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2010-09-20 11:10:02
Yen intervention
Exchange-rate manipulation with a political twist
Sep 16th 2010 | tokyo
HOW much does loyalty cost in Japan s fractured politics? Perhaps as much as 2 trillion ($23 billion). News reports suggest that may have been the sum it took to push the yen from 82.88 per dollar to beyond 85 when, on September 15th, the authorities unilaterally intervened in foreign-exchange markets for the first time since 2004.
In explaining the surprise move, the finance ministry argued that the surge in the yen to its highest level against the dollar since 1995 was too much volatility for the authorities liking. There was official talk of a defence line around 82. Another selling blitz was not ruled out.
But there was also a political element. One day before, Naoto Kan, the prime minister, had fought off a challenge to his leadership of the ruling Democratic Party and hence of Japan itself by Ichiro Ozawa, a feisty operator who had pledged to weaken the yen if elected. As the currency soared uncomfortably high following Mr Kan s victory, intervention was a way of showing to Mr Ozawa s supporters that Mr Kan could be just as decisive.
According to HSBC, Japan has plenty more room to hit the market hard, fast and furious , because the country suffers from deflation and has near-zero interest rates. That means it can benefit from extra liquidity without destabilising the economy. Analysts say the Bank of Japan appears not to have sterilised , or mopped up, the excess funds, as central banks do if worried that intervention will stoke inflation.
However, the action of the Japanese authorities was unsupported by other central banks, which may weaken its effectiveness. Moreover, in reality Japan s currency is much cheaper than it looks in nominal terms, because prices in Japan have been falling for years, whereas in dollar economies they have risen. Other central banks have sound economic reasons for not stepping in on Japan s behalf.
In Japan, the argument for stopping yen appreciation is partly a psychological one, economists say. Though exporters have complained noisily about the currency, they continue to reap solid profits abroad and the repatriated earnings may help lift the yen. A stronger currency does most damage to confidence about the future: it tends to depress the stockmarket, which dampens exporters risk appetites. Japan s main stockmarket surged by 2.5% immediately after the official yen sales.
Intervention is a deal with the devil, however. Currency manipulation from a G7 country such as Japan could undermine efforts to persuade China to refrain from artificially cheapening its own currency. Given that Japan s trade with China is bigger than its trade with America, its beggar-thy-neighbour policy might perversely end up beggaring itself.