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5 [1] When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, *chametz* on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin - e.g., *chametz* during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan. [2] If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the *kiddushin* are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the *kiddushin* are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the *kiddushin* are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."
If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned, the *kiddushin* are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox. [3] When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year, with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer], the *kiddushin* are valid.
[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the *kiddushin* are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple. If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated. [4] When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the *kiddushin* are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's." [5] When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.
When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great *terumah*, the *terumah* taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the *kiddushin* are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor. [6] The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the *terumah* and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the *terumah* and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.
When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with *terumah* that he separates from his grain heap, the *kiddushin* are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this *terumah*; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money. [7] [The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article, and it is known that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid. [8] When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.
If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the *kiddushin* is in doubt. [9] When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the *kiddushin* are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague]. [10] [The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as *kiddushin*. If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the *kiddushin*], she is consecrated. [11] Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the *kiddushin*] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the *kiddushin*] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article. [12] [The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.
If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again. [13] When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note, she is not consecrated.
What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a *dinar*; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the *dinar* that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as *kiddushin*]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ] already spent that *dinar* and has derived benefit from it already. [14] [A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral, she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the *kiddushin*,] she has derived benefit. [15] When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.
What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 *zuz* [at the time of the *kiddushin*] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.
It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest. My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention. [16] If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this *p'rutah* and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this *p'rutah*, the consecration is binding. [17] When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding. [18] [The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a *p'rutah* and it exists within her property, she is consecrated. [19] [The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a *p'rutah* of his own.
[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan, and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the *kiddushin* are not binding. [20] [The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a *p'rutah* of his own.
[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him]. And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the *kiddushin* are not binding. [21] [The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the *kiddushin* are binding. Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.
Similarly, if she told him, "Give a *dinar* to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the *kiddushin* are binding provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request." [22] [To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this *dinar* as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the *kiddushin* are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.
[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this *dinar* as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated. For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him. [23] When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a *dinar*. [Take this article] as security until I give you the *dinar*," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the *dinar*, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.
If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as *kiddushin*, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security. [24] When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar* on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything. [25] [These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a *p'rutah*." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four *zuz* that are hidden in the wreath."
If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence. There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the *kiddushin* are valid, lest the wreath be worth a *p'rutah* in another place. [26] [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a *p'rutah*, she is consecrated. If not, the *kiddushin* are merely of doubtful status, [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a *p'rutah* in another place. [27] [Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a *p'rutah*, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the *kiddushin* is doubtful.
[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a *p'rutah*, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the *kiddushin* is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the *kiddushin* are not valid. Thus, the status of the *kiddushin* [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date. [28] If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the *kiddushin* are binding if all the dates together are worth a *p'rutah*. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property. [29] [The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.
Therefore, if the oil was not worth a *p'rutah*, the status of the *kiddushin* is doubtful. If the oil is worth a *p'rutah*, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC