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Keywords: mip, cryptographic keys, dmu
Network Working Group C. Carroll
Request for Comments: 4784 Ropes & Gray LLP
Category: Informational F. Quick
Qualcomm Inc.
June 2007
Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update
for cdma2000(R) Networks
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
IESG Note
This document describes an existing deployed technology that was
developed outside the IETF. It utilizes the RADIUS Access-Reject in
order to provision service, which is incompatible with the RADIUS
protocol, and practices the sharing of secret keys in public-key
cryptosystems, which is not a practice the IETF recommends. The IESG
recommends against using this protocol as a basis for solving similar
problems in the future.
Abstract
The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update procedure is a
mechanism for distributing and updating Mobile IP (MIP) cryptographic
keys in cdma2000(R) networks (including High Rate Packet Data, which
is often referred to as 1xEV-DO). The Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update
(DMU) procedure occurs between the MIP Mobile Node (MN) and RADIUS
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Server via a
cdma2000(R) Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN) that is acting as a
Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA).
cdma2000(R) is a registered trademark of the Telecommunications
Industry Association (TIA).
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 1]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................3
2. Basic Dynamic MIP Key Update Mechanism ..........................3
2.1. RSA Encrypted Key Distribution .............................4
2.2. Mutual Authentication (1X) .................................5
2.3. Encrypted Password Authentication ..........................8
3. Dynamic MIP Key Update Advantages over OTASP ...................10
4. Detailed DMU Procedure Description and Requirements ............10
4.1. RSA Public Key Cryptography ...............................11
4.2. Other Public Key Algorithms ...............................11
4.3. Why No Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)? ...................11
4.4. Cryptographic Key Generation ..............................12
4.5. MIP_Key_Data Payload ......................................12
4.6. RSA Key Management ........................................13
4.7. RADIUS AAA Server .........................................14
4.8. MN (Handset or Modem) .....................................16
4.9. PDSN / Foreign Agent (FA) .................................19
4.10. Home Agent (HA) ..........................................20
4.11. DMU Procedure Network Flow ...............................20
5. DMU Procedure Failure Operation ................................25
6. cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO Support ...............................28
6.1. RADIUS AAA Support ........................................28
6.2. MN Support ................................................29
6.3. Informative: MN_Authenticator Support .....................30
7. Security Considerations ........................................31
7.1. Cryptographic Key Generation by the MN ....................31
7.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack ..................................31
7.3. RSA Private Key Compromise ................................32
7.4. RSA Encryption ............................................32
7.5. False Base Station/PDSN ...................................32
7.6. cdma2000(R) 1X False MN ...................................32
7.7. HRPD/1xEV-DO False MN .....................................32
7.8. Key Lifetimes .............................................32
7.9. Network Message Security ..................................33
8. Verizon Wireless RADIUS Attributes .............................33
9. Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Extensions ..........................34
10. Public Key Identifier and DMU Version .........................36
11. Conclusion ....................................................40
12. Normative References ..........................................41
13. Informative References ........................................41
14. Acknowledgments ...............................................42
Appendix A. Cleartext-Mode Operation ..............................43
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 2]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
1. Introduction
The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update procedure is a
mechanism for distributing and updating Mobile IP (MIP) cryptographic
keys in cdma2000(R) 1xRTT (1X) [2] and High Rate Packet Data (HRPD) /
1xEV-DO networks [3]. The Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update (DMU)
procedure occurs between the Mobile IP Mobile Node (MN) and the home
RADIUS [4] (or Diameter [5]) Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) Server via a cdma2000(R) Packet Data Serving Node
(PDSN) that is acting as a Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA). (In this
document, we use the acronym AAAH to indicate the home AAA server as
opposed to an AAA server that may be located in a visited system.)
This procedure is intended to support wireless systems conforming to
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) TR-45 Standard IS-835
[6]. DMU, however, could be performed in any MIP network to enable
bootstrapping of a shared secret between the Mobile Node (MN) and
RADIUS AAA Server.
The DMU procedure utilizes RSA public key cryptography to securely
distribute unique MIP keys to potentially millions of cdma2000(R) 1X
and HRPD/1xEV-DO Mobile Nodes (MN) using the same RSA public key.
By leveraging the existing cdma2000(R) 1X authentication process, the
Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update process employs a mutual authentication
mechanism in which device-to-network authentication is facilitated
using cdma2000(R) 1X challenge-response authentication, and network-
to-device authentication is facilitated using RSA encryption.
By utilizing RSA encryption, the MN (or MN manufacturer) is able to
pre-generate MIP keys (and the Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP) key) and pre-encrypt the MIP keys prior to initiation
of the DMU procedure. By employing this pre-computation capability,
the DMU process requires less computation (by an order of magnitude)
during the key exchange than Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
2. Basic Dynamic MIP Key Update Mechanism
The DMU procedure is basically an authentication and key distribution
protocol that is more easily understood by separately describing the
mechanism's two functional goals: 1) encrypted key distribution and
2) mutual authentication.
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 3]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
2.1. RSA Encrypted Key Distribution
By utilizing RSA public key cryptography, MNs can be pre-loaded with
a common RSA public (encryption) key (by the MN manufacturer), while
the associated RSA Private (decryption) key is securely distributed
from the MN manufacturer to a trusted service provider.
