💾 Archived View for scholasticdiversity.us.to › scriptures › jewish › t › Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Sabba… captured on 2024-07-09 at 03:44:06. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
1 ‎[1] Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [*ibid.* 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for *karet*; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature. ‎[2] Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for *karet*, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering. ‎[3] Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for *karet*, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.
In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion is given "stripes for defiance." ‎[4] Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act. Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.] ‎[5] It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.
What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.
Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair. Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so. ‎[6] [In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].
What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken, he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations. ‎[7] Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.
What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing, but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him, and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations. ‎[8] Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.
What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.
How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a* carmelit,* and instead, the stone passed into the public domain. He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable. For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground, he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations. ‎[9] Should a person intend to pick black figs and pick white figs instead - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable. He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade. ‎[10] When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable, for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.
To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being] and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed. ‎[11] One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.
If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable. ‎[12] Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable. If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.
What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner. ‎[13] [A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position. ‎[14] Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability, he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.
For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands. Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations. ‎[15] Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself, they are [both] free of liability.
This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another. ‎[16] When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable]. For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone, and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.
[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all. The same applies in other similar situations. ‎[17] Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable. What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent, one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability. Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent. ‎[18] Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable. For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place, one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.
The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity. ‎[19] Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally, he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.
One is liable for *karet* only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning. Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC