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Updates:

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Brockhaus
Request for Comments: 9481 H. Aschauer
Updates: 4210 Siemens
Category: Standards Track M. Ounsworth
ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Gray
Entrust
November 2023
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using several
cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP). CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of
X.509 certificates. This document also updates the algorithm use
profile from Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Terminology
2. Message Digest Algorithms
2.1. SHA2
2.2. SHAKE
3. Signature Algorithms
3.1. RSA
3.2. ECDSA
3.3. EdDSA
4. Key Management Algorithms
4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms
4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman
4.1.2. ECDH
4.2. Key Transport Algorithms
4.2.1. RSA
4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms
4.3.1. AES Key Wrap
4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms
4.4.1. PBKDF2
5. Content-Encryption Algorithms
5.1. AES-CBC
6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
6.1. Password-Based MAC
6.1.1. PasswordBasedMac
6.1.2. PBMAC1
6.2. Symmetric Key-Based MAC
6.2.1. SHA2-Based HMAC
6.2.2. AES-GMAC
6.2.3. SHAKE-Based KMAC
7. Algorithm Use Profiles
7.1. Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles in
RFC 4210
7.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile
8. IANA Considerations
9. Security Considerations
10. References
10.1. Normative References
10.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Appendix D.2 of [RFC4210] contains a set of algorithms that is
mandatory to be supported by implementations conforming to [RFC4210].
These algorithms were appropriate at the time CMP was released, but
as cryptographic algorithms weaken over time, some of them should no
longer be used. In general, new attacks are emerging due to research
in cryptanalysis or an increase in computing power. New algorithms
were introduced that are more resistant to today's attacks.
This document lists current cryptographic algorithms that can be used
with CMP to offer an easier way to maintain the list of suitable
algorithms over time.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
In the following sections, ASN.1 values and types are used to
indicate where algorithm identifier and output values are provided.
These ASN.1 values and types are defined in CMP [RFC4210],
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211], CMP Updates
[RFC9480], and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652].
2. Message Digest Algorithms
This section provides references to object identifiers and
conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support SHA2
or SHAKE message digest algorithms.
Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* hashAlg field of OOBCertHash and CertStatus,
* owf field of Challenge, PBMParameter, and DHBMParameter,
* digestAlgorithms field of SignedData, and
* digestAlgorithm field of SignerInfo.
Digest values are located in the:
* hashVal field of OOBCertHash,
* certHash field of CertStatus, and
* witness field of Challenge.
In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms.
2.1. SHA2
The SHA2 algorithm family is defined in FIPS Pub 180-4
[NIST.FIPS.180-4].
The message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
are identified by the following OIDs:
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 3 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 2 of
[RFC5754].
2.2. SHAKE
The SHA-3 family of hash functions is defined in FIPS Pub 202
[NIST.FIPS.202] and consists of the fixed output length variants
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, as well as the
extendable-output functions (XOFs) SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Currently,
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are the only members of the SHA3-family that
are specified for use in X.509 certificates [RFC8692] and CMS
[RFC8702] as one-way hash functions for use with RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA.
SHAKE is an extendable-output function, and FIPS Pub 202
[NIST.FIPS.202] prohibits using SHAKE as a general-purpose hash
function. When SHAKE is used in CMP as a message digest algorithm,
the output length MUST be 256 bits for SHAKE128 and 512 bits for
SHAKE256.
The message digest algorithms SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are identified by
the following OIDs:
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashalgs(2) 12 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 3.1 of
[RFC8702].
3. Signature Algorithms
This section provides references to object identifiers and
conventions to be employed by CMP implementations that support
signature algorithms like RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA.
The signature algorithm is referred to as MSG_SIG_ALG in Appendices D
and E of [RFC4210], in the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483], and in
Section 7.2.
Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader,
* algorithmIdentifier field of POPOSigningKey, and
* signatureAlgorithm field of CertificationRequest,
SignKeyPairTypes, and SignerInfo
Signature values are located in the:
* protection field of PKIMessage,
* signature field of POPOSigningKey, and
* signature field of CertificationRequest and SignerInfo.
3.1. RSA
The RSA (RSASSA-PSS and PKCS #1 version 1.5) signature algorithm is
defined in [RFC8017].
The algorithm identifier for RSASAA-PSS signatures used with SHA2
message digest algorithms is identified by the following OID:
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC4056].