Alternatively, a service provider can generate its own RSA
public/private key pair and only distribute the RSA public key to MN
manufacturers for pre-loading of MNs.
During the manufacturing process, the MN manufacturer pre-loads each
MN with the RSA public key. When the MN is powered-up (or client
application initiated), the MN can pre-generate and encrypt MIP keys
for distribution to the Home RADIUS AAA Server during the DMU
process. Alternatively, the MN manufacturer can pre-generate MIP
keys, encrypt the MIP key payload, and pre-load the MN with multiple
encrypted MIP key payloads to enable the DMU procedure.
During the initial registration process (or when the AAA requires MIP
key update), the MN: 1) generates the appropriate MIP keys, CHAP key,
and authentication information, 2) uses the embedded RSA public key
to encrypt the payload information, 3) and appends the payload to the
MIP Registration Request. The Registration Request is sent to the
Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA) via the cellular Base Station (BS) and
Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN). When the RADIUS AAA Server receives
the encrypted payload (defined later as MIP_Key_Data), the AAA Server
uses the RSA Private key to decrypt the payload and recover the MIP
keys.
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 4]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
MN BS/PDSN/FA AAA
-- ---------- ---
| | |
------------------ | -------------------
| RSA Public Key | | | RSA Private Key |
| Pre-loaded by | | | Pre-loaded by |
| Manufacturer | | | Service Provider |
------------------ | -------------------
| Registration Request, |
| (MIP keys), RSA | |
| Public Key | |
|-------------------->| |
| | Access Request, (MIP keys),
| | RSA Public Key |
| |---------------------->|
| | -------------------
| | | Decrypt MIP |
| | | Keys using RSA |
| | | Private Key |
| | -------------------
Figure 1. RSA Encrypted Key Distribution
2.2. Mutual Authentication (1X)
Mutual authentication can be achieved by delegation of the MN/device
authentication by the RADIUS AAA Server to the cdma2000(R) 1X Home
Location Register (HLR) and its associated Authentication Center (AC)
[7], while the MN utilizes RSA encryption to authenticate the RADIUS
AAA Server.
MN/device authentication via an HLR/AC is based on the assumption
that the MN's Mobile Station (MS) has an existing Authentication Key
(A-key) and Shared Secret Data (SSD) with the cdma2000(R) 1X network.
When MS call origination occurs, the AC authenticates the MS. If
authentication is successful, the BS passes the Mobile Station
Identifier (MSID) (e.g., Mobile Identification Number (MIN)) to the
PDSN. The "Authenticated MSID" is then included in the RADIUS Access
Request (ARQ) message [4] sent from the PDSN to the RADIUS AAA
server. Because the RADIUS AAA server stores the MSID associated
with an MN subscription, the RADIUS AAA server is able to authorize
MN access if the "Authenticated MSID" matches the RADIUS AAA MSID,
i.e., the RADIUS AAA server is delegating its authentication function
to the cdma2000(R) 1X HLR/AC.
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
RADIUS AAA Server authentication (by the MN) is enabled by including
a random number (AAA_Authenticator) in the encrypted payload sent
from the MN to the RADIUS AAA Server. Only the possessor of the
proper RSA Private key will have the ability to decrypt the payload
and recover the unique AAA_Authenticator. If the MN receives the
correct AAA_Authenticator (returned by the RADIUS AAA Server), the MN
is assured that it is not interacting with a false Base Station (BS).
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 6]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
MN BS/PDSN/FA HLR/AC AAA
-- ---------- ------ ---
------------------ | | -------------------
| RSA Public Key | | | | RSA Private Key |
| Pre-loaded by | | | | Pre-loaded by |
| Manufacturer | | | | Service Provider |
------------------ | | -------------------
| Global Challenge | |
|<-------------| | |
| | | |
| Auth_Response | |
|------------->| | |
| | Auth_Response | |
| |---------------->| |
| | ------------------ |
| | | IS-2000 | |
| | | Authentication | |
| | ------------------ |
| | Auth_Success | |
| |<----------------| |
| ------------------ | |
| | BS forwards | | |
| | Authenticated | | |
| | MSID to PDSN | | |
| ------------------ | |
| | | |
| Registration Request | |
| (MIP keys, AAA_Authenticator), |
| RSA Public Key | |
|------------->| | |
| | Access Request, MSID, |
| | (MIP keys, AAA_Authenticator),
| | RSA Public Key |
| |------------------------------->|
| | | -------------------
| | | | Check MSID, |
| | | | Decrypt AAA_- |
| | | | Authenticator |
| | | -------------------
| Access Reject, AAA_Authenticator |
| |<-------------------------------|
Registration Reply, AAA_Authenticator |
|<-------------| | |
------------------ | | |
| Check AAA_- | | | |
| Authenticator | | | |
------------------ | | |
Figure 2. Mutual Authentication
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
2.3. Encrypted Password Authentication
Because cdma2000(R) A-key/SSD authentication is not available in
1xEV-DO, or a particular cdma2000(R) 1X network may not support A-key
authentication, the DMU procedure also includes a random number
(MN_Authenticator) generated by the MN (and/or pre-loaded by the
manufacturer), which enables the RADIUS AAA Server to optionally
authenticate the MN (in 1XEV DO network only).
The MN_Authenticator is transmitted from the MN to the Home AAA
Server within the RSA-encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload to prevent
interception and possible re-use by an attacker. Ideally, the
MN_Authenticator is utilized as a One-Time Password; however, RSA
encryption allows the MN_Authenticator to possibly be re-used based
on each service provider's key distribution policy.
When the encrypted MIP keys are decrypted at the Home RADIUS AAA
Server, the MN_Authenticator is also decrypted and compared with a
copy of the MN_Authenticator stored within the Home RADIUS AAA
Server. The Home RADIUS AAA Server receives a copy of the
MN_Authenticator out-of-band (not using the cdma2000(R) network)
utilizing one of numerous possible methods outside the scope of the
standard. For example, the MN_Authenticator MAY be: 1) read out by a
Point-of-Sale provisioner from the MN, input into the subscriber
profile, and delivered, along with the Network Access Identifier
(NAI), via the billing/provision system to the Home RADIUS AAA
server, 2) verbally communicated to a customer care representative
via a call, or 3) input by the user interfacing with an interactive
voice recognition server. The out-of-band MN_Authenticator delivery
is not specified in this document to maximize the service provider's
implementation flexibility.
It is possible for an unscrupulous provisioner or distribution
employee to extract the MN_Authenticator prior to the DMU procedure;
however, the risk associated with such a disclosure is minimal.
Because the HRPD/1xEV-DO MN does not transmit a device identifier
during the initial registration process, an attacker, even with a
stolen MN_Authenticator, cannot correlate the password with a
particular MN device or NAI, which is typically provisioned just
prior to DMU procedure initiation.
The MN_Authenticator is typically generated by a random/pseudorandom
number generator within the MN. MN_Authenticator generation is
initiated by the MN user; however, it may be initially pre-loaded by
the manufacturer. When the MN_Authenticator is reset (i.e., a new
MN_Authenticator is generated), all MIP_Data_Key payloads using the
previous MN_Authenticator are discarded and the MN immediately re-
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 8]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
encrypts a MIP_Key_Data payload containing the new MN_Authenticator.
The MN_Authenticator MUST NOT change unless it is explicitly reset by
the MN user. Thus, the MN will generate new MIP_Key_Data payloads
using the same MN_Authenticator until the MN_Authenticator is
updated.
-------------------------
| User-initiated |
| MN_Authenticator[x] |
| Generation |
-------------------------
|
v
----------------------------- ------------------------------
| Manufacturer | | Delete MN_Authenticator[y], |
| MN_Authenticator[y] |----->| Store MN_Authenticator[x] |
| Generation** | | in MN |
----------------------------- ------------------------------
|
v
-------------------------
| Delete MIP_Key_Data |
| Payloads based on |
| MN_Authenticator[y] |
-------------------------
|
v
----------------------------- -------------------------
| KEYS_VALID state and | | Generate MIP_Key_Data |
| committed, delete |----->| Payloads based on |
| MIP_Key_Data Payload | | MN_Authenticator[x] |
----------------------------- -------------------------
^ |
| v
----------------------------- -------------------------
| DMU MIP_Key_Data | | Store MIP_Key_Data |
| Delivery |<-----| Payload |
----------------------------- -------------------------
Figure 3. MN_Authenticator and MIP_Key_Data Payload State Machine
**Note: Manufacturer pre-load of MN_Authenticator is not essential
since the MN_Authenticator is typically generated by the MN.
However, manufacturer pre-load may reduce the provisioner burden of
accessing a device such as a modem to recover the MN_Authenticator
for entry into the service provider provisioning system.
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
3. Dynamic MIP Key Update Advantages over OTASP
The DMU procedure has numerous advantages over the current Over-the-
Air Service Provisioning (OTASP) [8] procedure, including:
* In DMU, MIP key distribution occurs directly between the MN and
AAA Server at the IP Layer. This eliminates the need for an
interface between the Over-the-Air Functionality (OTAF) and
RADIUS AAA server.
* DMU Supports MIP key distribution for cdma2000(R) 1X and
HRPD/1xEV-DO MN. OTASP only supports cdma2000(R) 1X MIP key
distribution.
* DMU facilitates MIP key distribution to an MN in a Relay-mode
MS. OTASP only delivers the MIP keys to the MS. For example,
OTASP cannot deliver MIP keys to a Laptop MN interfacing with
an MS modem.
* Pre-encryption of MIP_Key_Data allows the DMU procedure to be
an order of magnitude faster than Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.
* In DMU, an MN manufacturer can pre-generate MIP keys, pre-
encrypt the MIP key payload, and pre-load the payload in the
MN. Thus, an MN with limited processing power is never
required to use RSA encryption. An OTASP device is always
forced to perform computationally expensive exponentiations
during the key update process.
* In DMU, the MN is protected against Denial-of-Service (DOS)
attacks in which a false BS changes the MIP key for MNs in its
vicinity. OTASP Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is vulnerable to a
false BS DOS attack.
* DMU utilizes mutual authentication. OTASP Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange does not utilize mutual authentication.
