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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Moriarty, Ed.
Request for Comments: 7292 EMC
Category: Informational M. Nystrom
ISSN: 2070-1721 Microsoft Corporation
S. Parkinson
A. Rusch
M. Scott
RSA
July 2014
PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1
Abstract
PKCS #12 v1.1 describes a transfer syntax for personal identity
information, including private keys, certificates, miscellaneous
secrets, and extensions. Machines, applications, browsers, Internet
kiosks, and so on, that support this standard will allow a user to
import, export, and exercise a single set of personal identity
information. This standard supports direct transfer of personal
information under several privacy and integrity modes.
This document represents a republication of PKCS #12 v1.1 from RSA
Laboratories' Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) series. By
publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.
IESG Note
The IESG thanks RSA Laboratories for transferring change control to
the IETF. Enhancements to this specification that preserve backward
compatibility are expected in an upcoming IETF Standards Track
document.
Moriarty, et al. Informational [Page 1]
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Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Changes from PKCS #12 Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Exchange Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Mode Choice Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Trusted Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. The AuthenticatedSafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. PFX PDU Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. The AuthenticatedSafe Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. The SafeBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.1. The KeyBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.2. The PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.3. The CertBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.4. The CRLBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.5. The SecretBag Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.6. The SafeContents Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Using PFX PDUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Creating PFX PDUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Importing Keys, etc., from a PFX PDU . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Deriving Keys and IVs from Passwords and Salt . . . 19
B.1. Password Formatting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.2. General Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B.3. More on the ID Byte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.4. Keys for Password Integrity Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix C. Keys and IVs for Password Privacy Mode . . . . . . . 22
Appendix D. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix E. Intellectual Property Considerations . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix F. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix G. About PKCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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1. Introduction
This document represents a republication of PKCS #12 v1.1 from RSA
Laboratories' Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) series. By
publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF. RSA
and its parent company EMC reserve the right to continue publishing
and distributing PKCS #12 v1.1 and its predecessors.
The body of this document, except for the Security Considerations
section, is taken directly from the PKCS #12 v1.1 specification. The
list of references and the in-line cites have been updated or added
where appropriate to cite the most current documents in addition to
those current at the original publication of PKCS #12 v1.1.
This standard describes a transfer syntax for personal identity
information, including private keys, certificates, miscellaneous
secrets, and extensions. Machines, applications, browsers, Internet
kiosks, and so on, that support this standard will allow a user to
import, export, and exercise a single set of personal identity
information.
This standard supports direct transfer of personal information under
several privacy and integrity modes. The most secure of the privacy
and integrity modes require the source and destination platforms to
have trusted public/private key pairs usable for digital signatures
and encryption, respectively. The standard also supports lower-
security, password-based privacy and integrity modes for those cases
where trusted public/private key pairs are not available.
This standard should be amenable to both software and hardware
implementations. Hardware implementations offer physical security in
tamper-resistant tokens such as smart cards and Personal Computer
Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) devices.
This standard can be viewed as building on PKCS #8 [15] [24] by
including essential but ancillary identity information along with
private keys and by instituting higher security through public-key
privacy and integrity modes.
1.1. Changes from PKCS #12 Version 1
This document transfers PKCS #12 [16] into the IETF and includes some
minor changes from the authors for this submission.
o Addition of hash algorithms.
o Incorporation of Technical Corrigendum #1, which makes some minor
corrections to the ASN.1 syntax.
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o Removed (from the ASN.1 syntax) 1024 as an example of the
iteration count.
o Addition of a recommendation that the technique in Appendix B no
longer be used for a specific mode (password privacy mode) and
that techniques from PKCS#5 v2.1 be used instead.
o Addition of comments and minor corrections to the ASN.1 module in
Appendix C.
o Removal of the export regulations discussion in the former
Appendix D.
o Replacement of RSA with EMC in the "Intellectual Property
Considerations".
o Many changes and additions to the references.
o A reference was added to NIST SP 800-132 for its recommendations
on selection of the iteration count value for password integrity
(part of dictionary-attack resistance).
o Comment included on acronym expansion of PFX: The acronym is
sometimes expanded as Personal Information Exchange.
o In Appendix B, the phrase "no longer recommended" was changed to
"not recommended" in the following sentence to address a question
and make it clear the method was not recommended: "Note that this
method for password privacy mode is no longer recommended."
2. Definitions and Notation
AlgorithmIdentifier: An ASN.1 type that identifies an algorithm (by
an object identifier) and any associated parameters. This type is
defined in [8].
ASN.1: Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in [2], [3], [4],
and [5].
Attribute: An ASN.1 type that identifies an attribute type (by an
object identifier) and an associated attribute value. The ASN.1
type Attribute is defined in [7].
Certificate: A digitally signed data unit binding a public key to
identity information. A specific format for identity certificates
is defined in [8]. Another format is described in [17].
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Certificate Revocation List (CRL): A digitally signed list of
certificates that should no longer be honored, having been revoked
by the issuers or a higher authority. One format for CRLs is
defined in [8].
ContentInfo: An ASN.1 type used to hold data that may have been
cryptographically protected. This type is defined in [21] and
[14].
DER: Distinguished Encoding Rules, as defined in [6].
Destination platform: The ultimate, final target platform for the
personal information originating from the source platform. Even
though certain information may be transported from the destination
platform to the source platform, the ultimate target for personal
information is always called the destination platform.
DigestInfo: An ASN.1 type used to hold a message digest. This type
is defined in [21] and [14].
Encryption Key Pair (DestEncK): A public/private key pair used for
the public-key privacy mode of this standard. The public half is
called PDestEncK (TPDestEncK when emphasizing that the public key
is "trusted"), and the private half is called VDestEncK.
Export time: The time that a user reads personal information from a
source platform and transforms the information into an
interoperable, secure Protocol Data Unit (PDU).
Import time: The time that a user writes personal information from a
Safe PDU to a destination platform.
Message Authentication Code (MAC): A type of collision-resistant,
"unpredictable" function of a message and a secret key. MACs are
used for data authentication and are akin to secret-key digital
signatures in many respects.
Object Identifier: A sequence of integers that uniquely identifies
an associated data object in a global name space administrated by
a hierarchy of naming authorities. This is a primitive data type
in ASN.1.
PFX: The top-level exchange PDU defined in this standard. The
acronym is sometimes expanded as Personal Information Exchange.
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Platform: A combination of machine, operating system, and
applications software within which the user exercises personal
identity. An application, in this context, is software that uses
personal information. Two platforms differ if their machine types
differ or if their applications software differs. There is at
least one platform per user in multi-user systems.
Protocol Data Unit (PDU): A sequence of bits in machine-independent
format constituting a message in a protocol.
Shrouding: Encryption as applied to private keys, possibly in
concert with a policy that prevents the plaintext of the key from
ever being visible beyond a certain, well-defined interface.
Signature Key Pair (SrcSigK): A platform-specific signature key pair
used for the public-key integrity mode of this standard. The
public half is called PSrcSigK (TPSrcSigK when emphasizing that
the public key is "trusted"), and the private half is called
VSrcSigK.
Source platform: The origin platform of the personal information
ultimately intended for the destination platform. Even though
certain information may be transported from the destination
platform to the source platform, the platform that is the origin
of personal information is always called the source platform.
3. Overview
3.1. Exchange Modes
There are four combinations of privacy modes and integrity modes.
The privacy modes use encryption to protect personal information from
exposure, and the integrity modes protect personal information from
tampering. Without protection from tampering, an adversary could
conceivably substitute invalid information for the user's personal
information without the user being aware of the substitution.
The following are the privacy modes:
o Public-key privacy mode: Personal information is enveloped on the
source platform using a trusted encryption public key of a known
destination platform (see Section 3.3). The envelope is opened
with the corresponding private key.
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o Password privacy mode: Personal information is encrypted with a
symmetric key derived from a user name and a privacy password, as
in [22] and [13]. If password integrity mode is used as well, the
privacy password and the integrity password may or may not be the
same.
The following are the integrity modes:
o Public-key integrity mode: Integrity is guaranteed through a
digital signature on the contents of the PFX PDU, which is
produced using the source platform's private signature key. The
signature is verified on the destination platform by using the
corresponding public key (see Section 3.4).
o Password integrity mode: Integrity is guaranteed through a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) derived from a secret integrity
password. If password privacy mode is used as well, the privacy
password and the integrity password may or may not be the same.
3.2. Mode Choice Policies
All combinations of the privacy and integrity modes are permitted in
this standard. Of course, good security policy suggests that certain
practices be avoided, e.g., it can be unwise to transport private
keys without physical protection when using password privacy mode or
when using public-key privacy mode with weak symmetric encryption.
In general, the public-key modes for both privacy and integrity are
preferable to the password modes (from a security viewpoint).
However, it is not always possible to use the public-key modes. For
example, it may not be known at export time what the destination
platform is; if this is the case, then the use of the public-key
privacy mode is precluded.
3.3. Trusted Public Keys
Asymmetric key pairs may be used in this standard in two ways:
public-key privacy mode and public-key integrity mode. For public-
key privacy mode, an encryption key pair is required; for public-key
integrity mode, a signature key pair is required.
It may be appropriate for the keys discussed in this section to be
platform-specific keys dedicated solely for the purpose of
transporting a user's personal information. Whether or not that is
the case, though, the keys discussed here should not be confused with
the user's personal keys that the user wishes to transport from one
platform to another. (These latter keys are stored within the PDU.)
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For public-key privacy mode, the private key from the encryption key
pair is kept on the destination platform, where it is ultimately used
to open a private envelope. The corresponding trusted public key is
called TPDestEncK.
For public-key integrity mode, the private key from the signature
pair is kept on the source platform, where it is used to sign
personal information. The corresponding trusted public key is called
TPSrcSigK.
For both uses of public/private key pairs, the public key from the
key pair must be transported to the other platform such that it is
trusted to have originated at the correct platform. Judging whether
or not a public key is trusted in this sense must ultimately be left
to the user. There are a variety of methods for ensuring that a
public key is trusted.
The processes of imbuing keys with trust and of verifying
trustworthiness of keys are not discussed further in this document.
Whenever asymmetric keys are discussed in what follows, the public
keys are assumed to be trusted.
3.4. The AuthenticatedSafe
Each compliant platform shall be able to import and export
AuthenticatedSafe PDUs wrapped in PFX PDUs.
For integrity, the AuthenticatedSafe is either signed (if public-key
integrity mode is used) or MACed (if password integrity mode is used)
to produce a PFX PDU. If the AuthenticatedSafe is signed, then it is
accompanied by a digital signature, which was produced on the source
platform with a private signature key, VSrcSigK, corresponding to a
trusted public signature key, TPSrcSigK. TPSrcSigK must accompany
the PFX to the destination platform, where the user can verify the
trust in the key and can verify the signature on the
AuthenticatedSafe. If the AuthenticatedSafe is MACed, then it is
accompanied by a MAC computed from a secret integrity password, salt
bits, an iteration count, and the contents of the AuthenticatedSafe.
The AuthenticatedSafe itself consists of a sequence of ContentInfo
values, some of which may consist of plaintext (data), and others
that may either be enveloped (if public-key privacy mode is used) or
encrypted (if password privacy mode is used). If the contents are
enveloped, then they are encrypted with a symmetric cipher under a
freshly generated key, which is in turn encrypted with RSA asymmetric
encryption. The RSA public key used to encrypt the symmetric key is
called TPDestEncK and corresponds to an RSA private key, VDestEncK,
on the destination platform. TPDestEncK needs to be trusted by the
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user when it is used at export time. If the contents are encrypted,
then they are encrypted with a symmetric cipher under a key derived
from a secret privacy password, salt bits, and an iteration counter.
Each ContentInfo contains an arbitrary collection of private keys,
PKCS #8-shrouded private keys, certificates, CRLs, or opaque data
objects, at the user's discretion, stored in values of type
SafeContents.
The raison d'etre for the unencrypted option is that some governments
restrict certain uses of cryptography. Having several parts in an
AuthenticatedSafe keeps implementers' options open. For example, it
may be the case that strong cryptography can be used to make PKCS
#8-shrouded keys, but then these shrouded keys should not be further
encrypted, because super-encryption can limit a product's
exportability. The multi-part AuthenticatedSafe design permits this
possibility.
Around the AuthenticatedSafe is the integrity-mode wrapper, which
protects the entire contents of the AuthenticatedSafe (including
unencrypted parts, if they are present). This is the reverse of the
wrapping order in many protocols, in which privacy is the outermost
protection. This latter, more-common wrapping order avoids
signatures on encrypted data, which are undesirable under certain
circumstances; however, these circumstances do not apply to this
document, and it is therefore preferable to protect the integrity of
as much information as possible.
4. PFX PDU Syntax
This format corresponds to the data model presented above, with
wrappers for privacy and integrity. This section makes free
reference to PKCS #7 [14] [21] and assumes the reader is familiar
with terms defined in that document.
All modes of direct exchange use the same PDU format. ASN.1 and BER-
encoding ensure platform independence.
This standard has one ASN.1 export: PFX. This is the outer integrity
wrapper. Instances of PFX contain:
1. A version indicator. The version shall be v3 for this version of
this document.
2. A PKCS #7 ContentInfo, whose contentType is signedData in public-
key integrity mode and data in password integrity mode.
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3. An optional instance of MacData, present only in password
integrity. This object, if present, contains a PKCS #7
DigestInfo, which holds the MAC value, a macSalt, and an
iterationCount. As described in Appendix B, the MAC key is
derived from the password, the macSalt, and the iterationCount;
as described in Section 5, the MAC is computed from the authSafe
value and the MAC key via HMAC [11] [20]. The password and the
MAC key are not actually present anywhere in the PFX. The salt
and (to a certain extent) the iteration count thwarts dictionary
attacks against the integrity password. See NIST Special
Publication 800-132 [12] about how to choose a reasonable value
for the iteration count.
PFX ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER {v3(3)}(v3,...),
authSafe ContentInfo,
macData MacData OPTIONAL
}
MacData ::= SEQUENCE {
mac DigestInfo,
macSalt OCTET STRING,
iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 1
-- Note: The default is for historical reasons and its
-- use is deprecated.