The signature algorithm RSASSA-PSS used with SHAKE message digest
algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 3.2.1
of [RFC8702].
The signature algorithm PKCS #1 version 1.5 used with SHA2 message
digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 14 }
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 }
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 }
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 3.2 of
[RFC5754].
3.2. ECDSA
The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-5
[NIST.FIPS.186-5].
The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHA2 message digest
algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
As specified in [RFC5480], the NIST-recommended curves are identified
by the following OIDs:
secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 3.3 of
[RFC5754].
The signature algorithm ECDSA used with SHAKE message digest
algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 3.2.2
of [RFC8702].
3.3. EdDSA
The EdDSA signature algorithm is defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC8032]
and FIPS Pub 186-5 [NIST.FIPS.186-5].
The signature algorithm Ed25519 that MUST be used with SHA-512
message digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 112 }
The signature algorithm Ed448 that MUST be used with SHAKE256 message
digest algorithms is identified by the following OIDs:
id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 113 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC8419].
Note: The hash algorithm used to calculate the certHash in certConf
messages MUST be SHA512 if the certificate to be confirmed has been
signed using Ed25519 or SHAKE256 with d=512 if the certificate to be
confirmed has been signed using Ed448.
4. Key Management Algorithms
CMP utilizes the following general key management techniques: key
agreement, key transport, and passwords.
CRMF [RFC4211] and CMP Updates [RFC9480] promote the use of CMS
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] by deprecating the use of EncryptedValue.
4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms
The key agreement algorithm is referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210] and as KM_KA_ALG in the Lightweight
CMP Profile [RFC9483] and Section 7.
Key agreement algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] together with the key agreement key
management technique. When a key agreement algorithm is used, a key-
encryption algorithm (Section 4.3) is needed next to the content-
encryption algorithm (Section 5).
Key agreement algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the:
* encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys.
4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement is defined in [RFC2631] and
SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static variants, as specified in
[RFC3370]. Static-static variants SHALL NOT be used.
The DH key agreement algorithm is identified by the following OID:
id-alg-ESDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 5 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in Section 4.1 of
[RFC3370].
4.1.2. ECDH
The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement is defined in
[RFC5753] and SHALL be used in the ephemeral-static variant, as
specified in [RFC5753], or the 1-Pass Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-
Vanstone (ECMQV) variant, as specified in [RFC5753]. Static-static
variants SHALL NOT be used.
The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with NIST-recommended
SECP curves are identified by the following OIDs:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 1 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 11(11) 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 0 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 1 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 2 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1)
14(14) 3 }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 0 }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 1 }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 2 }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 15(15) 3 }
As specified in [RFC5480], the NIST-recommended SECP curves are
identified by the following OIDs:
secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 }
secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC5753].
The ECDH key agreement algorithm used together with curve25519 or
curve448 is identified by the following OIDs:
id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 110 }
id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 111 }
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in [RFC8418].
4.2. Key Transport Algorithms
The key transport algorithm is also referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210] and as KM_KT_ALG in the Lightweight
CMP Profile [RFC9483] and Section 7.
Key transport algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
[RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with the key transport key
management technique.
Key transport algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* keyEncryptionAlgorithm field of KeyTransRecipientInfo.
Key transport encrypted content-encryption keys are located in the:
* encryptedKey field of KeyTransRecipientInfo.
4.2.1. RSA
The RSA key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme defined
in [RFC8017].
The algorithm identifier for RSA (PKCS #1 v1.5) is:
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }
The algorithm identifier for RSAES-OAEP is:
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }
Further conventions to be considered for PKCS #1 v1.5 are specified
in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC3370] and for RSAES-OAEP in [RFC3560].
4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms
The symmetric key-encryption algorithm is also referred to as
KM_KW_ALG in Section 7.2 and the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
As the symmetric key-encryption key management technique is not used
by CMP, the symmetric key-encryption algorithm is only needed when
using the key agreement or password-based key management technique
with CMS [RFC5652] EnvelopedData.
Key wrap algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* parameters field of the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and PasswordRecipientInfo.
Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the:
* encryptedKey field of RecipientEncryptedKeys (for key agreement)
and PasswordRecipientInfo (for password-based key management).
4.3.1. AES Key Wrap
The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197
[NIST.FIPS.197], and the key wrapping is defined in [RFC3394].