4. Detailed DMU Procedure Description and Requirements
The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Update procedure is a secure,
yet extremely efficient mechanism for distributing essential MIP
cryptographic keys (e.g., MN-AAAH key and MN-HA key) and the Simple
IP CHAP key. The DMU protocol enables pre-computation of the
encrypted key material payload, known as MIP_Key_Data. The DMU
procedure purposely avoids the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Certificates, greatly enhancing the procedure's efficiency.
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 10]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
4.1. RSA Public Key Cryptography
RSA public key encryption and decryption MUST be performed in
accordance with RFC 3447 [9] PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5. DMU
MUST support RSA with a 1024-bit modulus by default. DMU MAY also
support 768-bit or 2048-bit RSA, depending on the MN user's
efficiency or security requirements. RSA computation speed-ups using
a public RSA exponent that is small or has a small number of nonzero
bits (e.g., 65537) are acceptable.
4.2. Other Public Key Algorithms
DMU does not preclude the use of other public key technologies. The
protocol includes a Public Key Type field that defines the type of
encryption used.
4.3. Why No Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)?
DMU is designed to maximize the efficiency of Mobile IP (MIP) key
distribution for cdma2000(R) MNs. The use of a public key
Certificate would improve the flexibility of the MIP key update
process by allowing a Certificate Authority (CA) to vouch for the RSA
public key delivered to the MN. Unfortunately, the use of a public
key certificate would significantly reduce the efficiency (speed and
overhead) of the MIP key update process. For instance, each MN must
be pre-loaded with the CA's public key. During the MIP key
distribution process, the network must first deliver its RSA public
key (in a certificate) to the MN. The MN must then use RSA to
decrypt the Certificate's digital signature to verify that the
presented RSA public key is legitimate. Such a process significantly
increases the number of exchanges, increases air interface overhead,
increases the amount of MN computation, and slows the MIP key update
process.
Aside from the operational efficiency issues, there are numerous
policy and procedural issues that have previously hampered the
deployment of PKI in commercial networks.
On a more theoretical basis, PKI is likely unnecessary for this key
distribution model. PKI is ideal for a Many-to-Many communications
model, such as within the Internet, where many different users
interface with many different Websites. However, in the cellular/PCS
Packet Data environment, a Many-to-One (or few) distribution model
exists, in which many users interface with one wireless Carrier to
establish their Mobile IP security associations (i.e., cryptographic
keys).
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
4.4. Cryptographic Key Generation
The DMU procedure relies on each MN to randomly/pseudo-randomly
generate the MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, and Simple IP CHAP key. Each MN
MUST have the capability to generate random/pseudo-random numbers in
accordance with the guidelines specified in RFC 4086 "Randomness
Requirements for Security".
Although it may be more secure for the network to generate
cryptographic keys at the RADIUS AAA server, client cryptographic key
generation is acceptable due to the significant efficiency
improvement in the update process via pre-generation and pre-
encryption of the MIP keys.
4.5. MIP_Key_Data Payload
MIP cryptographic keys (MN_AAAH key and MN_HA key) and the Simple IP
CHAP key are encapsulated and encrypted into a MIP_Key_Data Payload
(along with the AAA_Authenticator and MN_Authenticator). The
MIP_Key_Data Payload is appended to the MN's MIP Registration Request
(RRQ) as a MIP Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension (VSE) (see RFC
3115 [10] Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-Specific Extensions). When
the PDSN converts the MIP RRQ to a RADIUS Access Request (ARQ)
message, the MIP_Key_Data Payload is converted from a MIP
Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension to a Vendor Specific RADIUS
Attribute (VSA).
Upon receipt of the RADIUS Access Request, the RADIUS AAA Server
decrypts the MIP_Key_Data payload using the RSA private (decryption)
key associated with the RSA public (encryption) used to encrypt the
MIP_Key_Data payload. The MIP_Key_Data is defined as follows:
MIP_Key_Data = RSA_Public_Key [MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, CHAP_key,
MN_Authenticator, AAA_Authenticator], Public_Key_ID, DMUV
Where:
MN_AAAH key = 128-bit random MN / RADIUS AAA Server key
(encrypted)
MN_HA key = 128-bit random MN / Home Agent (HA) key (encrypted)
CHAP_key = 128-bit random Simple IP authentication key (encrypted)
Note: the Simple IP CHAP key is not the same as the AT-CHAP key
used for A12 Interface authentication [11].
MN_Authenticator = 24-bit random number (displayed as an 8 decimal
digit number). (To be used for 1xEV-DO networks.) (encrypted)
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
AAA_Authenticator = 64-bit random number used by MN to
authenticate the RADIUS AAA Server. (encrypted)
DMU Version (DMUV) = 4-bit identifier of DMU version.
Public Key Identifier (Public_Key_ID) = PKOID, PKOI, PK_Expansion,
ATV
Where:
Public Key Organization Identifier (PKOID) = 8-bit serial number
identifier of Public Key Organization (PKO) that created the
Public Key.
Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) = 8-bit serial number used at
PKO discretion to distinguish different public/private key
pairs.
PK_Expansion = 8-bit field to enable possible expansion of PKOID
or PKOI fields. (Note: Default value = 0xFF)
Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) = 4-bit identifier of the
algorithm used.