}
4.1. The AuthenticatedSafe Type
As mentioned, the contentType field of authSafe shall be of type data
or signedData. The content field of the authSafe shall, either
directly (data case) or indirectly (signedData case), contain a BER-
encoded value of type AuthenticatedSafe.
AuthenticatedSafe ::= SEQUENCE OF ContentInfo
-- Data if unencrypted
-- EncryptedData if password-encrypted
-- EnvelopedData if public key-encrypted
An AuthenticatedSafe contains a sequence of ContentInfo values. The
content field of these ContentInfo values contains either plaintext,
encrypted, or enveloped data. In the case of encrypted or enveloped
data, the plaintext of the data holds the BER-encoding of an instance
of SafeContents. Section 5.1 of this document describes the
construction of values of type AuthenticatedSafe in more detail.
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4.2. The SafeBag Type
The SafeContents type is made up of SafeBags. Each SafeBag holds one
piece of information -- a key, a certificate, etc. -- which is
identified by an object identifier.
SafeContents ::= SEQUENCE OF SafeBag
SafeBag ::= SEQUENCE {
bagId BAG-TYPE.&id ({PKCS12BagSet})
bagValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type({PKCS12BagSet}{@bagId}),
bagAttributes SET OF PKCS12Attribute OPTIONAL
}
PKCS12Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrId ATTRIBUTE.&id ({PKCS12AttrSet}),
attrValues SET OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({PKCS12AttrSet}{@attrId})
} -- This type is compatible with the X.500 type 'Attribute'
PKCS12AttrSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
friendlyName | -- from PKCS #9 [23]
localKeyId, -- from PKCS #9
... -- Other attributes are allowed
}
The optional bagAttributes field allows users to assign nicknames and
identifiers to keys, etc., and permits visual tools to display
meaningful strings of some sort to the user.
Six types of SafeBags are defined in this version of this document:
bagtypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 10 1}
BAG-TYPE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
keyBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{KeyBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 1}}
pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 2}}
certBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{CertBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 3}}
crlBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{CRLBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 4}}
secretBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{SecretBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 5}}
safeContentsBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{SafeContents IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 6}}
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PKCS12BagSet BAG-TYPE ::= {
keyBag |
pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag |
certBag |
crlBag |
secretBag |
safeContentsBag,
... -- For future extensions
}
As new bag types become recognized in future versions of this
standard, the PKCS12BagSet may be extended.
4.2.1. The KeyBag Type
A KeyBag is a PKCS #8 PrivateKeyInfo. Note that a KeyBag contains
only one private key.
KeyBag ::= PrivateKeyInfo
4.2.2. The PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag Type
A PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag holds a private key, which has been shrouded in
accordance with PKCS #8. Note that a PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag holds only
one shrouded private key.
PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag ::= EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
4.2.3. The CertBag Type
A CertBag contains a certificate of a certain type. Object
identifiers are used to distinguish between different certificate
types.
CertBag ::= SEQUENCE {
certId BAG-TYPE.&id ({CertTypes}),
certValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({CertTypes}{@certId})
}
x509Certificate BAG-TYPE ::=
{OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY {certTypes 1}}
-- DER-encoded X.509 certificate stored in OCTET STRING
sdsiCertificate BAG-TYPE ::=
{IA5String IDENTIFIED BY {certTypes 2}}
-- Base64-encoded SDSI certificate stored in IA5String
CertTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
x509Certificate |
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sdsiCertificate,
... -- For future extensions
}
4.2.4. The CRLBag Type
A CRLBag contains a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of a certain
type. Object identifiers are used to distinguish between different
CRL types.
CRLBag ::= SEQUENCE {
crlId BAG-TYPE.&id ({CRLTypes}),
crlValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({CRLTypes}{@crlId})
}
x509CRL BAG-TYPE ::=
{OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY {crlTypes 1}}
-- DER-encoded X.509 CRL stored in OCTET STRING
CRLTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
x509CRL,
... -- For future extensions
}
4.2.5. The SecretBag Type
Each of the user's miscellaneous personal secrets is contained in an
instance of SecretBag, which holds an object identifier-dependent
value. Note that a SecretBag contains only one secret.
SecretBag ::= SEQUENCE {
secretTypeId BAG-TYPE.&id ({SecretTypes}),
secretValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({SecretTypes}
{@secretTypeId})
}
SecretTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
... -- For future extensions
}
Implementers can add values to this set at their own discretion.
4.2.6. The SafeContents Type
The sixth type of bag that can be held in a SafeBag is a
SafeContents. This recursive structure allows for arbitrary nesting
of multiple KeyBags, PKCS8ShroudedKeyBags, CertBags, CRLBags, and
SecretBags within the top-level SafeContents.
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5. Using PFX PDUs
This section describes the creation and usage of PFX PDUs.
