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Site Name - City Name State Cd
Report Date Notification Dt Notification Time
Event Date Event Dt Event Time
Event Text
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Grand Gulf - Port Gibson MS
Report Date 09/28/2024 0:35:00
Event Date 09/27/2024 18:22:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/26/2024
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INJECTION INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1822 CST on September 27, 2024, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was conducting surveillance testing on the high pressure core spray (HPCS) division Ill diesel generator. Following initiation of the test signal, the HPCS pump room cooler start time exceeded the surveillance procedure allowance of less than or equal to 20 seconds. The HPCS pump room cooler started in 26.2 seconds. HPCS was already inoperable for performance of the surveillance testing.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Troubleshooting is in progress. HPCS, a single-train system, will remain inoperable until the condition is corrected.
"All sources of offsite power are available. No other safety systems are inoperable. Reactor core isolation cooling was verified to be operable per GGNS technical specification 3.5.1.B.1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"Investigation of the delayed start time of the HPCS pump room cooler indicated that the condition would not have challenged the ability of the room cooler to maintain temperatures less than the temperature limit of 150 degrees Fahrenheit. As a result, HPCS remained capable of fulfilling its safety function. Therefore, EN 57349 is being retracted.
"The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified of this retraction."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe)
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Maryland Dept of the Environment - MD
Report Date 10/09/2024 17:00:00
Event Date 10/09/2024 15:49:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/29/2024
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN SOIL DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via email from the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE):
"On October 9, 2024, at 1549 EDT, the MDE emergency response center received a telephone report of a suspected stolen soil density gauge was captured by police. The report came from the Prince George's County Police to get guidance on the subject. MDE has called the Prince George's County Police contact person and are waiting for a response. Details about the gauge are not yet available.
"This report is based on 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) because soil density gauges have a typical activity of 9 mCi of Cs-137 and/or 44 mCi of Am-241.
"An investigation will be conducted and follow up reports are to be expected."
"This is a follow up report to the initial notification concerning the suspected stolen soil density gauge on October 9, 2024 that was recovered by Prince George's (P.G.) County Police.
"The P. G. County police contact person reported on October 16, 2024, detailing the gauge identifications.
"The gauge is a Troxler Model 3440, Serial Number 17114; which contains 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be sources.
"The gauge owner is North East Technical Services, Inc., a Maryland RAM licensee with RAML number: MD-13-020-01 which provides technical services to gauge users; and the gauge was rented to the Soil and Land Use Technology, Inc. (RAML number MD-03-045-01) and transferred on March 4, 2024. Soil and Land Use Technology, Inc. is a Maryland RAM licensee. It was reported by the police that the gauge was found locked in the rear of the vehicle that was carjacked, just as it was prior to the theft of the vehicle and it was returned to the owner on the same day, October 9, 2024, by the police. The gauge was last leak tested on September 3, 2024 with negative results, (i.e. no leakage).
"The gauge owner, Soil and Land Use Technology, Inc. is in violation by not reporting the incident to the MDE as per the requirements in the regulations and on failure to secure the gauge.
"No further substantive information is expected, and the notified event will be closed."
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL), ILTAB (EMAIL)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Colorado Dept of Health - Lakewood CO
Report Date 10/28/2024 16:49:00
Event Date 10/23/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS
The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
Four exit signs, each containing 12.57 curies of tritium (50.28 curies total), were determined to be lost by the licensee.
Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation Model Number: SLX60
Colorado event number: CO240025
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm - Savannah GA
Report Date 10/29/2024 14:53:00
Event Date 10/09/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"[The licensee's] radiation safety officer (RSO) reported that a shutter had failed in the open position during a routine shutter check on October 9, 2024. This was a Ohmart/Vega [gauge containing] 15 mCi of Cs-137, serial number: 32153cp. The licensee barricaded the area around [the gauge]. A service repair request and leak test are currently in progress. The RSO stated that the licensee checked [radiation level] at 1 foot away, and found [exposure rate] to be 0.2 millirad per hour and presents no risk to health and safety."
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Turkey Point - Miami FL
Report Date 10/30/2024 10:46:00
Event Date 10/30/2024 9:05:00
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE OFF-SITE FATALITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email:
"At 0905 EDT, on October 30, 2024, a courtesy notification was made to OSHA for a contractor working at Turkey Point who was transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment of a personal medical condition. Upon arrival at that facility, medical personnel declared the individual was deceased.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
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New York State Dept. of Health - Westbury NY
Report Date 10/31/2024 17:19:00
Event Date 07/25/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE - DAMAGED S-TUBE
The following information was provided by the New York State Department of Health via email:
"New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection conducted a routine inspection of Sky Testing Services, Inc. (Radioactive Materials License No. C5409) and discovered that a Delta 880 Camera (serial number D6138) had been taken out of service due to a worn s-tube. The camera had been sent to QSA for resourcing on July 25, 2024. As part of the routine servicing/resourcing the leak test for the Ir-192 and depleted uranium (DU) were below 0.001 microcurie, thereby indicating that the source was not leaking. QSA performed a borescopic exam to discover that the s-tube was worn out and the DU shield was exposed. As a result, the camera had been removed from service in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 34.27. This appears to meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) and (c), in addition to 34.101 (equivalent to 12 [New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR)] 38.34(h)(3)). Even though the DU was not found to be leaking, the s-tube was worn and retained by the manufacturer during routine quality checks/resourcing.
"Prior to discovery of this worn s-tube, the device appears to have operated as intended but posed vulnerability to potential failure from what is believed to be routine wear and tear. As a result, no unplanned exposures directly resulted from this worn s-tube prior to its discovery during routine servicing.
"NYSDOH did request corrective actions from this event to confirm if this s-tube will be replaced or if the camera will be removed from service indefinitely. Additionally, NYSDOH informed the facility of the reporting criteria required to address in these corrective actions. It does not appear that the licensee was aware of the reporting requirement.
"It is unclear if this event truly meets the reportability under 10 CFR 30.50, however, NYSDOH wants to report this as a precautionary measure.
"NYSDOH is closely monitoring this event and has assigned NYSDOH Incident No. 1505. More information will be provided to Nuclear Material Events Database (NMED) once available."
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Athens TX
Report Date 11/02/2024 12:50:00
Event Date 12/04/2023 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On November 1, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that it discovered it had a missing general licensed device during an inventory verification exercise. The device, which is a P2042 static eliminator, has not been accounted for as of December 4, 2023. This discovery was made by the EHS technician. The technician conducted an internal exercise to verify the inventory of these devices and discovered that there was a missing device. The technician contacted the device manufacturer who advised the licensee to contact the Department. The device contains a 5 millicurie (original activity - around October 2023) polonium-210 sealed source. The licensee stated the device did not pose a risk of exposure to any individual. The licensee searched for the device, but was unable to locate it. The licensee has since made several administrative controls to avoid such a situation in future."
Texas Incident Number: 10139 Texas NMED Number: TX240040
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Cook - Bridgman MI
Report Date 11/03/2024 23:33:00
Event Date 11/03/2024 23:12:00
NOTIFICATION OF RAPIDLY TERMINATED UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO FIRE ALARM IN CONTAINMENT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 11/03/2024, at 2242 EST, DC Cook Unit 2 received an annunciator indicating a fire in containment. Verification time of existence of a fire exceeded the threshold for an Unusual Event (UE), and a UE was declared at 2312 on 11/03/24. Subsequently, the alarm was determined to not be valid and the UE was exited at 2328. Berrien County and the State of Michigan were notified of the UE declaration and exit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
No actual fire existed. The emergency action level for this event is HU4.2.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
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Monticello - Monticello MN
Report Date 11/04/2024 9:02:00
Event Date 11/04/2024 5:00:00
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0500 CST, on November 4, 2024, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant was notified by Wright County dispatch of a spurious actuation of one emergency response siren that lasted approximately ten minutes. The cause of the actuation has not been determined and the vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event and the offsite response capabilities remain functional. No press release by the licensee is planned at this time. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
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Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency - Hoffman Estates IL
Report Date 11/04/2024 15:19:00
Event Date 10/23/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOACTIVE LIQUID
The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email.
"The Agency was contacted on 10/23/24, to advise of the loss of a syringe containing 7.5 mCi of liquid Tb-161. The loss occurred at Siemens Medical Solutions (RML #1130-02) in Hoffman Estates, IL. Reportedly, the week of 10/16/24, a [Siemens Medical Solutions] technician placed the syringe inside a blue syringe shield for future testing. On Friday, 10/18/24, the supplier of the syringe shields (Hot Shots NM, LLC) conducted a routine collection of used shields. Despite it being properly labeled, it is suspected that Hot Shots' courier collected the syringe shield containing the Tb-161. After the investigation, it is believed the syringe was transported back to the Hot Shots' Loves Park, IL, facility where it was discarded into their Tc-99m decay-in-storage bin.