AES key encryption has the algorithm identifier:
id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 5 }
id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 25 }
id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 45 }
The underlying encryption functions for the key wrap and content-
encryption algorithms (as specified in Section 5) and the key sizes
for the two algorithms MUST be the same (e.g., AES-128 key wrap
algorithm with AES-128 content-encryption algorithm); see [RFC8551].
Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap are specified
in Section 2.2 of [RFC3394] and Section 2.3.2 of [RFC3565].
4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms
The key derivation algorithm is also referred to as KM_KD_ALG in
Section 7.2 and the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Key derivation algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] together with the password-based key
management technique.
Key derivation algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* keyDerivationAlgorithm field of PasswordRecipientInfo.
When using the password-based key management technique with
EnvelopedData as specified in CMP Updates [RFC9480] together with
PKIProtection based on the message authentication code (MAC), the
salt for the password-based MAC and key derivation function (KDF)
must be chosen independently to ensure usage of independent symmetric
keys.
4.4.1. PBKDF2
Password-based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2) is defined in
[RFC8018].
PBKDF2 has the algorithm identifier:
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 12 }
Further conventions to be considered for PBKDF2 are specified in
Section 4.4.1 of [RFC3370] and Section 5.2 of [RFC8018].
5. Content-Encryption Algorithms
The content-encryption algorithm is also referred to as PROT_SYM_ALG
in Appendices D and E of [RFC4210], in the Lightweight CMP Profile
[RFC9483], and in Section 7.
Content-encryption algorithms are used in CMP when using CMS
EnvelopedData [RFC5652] to transport a signed private key package in
case of central key generation or key archiving, a certificate to
facilitate implicit proof-of-possession, or a revocation passphrase
in encrypted form.
Content-encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* contentEncryptionAlgorithm field of EncryptedContentInfo.
Encrypted content is located in the:
* encryptedContent field of EncryptedContentInfo.
5.1. AES-CBC
The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197
[NIST.FIPS.197].
AES Cipher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) content encryption has the
algorithm identifier:
id-aes128-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 2 }
id-aes192-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)22 }
id-aes256-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1)42 }
Specific conventions to be considered for AES-CBC content encryption
are specified in [RFC3565].
6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
The message authentication code (MAC) is either used for shared
secret-based CMP message protection or together with the password-
based key derivation function (PBKDF2).
The MAC algorithm is also referred to as MSG_MAC_ALG in Section 7,
Appendices D and E of [RFC4210], and the Lightweight CMP Profile
[RFC9483].
6.1. Password-Based MAC
Password-based message authentication code (MAC) algorithms combine
the derivation of a symmetric key from a password or other shared
secret information and a symmetric key-based MAC function, as
specified in Section 6.2, using this derived key.
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader.
Message authentication code values are located in the:
* PKIProtection field of PKIMessage.
6.1.1. PasswordBasedMac
The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is defined in Section 5.1.3.1 of
[RFC4210], Section 4.4 of [RFC4211], and "Algorithm Requirements
Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)" [RFC9045].
The PasswordBasedMac algorithm is identified by the following OID:
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
Further conventions to be considered for PasswordBasedMac are
specified in Section 5.1.3.1 of [RFC4210], Section 4.4 of [RFC4211],
and "Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)" [RFC9045].
6.1.2. PBMAC1
Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1 (PBMAC1) is defined in
[RFC8018]. PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function,
like PBKDF2 (Section 4.4.1), with an underlying symmetric key-based
message authentication scheme.
PBMAC1 has the following OID:
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 14 }
Specific conventions to be considered for PBMAC1 are specified in
Section 7.1 and Appendix A.5 of [RFC8018].
6.2. Symmetric Key-Based MAC
Symmetric key-based message authentication code (MAC) algorithms are
used for deriving the symmetric encryption key when using PBKDF2, as
described in Section 4.4.1, as well as with password-based MAC, as
described in Section 6.1.
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the:
* protectionAlg field of PKIHeader,
* messageAuthScheme field of PBMAC1,
* mac field of PBMParameter, and
* prf field of PBKDF2-params.
MAC values are located in the:
* PKIProtection field of PKIMessage.
6.2.1. SHA2-Based HMAC
The HMAC algorithm is defined in [RFC2104] and FIPS Pub 198-1
[NIST.FIPS.198-1].
The HMAC algorithm used with SHA2 message digest algorithms is
identified by the following OIDs:
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
Specific conventions to be considered for SHA2-based HMAC are
specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC4231].
6.2.2. AES-GMAC
The AES-GMAC algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197 [NIST.FIPS.197] and
NIST SP 800-38d [NIST.SP.800-38d].
Note: The AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used twice with the same parameter
set, especially the same nonce. Therefore, it MUST NOT be used
together with PBKDF2. When using it with PBMAC1, it MUST be ensured
that the AES-GMAC is only used as a message authentication scheme and
not for the key derivation function PBKDF2.
The AES-GMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:
id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 }
id-aes192-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 29 }
id-aes256-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 49 }
Specific conventions to be considered for the AES-GMAC are specified
in [RFC9044].
6.2.3. SHAKE-Based KMAC
The KMAC algorithm is defined in [RFC8702] and FIPS SP 800-185
[NIST.SP.800-185]].
The SHAKE-based KMAC algorithm is identified by the following OIDs:
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) 19 }
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) 20 }
Specific conventions to be considered for KMAC with SHAKE are
specified in Section 3.4 of [RFC8702].
7. Algorithm Use Profiles
This section provides profiles of algorithms and respective
conventions for different application use cases.
Recommendations like those described in Table 2 of NIST SP 800-57
"Recommendation for Key Management" [NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5] and
Section 4.6 of ECRYPT "Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols Report
(2018)" [ECRYPT.CSA.D5.4] provide general information on current
cryptographic algorithms.
The overall cryptographic strength of CMP implementations will depend
on several factors, including:
* capabilities of the end entity: What kind of algorithms does the
end entity support? The cryptographic strength of the system
SHOULD be at least as strong as the algorithms and keys used for
the certificate being managed.
* algorithm profile: The overall strength of the profile will be the
strength of the weakest algorithm it contains.
* message protection: The overall strength of the CMP message
protection.
- MAC-based protection: The entropy of the shared secret
information or password when MAC-based message protection is
used (MSG_MAC_ALG).
- signature-based protection: The strength of the key pair and
signature algorithm when signature-based protection is used
(MSG_SIG_ALG).
- protection of centrally generated keys: The strength of the
algorithms used for the key management technique (Section 7.1:
PROT_ENC_ALG or Section 7.2: KM_KA_ALG, KM_KT_ALG, KM_KD_ALG)
and the encryption of the content-encryption key and private
key (Section 7.1: SYM_PENC_ALG, PROT_SYM_ALG or Section 7.2:
KM_KW_ALG, PROT_SYM_ALG).
The following table shows the algorithms listed in this document
sorted by their bits of security. If an implementation intends to
enroll and manage certificates for keys of a specific security, it
SHALL implement and use algorithms of at least that strength for the
respective PKI management operation. If one row does not provide a
suitable algorithm, the implementer MUST choose one offering more
bits of security.
+========+==========+==============+==================+============+
|Bits of | RSA or | Elliptic | Hash Function or | Symmetric |
|Security| DH | Curve | XOF with | Encryption |
| | | Cryptography | Specified Output | |
| | | | Length (d) | |
+========+==========+==============+==================+============+
|112 | RSA2048, | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA-224 | |
| | DH(2048) | (secp224r1) | | |
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|128 | RSA3072, | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA-256, | AES-128 |
| | DH(3072) | (secp256r1), | SHAKE128(d=256) | |
| | | Ed25519/ | | |
| | | X25519 | | |
| | | (curve25519) | | |
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|192 | | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA-384 | AES-192 |
| | | (secp384r1) | | |
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|224 | | Ed448/X448 | | |
| | | (curve448) | | |
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
|256 | | ECDSA/ECDH | SHA-512, | AES-256 |
| | | (secp521r1) | SHAKE256(d=512) | |
+--------+----------+--------------+------------------+------------+
Table 1: Cryptographic Algorithms Sorted by Their Bits of Security
The following table shows the cryptographic algorithms sorted by
their usage in CMP and with more details.
+========+==========+================+================+=============+
|Bits of |Key Types | CMP Protection | Key Management |Key-Wrap and |
|Security|to Be | MSG_SIG_ALG, | Technique |Symmetric |
| |Certified | MSG_MAC_ALG | PROT_ENC_ALG |Encryption |
| | | | or KM_KA_ALG, |PROT_SYM_ALG,|
| | | | KM_KT_ALG, |SYM_PENC_ALG |
| | | | KM_KD_ALG |or |
| | | | |KM_KW_ALG |
+========+==========+================+================+=============+
|112 |RSA2048, | RSASSA-PSS | DH(2048), | |
| |secp224r1 | (2048, SHA-224 | RSAES-OAEP | |
| | | or SHAKE128 | (2048, SHA- | |
| | | (d=256)), | 224), | |
| | | RSAEncryption | RSAEncryption | |
| | | (2048, SHA- | (2048, SHA- | |
| | | 224), | 224), | |
| | | ECDSA | ECDH | |
| | | (secp224r1, | (secp224r1, | |
| | | SHA-224 or | SHA-224), | |
| | | SHAKE128 | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | | (d=256)), | SHA-224) | |
| | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | | SHA-224) | | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|128 |RSA3072, | RSASSA-PSS | DH(3072), |AES-128 |
| |secp256r1,| (3072, SHA-256 | RSAES-OAEP | |
| |curve25519| or SHAKE128 | (3072, SHA- | |
| | | (d=256)), | 256), | |
| | | RSAEncryption | RSAEncryption | |
| | | (3072, SHA- | (3072, SHA- | |
| | | 256), | 256), | |
| | | ECDSA | ECDH | |
| | | (secp256r1, | (secp256r1, | |
| | | SHA-256 or | SHA-256), | |
| | | SHAKE128 | X25519, | |
| | | (d=256)), | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | | Ed25519 (SHA- | SHA-256) | |
| | | 512), | | |
| | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | | SHA-256) | | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|192 |secp384r1 | ECDSA | ECDH |AES-192 |
| | | (secp384r1, | (secp384r1, | |
| | | SHA-384), | SHA-384), | |
| | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | | SHA-384) | SHA-384) | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|224 |curve448 | Ed448 | X448 | |
| | | (SHAKE256) | | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
|256 |secp521r1 | ECDSA | ECDH |AES-256 |
| | | (secp521r1, | (secp521r1, | |
| | | SHA-512 or | SHA-512), | |
| | | SHAKE256 | PBKDF2 (HMAC- | |
| | | (d=512)), | SHA-512) | |
| | | PBMAC1 (HMAC- | | |
| | | SHA-512) | | |
+--------+----------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
Table 2: Cryptographic Algorithms Sorted by Their Bits of
Security and Usage by CMP
To avoid consuming too many computational resources, choosing a set
of algorithms offering roughly the same level of security is
recommended. Below are several algorithm profiles that are balanced,
assuming the implementer chooses MAC secrets and/or certificate
profiles of at least equivalent strength.
7.1. Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles in RFC 4210
The following table updates the definitions of algorithms used within
PKI Management Message Profiles, as defined in Appendix D.2 of
[RFC4210].
The columns in the table are:
Name: An identifier used for message profiles
Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used
Mandatory: Algorithms that MUST be supported by conforming
implementations
Optional: Algorithms that are OPTIONAL to support
Deprecated: Algorithms from [RFC4210] that SHOULD NOT be used any
more
+============+=============+=========+=================+============+
|Name |Use |Mandatory|Optional |Deprecated |
+============+=============+=========+=================+============+
|MSG_SIG_ALG |protection of|RSA |ECDSA, EdDSA |DSA, |
| |PKI messages | | |combinations|
| |using | | |with MD5 and|
| |signatures | | |SHA-1 |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|MSG_MAC_ALG |protection of|PBMAC1 |PasswordBasedMac,|X9.9 |
| |PKI messages | |HMAC, KMAC | |
| |using MACs | | | |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|SYM_PENC_ALG|symmetric |AES-wrap | |3-DES(3-key-|
| |encryption of| | |EDE, CBC |
| |an end | | |Mode), RC5, |
| |entity's | | |CAST-128 |
| |private key | | | |
| |where the | | | |
| |symmetric key| | | |
| |is | | | |
| |distributed | | | |
| |out of band | | | |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|PROT_ENC_ALG|asymmetric |DH |ECDH, RSA | |
| |algorithm | | | |
| |used for | | | |
| |encryption of| | | |
| |(symmetric | | | |
| |keys for | | | |
| |encryption | | | |
| |of) private | | | |
| |keys | | | |
| |transported | | | |
| |in | | | |
| |PKIMessages | | | |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
|PROT_SYM_ALG|symmetric |AES-CBC | |3-DES(3-key-|
| |encryption | | |EDE, CBC |
| |algorithm | | |Mode), RC5, |
| |used for | | |CAST-128 |
| |encryption of| | | |
| |private key | | | |
| |bits (a key | | | |
| |of this type | | | |
| |is encrypted | | | |
| |using | | | |
| |PROT_ENC_ALG)| | | |
+------------+-------------+---------+-----------------+------------+
Table 3: Algorithms Used within Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210
The following are the mandatory algorithm identifiers and
specifications:
RSA: sha256WithRSAEncryption with 2048 bit, see Section 3.1
PasswordBasedMac: id-PasswordBasedMac, see Section 6.1 (with id-
sha256 as the owf parameter, see Section 2.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256
as the mac parameter, see Section 6.2.1)
PBMAC1: id-PBMAC1, see Section 6.1.2 (with id-PBKDF2 as the key
derivation function, see Section 4.4.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256 as
the message authentication scheme, see Section 6.2.1). It is
RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of
PasswordBasedMac.
