an activity is limited. By providing a high level of
assistance all the time, the salesperson and the entire sales activity can
often achieve efficiencies of learning and scale.
Finally, trade-offs arise from limits on internal coordination and control. By
clearly choosing to compete in one way and not another, senior management makes
organizational priorities clear. Companies that try to be all things to all
customers, in contrast, risk confusion in the trenches as employees attempt to
make day-to-day operating decisions without a clear framework.
Positioning trade-offs are pervasive in competition and essential to strategy.
They create the need for choice and purposefully limit what a company offers.
They deter straddling or repositioning, because competitors that engage in
those approaches undermine their strategies and degrade the value of their
existing activities.
Trade-offs are essential to strategy. They create the need for choice and
purposefully limit what a company offers.
Trade-offs ultimately grounded Continental Lite. The airline lost hundreds of
millions of dollars, and the CEO lost his job. Its planes were delayed leaving
congested hub cities or slowed at the gate by baggage transfers. Late flights
and cancellations generated a thousand complaints a day. Continental Lite could
not afford to compete on price and still pay standard travel-agent commissions,
but neither could it do without agents for its full-service business. The
airline compromised by cutting commissions for all Continental flights across
the board. Similarly, it could not afford to offer the same frequent-flier
benefits to travelers paying the much lower ticket prices for Lite service. It
compromised again by lowering the rewards of Continental s entire
frequent-flier program. The results: angry travel agents and full-service
customers.
Continental tried to compete in two ways at once. In trying to be low cost on
some routes and full service on others, Continental paid an enormous straddling
penalty. If there were no trade-offs between the two positions, Continental
could have succeeded. But the absence of trade-offs is a dangerous half-truth
that managers must unlearn. Quality is not always free. Southwest s
convenience, one kind of high quality, happens to be consistent with low costs
because its frequent departures are facilitated by a number of low-cost
practices fast gate turnarounds and automated ticketing, for example. However,
other dimensions of airline quality an assigned seat, a meal, or baggage
transfer require costs to provide.
In general, false trade-offs between cost and quality occur primarily when
there is redundant or wasted effort, poor control or accuracy, or weak
coordination. Simultaneous improvement of cost and differentiation is possible
only when a company begins far behind the productivity frontier or when the
frontier shifts outward. At the frontier, where companies have achieved current
best practice, the trade-off between cost and differentiation is very real
indeed.
After a decade of enjoying productivity advantages, Honda Motor Company and
Toyota Motor Corporation recently bumped up against the frontier. In 1995,
faced with increasing customer resistance to higher automobile prices, Honda
found that the only way to produce a less-expensive car was to skimp on
features. In the United States, it replaced the rear disk brakes on the Civic
with lower-cost drum brakes and used cheaper fabric for the back seat, hoping
customers would not notice. Toyota tried to sell a version of its best-selling
Corolla in Japan with unpainted bumpers and cheaper seats. In Toyota s case,
customers rebelled, and the company quickly dropped the new model.
For the past decade, as managers have improved operational effectiveness
greatly, they have internalized the idea that eliminating trade-offs is a good
thing. But if there are no trade-offs companies will never achieve a
sustainable advantage. They will have to run faster and faster just to stay in
place.
As we return to the question, What is strategy? we see that trade-offs add a
new dimension to the answer. Strategy is making trade-offs in competing. The
essence of strategy is choosing what not to do. Without trade-offs, there would
be no need for choice and thus no need for strategy. Any good idea could and
would be quickly imitated. Again, performance would once again depend wholly on
operational effectiveness.
IV. Fit Drives Both Competitive Advantage and Sustainability
Positioning choices determine not only which activities a company will perform
and how it will configure individual activities but also how activities relate
to one another. While operational effectiveness is about achieving excellence
in individual activities, or functions, strategy is about combining activities.
Southwest s rapid gate turnaround, which allows frequent departures and greater
use of aircraft, is essential to its high-convenience, low-cost positioning.
But how does Southwest achieve it? Part of the answer lies in the company s
well-paid gate and ground crews, whose productivity in turnarounds is enhanced
by flexible union rules. But the bigger part of the answer lies in how
Southwest performs other activities. With no meals, no seat assignment, and no
interline baggage transfers, Southwest avoids having to perform activities that
slow down other airlines. It selects airports and routes to avoid congestion
that introduces delays. Southwest s strict limits on the type and length of
routes make standardized aircraft possible: every aircraft Southwest turns is a
Boeing 737.
What is Southwest s core competence? Its key success factors? The correct
answer is that everything matters. Southwest s strategy involves a whole system
of activities, not a collection of parts. Its competitive advantage comes from
the way its activities fit and reinforce one another.
Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest
link.
Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest
link. As in most companies with good strategies, Southwest s activities
complement one another in ways that create real economic value. One activity s
cost, for example, is lowered because of the way other activities are
performed. Similarly, one activity s value to customers can be enhanced by a
company s other activities. That is the way strategic fit creates competitive
advantage and superior profitability.
Types of Fit
The importance of fit among functional policies is one of the oldest ideas in
strategy. Gradually, however, it has been supplanted on the management agenda.
Rather than seeing the company as a whole, managers have turned to core
competencies, critical resources, and key success factors. In fact, fit is
a far more central component of competitive advantage than most realize.
Fit is important because discrete activities often affect one another. A
sophisticated sales force, for example, confers a greater advantage when the
company s product embodies premium technology and its marketing approach
emphasizes customer assistance and support. A production line with high levels
of model variety is more valuable when combined with an inventory and order
processing system that minimizes the need for stocking finished goods, a sales
process equipped to explain and encourage customization, and an advertising
theme that stresses the benefits of product variations that meet a customer s
special needs. Such complementarities are pervasive in strategy. Although some
fit among activities is generic and applies to many companies, the most
valuable fit is strategy-specific because it enhances a position s uniqueness
and amplifies trade-offs.2
There are three types of fit, although they are not mutually exclusive.
First-order fit is simple consistency between each activity (function) and the
overall strategy. Vanguard, for example, aligns all activities with its
low-cost strategy. It minimizes portfolio turnover and does not need highly
compensated money managers. The company distributes its funds directly,
avoiding commissions to brokers. It also limits advertising, relying instead on
public relations and word-of-mouth recommendations. Vanguard ties its employees
bonuses to cost savings.
Consistency ensures that the competitive advantages of activities cumulate and
do not erode or cancel themselves out. It makes the strategy easier to
communicate to customers, employees, and shareholders, and improves
implementation through single-mindedness in the corporation.
Second-order fit occurs when activities are reinforcing. Neutrogena, for
example, markets to upscale hotels eager to offer their guests a soap
recommended by dermatologists. Hotels grant Neutrogena the privilege of using
its customary packaging while requiring other soaps to feature the hotel s
name. Once guests have tried Neutrogena in a luxury hotel, they are more likely
to purchase it at the drugstore or ask their doctor about it. Thus Neutrogena s
medical and hotel marketing activities reinforce one another, lowering total
marketing costs.
In another example, Bic Corporation sells a narrow line of standard, low-priced
pens to virtually all major customer markets (retail, commercial, promotional,
and giveaway) through virtually all available channels. As with any
variety-based positioning serving a broad group of customers, Bic emphasizes a
common need (low price for an acceptable pen) and uses marketing approaches
with a broad reach (a large sales force and heavy television advertising). Bic
gains the benefits of consistency across nearly all activities, including
product design that emphasizes ease of manufacturing, plants configured for low
cost, aggressive purchasing to minimize material costs, and in-house parts
production whenever the economics dictate.
Yet Bic goes beyond simple consistency because its activities are reinforcing.
For example, the company uses point-of-sale displays and frequent packaging
changes to stimulate impulse buying. To handle point-of-sale tasks, a company
needs a large sales force. Bic s is the largest in its industry, and it handles
point-of-sale activities better than its rivals do. Moreover, the combination
of point-of-sale activity, heavy television advertising, and packaging changes
yields far more impulse buying than any activity in isolation could.
Third-order fit goes beyond activity reinforcement to what I call optimization
of effort. The Gap, a retailer of casual clothes, considers product
availability in its stores a critical element of its strategy. The Gap could
keep products either by holding store inventory or by restocking from
warehouses. The Gap has optimized its effort across these activities by
restocking its selection of basic clothing almost daily out of three
warehouses, thereby minimizing the need to carry large in-store inventories.
The emphasis is on restocking because the Gap s merchandising strategy sticks
to basic items in relatively few colors. While comparable retailers achieve
turns of three to four times per year, the Gap turns its inventory seven and a
half times per year. Rapid restocking, moreover, reduces the cost of
implementing the Gap s short model cycle, which is six to eight weeks long.3
Coordination and information exchange across activities to eliminate redundancy
and minimize wasted effort are the most basic types of effort optimization. But
there are higher levels as well. Product design choices, for example, can
eliminate the need for after-sale service or make it possible for customers to
perform service activities themselves. Similarly, coordination with suppliers
or distribution channels can eliminate the need for some in-house activities,
such as end-user training.
The competitive value of individual activities cannot be separated from the
whole.
In all three types of fit, the whole matters more than any individual part.
Competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of activities. The fit
among activities substantially reduces cost or increases differentiation.
Beyond that, the competitive value of individual activities or the associated
skills, competencies, or resources cannot be decoupled from the system or the
strategy. Thus in competitive companies it can be misleading to explain success
by specifying individual strengths, core competencies, or critical resources.
The list of strengths cuts across many functions, and one strength blends into
others. It is more useful to think in terms of themes that pervade many
activities, such as low cost, a particular notion of customer service, or a
particular conception of the value delivered. These themes are embodied in
nests of tightly linked activities.
Fit and sustainability
Strategic fit among many activities is fundamental not only to competitive
advantage but also to the sustainability of that advantage. It is harder for a
rival to match an array of interlocked activities than it is merely to imitate
a particular sales-force approach, match a process technology, or replicate a
set of product features. Positions built on systems of activities are far more
sustainable than those built on individual activities.
Consider this simple exercise. The probability that competitors can match any
activity is often less than one. The probabilities then quickly compound to
make matching the entire system highly unlikely (.9 .9 = .81; .9 .9 .9
.9 = .66, and so on). Existing companies that try to reposition or straddle
will be forced to reconfigure many activities. And even new entrants, though
they do not confront the trade-offs facing established rivals, still face
formidable barriers to imitation.
The more a company s positioning rests on activity systems with second- and
third-order fit, the more sustainable its advantage will be. Such systems, by
their very nature, are usually difficult to untangle from outside the company
and therefore hard to imitate. And even if rivals can identify the relevant
interconnections, they will have difficulty replicating them. Achieving fit is
difficult because it requires the integration of decisions and actions across
many independent subunits.
A competitor seeking to match an activity system gains little by imitating only
some activities and not matching the whole. Performance does not improve; it
can decline. Recall Continental Lite s disastrous attempt to imitate Southwest.
Finally, fit among a company s activities creates pressures and incentives to
improve operational effectiveness, which makes imitation even harder. Fit means
that poor performance in one activity will degrade the performance in others,
so that weaknesses are exposed and more prone to get attention. Conversely,
improvements in one activity will pay dividends in others. Companies with
strong fit among their activities are rarely inviting targets. Their
superiority in strategy and in execution only compounds their advantages and
raises the hurdle for imitators.
When activities complement one another, rivals will get little benefit from
imitation unless they successfully match the whole system. Such situations tend
to promote winner-take-all competition. The company that builds the best
activity system Toys R Us, for instance wins, while rivals with similar
strategies Child World and Lionel Leisure fall behind. Thus finding a new
strategic position is often preferable to being the second or third imitator of
an occupied position.