"There was no indication of attempted theft or diversion."
Additional Involved Party: Hot Shots NM, LLC Loves Park, IL 61111 Illinois License Number: IL-01874-01
Illinois Item Number: IL240026
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Vermont Yankee - Vernon VT
Report Date 11/06/2024 13:25:00
Event Date 11/06/2024 11:18:00
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:
At 1118 EST, on 11/6/24, a small brush fire occurred within the owner controlled area. The fire started when a lawn mower passed by a pile of dry leaves that had built up for a couple of weeks. Security contacted Windham County emergency dispatcher for fire department support. Vermont Yankee personnel managed to put the fire out prior to the fire department arriving onsite. Due to the offsite notification to local law enforcement and fire department, Vermont Yankee is reporting this event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 72.75(b)(2).
Vermont Yankee will also notify the State of Vermont and NRC Region 1.
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Pasedena TX
Report Date 11/06/2024 16:18:00
Event Date 11/05/2024 17:45:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the the Texas Department of State Health Services (Department) via phone and email:
"On November 6, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that the shutters of two Vega model SH-F2 gauges were stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operating position. Each gauge contains a Cs-137 sealed radioactive source and the activities for the sources are 500mCi and 600mCi respectively. The discovery was made by the licensee on November 5, 2024, [at 1745 CST] during a routine semi-annual visual inspection of the gauges. The licensee has made arrangements for a service provider to conduct repairs on the shutters on November 8, 2024. The licensee stated the gauges do not pose a risk of additional exposure to any worker or member of the public.
"Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: 10142 Texas NMED # TX240041
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Louisiana Radiation Protection Div - Geismar LA
Report Date 11/08/2024 14:27:00
Event Date 11/07/2024 19:30:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CRIMPED SOURCE GUIDE TUBE
The following is a summary of information received from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:
On November 7, 2024 at 1930 CST, a source guide tube became crimped which prevented source retraction to the shielded condition. The industrial radiography camera being used was a QSA 880 Delta (serial number D12667) containing a 106 Curie Ir-192 source (serial number 10791P).
The licensee was able to retrieve the source. One authorized user received 500 mR radiation exposure.
Louisiana Event Report ID Number: LA20240011
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Colorado Dept of Health - Vail CO
Report Date 11/08/2024 18:12:00
Event Date 07/02/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS
The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
Two tritium exit signs were determined to be lost by the licensee.
Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation Model Number: 880 Activity: 12 Ci H-3
Manufacturer: Shield Source Inc. Model Number: 101 Activity: 13 Ci H-3
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
The event date is 10/1/2023, which occurred during a renovation period of October 2023 through November 2023.
Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS Events Notification (email), and ILTAB (email).
Colorado event number: CO0026
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Grand Gulf - Port Gibson MS
Report Date 11/10/2024 7:59:00
Event Date 11/10/2024 3:37:00
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 10, 2024, at 0337 CST, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was operating in mode 1 at 100 percent power when a manual scram was initiated due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degrading main condenser vacuum is not known at this time and is being investigated. All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. Reactor pressure was initially maintained with main turbine bypass valves. Reactor water level was initially maintained with main feedwater and condensate.
"At 0457, operators transitioned pressure control to safety relief valves and began using reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to maintain reactor water level. This was performed using plant procedures due to degrading vacuum. GGNS is currently in mode 3. Reactor level is being maintained with RCIC and pressure is being maintained using the safety relief valves.
"The manual reactor protection system (RPS) actuation is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and the RCIC actuation is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
At the time of the notification, main steam isolation valves had shut on low vacuum.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/10/24 AT 1236 CST FROM MELISSA LIMBECK TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This update is being made to report the following occurrences which took place after the scram reported in event number 57418.
"On November 10, 2024, at 0545 CST, a group 1 containment isolation signal resulted in the closure of all MSIVs. The signal was due to continued degradation of condenser vacuum post-trip. At 0620, an automatic RPS actuation occurred when reactor water level lowered to level 3. This RPS actuation occurred with all control rods fully inserted. Reactor water level lowered following closure of an open safety relief valve and was recovered to within the established band.
"The events are being reported as specified system actuations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of the update."