5.1. Creating PFX PDUs
The steps for creating PFX PDUs are as follows.
1. It is somewhat clear from the ASN.1 how to make a number of
instances of SafeContents, each containing a number of (possibly
nested) instances of SafeBag. Let us assume, therefore, a number
of instances SC_1, SC_2,..., SC_n of SafeContents. Note that
there can be a more or less arbitrary number of instances of
SafeContents in a PFX PDU. As will be seen in step 2, each
instance can be encrypted (or not) separately.
2. For each SCI, depending on the chosen encryption option,
A. If SC_i is not to be encrypted, make a ContentInfo CI_i
holding content type Data. The contents of the Data OCTET
STRING shall be a BER-encoding of SC_i (including tag,
length, and value octets).
B. If SC_i is to be encrypted with a password, make a
ContentInfo CI_i of type EncryptedData. The
encryptedContentInfo field of CI_i has its contentType field
set to data and its encryptedContent field set to the
encryption of the BER-encoding of SC_i (note that the tag and
length octets shall be present).
C. If SC_i is to be encrypted with a public key, make a
ContentInfo CI_i of type EnvelopedData in essentially the
same fashion as the EncryptedData ContentInfo was made in B.
3. Make an instance of AuthenticatedSafe by stringing together the
CI_i's in a SEQUENCE.
4. Make a ContentInfo T holding content type Data. The contents of
the Data OCTET STRING shall be a BER-encoding of the
AuthenticatedSafe value (including tag, length, and value
octets).
5. For integrity protection,
A. If the PFX PDU is to be authenticated with a digital
signature, make a ContentInfo C of type SignedData. The
contentInfo field of the SignedData in C has T in it. C is
the ContentInfo in the top-level PFX structure.
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B. If the PFX PDU is to be authenticated with HMAC, then an HMAC
with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
or SHA-512/256 is computed on the contents of the Data in T
(i.e., excluding the OCTET STRING tag and length bytes).
This is exactly what would be initially digested in step 5A
if public-key authentication were being used.
5.2. Importing Keys, etc., from a PFX PDU
Importation from a PFX is accomplished essentially by reversing the
procedure for creating a PFX. In general, when an application
imports keys, etc., from a PFX, it should ignore any object
identifiers that it is not familiar with. At times, it may be
appropriate to alert the user to the presence of such object
identifiers.
Special care may be taken by the application when importing an item
in the PFX would require overwriting an item that already exists
locally. The behavior of the application when such an item is
encountered may depend on what the item is (i.e., it may be that a
PKCS #8-shrouded private key and a CRL should be treated differently
here). Appropriate behavior may be to ask the user what action
should be taken for this item.
6. Security Considerations
When using passwords in privacy or integrity mode, it needs to be
considered that password-based cryptography is generally limited in
the security that it can provide, particularly for methods such as
those defined in this document where off-line password search is
possible. While the use of salt and iteration count can increase the
complexity of attack, it is essential that passwords are selected
well and that relevant guidelines (e.g., NIST SP 800-61-1) are taken
into account. It is also important that passwords be protected well
if stored.
When choosing a salt value in password privacy or integrity mode, the
recommendations in Section 4 of PKCS #5 2.1 [13] [22] should be taken
into account. Ideally, the salt is as long as the output of the hash
function being used and consists of randomly generated data.
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7. Normative References
[1] Dobbertin, H., "The status of MD5 after a recent attack.",
CryptoBytes Vol. 2, #2, 1996.
[2] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) -- Specification of basic notation", ISO/IEC
8824-1:2008, 2008.
[3] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) -- Information object specification", ISO/IEC
8824-2:2008, 2008.
[4] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) -- Constraint specification", ISO/IEC 88247-3:2008,
2008.
[5] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) -- Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications",
ISO/IEC 8824-4:2008, 2008.
[6] ISO/IEC, "Information Technology - ASN.1 Encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding
Rules (CER), and Distinguished Encoding Rules", ISO/IEC
8825-1:2008, 2008.
[7] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- The Directory: Models", ISO/IEC 9594-2:1997,
1997.
[8] ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Open Systems
Interconnection -- The Directory: Authentication Framework",
ISO/IEC 9594-8:1997, 1997.
[9] Microsoft, "PFX: Personal Exchange Syntax and Protocol
Standard", ISO/IEC Version 0.020, January 1997.
[10] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS Publication 180-4, March 2012.
[11] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)", FIPS
Publication 198-1, July 2008.
[12] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "The
Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part 1:
Storage Applications", NIST Special Publication 800-132,
December 2010.
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[13] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption
Standard", PKCS Version 2.1, October 2012.
[14] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Standard", PKCS Version 1.5, November 1993.
[15] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax
Standard", PKCS Version 1.2, November 1993.
[16] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
Syntax", PKCS Version 1.1, December 2012.
[17] Rivest, R. and B. Lampson, "SDSI - A Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure", 1996,
<http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/sdsi10.html>.
[18] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD2 to Historic Status", RFC 6149,
March 2011.
[19] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April
1992.
[20] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[21] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version
1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998.
[22] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
[23] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes
and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, November 2000.
[24] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August 2010.
[25] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations for
the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", RFC 6151,
March 2011.
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Appendix A. Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
A MAC is a special type of function of a message (data bits) and an
integrity key. It can be computed or checked only by someone
possessing both the message and the integrity key. Its security
follows from the secrecy of the integrity key. In this standard,
MACing is used in password integrity mode.
This document uses a particular type of MAC called HMAC [11] [20],
which can be constructed from any of a variety of hash functions.
Note that the specifications in [20] and [11] differ somewhat from
the specification in [9]. The hash function HMAC is based on is
identified in the MacData, which holds the MAC; for this version of
this standard, the hash function can be one of the following: SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, or SHA-512/256 [10].
As indicated in Appendix B.4, this structure implies that the same
hash algorithm must be used to derive the MAC key itself in password
integrity mode and that the MAC key has either 160, 224, 256, 384, or
512 bits.
When password integrity mode is used to secure a PFX PDU, an HMAC
with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, or
SHA-512/256 is computed on the BER-encoding of the contents of the
content field of the authSafe field in the PFX PDU (see Section 5.1).
Appendix B. Deriving Keys and IVs from Passwords and Salt
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
The method presented here is still used to generate the key in
password integrity mode.
We present here a general method for using a hash function to produce
various types of pseudorandom bits from a password and a string of
salt bits. This method is used for password privacy mode and
password integrity mode in the present standard.
B.1. Password Formatting
The underlying password-based encryption methods in PKCS #5 v2.1 view
passwords (and salt) as being simple byte strings. The underlying
password-based encryption methods and the underlying password-based
authentication methods in this version of this document are similar.
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What's left unspecified in the above paragraph is precisely where the
byte string representing a password comes from. (This is not an
issue with salt strings, since they are supplied as a password-based
encryption (or authentication) parameter.) PKCS #5 v2.1 says: "[...]
a password is considered to be an octet string of arbitrary length
whose interpretation as a text string is unspecified. In the
interest of interoperability, however, it is recommended that
applications follow some common text encoding rules. ASCII and UTF-8
are two possibilities."
In this specification, however, all passwords are created from
BMPStrings with a NULL terminator. This means that each character in
the original BMPString is encoded in 2 bytes in big-endian format
(most-significant byte first). There are no Unicode byte order
marks. The 2 bytes produced from the last character in the BMPString
are followed by 2 additional bytes with the value 0x00.
To illustrate with a simple example, if a user enters the 6-character
password "Beavis", the string that PKCS #12 implementations should
treat as the password is the following string of 14 bytes:
0x00 0x42 0x00 0x65 0x00 0x61 0x00 0x76 0x00 0x69 0x00 0x73 0x00 0x00
B.2. General Method
Let H be a hash function built around a compression function f:
Z_2^u x Z_2^v -> Z_2^u
(that is, H has a chaining variable and output of length u bits, and
the message input to the compression function of H is v bits). The
values for u and v are as follows:
HASH FUNCTION VALUE u VALUE v
MD2, MD5 128 512
SHA-1 160 512
SHA-224 224 512
SHA-256 256 512
SHA-384 384 1024
SHA-512 512 1024
SHA-512/224 224 1024
SHA-512/256 256 1024
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Furthermore, let r be the iteration count.
We assume here that u and v are both multiples of 8, as are the
lengths of the password and salt strings (which we denote by p and s,
respectively) and the number n of pseudorandom bits required. In
addition, u and v are of course non-zero.
For information on security considerations for MD5 [19], see [25] and
[1], and on those for MD2, see [18].
The following procedure can be used to produce pseudorandom bits for
a particular "purpose" that is identified by a byte called "ID". The
meaning of this ID byte will be discussed later.
1. Construct a string, D (the "diversifier"), by concatenating v/8
copies of ID.
2. Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string S of
length v(ceiling(s/v)) bits (the final copy of the salt may be
truncated to create S). Note that if the salt is the empty
string, then so is S.
3. Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string P
of length v(ceiling(p/v)) bits (the final copy of the password
may be truncated to create P). Note that if the password is the
empty string, then so is P.
4. Set I=S||P to be the concatenation of S and P.
5. Set c=ceiling(n/u).
6. For i=1, 2, ..., c, do the following:
A. Set A2=H^r(D||I). (i.e., the r-th hash of D||1,
H(H(H(... H(D||I))))
B. Concatenate copies of Ai to create a string B of length v
bits (the final copy of Ai may be truncated to create B).
