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<TITLE>Chapter 8</TITLE>
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<H2>Socioeconomic Status and HH Background Characteristics</H2>
It is reasonable to assume that the socioeconomic status of any HH will
be related to other background characteristics. Age, sex, refugee status
and locality should be considered important in this respect.
<P>
<B>Age and sex</B><BR>
In the absence of any form of social security, ability to find work becomes
all the more important, and one would expect that the labour market favours
the young rather than the old. Likewise the acquisition of wealth can be
assumed to rise as the HH grows older. On the other hand, different historical
experiences (war, the introduction of free education, etc.) may cause both
variations in possibilities for acquiring skills (education) and in consumption
patterns among HHs. Especially important here is perhaps the fact that most
elderly Palestinian HHs have not been able to profit from the educational
revolution that took place in the 1960s and 70s.
<P>
Comparing status scores across HH age groups significant variations are
revealed (Figure 8.2).<a href="8_notes.html#15"><sup>15</sup></a> The figure suggests a curvilinear pattern. HHs
in the 20-29 years age group are over-represented in the lower status categories.
In the category 30-39 years the incidence of higher scores is more frequent
than in the youngest cohort. Then the level falls somewhat in the 40-49
years group - still at a somewhat higher level than for the youngest cohort
- and continues to fall for the 50-59 and 60+ years cohorts. In other words,
the socioeconomic status seems first to rise slightly from the young to
the young middle-aged, then to fall somewhat for old middle- aged, and further
to fall considerably for old HHs.
<p>
<i>Figure 8.2 Socioeconomic status by age of HH. Percentages</i><br>
<img src="bilder/82.gif">
<P>
Due to the generally subordinate role of women, the social status of female
headed households may be expected to be lower than that of their male counterparts,
and may in some cases rather be determined by the status of the (absentee)
male HH. The instance of female HHs is indeed largely due to special circumstances
in which the male HH is absent for a longer duration of time for reasons
of work. The point is borne out by the higher amount of remittances received
in this category (33% among the female as opposed to 6% among male HHs).
Hence the individual female HH status may not be an exact reflection of
the family socioeconomic status. Comparing the socioeconomic status of male
and female headed households (figure not shown), the females appear clearly
less fortunate (59% appear in the low status category and no-one in the
high status category) than the male ones (15% and 12% are found in the low
and high status categories respectively).
<P>
As indicated above, it is impossible to offer a conclusive interpretation
of the age and gender effects. Age discrepancies may be explained in terms
of both generational and life cycle factors. Further, many HHs have experienced
complete lack of income in periods of curfews or as a result of changing
economic regulations in the occupied territories. Such circumstances, which
have been broadly felt, make it difficult to isolate the age effects on
economic activities of HHs. Likewise, if the socioeconomic status of female
headed households is relatively low, this may be compensated by a higher
status ascribed to her absentee husband or to her sons. Suffice it to say
that scores for "elderly" and female headed households are generally
low, probably caused by a complicated mixture of cultural, age and gender
related factors.
<P>
The general decrease in status by age, however, suggests a challenge to
the traditional conception of a deferential attitude to the family elders,
caused by the fact that younger family members now may be able to acquire
jobs and income without their mediation.
<P>
<B>Locality and Refugee Status</B><BR>
HHs in Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem could be expected to show
divergent socioeconomic patterns as these three main areas have been differently
affected by the years of occupational rule. Figure 8.3 presents the distribution
of the stratification index for Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem,
and is directly comparable with figure 8.1.
<p>
<i>Figure 8.3 Socioeconomic status by locality of HH: three main areas. Percentages</i><br>
<img src="bilder/83.gif">
<P>
Although numbers are small for some categories, which increases the margins
of error, the figures are tentatively applied to illuminate the regional
variations. Following the curve for Gaza, we observe a quick rise at the
lower end of the status index, a turn as we advance from the low to the
lower middle category and a falling trend as we move towards the higher
strata. Very few Gaza residents enjoy a "high" socioeconomic status.
The curve for Arab Jerusalem inverts the pattern for Gaza. The curve rises
more or less steadily from the low to the high status side of the index,
with a peak at the upper middle level, then falls slowly for higher strata,
but at a higher level than for Gaza. West Bank villages assume an intermediate
position, close to that of the total distribution. The highest point is
located at the left side of the upper middle category. The curve falls steadily
at both extremities, but reveals a slightly greater occurrence of lower
middle than upper middle scores.<BR>
Possible explanations for the differences, which may not be surprising,
are dealt with extensively in the previous chapters. Here we would like
to focus on some basic factors: Gaza, typically characterized by a massive
refugee population, and a very high population density, is also distinguished
by severe labour market problems and fewer migration possibilities. Arab
Jerusalem, on the other hand, is characterized by its role as a market and
service centre for the central West Bank region. It offers religious, health,
travel, banking, cultural entertainment and (indeed) political services
which are absent, or thinly spread, in the West Bank and Gaza. The creation
of a "welfare cushion" should also be noted, by which Jerusalemites
are given access to financial support (e.g. National Insurance, Child support,
Retirement funds, etc.) not available in the other two regions.<a href="8_notes.html#16"><sup>16</sup></a><BR>
The West Bank, however, has been less affected by the disruptions of war
than Gaza, having a relatively diversified economy which has allowed it
to retain to a large extent its pre-war hierarchical social structure. In
sum, deprivation is neither as prevalent as in Gaza nor prosperity as evident
as in Arab Jerusalem. Despite major changes in agrarian social relations,
as a result of increased monetization of the economy and of physical mobility,
considerable degree of continuity is encountered here. The main explanation
appears to be the existence of village subsistence economy and the family
farm, elements which are less pronounced in the two other regions.