Notified R4DO (Dixon)
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Pilgrim - Plymouth MA
Report Date 11/11/2024 16:49:00
Event Date 11/11/2024 15:10:00
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following is summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 11, 2024, at 1510 EST, site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from the pavement adjacent to the sanitary lift station 'C' outside of the facility industrial area. Less than 100 gallons of non-radiological sanitary water ran to a catch basin connected to permitted outfall number 007. Visual inspection did not identify any odor or indication of flow at outfall number 007 discharge. By 1530, the lift station pumps had been secured, sources of influent to the lift station were removed from service, and efforts were underway to pump the tank.
At 1611, an offsite notification was made to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with leakage from underground sewage system piping from a non-radiological underground tank and lift station.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
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Beaver Valley - Shippingport PA
Report Date 11/12/2024 1:21:00
Event Date 11/11/2024 17:31:00
MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2250 EST on November 11, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The following technical specification limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) were entered at 1939 EST on November 11, 2024:
"LCO 3.6.3, containment isolation valves, condition C, one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable; required action C.1, isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.
"LCO 3.7.2, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), condition C, one or more MSIVs inoperable in mode 2 or 3; required action C.1, close MSIV within 8 hours.
"These technical specification required actions will not be completed within the completion time; therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"With one main steam isolation valve inoperable, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The failure occurred during planned surveillance testing in preparation for reactor startup.
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Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency - Arlington Heights IL
Report Date 11/13/2024 13:18:00
Event Date 11/12/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PACKAGE
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"On November 10, 2024, GE Healthcare reportedly shipped two vials containing 20.0 mCi of I-123 each from their Arlington Heights, IL facility to RLS USA in Sunnyvale, CA. The UN2915 Yellow-II package was loaded at the United Cargo facility in Chicago, IL onto United Flight UA 1878. Although tracking details indicate the package was received by United upon arrival at the San Francisco terminal, the package could not be located for pickup. At this time, a search at the Chicago facility has confirmed it is not on site and the San Francisco United facility claims they do not have the package. As a result, GE Healthcare declared the package as missing on 11/12/2024 and reported the matter to the Agency. The California program staff were notified as well. The vials are shipped within shielded containers and have currently decayed to approximately 1.0 mCi each. There is no indication of damage, intentional theft, or diversion. The quantity of radioactive material present would not be useful for illicit intent."
Illinois Item Number: IL240027
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Millstone - Waterford CT
Report Date 11/13/2024 13:38:00
Event Date 10/10/2024 9:02:00
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0902 EST, on 10/10/2024, with Millstone Unit 3 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, it was discovered that the secondary containment boundary was inoperable when the latch that secured a hatch that was part of the secondary containment boundary was not functional. The latch was repaired by 1115, on 10/10/2024, and the secondary containment boundary was declared operable at 1200, on 10/10/2024. The initial assessment of reportability concluded that an immediate report was not required. However, upon additional review, it has been determined that because the secondary containment boundary is a single-train system that performs a safety function, an 8-hour report was required in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and (D).
"This report should have been made on 10/10/2024 and is late.
"There has been no impact to Unit 2, and Unit 3 continues to operate in mode 1 at 100 percent power.
"There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
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WA Office of Radiation Protection - Anacortes WA
Report Date 11/13/2024 21:09:00
Event Date 11/12/2024 13:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/15/2024
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"Radiography was being performed in a tank at the refinery. [A radiation protection boundary was set up around a tank], and the source was secured in the exposure device. One radiographer was outside the boundary and the other radiographer was inside the boundary with another individual (contractor) outside of the tank. The contractor was in a lift moving upwards next to the tank. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between the radiographers and the contractor, the two individuals outside the tank and within the radiation boundaries were exposed to the source for 2 minutes.
"The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) estimates 1.8 R radiation exposure for the 2 minutes duration right outside the tank as a worst-case scenario. The RSO is currently performing a dose investigation of the affected contract personnel and radiographer. The RSO recommended the contactor to receive medical monitoring (blood draw) as a precaution. The Department set expectations for the licensee to send a full detailed report on findings for this incident. More information to follow for this incident report."
Device information: Isotope: 87 Ci of Ir-192 Manufacturer: QSA Global Device Model: 880D
Incident number: WA-24-022
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"On 11/14/2024, inspectors from the Department will be conducting a reactive onsite visit of the overexposure event which occurred on 11/12/2024. The inspectors will be meeting at the refinery site where the overexposure occurred with the licensee representatives including the RSO to gather information on the event related to what and how the event occurred and to review related records.