The most viable positions are those whose activity systems are incompatible
because of tradeoffs. Strategic positioning sets the trade-off rules that
define how individual activities will be configured and integrated. Seeing
strategy in terms of activity systems only makes it clearer why organizational
structure, systems, and processes need to be strategy-specific. Tailoring
organization to strategy, in turn, makes complementarities more achievable and
contributes to sustainability.
One implication is that strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade
or more, not of a single planning cycle. Continuity fosters improvements in
individual activities and the fit across activities, allowing an organization
to build unique capabilities and skills tailored to its strategy. Continuity
also reinforces a company s identity.
Strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade or more, not of a single
planning cycle.
Conversely, frequent shifts in positioning are costly. Not only must a company
reconfigure individual activities, but it must also realign entire systems.
Some activities may never catch up to the vacillating strategy. The inevitable
result of frequent shifts in strategy, or of failure to choose a distinct
position in the first place, is me-too or hedged activity configurations,
inconsistencies across functions, and organizational dissonance.
What is strategy? We can now complete the answer to this question. Strategy is
creating fit among a company s activities. The success of a strategy depends on
doing many things well not just a few and integrating among them. If there is
no fit among activities, there is no distinctive strategy and little
sustainability. Management reverts to the simpler task of overseeing
independent functions, and operational effectiveness determines an organization
s relative performance.
V. Rediscovering Strategy: The Failure to Choose
Why do so many companies fail to have a strategy? Why do managers avoid making
strategic choices? Or, having made them in the past, why do managers so often
let strategies decay and blur?
Commonly, the threats to strategy are seen to emanate from outside a company
because of changes in technology or the behavior of competitors. Although
external changes can be the problem, the greater threat to strategy often comes
from within. A sound strategy is undermined by a misguided view of competition,
by organizational failures, and, especially, by the desire to grow.
Managers have become confused about the necessity of making choices. When many
companies operate far from the productivity frontier, trade-offs appear
unnecessary. It can seem that a well-run company should be able to beat its
ineffective rivals on all dimensions simultaneously. Taught by popular
management thinkers that they do not have to make trade-offs, managers have
acquired a macho sense that to do so is a sign of weakness.
Unnerved by forecasts of hypercompetition, managers increase its likelihood by
imitating everything about their competitors. Exhorted to think in terms of
revolution, managers chase every new technology for its own sake.
The pursuit of operational effectiveness is seductive because it is concrete
and actionable. Over the past decade, managers have been under increasing
pressure to deliver tangible, measurable performance improvements. Programs in
operational effectiveness produce reassuring progress, although superior
profitability may remain elusive. Business publications and consultants flood
the market with information about what other companies are doing, reinforcing
the best-practice mentality. Caught up in the race for operational
effectiveness, many managers simply do not understand the need to have a
strategy.
Companies avoid or blur strategic choices for other reasons as well.
Conventional wisdom within an industry is often strong, homogenizing
competition. Some managers mistake customer focus to mean they must serve all
customer needs or respond to every request from distribution channels. Others
cite the desire to preserve flexibility.
Organizational realities also work against strategy. Trade-offs are
frightening, and making no choice is sometimes preferred to risking blame for a
bad choice. Companies imitate one another in a type of herd behavior, each
assuming rivals know something they do not. Newly empowered employees, who are
urged to seek every possible source of improvement, often lack a vision of the
whole and the perspective to recognize trade-offs. The failure to choose
sometimes comes down to the reluctance to disappoint valued managers or
employees.
The Growth Trap
Among all other influences, the desire to grow has perhaps the most perverse
effect on strategy. Trade-offs and limits appear to constrain growth. Serving
one group of customers and excluding others, for instance, places a real or
imagined limit on revenue growth. Broadly targeted strategies emphasizing low
price result in lost sales with customers sensitive to features or service.
Differentiators lose sales to price-sensitive customers.