DH: id-alg-ESDH, see Section 4.1.1
AES-wrap: id-aes128-wrap, see Section 4.3.1
AES-CBC: id-aes128-CBC, see Section 5.1
7.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile
The following table contains definitions of algorithms that MAY be
supported by implementations of the Lightweight CMP Profile
[RFC9483].
As the set of algorithms to be used for implementations of the
Lightweight CMP Profile heavily depends on the PKI management
operations implemented, the certificates used for message protection,
and the certificates to be managed, this document will not specify a
specific set that is mandatory to support for conforming
implementations.
The columns in the table are:
Name: An identifier used for message profiles
Use: Description of where and for what the algorithm is used
Examples: Lists the algorithms, as described in this document. The
list of algorithms depends on the set of PKI management operations
to be implemented.
Note: It is RECOMMENDED to prefer the usage of PBMAC1 instead of
PasswordBasedMac.
+==============+================================+==================+
| Name | Use | Examples |
+==============+================================+==================+
| MSG_SIG_ALG | protection of PKI messages | RSA, ECDSA, |
| | using signatures and for | EdDSA |
| | SignedData, e.g., a private | |
| | key transported in PKIMessages | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| MSG_MAC_ALG | protection of PKI messages | PasswordBasedMac |
| | using MACing | (see Section 9), |
| | | PBMAC1, HMAC, |
| | | KMAC |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KA_ALG | asymmetric key agreement | DH, ECDH |
| | algorithm used for agreement | |
| | of a symmetric key for use | |
| | with KM_KW_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KT_ALG | asymmetric key-encryption | RSA |
| | algorithm used for transport | |
| | of a symmetric key for | |
| | PROT_SYM_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KD_ALG | symmetric key derivation | PBKDF2 |
| | algorithm used for derivation | |
| | of a symmetric key for use | |
| | with KM_KW_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| KM_KW_ALG | algorithm to wrap a symmetric | AES-wrap |
| | key for PROT_SYM_ALG | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
| PROT_SYM_ALG | symmetric content-encryption | AES-CBC |
| | algorithm used for encryption | |
| | of EnvelopedData, e.g., a | |
| | private key transported in | |
| | PKIMessages | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+------------------+
Table 4: Algorithms Used within the Lightweight CMP Profile
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. Security Considerations
This document lists many cryptographic algorithms usable with CMP to
offer implementers a more up-to-date choice. Finally, the algorithms
to be supported also heavily depend on the certificates and PKI
management operations utilized in the target environment. The
algorithm with the lowest security strength and the entropy of shared
secret information defines the security of the overall solution; see
Section 7.
When using MAC-based message protection, the use of PBMAC1 is
preferable to that of PasswordBasedMac. First, PBMAC1 is a well-
known scrutinized algorithm, which is not true for PasswordBasedMac.
Second, the PasswordBasedMac algorithm as specified in Section 4.4 of
[RFC4211] is essentially PBKDF1 (as defined in Section 5.1 of
[RFC8018]) with an HMAC step at the end. Here, we update to use the
PBKDF2-HMAC construct defined as PBMAC1 in [RFC8018]. PBKDF2 is
superior to PBKDF1 in an improved internal construct for iterated
hashing and in removing PBKDF1's limitation of only being able to
derive keys up to the size of the underlying hash function.
Additionally, PBKDF1 is not recommended for new applications as
stated in Section 5.1 of [RFC8018] and is no longer an approved
algorithm by most standards bodies. Therefore, it presents
difficulties to implementers who are submitting their CMP
implementations for certification, hence moving to a PBKDF2-based
mechanism. This change is in alignment with [RFC9045], which updates
[RFC4211] to allow the use of PBMAC1 in CRMF.
The AES-GMAC MUST NOT be used as the pseudorandom function (PRF) in
PBKDF2; the use of the AES-GMAC more than once with the same key and
the same nonce will break the security.
In Section 7 of this document, there is also an update to
Appendix D.2 of [RFC4210] and a set of algorithms that MAY be
supported when implementing the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
It is recognized that there may be older CMP implementations in use
that conform to the algorithm use profile from Appendix D.2 of
[RFC4210]. For example, the use of AES is now mandatory for
PROT_SYM_ALG, while 3-DES was mandatory in [RFC4210]. Therefore, it
is expected that many CMP systems may already support the recommended
algorithms in this specification. In such systems, the weakened
algorithms should be disabled from further use. If critical systems
cannot be immediately updated to conform to the recommended algorithm
use profile, it is recommended that a plan to migrate the
infrastructure to conforming profiles be adopted as soon as possible.
Symmetric key-based MAC algorithms as described in Section 6.2 MAY be
used as MSG_MAC_ALG. The implementer MUST choose a suitable PRF and
ensure that the key has sufficient entropy to match the overall
security level of the algorithm profile. These considerations are
outside the scope of the profile.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[NIST.FIPS.180-4]
Dang, Q. H. and NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST Federal
Information Processing Standards Publications 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, July 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.186-5]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-5,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.197]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", NIST FIPS 197,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197, November 2001,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.198-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)", FIPS
PUB 198-1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1, July 2008,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf>.
[NIST.FIPS.202]
Dworkin, M. J. and NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", NIST Federal
Information Processing Standards Publications 202,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, July 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-185]]
Kelsey, J., Change, S., Perlner, R., and NIST, "SHA-3
derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash", NIST Special Publications
(General) 800-185, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185, December
2016,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-38d]
Dworkin, M J. and NIST, "Recommendation for block cipher
modes of operation :GaloisCounter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
NIST Special Publications (General) 800-38d,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38d, 2007,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>.
[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
[RFC3560] Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3560, DOI 10.17487/RFC3560, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3560>.
[RFC3565] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 3565, DOI 10.17487/RFC3565, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3565>.
[RFC4056] Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4056, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4056>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8018] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8418] Housley, R., "Use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement Algorithm with X25519 and X448 in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8418,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8418, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8418>.
[RFC8419] Housley, R., "Use of Edwards-Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (EdDSA) Signatures in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8419, DOI 10.17487/RFC8419, August
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8419>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC8692] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs", RFC 8692,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8692, December 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692>.
[RFC8702] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash
Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 8702, DOI 10.17487/RFC8702, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8702>.
[RFC9044] Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9044,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9044, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9044>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
[RFC9480] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
10.2. Informative References
[ECRYPT.CSA.D5.4]
University of Bristol, "Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols
Report (2018)", March 2015,
<https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/csa/documents/
D5.4-FinalAlgKeySizeProt.pdf>.
[NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5]
Barker, E. and NIST, "Recommendation for key
management:part 1 - general", NIST Special Publications
(General) 800-57pt1r5, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5,
May 2020,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Russ Housley for his work on [RFC9044] and [RFC9045] upon
which this RFC relies heavily.
May thanks also to all reviewers like Serge Mister, Mark Ferreira,
Yuefei Lu, Tomas Gustavsson, Lijun Liao, David von Oheimb, and
Steffen Fries for their input and feedback to this document.
Apologies to all not mentioned reviewers and supporters.
Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens AG
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
Hans Aschauer
Siemens AG
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hans.aschauer@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
Mike Ounsworth
Entrust
1187 Park Place
Minneapolis, MN 55379
United States of America
Email: mike.ounsworth@entrust.com
URI: https://www.entrust.com
John Gray
Entrust
1187 Park Place
Minneapolis, MN 55379
United States of America
Email: john.gray@entrust.com
URI: https://www.entrust.com