<P>
There are also significant socioeconomic differences along the "urban"
and "rural" axes within each of the three main areas (Figure 8.4).
Again focusing on the differences, Gaza camps are heavily over-represented
in the lower status category. Gaza City and Gaza villages take similar positions,
the occurrence of higher scores slightly more frequent in the latter category.
West Bank villages and camps are relatively speaking more common in the
lower middle status category. Arab Jerusalem is heavily represented in the
upper middle and high status categories, accompanied by West Bank towns.
The contrasts are thus striking between on the one hand HHs in Arab Jerusalem
and in West Bank towns, and on the other their counterparts in Gaza camps.
Six-seven out of ten HHs are found in the two upper status categories in
the former regions while eight out of ten HHs are found in the two lower
status categories in the latter.
<p>
<i>Figure 8.4 Socioeconomic status by locality of HH: urban/ rural/ camp distributions. Percentages</i><br>
<img src="bilder/84.gif">
<P>
Gaza City and Gaza villages, though, are basically on a par with West Bank
villages and camps. More surprisingly, perhaps, West Bank camps show a distribution
similar to that of West Bank villages. Further analysis reveals that it
is the better housing standards in Gaza City, as indicated by housing amenities,
that places it on the level of West Bank camps, whereas it is the lower
educational attainments that bring it to the level of West Bank villages.
This again may reflect differences in infrastructural provisions (piped
water, sewage and electricity) and occupational possibilities in the three
areas. The main differences between West Bank villages and West Bank camps,
thus, are the housing and occupational standards.<a href="8_notes.html#17"><sup>17</sup></a>
<P>
A comparison of the socioeconomic status of respectively non-refugees, refugees
outside camps and refugees living in camps (figure not presented), suggests
that camp residence, and not refugee status in itself, is the vital, determining
factor. Refugees outside camps and non-refugees are generally located in
the lower and upper middle strata, while more camp refugees are found in
the lower middle and low categories.
<P>
So far focus has been on explaining variations between the different localities,
i.e. on general differences. Yet the actual size of the differences should
not be ignored. Returning briefly to figure 8.4, more than half of the HHs
in the two contrasting regions of Arab Jerusalem and Gaza camps are still
all within the range of the two middle status categories, thus indicating
a significant element of homogeneity among the areas.
<P>
Why are the regional differences not even more frequent and clear-cut? The
explanation is probably to be found at the intersection of various social
and economic factors. The twin processes of "ruralization" of
the cities and "urbanization" of the countryside stand out as
possible explanations, as they may be expected to promote homogeneous social
conditions in "rural" and "urban" areas alike.
<P>
The main factor contributing to the recent social decline in rural areas
is the undermining in the value of non-irrigated land as a designator of
traditional social status (such land has, however, retained its importance
as real estate). New sources of income have emerged outside the traditional
village structure and the agricultural sector.<a href="8_notes.html#18"><sup>18</sup></a>
<P>
This change in the role and impact of land ownership is not only due to
the upheavals of war, but to an even larger extent to long-term economic
trends, invoking a greater part of young people to seek urban wage labour,
who are thus freed from the control of landowners or rural notables. In
addition the enhanced availability of public education has given rise to
professional and semi-professional employment outside the agrarian system,
leaving the role of agriculture increasingly marginalized.<BR>
Parallel to this "levelling" of the class structure of rural areas,
a modification in the social composition of urban areas is occurring. A
process of emigration of the landed elite and (more recently) professional
and middle classes has been mentioned above, although the ratio of emigrating
elites to emigrating lower strata is unknown. The landed elite has, nonetheless,
partly been replaced by new ranks of successful businessmen and professionals
moving from villages to towns.
<P>
The factors contributing to the transformation of rural areas - new possibilities
of wage labour in the cities, remittances and access to education - naturally
also affect life in urban areas, opening up as they do possibilities for
economic (though not necessarily social) mobility for more deprived groups
in urban areas.
<P>
A process of "ruralization" of townships, an exclusive West Bank
phenomenon, should also be noted. This process refers to an increasing number
of rural residents seeking employment and/or services in urban areas and
ultimately establishing residence there. Nevertheless most Palestinians
living in the West Bank today still reside in rural districts, and cannot
be characterized as living in a peasant society; that is a society deriving
its livelihood from agriculture and being organized socially around the
family farm. West Bank townships, in themselves dominated by small trade
and small workshops with a minor manufacturing sector, likewise constitute
regional markets and administrative service centres for their rural hinterland.
<P>
Finally, the similarity may also reflect the strong degree of urban-rural
interdependence, as is clearly demonstrated by the even, differential growth
rates of towns and villages.<BR>
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