Managers are constantly tempted to take incremental steps that surpass those
limits but blur a company s strategic position. Eventually, pressures to grow
or apparent saturation of the target market lead managers to broaden the
position by extending product lines, adding new features, imitating competitors
popular services, matching processes, and even making acquisitions. For
years, Maytag Corporation s success was based on its focus on reliable, durable
washers and dryers, later extended to include dishwashers. However,
conventional wisdom emerging within the industry supported the notion of
selling a full line of products. Concerned with slow industry growth and
competition from broad-line appliance makers, Maytag was pressured by dealers
and encouraged by customers to extend its line. Maytag expanded into
refrigerators and cooking products under the Maytag brand and acquired other
brands Jenn-Air, Hardwick Stove, Hoover, Admiral, and Magic Chef with disparate
positions. Maytag has grown substantially from $684 million in 1985 to a peak
of $3.4 billion in 1994, but return on sales has declined from 8% to 12% in the
1970s and 1980s to an average of less than 1% between 1989 and 1995. Cost
cutting will improve this performance, but laundry and dishwasher products
still anchor Maytag s profitability.
Neutrogena may have fallen into the same trap. In the early 1990s, its U.S.
distribution broadened to include mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart Stores.
Under the Neutrogena name, the company expanded into a wide variety of products
eye-makeup remover and shampoo, for example in which it was not unique and
which diluted its image, and it began turning to price promotions.
Compromises and inconsistencies in the pursuit of growth will erode the
competitive advantage a company had with its original varieties or target
customers. Attempts to compete in several ways at once create confusion and
undermine organizational motivation and focus. Profits fall, but more revenue
is seen as the answer. Managers are unable to make choices, so the company
embarks on a new round of broadening and compromises. Often, rivals continue to
match each other until desperation breaks the cycle, resulting in a merger or
downsizing to the original positioning.
Profitable Growth
Many companies, after a decade of restructuring and cost-cutting, are turning
their attention to growth. Too often, efforts to grow blur uniqueness, create
compromises, reduce fit, and ultimately undermine competitive advantage. In
fact, the growth imperative is hazardous to strategy.
What approaches to growth preserve and reinforce strategy? Broadly, the
prescription is to concentrate on deepening a strategic position rather than
broadening and compromising it. One approach is to look for extensions of the
strategy that leverage the existing activity system by offering features or
services that rivals would find impossible or costly to match on a stand-alone
basis. In other words, managers can ask themselves which activities, features,
or forms of competition are feasible or less costly to them because of
complementary activities that their company performs.
Deepening a position involves making the company s activities more distinctive,
strengthening fit, and communicating the strategy better to those customers who
should value it. But many companies succumb to the temptation to chase easy
growth by adding hot features, products, or services without screening them or
adapting them to their strategy. Or they target new customers or markets in
which the company has little special to offer. A company can often grow faster
and far more profitably by better penetrating needs and varieties where it is
distinctive than by slugging it out in potentially higher growth arenas in
which the company lacks uniqueness. Carmike, now the largest theater chain in
the United States, owes its rapid growth to its disciplined concentration on
small markets. The company quickly sells any big-city theaters that come to it
as part of an acquisition.
Globalization often allows growth that is consistent with strategy, opening up
larger markets for a focused strategy. Unlike broadening domestically,
expanding globally is likely to leverage and reinforce a company s unique
position and identity.
Companies seeking growth through broadening within their industry can best
contain the risks to strategy by creating stand-alone units, each with its own
brand name and tailored activities. Maytag has clearly struggled with this
issue. On the one hand, it has organized its premium and value brands into
separate units with different strategic positions. On the other, it has created
an umbrella appliance company for all its brands to gain critical mass. With
shared design, manufacturing, distribution, and customer service, it will be
hard to avoid homogenization. If a given business unit attempts to compete with
different positions for different products or customers, avoiding compromise is
nearly impossible.
The Role of Leadership
The challenge of developing or reestablishing a clear strategy is often
primarily an organizational one and depends on leadership. With so many forces
at work against making choices and tradeoffs in organizations, a clear
intellectual framework to guide strategy is a necessary counterweight.
Moreover, strong leaders willing to make choices are essential.