"The Department staff will continue to gather information on the event to determine the extent of the exposures, the potential root cause of this incident, any correlation to previous incidents with this licensee, and appropriate corrective actions. This may include potential enforcement actions in addition to the corrective actions. Updates will be provided as additional information is received."
Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS MSST Deputy Division Director (Silberfeld), and NMSS (email)
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Seabrook - Manchester NH
Report Date 11/14/2024 10:58:00
Event Date 10/01/2024 7:38:00
PART 21 - CONTROL RELAY DEFECT The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"NextEra Energy Seabrook LLC. makes the following notification under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) of a defect found in a GE - Hitachi Relay, CR120B (Model #DD945E118P0060) during pre-installation bench testing. During bench testing, the relay failed to energize and transfer all associated contacts. The relay was purchased from GE - Hitachi (GEH) as safety-related, GE CR-120B relays. All GE CR-120B relays that were purchased in the same batch as the failed relay were located and quarantined in order to be returned to GEH for forensic testing. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC has concluded that this defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard (SSH). A SSH exists because the nature of the defect was such that, if installed in certain safety-related applications and failed, it would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. On November 12, 2024, the Seabrook site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).
"Because the defect was discovered prior to installation, there was no impact to safety-related equipment.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
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Saint Lucie - Ft. Pierce FL
Report Date 11/15/2024 12:14:00
Event Date 11/15/2024 10:01:00
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1001 EST, on November 15, 2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to three control element assemblies fully inserting into the core. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam bypass control system and main feedwater. Unit 2 was not affected.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The insertion of the three control rods is suspected to be caused by an electrical failure; however, the cause is still being investigated.
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Monticello - Monticello MN
Report Date 11/15/2024 16:29:00
Event Date 11/15/2024 13:05:00
UNANALYZED CONDITION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1305 CST, on November 15, 2024, it was determined that division 2 cables for the '12' emergency diesel generator start circuitry are routed through a division 1 area without adequate fire barrier separation. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. A fire impairment and hourly fire watch have been established for the affected fire zones. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Kingwood TX
Report Date 11/15/2024 16:58:00
Event Date 11/15/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCES
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On November 15, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that the location of three 5 mCi (original activity in October 2021) Ge-68 rod sources could not be determined. The sources were supposedly shipped back to the manufacturer in the fourth quarter of 2022, but no receipt record was available from the manufacturer to show the sources were received. The missing paperwork was discovered during an inventory verification audit in May of 2024 by the consulting physicist. Since that time, there were many staff changes. The new technologist had been working to clean up issues and has tried to contact all the parties involved, but could not find the paperwork. Consequently, the licensee declared them lost and reported them as such to the Department on November 15, 2024. The licensee stated the sources do not pose a risk of additional exposure to any worker or member of the public. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 10144 Texas NMED Number: TX240043
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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NC Div of Radiation Protection - Boone NC
Report Date 11/18/2024 10:53:00
Event Date 11/14/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGE TO TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was provided by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"On November 14, 2024, the licensee reported a portable nuclear gauge was damaged by a member of the public's privately owned vehicle that drove into the cordoned off area where road workers were conducting their work. The gauge was hit by the vehicle and was damaged but the source and source rod were intact and in the shielded position. The gauge was placed in its transportation box and transported to the manufacturer for disposal/repair.
"North Carolina Emergency Management and local law enforcement were informed."
Damaged Device: Portable Nuclear Gauge Manufacturer: Troxler Model: 4640B Serial: 1599
NC Tracking Number: NC 240010
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Houston TX
Report Date 11/18/2024 19:04:00
Event Date 11/18/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On November 18, 2024, the Department received notification from the licensee of a missing self-luminous exit sign. The licensee made the discovery on October 15, 2024, during a semiannual inventory of radioactive sources verification exercise. The device, which contains about 20 curies of tritium in gaseous form, is a Betalux, Model 171 with serial number C207471.
"The licensee believes the sign, which was located at the back of a building, was dislodged during Hurricane Beryl on July 8, 2024. The licensee stated that two possible scenarios on what might have occurred when the sign was removed. The licensee stated the sign may have been picked up together with the large amount of debris collected and cleared out for disposal by the cleaning crews following the storm. The other possibility is that the sign may have been blown away off campus by hurricane force winds.
"The licensee stated that there are currently no known exposures to persons at this time due to the loss of this device.
"Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 10145 Texas NMED Number: TX240044
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Seabrook - Manchester NH
Report Date 11/19/2024 16:02:00
Event Date 11/19/2024 13:50:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/20/2024
EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1350 [EST] on 11/19/2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to an automatic trip of the `B' main feedwater pump turbine. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by the steam dumps to the condenser.
"Emergency feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level, as expected.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' main feedwater pump turbine trip is under investigation.
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Florida Bureau of Radiation Control - Miramar Beach FL
Report Date 11/19/2024 16:24:00
Event Date 10/15/2024 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"Sacred Heart's failure to notify the Florida BRC at the time of the occurrence, 10/15/24, was identified by [the Florida BRC inspector] during a routine inspection.
"Sacred Heart intended to inject the patient with 6 mCi of Tc-99m mebrofenin which would travel to the gallbladder. Instead, the patient received 6 mCi of Tc-99m methyl diphosphonate which targeted the bladder wall. The dose received [by the patient] is estimated at 1.6 mGy. Sacred Heart states the syringe had the expected markings of mebrofenin, and the error was caused by the supplier in Alabama.
"The patient and primary physician were notified of the occurrence."
Florida Incident Number: FL24-110
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
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Florida Bureau of Radiation Control - Jacksonville FL
Report Date 11/19/2024 22:28:00
Event Date 11/19/2024 15:30:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"The Florida BRC received initial notification at 1830 [EST] from licensee (4696-7) UES Professional Solutions of a lost in transit density gauge. More information about this incident was received at 2000 from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO).
"The licensee's technician noticed the soil moisture density gauge was missing from the back of his pick-up truck around 1530 [on 11/19/2024] when he returned to the job site after lunch. He realized the tailgate was open and, when he went to close it, he noticed the gauge wasn't there. The technician last used the gauge during a subgrade test right before he went to lunch around 1430. He thinks the gauge was lost while at lunch. The technician called his supervisor at 1730, who contacted the RSO. The employee admitted that the gauge case was not locked, but the gauge was secure in the case. The RSO and technician retraced the route several times, but were not able to locate the gauge.
"The density gauge is a Troxler [model] 3430 with serial number 31852 [nominally containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be]."
Florida Incident Number: FL24-111
"A Jacksonville area inspector responded [on 11/20/2024] and reported their findings. UES Professional Solutions terminated the employee [on 11/19/2024] and used GPS tracking to retrace the route, but did not find the gauge. The Jacksonville Police Department was notified and is also waiting on video surveillance footage from the [restaurant] where the employee stopped."
Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email), and ILTAB (email).
"At 1630 EST on Wednesday 11/20/2024, the RSO called and stated an individual found the gauge. The licensee has the gauge back in their possession and are sending it to Troxler for testing before returning to service."
Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email), and ILTAB (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Louisiana Radiation Protection Div - Plaquemine LA
Report Date 11/20/2024 15:19:00
Event Date 11/19/2024 15:30:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:
"On November 20, 2024, LDEQ was notified by Blue Cube Operations LLC, that during a semi-annual equipment inspection, it was determined that a level density gauge shutter was malfunctioning and would not fully close.
"The density gauge was a TN Technologies Inc. Model: 5201 serial number: B465, and equipped with a TN Technologies Inc. Cs-137 100 mCi source - serial number: GK-9492.
"No release or exposure to personnel [occurred]. Blue Cube Operations called the vendor to service the level density gauge. The vendor removed the fixed gauge from operations. The fixed gauge with source was secured and is waiting for disposal."
LA Event Report ID Number: LA20240012
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Puerto Rico Health Department - Sabana Grande PR
Report Date 11/22/2024 9:17:00
Event Date 11/04/2024 15:50:00
POTENTIAL ORPHANED SOURCE
The following is a summary of information obtained from the Puerto Rico Division of Radiological Health (DRH) via phone and email:
On November 4, 2024, the DRH received a report of a metal device with radiation symbols in a vacant lot in the town of Sabana Grande, Puerto Rico. At 1550 EST, on November 4, 2024, the DRH visited the area with the site engineer and found medical equipment, such as ultrasound machines. Upon viewing radiation symbols on one of the devices found, they decided to move the device to an area away from personnel and instructed everyone to stay away from the object.