Note: If 1024-bit RSA is used, the encrypted portion of the payload
is 1024 bits (128 bytes) long. With the 28-bit Public Key Identifier
and 4-bit DMUV, the total MIP_Key_Data payload is 132 bytes long.
4.6. RSA Key Management
The wireless service provider or carrier MUST generate the RSA
Public/Private key pair(s). An organization within the service
provider MUST be designated by the service provider to generate,
manage, protect, and distribute RSA Private keys (to the RADIUS AAA
Server) and public keys (to the MN manufacturers) in support of the
DMU procedure.
Each RSA public/private key pair, generated by the wireless carrier,
MUST be assigned a unique Public Key Identifier in accordance with
Section 9.
RSA Private keys MUST be protected from disclosure to unauthorized
parties. The service provider organization with the responsibility
of generating the RSA public/private key pairs MUST establish an RSA
key management policy to protect the RSA Private (decryption) keys.
RSA public keys MAY be freely distributed to all MN manufacturers
(along with the Public Key Identifier). Because one RSA public key
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
can be distributed to million of MNs, it is acceptable to distribute
the RSA public key (and Public Key Identifier) to MN manufacturers
via e-mail, floppy disk, or a Website. The preferred method is to
simply publish the RSA public key and associated Public Key
Identifier in the DMU Requirements document sent to each MN
manufacturer/OEM.
When public keys are distributed, the public keys MUST be protected
against alteration. If an invalid public key is programmed into a
terminal, the terminal may be denied service because DMU cannot be
performed successfully.
RSA Private keys MAY be loaded into the RADIUS AAA server manually.
Access to the RADIUS AAA Server RSA Private keys MUST be restricted
to authorized personnel only.
The wireless service provider MAY accept RSA Private key(s) (and
Public Key Identifier) from MN manufacturers that have preloaded MNs
with manufacturer-generated RSA public keys.
4.7. RADIUS AAA Server
The RADIUS AAA Server used for DMU MUST support the DMU Procedure.
The AAA Server MUST support RSA public key cryptography and maintain
a database of RSA Private (decryption) keys indexed by the Public Key
Identifier.
Delivery of the RSA Private key(s) to an AAA Server from the MN
manufacturer(s) is outside the scope of this document. However, RSA
Private key(s) delivery via encrypted e-mail or physical (mail)
delivery is likely acceptable.
Access to the RADIUS AAA Server MUST be limited to authorized
personnel only.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support 1024-bit RSA decryption.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a database of RSA public/private
key pair indexed by the Public Key Identifier.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support the RADIUS attributes specified in
Section 8.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support a subscriber-specific MIP Update
State Field. When the MIP Update State Field is set to UPDATE KEYS
(1), the RADIUS AAA Server MUST initiate the DMU procedure by
including the MIP_Key_Request attribute in an Access Reject message
sent to the PDSN. The MIP Update State Field MAY be set to UPDATE
Carroll & Quick Informational [Page 14]
RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
KEYS (1) by the service provider's Billing/Provisioning system based
on IT policy. Upon verification of MN-AAA Authentication Extension
using the decrypted MN_AAA key, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST set the
MIP Update State Field to KEYS UPDATED (2). Upon verification of the
MN-Authentication Extension on a subsequent RRQ/ARQ, the RADIUS AAA
Server MUST set the MIP Update State Field to KEYS VALID (0).
Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
Reject message is not consistent with Section 5.44 of [4]. A RADIUS
AAA server that supports DMU SHOULD NOT include a vendor-specific
attribute if the corresponding Access Request message was not
received from a DMU-compliant PDSN. This use of Access Reject is
strongly discouraged for any future work based on this document.
Future work should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this
vendor-specific attribute.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a MIP Update State Field, for
each subscription, in one of three states (0 = KEYS VALID, 1 = UPDATE
KEYS, 2 = KEYS UPDATED).
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST decrypt the encrypted portion of the
MIP_Key_Data payload using the appropriate RSA Private (decryption)
key.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST check the MN_AAA Authentication Extension
of the DMU RRQ using the decrypted MN_AAA key.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST include the AAA_Authenticator in the
Access Accept as a Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attribute.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support the MN_Authenticator options
specified in Section 6.1.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST comply with DMU Procedure failure
operation specified in Section 5.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support manual hexadecimal entry of MN_AAA
key, MN_HA key, and Simple IP CHAP key via the AAA GUI for each
subscription.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST provide a mechanism to validate the
MIN/International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). When the
MIN/IMSI validation is on, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST compare the
MIN/IMSI sent from the PDSN with the MIN/IMSI in the AAA subscription
record/profile. If the MINs or IMSIs do not match, the RADIUS AAA
Server MUST send an Access Reject to the PDSN/FA. The Access Reject
MUST NOT contain a MIP Key Data request
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When the "Ignore MN_Authenticator" bit is not set, the RADIUS AAA
Server MUST check whether MN_AuthenticatorMN = MN_AuthenticatorAAA.