In many companies, leadership has degenerated into orchestrating operational
improvements and making deals. But the leader s role is broader and far more
important. General management is more than the stewardship of individual
functions. Its core is strategy: defining and communicating the company s
unique position, making trade-offs, and forging fit among activities. The
leader must provide the discipline to decide which industry changes and
customer needs the company will respond to, while avoiding organizational
distractions and maintaining the company s distinctiveness. Managers at lower
levels lack the perspective and the confidence to maintain a strategy. There
will be constant pressures to compromise, relax trade-offs, and emulate rivals.
One of the leader s jobs is to teach others in the organization about strategy
and to say no.
At general management s core is strategy: defining a company s position, making
trade-offs, and forging fit among activities.
Strategy renders choices about what not to do as important as choices about
what to do. Indeed, setting limits is another function of leadership. Deciding
which target group of customers, varieties, and needs the company should serve
is fundamental to developing a strategy. But so is deciding not to serve other
customers or needs and not to offer certain features or services. Thus strategy
requires constant discipline and clear communication. Indeed, one of the most
important functions of an explicit, communicated strategy is to guide employees
in making choices that arise because of trade-offs in their individual
activities and in day-to-day decisions.
Improving operational effectiveness is a necessary part of management, but it
is not strategy. In confusing the two, managers have unintentionally backed
into a way of thinking about competition that is driving many industries toward
competitive convergence, which is in no one s best interest and is not
inevitable.
Managers must clearly distinguish operational effectiveness from strategy. Both
are essential, but the two agendas are different.
The operational agenda involves continual improvement everywhere there are no
trade-offs. Failure to do this creates vulnerability even for companies with a
good strategy. The operational agenda is the proper place for constant change,
flexibility, and relentless efforts to achieve best practice. In contrast, the
strategic agenda is the right place for defining a unique position, making
clear trade-offs, and tightening fit. It involves the continual search for ways
to reinforce and extend the company s position. The strategic agenda demands
discipline and continuity; its enemies are distraction and compromise.
Strategic continuity does not imply a static view of competition. A company
must continually improve its operational effectiveness and actively try to
shift the productivity frontier; at the same time, there needs to be ongoing
effort to extend its uniqueness while strengthening the fit among its
activities. Strategic continuity, in fact, should make an organization s
continual improvement more effective.
A company may have to change its strategy if there are major structural changes
in its industry. In fact, new strategic positions often arise because of
industry changes, and new entrants unencumbered by history often can exploit
them more easily. However, a company s choice of a new position must be driven
by the ability to find new trade-offs and leverage a new system of
complementary activities into a sustainable advantage.
1. I first described the concept of activities and its use in understanding
competitive advantage in Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press,
1985). The ideas in this article build on and extend that thinking.
2. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts have begun to explore the economics of systems
of complementary functions, activities, and functions. Their focus is on the
emergence of modern manufacturing as a new set of complementary activities,
on the tendency of companies to react to external changes with coherent bundles
of internal responses, and on the need for central coordination a strategy to
align functional managers. In the latter case, they model what has long been a
bedrock principle of strategy. See Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, The
Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization,
American Economic Review 80 (1990): 511 528; Paul Milgrom, Yingyi Qian, and
John Roberts, Complementarities, Momentum, and Evolution of Modern
Manufacturing, American Economic Review 81 (1991) 84 88; and Paul Milgrom and
John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and
Organizational Changes in Manufacturing, Journal of Accounting and Economics,
vol. 19 (March May 1995): 179 208.
3. Material on retail strategies is drawn in part from Jan Rivkin, The Rise of
Retail Category Killers, unpublished working paper, January 1995. Nicolaj
Siggelkow prepared the case study on the Gap.
A version of this article appeared in the November December 1996 issue of
Harvard Business Review.
Michael E. Porter is a University Professor based at Harvard Business School.
Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies
The Japanese triggered a global revolution in operational effectiveness in the
1970s and 1980s, pioneering practices such as total quality management and
continuous improvement. As a result, Japanese manufacturers enjoyed substantial
cost and quality advantages for many years.