C. Treating I as a concatenation I_0, I_1, ..., I_(k-1) of v-bit
blocks, where k=ceiling(s/v)+ceiling(p/v), modify I by
setting I_j=(I_j+B+1) mod 2^v for each j.
7. Concatenate A_1, A_2, ..., A_c together to form a pseudorandom
bit string, A.
8. Use the first n bits of A as the output of this entire process.
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If the above process is being used to generate a DES key, the process
should be used to create 64 random bits, and the key's parity bits
should be set after the 64 bits have been produced. Similar concerns
hold for 2-key and 3-key triple-DES keys, for CDMF keys, and for any
similar keys with parity bits "built into them".
B.3. More on the ID Byte
This standard specifies 3 different values for the ID byte mentioned
above:
1. If ID=1, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
as key material for performing encryption or decryption.
2. If ID=2, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
as an IV (Initial Value) for encryption or decryption.
3. If ID=3, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
as an integrity key for MACing.
B.4. Keys for Password Integrity Mode
When password integrity mode is used to protect a PFX PDU, a password
and salt are used to derive a MAC key. As with password privacy
mode, the password is a Unicode string, and the salt is a byte
string. No particular lengths are prescribed in this standard for
either the password or the salt, but the general advice about
passwords and salt that is given in Appendix C applies here, as well.
The hash function used to derive MAC keys is whatever hash function
is going to be used for MACing. The MAC keys that are derived have
the same length as the hash function's output. In this version of
this standard, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
or SHA/512/256 can be used to perform MACing, and so the MAC keys can
be 160, 224, 256, 384, or 512 bits. See Appendix A for more
information on MACing.
Appendix C. Keys and IVs for Password Privacy Mode
As stated at the start of Appendix B, use of this method for password
privacy mode is not recommended; this specification of keys and IVs
for password privacy mode is retained for backwards compatibility
with PKCS #12 v1.0 only.
When password privacy mode is used to encrypt a PFX PDU, a password
(typically entered by the user), a salt and an iteration parameter
are used to derive a key (and an IV, if necessary). The password is
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a Unicode string, and as such, each character in it is represented by
2 bytes. The salt is a byte string and so can be represented
directly as a sequence of bytes.
This standard does not prescribe a length for the password. As
usual, however, too short a password might compromise privacy. A
particular application might well require a user-entered privacy
password for creating a PFX PDU to have a password exceeding some
specific length.
This standard does not prescribe a length for the salt either.
Ideally, the salt is as long as the output of the hash function being
used and consists of completely random bits.
The iteration count is recommended to be 1024 or more. (See [22] and
[13] for more information.)
The PBES1 encryption scheme defined in PKCS #5 provides a number of
algorithm identifiers for deriving keys and IVs; here, we specify a
few more, all of which use the procedure detailed in Appendices B.2
and B.3 to construct keys (and IVs, where needed). As is implied by
their names, all of the object identifiers below use the hash
function SHA-1.
pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1}
pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1}
pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2}
pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3}
pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4}
pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5}
pbewithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6}
Each of the six PBE object identifiers above has the following ASN.1
type for parameters:
pkcs-12PbeParams ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
iterations INTEGER
}
The pkcs-12PbeParams holds the salt that is used to generate the key
(and IV, if necessary) and the number of iterations to carry out.
Note that the first two algorithm identifiers above (the algorithm
identifiers for RC4) only derive keys; it is unnecessary to derive an
IV for RC4.
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This section is here for two reasons: first, to enable backwards
compatibility as described in the first paragraph of this section;
second, because it is still used in password integrity mode. In
order to not use it in password integrity mode, the ASN.1 definitions
require updates. This document recommends that future definitions of
the PFX structure replace the existing MacData object, optionally
present in password integrity mode, with a new object definition that
holds a MAC based on PKCS#5 [13] [22] PBMAC1 message authentication
scheme. This change would simplify the requirements for key
derivation functions used across all parts of the PFX structure.
Appendix D. ASN.1 Module
This appendix documents all ASN.1 types, values, and object sets
defined in this specification. It does so by providing an ASN.1
module called PKCS-12.
PKCS-12 {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-12(12)
modules(0) pkcs-12(1)}
-- PKCS #12 v1.1 ASN.1 Module
-- Revised October 27, 2012
-- This module has been checked for conformance with the ASN.1 standard
-- by the OSS ASN.1 Tools
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
-- All types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in other ASN.1 modules.