The DRH proceeded to take background radiation measurements before approaching the device. Photos and radiation measurements of the device were taken. The radiation levels do not exceed background. The radiation symbol was removed on the understanding that, if there was no emission present, it does not pose any risk and should not be labeled. The object is buried in the same place where it was found.
Based on the information and photos provided, the following was determined by the DRH: the device is part of the Elekta microSelectron Digital equipment (brachytherapy equipment for high-dose cancer treatment). The potential radioactive material is an Ir-192 source; however, it is still unknown if the source remains in the device. The only equipment of this type in Puerto Rico has the serial number 10866 with a radioactive source with serial number D36R2352. The source with serial number D36R2352 would have a remaining calculated activity of 0 mCi if that source is present in the device. The DRH will determine how to proceed after determining if the device still contains a source.
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FitzPatrick - Lycoming NY
Report Date 11/22/2024 12:50:00
Event Date 09/26/2024 17:01:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/25/2024
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - DEFECTIVE THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAY DISCOVERED DURING TESTING
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This notification is a 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) interim report for General Electric thermal overload relay, model CF124G011, part number DD317A7861P003.
"A sample of overload relays were sent to PowerLabs for parts quality initiative testing. The results were reviewed by James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) and a deviation in one relay component was discovered. Testing identified a failure to latch on trip, which is a deviation from the performance characteristics of the relay. Under normal operation, the relay would latch in the tripped state requiring a manual reset of the relay. If the relay with the deviation were installed, the relay would trip when required; however, it would automatically reset. The unexpected reset could result in unintended cycling of associated equipment including repeated exposure to inrush current and potential damage.
"Bench testing would be expected to identify this condition prior to installation. Based on a review, this potential condition does not affect installed equipment. The affected relay was stored at JAF since July 1998.
"The cause of the deviation cannot be investigated because the part is not available; however, the evaluation of the potential effect of the condition on equipment where the relay could have been used at JAF is ongoing, and it is expected to be completed by February 28, 2025. This notification is being submitted as an interim report per 10CFR21.21(a)(2)."
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
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Watts Bar - Spring City TN
Report Date 11/23/2024 2:42:00
Event Date 11/22/2024 19:37:00
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR TEMPERATURE CONTROL SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email:
"At 1937 EST on 11/22/2024, it was discovered that both trains of the control room emergency air temperature control system (CREATCS) were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with headquarters operations officers report guidance:
Technical specification 3.7.11 conditions A and C were entered as a result of this event. The 'B' train of CREATCS was restored at 0130 EST on 11/23/24 and the plant exited condition C. The 'A' train remained out of service at the time of notification.
Although CREATCS is a common system for both Units 1 and 2, Unit 1 was defueled and outside the mode of applicability during the timeframe of this event.
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Perry - Perry OH
Report Date 11/26/2024 14:14:00
Event Date 11/26/2024 11:58:00
DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1158 EST on 11/26/24, the Division 3 diesel generator was declared inoperable due to failure of the right bank air start motor during a planned monthly surveillance run. Troubleshooting of the issue is in progress. This condition could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The Division 3 diesel generator supports high pressure core spray, a single train system.
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University of Missouri - Columbia - Columbia MO
Report Date 11/26/2024 14:13:00
Event Date 11/25/2024 14:40:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/27/2024
EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE
The following report was provided by the licensee via email:
"This event is being reported as an 'Abnormal Occurrence,' per the University of Missouri Research Reactor technical specification (TS) 6.6.c, which requires 'Abnormal Occurrences,' defined by TS 1.1, be promptly reported to the NRC Operations Center within one working day.
"At approximately 1440 CST on 11/25/24, during the banking of all four control rods at 50 kW, the '1S3' control blade selector switch became inoperable. The control blade selector switch allows selection of the control blades for manual operation. The inability to select control blades for manual operation resulted in a violation of TS 3.2.a, which requires all control blades, including the regulating blade, be operable during reactor operation.
"The reactor was immediately scrammed and placed in a safe shutdown condition. All applicable safety functions were completed as expected. As a result, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or facility staff due to this condition. Investigation determined that the internal spring of the '1S3' switch had failed, preventing the switch from selecting a specific control blade for manual control. The spring was replaced and approval to proceed per TS 6.4.c was obtained from the reactor facility director. Post-maintenance testing was completed at 1525 CST on 11/25/24, prior to returning the reactor to normal operations."
The NRC project manager has been notified.
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