But Japanese companies rarely developed distinct strategic positions of the
kind discussed in this article. Those that did Sony, Canon, and Sega, for
example were the exception rather than the rule. Most Japanese companies
imitate and emulate one another. All rivals offer most if not all product
varieties, features, and services; they employ all channels and match one
anothers plant configurations.
The dangers of Japanese-style competition are now becoming easier to recognize.
In the 1980s, with rivals operating far from the productivity frontier, it
seemed possible to win on both cost and quality indefinitely. Japanese
companies were all able to grow in an expanding domestic economy and by
penetrating global markets. They appeared unstoppable. But as the gap in
operational effectiveness narrows, Japanese companies are increasingly caught
in a trap of their own making. If they are to escape the mutually destructive
battles now ravaging their performance, Japanese companies will have to learn
strategy.
To do so, they may have to overcome strong cultural barriers. Japan is
notoriously consensus oriented, and companies have a strong tendency to mediate
differences among individuals rather than accentuate them. Strategy, on the
other hand, requires hard choices. The Japanese also have a deeply ingrained
service tradition that predisposes them to go to great lengths to satisfy any
need a customer expresses. Companies that compete in that way end up blurring
their distinct positioning, becoming all things to all customers.
This discussion of Japan is drawn from the author s research with Mirotaka
Takeuchi, with help from Mariko Sakakibara.
Finding New Positions: The Entrepreneurial Edge
Strategic competition can be thought of as the process of perceiving new
positions that woo customers from established positions or draw new customers
into the market. For example, superstores offering depth of merchandise in a
single product category take market share from broad-line department stores
offering a more limited selection in many categories. Mail-order catalogs pick
off customers who crave convenience. In principle, incumbents and entrepreneurs
face the same challenges in finding new strategic positions. In practice, new
entrants often have the edge.
Strategic positionings are often not obvious, and finding them requires
creativity and insight. New entrants often discover unique positions that have
been available but simply overlooked by established competitors. Ikea, for
example, recognized a customer group that had been ignored or served poorly.
Circuit City Stores entry into used cars, CarMax, is based on a new way of
performing activities extensive refurbishing of cars, product guarantees,
no-haggle pricing, sophisticated use of in-house customer financing that has
long been open to incumbents.
New entrants can prosper by occupying a position that a competitor once held
but has ceded through years of imitation and straddling. And entrants coming
from other industries can create new positions because of distinctive
activities drawn from their other businesses. CarMax borrows heavily from
Circuit City s expertise in inventory management, credit, and other activities
in consumer electronics retailing.
Most commonly, however, new positions open up because of change. New customer
groups or purchase occasions arise; new needs emerge as societies evolve; new
distribution channels appear; new technologies are developed; new machinery or
information systems become available. When such changes happen, new entrants,
unencumbered by a long history in the industry, can often more easily perceive
the potential for a new way of competing. Unlike incumbents, newcomers can be
more flexible because they face no trade-offs with their existing activities.
The Connection with Generic Strategies
In Competitive Strategy (The Free Press, 1985), I introduced the concept of
generic strategies cost leadership, differentiation, and focus to represent the
alternative strategic positions in an industry. The generic strategies remain
useful to characterize strategic positions at the simplest and broadest level.
Vanguard, for instance, is an example of a cost leadership strategy, whereas
Ikea, with its narrow customer group, is an example of cost-based focus.
Neutrogena is a focused differentiator. The bases for positioning varieties,
needs, and access carry the understanding of those generic strategies to a
greater level of specificity. Ikea and Southwest are both cost-based focusers,
for example, but Ikea s focus is based on the needs of a customer group, and
Southwest s is based on offering a particular service variety.
The generic strategies framework introduced the need to choose in order to
avoid becoming caught between what I then described as the inherent
contradictions of different strategies. Trade-offs between the activities of
incompatible positions explain those contradictions. Witness Continental Lite,
which tried and failed to compete in two ways at once.
Alternative Views of Strategy
The Implicit Strategy Model of the Past Decade
One ideal competitive position in the industry
Benchmarking of all activities and achieving best practice
Aggressive outsourcing and partnering to gain efficiencies
Advantages rest on a few key success factors, critical resources, core
competencies
Flexibility and rapid responses to all competitive and market changes
Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Unique competitive position for the company
Activities tailored to strategy
Clear trade-offs and choices vis- -vis competitors
Competitive advantage arises from fit across activities
Sustainability comes from the activity system, not the parts
Operational effectiveness a given
Reconnecting with Strategy
Most companies owe their initial success to a unique strategic position
involving clear trade-offs. Activities once were aligned with that position.
The passage of time and the pressures of growth, however, led to compromises
that were, at first, almost imperceptible. Through a succession of incremental
changes that each seemed sensible at the time, many established companies have
compromised their way to homogeneity with their rivals.
The issue here is not with the companies whose historical position is no longer
viable; their challenge is to start over, just as a new entrant would. At issue
is a far more common phenomenon: the established company achieving mediocre
returns and lacking a clear strategy. Through incremental additions of product
varieties, incremental efforts to serve new customer groups, and emulation of
rivals activities, the existing company loses its clear competitive position.
Typically, the company has matched many of its competitors offerings and
practices and attempts to sell to most customer groups.
A number of approaches can help a company reconnect with strategy. The first is
a careful look at what it already does. Within most well-established companies
is a core of uniqueness. It is identified by answering questions such as the
following:
Which of our product or service varieties are the most distinctive?
Which of our product or service varieties are the most profitable?
Which of our customers are the most satisfied?
Which customers, channels, or purchase occasions are the most profitable?
Which of the activities in our value chain are the most different and
effective?
Around this core of uniqueness are encrustations added incrementally over time.
Like barnacles, they must be removed to reveal the underlying strategic
positioning. A small percentage of varieties or customers may well account for
most of a company s sales and especially its profits. The challenge, then, is
to refocus on the unique core and realign the company s activities with it.
Customers and product varieties at the periphery can be sold or allowed through
inattention or price increases to fade away.
A company s history can also be instructive. What was the vision of the
founder? What were the products and customers that made the company? Looking
backward, one can reexamine the original strategy to see if it is still valid.
Can the historical positioning be implemented in a modern way, one consistent
with today s technologies and practices? This sort of thinking may lead to a
commitment to renew the strategy and may challenge the organization to recover
its distinctiveness. Such a challenge can be galvanizing and can instill the
confidence to make the needed trade-offs.
Emerging Industries and Technologies
Developing a strategy in a newly emerging industry or in a business undergoing
revolutionary technological changes is a daunting proposition. In such cases,
managers face a high level of uncertainty about the needs of customers, the
products and services that will prove to be the most desired, and the best
configuration of activities and technologies to deliver them. Because of all
this uncertainty, imitation and hedging are rampant: unable to risk being wrong
or left behind, companies match all features, offer all new services, and
explore all technologies.
During such periods in an industry s development, its basic productivity
frontier is being established or reestablished. Explosive growth can make such
times profitable for many companies, but profits will be temporary because
imitation and strategic convergence will ultimately destroy industry
profitability. The companies that are enduringly successful will be those that
begin as early as possible to define and embody in their activities a unique
competitive position. A period of imitation may be inevitable in emerging
industries, but that period reflects the level of uncertainty rather than a
desired state of affairs.
In high-tech industries, this imitation phase often continues much longer than
it should. Enraptured by technological change itself, companies pack more
features most of which are never used into their products while slashing prices
across the board. Rarely are trade-offs even considered. The drive for growth
to satisfy market pressures leads companies into every product area. Although a
few companies with fundamental advantages prosper, the majority are doomed to a
rat race no one can win.
Ironically, the popular business press, focused on hot, emerging industries, is
prone to presenting these special cases as proof that we have entered a new era
of competition in which none of the old rules are valid. In fact, the opposite
is true.