IMPORTS
informationFramework
FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
usefulDefinitions(0) 3}
ATTRIBUTE
FROM InformationFramework informationFramework
ContentInfo, DigestInfo
FROM PKCS-7 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-7(7) modules(0) pkcs-7(1)}
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PrivateKeyInfo, EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
FROM PKCS-8 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-8(8) modules(1) pkcs-8(1)}
pkcs-9, friendlyName, localKeyId, certTypes, crlTypes
FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)};
-- ============================
-- Object identifiers
-- ============================
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549)}
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi pkcs(1)}
pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 12}
pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1}
pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1}
pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2}
pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3}
pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4}
pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5}
pbewithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6}
bagtypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 10 1}
-- ============================
-- The PFX PDU
-- ============================
PFX ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER {v3(3)}(v3,...),
authSafe ContentInfo,
macData MacData OPTIONAL
}
MacData ::= SEQUENCE {
mac DigestInfo,
macSalt OCTET STRING,
iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 1
-- Note: The default is for historical reasons and its use is
-- deprecated.
}
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AuthenticatedSafe ::= SEQUENCE OF ContentInfo
-- Data if unencrypted
-- EncryptedData if password-encrypted
-- EnvelopedData if public key-encrypted
SafeContents ::= SEQUENCE OF SafeBag
SafeBag ::= SEQUENCE {
bagId BAG-TYPE.&id ({PKCS12BagSet}),
bagValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type({PKCS12BagSet}{@bagId}),
bagAttributes SET OF PKCS12Attribute OPTIONAL
}
-- ============================
-- Bag types
-- ============================
keyBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{KeyBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 1}}
pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 2}}
certBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{CertBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 3}}
crlBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{CRLBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 4}}
secretBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{SecretBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 5}}
safeContentsBag BAG-TYPE ::=
{SafeContents IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 6}}
PKCS12BagSet BAG-TYPE ::= {
keyBag |
pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag |
certBag |
crlBag |
secretBag |
safeContentsBag,
... -- For future extensions
}
BAG-TYPE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- KeyBag
KeyBag ::= PrivateKeyInfo
-- Shrouded KeyBag
PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag ::= EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo
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-- CertBag
CertBag ::= SEQUENCE {
certId BAG-TYPE.&id ({CertTypes}),
certValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({CertTypes}{@certId})
}
x509Certificate BAG-TYPE ::=
{OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY {certTypes 1}}
-- DER-encoded X.509 certificate stored in OCTET STRING
sdsiCertificate BAG-TYPE ::=
{IA5String IDENTIFIED BY {certTypes 2}}
-- Base64-encoded SDSI certificate stored in IA5String
CertTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
x509Certificate |
sdsiCertificate,
... -- For future extensions
}
-- CRLBag
CRLBag ::= SEQUENCE {
crlId BAG-TYPE.&id ({CRLTypes}),
crltValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({CRLTypes}{@crlId})
}
x509CRL BAG-TYPE ::=
{OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY {crlTypes 1}}
-- DER-encoded X.509 CRL stored in OCTET STRING
CRLTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
x509CRL,
... -- For future extensions
}
-- Secret Bag
SecretBag ::= SEQUENCE {
secretTypeId BAG-TYPE.&id ({SecretTypes}),
secretValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.&Type ({SecretTypes}
{@secretTypeId})
}
SecretTypes BAG-TYPE ::= {
... -- For future extensions
}
-- ============================
-- Attributes
-- ============================
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PKCS12Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrId ATTRIBUTE.&id ({PKCS12AttrSet}),
attrValues SET OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({PKCS12AttrSet}{@attrId})
} -- This type is compatible with the X.500 type 'Attribute'
PKCS12AttrSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
friendlyName |
localKeyId,
... -- Other attributes are allowed
}
END
Appendix E. Intellectual Property Considerations
EMC Corporation makes no patent claims on the general constructions
described in this document, although specific underlying techniques
may be covered.
RC2 and RC4 are trademarks of EMC Corporation.
EMC Corporation makes no representations regarding intellectual
property claims by other parties. Such determination is the
responsibility of the user.
Appendix F. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Dan Simon of Microsoft Corporation and Jim Spring of
Netscape Communications Corporation for their assistance in preparing
early drafts of this document. Especial thanks to Brian Beckman of
Microsoft Corporation for writing the specification that this
document is based on.
Appendix G. About PKCS
The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by
RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers
worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-
key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings
with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the
PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented.
Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal
and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/
MIME, and SSL.
Further development of PKCS occurs through the IETF. Suggestions for
improvement are welcome.
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Authors' Addresses
Kathleen M. Moriarty (editor)
EMC Corporation
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA
United States
EMail: Kathleen.Moriarty@emc.com
Magnus Nystrom
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
United States
EMail: mnystrom@microsoft.com
Sean Parkinson
RSA Security Inc.
345 Queen Street
Brisbane, QLD, 4000
Australia
EMail: Sean.Parkinson@rsa.com
Andreas Rusch
RSA Security Inc.
345 Queen Street
Brisbane, QLD, 4000
Australia
EMail: Andreas.Rusch@rsa.com
Michael Scott
RSA Security Inc.
345 Queen Street
Brisbane, QLD, 4000
Australia
EMail: Michael2.Scott@rsa.com
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