If the MN_Authenticators do not match, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST
send an Access Reject to the PDSN/FA. The Access Reject MUST NOT
contain a MIP_Key_Data request.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST include its PKOID (or another designated
PKOID) in the MIP_Key_Request RADIUS Attribute.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST compare the PKOID sent in the MIP_Key_Data
RADIUS Attribute with a list of valid PKOIDs in the RADIUS AAA
Server. If the PKOID is not valid, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST send
an Access Reject to the PDSN with the "Invalid Public Key" Verizon
Wireless RADIUS Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA). Note: the same
RADIUS attribute may be assigned a different Vendor identifier.
Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
Reject message is not consistent with section 5.44 of [4]. A RADIUS
AAA server that supports DMU SHOULD NOT include a vendor-specific
attribute if the corresponding Access Request message was not
received from a DMU-compliant PDSN. This use of Access Reject is
strongly discouraged for any future work based on this document.
Future work should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this
vendor-specific attribute.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support delivery of the MN-HA key using
3GPP2 RADIUS VSAs as specified in 3GPP2 X.S0011-005-C. The 3GPP2
VSAs used are the MN-HA Shared Key (Vendor-Type = 58) and MN-HA
Security Parameter Index (SPI) (Vendor-Type = 57).
The RADIUS AAA Server SHOULD always accept an Access Request from a
cdma2000(R) Access Node (AN) for a particular subscriber when the
UPDATE KEYS (1) and KEYS UPDATED (2) states are set. In the KEYS
VALID (0) state, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST check the Access Request
normally.
The RADIUS AAA Server MUST reject an Access Request with the
MIP_Key_Data RADIUS Attribute while the RADIUS AAA Server is in the
KEYS VALID state, i.e., the AAA MUST NOT allow an unsolicited key
update to occur.
4.8. MN (Handset or Modem)
The MN manufacturer MUST pre-load the Wireless Carrier RSA public key
(and Public Key Identifier).
The MN manufacturer MUST pre-generate and pre-load the
MN_Authenticator.
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The MN MUST support 1024-bit RSA Encryption using the pre-loaded RSA
public key.
The MN MUST support MN_AAA, MN_HA, and CHAP random/pseudo-random key
generation (in accordance with RFC 4086).
The MN MUST support random/pseudo-random AAA_Authenticator and
MN_Authenticator generation (in accordance with RFC 4086).
Upon power-up of an MN handset or launch of the MN client, the MN
MUST check whether a MIP_Key_Data payload has been computed. If no
MIP_Key_Data payload exists, the MN MUST generate and store a
MIP_Key_Data payload. The MN MUST maintain at least one pre-
generated MIP_Key_Data payload.
The MN MUST construct the MIP_Key_Data payload in accordance with
Section 4.5.
The MN MUST initiate the DMU Procedure upon receipt of a MIP
Registration Reply (RRP) with the MIP_Key_Request Verizon Wireless
Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension (VSE).
Upon receipt of an RRP including the MIP_Key_Request, the MN MUST
check the PKOID sent in the MIP_Key_Request. If the MN has a public
key associated with the PKOID, the MN MUST encrypt the MIP_Key_Data
payload using that public key.
The MN MUST have the capability to designate one public key as the
default public key if the MN supports multiple public keys.
The MN MUST insert the Verizon Wireless MIP_Key_Data VSE (or another
Organization-specific MIP_Key_Data VSE) after the Mobile-Home
Authentication Extension, but before the MN-AAA Authentication
Extension. The MIP_Key_Data Extension must also be located after the
FA Challenge Extension, if present.
Note: The order of the extensions is important for interoperability.
After the FA receives the Access Accept from the RADIUS AAA server,
the FA may strip away all MIP extensions after the Mobile-Home
Authenticator. If this occurs, it is not necessary for the HA to
process the DMU extensions. Other compatibility problems have also
been identified during testing with FAs from various vendors who
place extensions in various locations. Explicit placement of the
extensions eliminates these issues.
Upon initiation of the DMU Procedure, the MN MUST compute the MIP
authentication extensions using the newly-generated temporary MN_AAA
and MN_HA keys. Upon receipt of the AAA_Authenticator MIP Extension,
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the MN MUST compare the AAA_AuthenticatorMN (sent in the encrypted
MIP_Key_Data payload) with the AAA_AuthenticatorAAA (returned by the
RADIUS AAA Server). If both values are the same, the MN MUST
designate the temporary MN_AAA, MN_HA key, and the Simple IP CHAP key
as permanent. The MN MUST set its MIP Update State field to KEYS
VALID.
The MN MUST support reset (re-generation) of the MN_Authenticator by
the MN user as specified in Section 6.2.
The MN MUST enable the MN user to view the MN_Authenticator.
MN_Authenticator (24-bit random number) MUST be displayed as an 8
decimal digit number as specified in Section 6.2.
The MN manufacturer MUST pre-load each MN with a unique random 24-bit
MN_Authenticator.
Upon reset of the MN_Authenticator, the MN MUST delete all
MIP_Key_Data payloads based on the old MN_Authenticator and generate
all subsequent MIP_Key_Data payloads using the new MN_Authenticator
(until the MN_Authenticator is explicitly re-set again by the MN
user).
The MN MUST support manual entry of all cryptographic keys such as
the MN_AAA, MN_HA, and Simple IP CHAP key. MN MUST support
hexadecimal digit entry of a 128-bit key. (Note: certain Simple IP
devices only enable ASCII entry of a password as the CHAP key. It is
acceptable for future devices to provide both capabilities, i.e.,
ASCII for a password or hexadecimal for a key. The authors recommend
the use of strong cryptographic keys.)
The MN MUST support the Verizon Wireless MIP Vendor/Organization-
Specific Extensions specified in Section 9.
The MN MUST update the RRQ Identification field when re-transmitting
the same MIP_Key_Data in a new RRQ.
The MN MUST comply with the DMU Procedure failure operation specified
in Section 5.
The RSA public key MAY be stored in the MN flash memory as a constant
while being updatable via software patch.
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4.9. PDSN / Foreign Agent (FA)
The PDSN MUST support the Verizon Wireless RADIUS Vendor-Specific
Attributes (VSA) specified in Section 8 and the Verizon Wireless MIP
Vendor/Organization-Specific Extensions (VSEs) specified in Section
9.
The PDSN MAY support the RADIUS VSAs specified in Section 8 and the
MIP VSEs specified in Section 9 using another Organization
identifier.
Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the
MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA, PDSN MUST send an RRP to the MN with the
MIP_Key_Request VSE. The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89
(Vendor Specific) and MUST not tear down the PPP session after
transmission.
Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the AAA_Authenticator
VSA, the PDSN MUST send an RRP with the AAA_Authenticator MIP VSE.
The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89 (Vendor Specific) and MUST
NOT tear down the PPP session after transmission.
Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the Public Key Invalid
VSA, the PDSN MUST send an RRP with the Public Key Invalid MIP VSE.
The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89 (Vendor Specific) and MUST
NOT tear down the PPP session after transmission.
Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
Reject message is not consistent with section 5.44 of [4]. A PDSN
that supports DMU MUST accept an Access Reject message containing a
vendor-specific attribute. This use of Access Reject is strongly
discouraged for any future work based on this document. Future work
should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this vendor-
specific attribute.
Upon receipt of an RRQ with the MIP_Key_Data VSE, the PDSN MUST
convert the RRQ to an ARQ with the MIP_Key_Data VSA. The PDSN MUST
send the ARQ to the RADIUS AAA server.
The PDSN/FA MUST comply with the DMU Procedure failure operation
specified in Section 5.
The PDSN/FA MUST include the PKOID from the Access Reject
MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA in the MIP_Key_Request MIP VSE sent to the
MN.
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4.10. Home Agent (HA)
The HA MUST support the Verizon Wireless MIP Vendor/Organization-
Specific Extensions (VSEs) specified in Section 9. (Note: the HA may
not encounter a DMU MIP extension if the FA strips away all
extensions after the Mobile-Home authentication extension.)
The HA MAY support the MIP VSEs specified in Section 9 using another
Organization identifier. (Note: the HA may not encounter a DMU MIP
extension if the FA strips away all extensions after the Mobile-Home
authentication extension.)
The HA MUST support delivery of the MN-HA key from the Home RADIUS
AAA server using 3GPP2 RADIUS Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSA) as
specified in 3GPP2 X.S0011-005-C. The 3GPP2 VSAs used are the MN-HA
Shared Key (Vendor-Type = 58) and the MN-HA SPI (Vendor-Type = 57).
4.11. DMU Procedure Network Flow
This section provides a flow diagram and detailed description of the
process flow involving the Dynamic Mobile IP Update procedure process
within the IS-2000 network.
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MN PDSN/FA AAAH
-- ------- ----
--------------------- | -------------------
| 1: RSA Public Key | | | RSA Private Key |
| Pre-loaded by | | | Pre-loaded by |
| Manufacturer | | | Service Provider |
--------------------- | -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
| 2: MS/BS: IS-2000 Call Origination and Authentication |
| 3: MN/PDSN/FA: PPP Session Establishment |
---------------------------------------------------------
| 4: Registration Request (RRQ) | |
|--------------------------------->| 5: Access Request w/MSID
| |------------>|
| | --------------------
| | | 6: MIP Update State|
| | | is UPDATE KEYS |
| | --------------------
| 7: Access Reject with |
| MIP_Key_Update_Request |
| RADIUS Attribute |
| |<------------|
| 8: Registration Reply (RRP) | |
| with MIP_Key_Request MIP | |
| Vendor/organization-specific | |
| extension | |
|<---------------------------------| |
------------------- | |
| 9: MN generates | | |
| MIP_Key_Data | | |
| using temporary | | |
| MIP keys | | |
------------------- | |
| 10: RRQ with MIP_Key_Data | |
| Vendor/organization-specific extension |
|--------------------------------->| 11: Access Request
| | w/MSID
| | and MIP_Key_Data
| | RADIUS attribute
| |------------>|
Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 1)
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
MN PDSN/FA AAAH
-- ------- ----
| | |
| | -------------------
| | | 12: decrypt |
| | | MIP_Key_Data, |
| | | verify MN-AAA |
| | | authentication |
| | | extension, set |
| | | MIP Update State |
| | | = KEYS UPDATED |
| | -------------------
| 13: Access Reject with |
| AAA_Authenticator |
| RADIUS Attribute |
| |<------------|
| 14: Registration Reply (RRP) | |
| with AAA_Authenticator MIP | |
| Vendor/organization-specific | |
| extension | |
|<---------------------------------| |
---------------------- | |
| 15: verify | | |
| AAA_Authenticator, | | |
| store temporary | | |
| MIP keys as | | |
| permanent keys | | |
---------------------- | |
| 16: RRQ | |
|--------------------------------->| Access Request
| | w/MSID
| |------------>|
| | --------------------
| | | 17: verify MN-AAA |
| | | authentication |
| | | extension, set |
| | | MIP Update State |
| | | = KEYS VALID |
| | --------------------
| Access Accept |
| |<------------|
Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 2)
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MN PDSN/FA AAAH HA
-- ------- ---- --
| | | |
| | 18. Registration Request (RRQ) |
| |-------------------------------->|
| | 19: Access Request |
| | |<-----------------|
| | | Access Accept |
| | | with MN-HA key |
| | |----------------->|
| | | -------------------
| | | | verify |
| | | | mobile-home |
| | | | authentication |
| | | | extension |
| | | -------------------
| | 20. Registration Reply (RRP) |
| |<--------------------------------|
| RRP | | |
|<--------------| | |
Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 3)
Each step in the Figure 4 DMU Process is described as follows:
1. Each RSA public/private key pair MUST be generated in
accordance with RFC 3447. Each public/private key pair MUST
be assigned a unique Public Key Identifier (PKOID) by its
creator.
If the service provider does not generate the public/private
key pair and deliver the RSA public key to the MN manufacturer
for pre-installation in the MN, the MN manufacturer MUST
generate the RSA public/private key pair (using a 1024-bit
modulus) and pre-load all MNs with the RSA public (encryption)
key. The MN manufacturer MUST distribute the RSA Private
(decryption) key, in a secure manner, to the appropriate
service provider.
2. Assuming that the cdma2000(R) 1X MN has been provisioned with
an A-key and SSD, the cdma2000(R) 1X MS initiates a call
origination and authenticates itself to the IS-2000 network.
Upon IS-2000 authentication success, the BS sends the
"authenticated" MSID (e.g., MIN) to the PDSN.
3. The MN and PDSN establish a PPP session.
4. The MN sends a MIP Registration Request (RRQ) to the PDSN.
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5. The PDSN converts the MIP RRQ into a RADIUS Access Request
(ARQ) message, includes the MSID in the ARQ, and forwards the
ARQ to the Home RADIUS AAA server.
6. The RADIUS AAA Server compares the authenticated MSID (sent
from the PDSN) with the MSID in its subscriber database
(associated with the NAI). If the AAA MIP Update State Field
is set to UPDATE KEYS (1), the RADIUS AAA Server rejects
Packet Data access and orders a MIP key update.
7. The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Reject (code = 3)
message to the PDSN with the MIP_Key_Update_Request RADIUS
VSA.
8. The PDSN converts the Access Reject to a MIP Registration
Reply (RRP) with a MIP_Key_Request MIP VSE and sends the RRP
to the MN. RRP Code = 89 (Vendor Specific).
9. The MN sets the MN MIP Update State = UPDATE KEYS. If the MN
has no pre-generated and pre-encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload,
the MN MUST generate the MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, Chap key,
MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator in accordance with RFC
4086. Except for the Public Key Identifier, all generated
values MUST be encrypted using the pre-loaded RSA public
(encryption) key. The newly generated MN_AAATEMP Key and
MN_HATEMP MUST be used to calculate the MN-AAA and Mobile-Home
Authentication Extensions for the current RRQ. Note: the MN
MAY pre-compute the MIP_Key_Data payload by checking whether a
payload exists during each MN power-up or application
initiation.
10. The MN sends the RRQ with MIP_Key_Data MIP VSE to the PDSN.
11. The PDSN converts the RRQ to a RADIUS ARQ with MIP_Key_Data
RADIUS VSA and forwards the ARQ to the home RADIUS AAA Server.
The MSID is included in the ARQ.
12. The RADIUS AAA Server compares the authenticated MSID (sent
from the PDSN) with the MSID in its subscriber database
(associated with the NAI). If MSIDPDSN = MSIDAAA, the RADIUS
AAA server, using the Public Key Identifier, determines the
appropriate RSA Private key and decrypts the encrypted portion
of the MIP_Key_Data payload. The RADIUS AAA Server verifies
the MN-AAA Authentication Extension Authenticator using the
decrypted MN_AAA key. If successful, the RADIUS AAA Server
updates the subscriber profile with the decrypted MN_AAA key,
MN_HA key, and CHAP key. The RADIUS AAA Server sets the AAA
MIP Update State Field to KEYS UPDATED (2).
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13. The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Reject with
AAA_Authenticator RADIUS VSA to the PDSN.
14. The PDSN converts the Access Reject to a MIP RRP with
AAA_Authenticator MIP VSE. RRP Code = 89 (Vendor Specific).
15. If AAA_AuthenticatorMN = AAA_AuthenticatorAAA, the MN assigns
MN_AAATEMP to MN_AAA key and MN_HATEMP to MN_HA key (MN MIP
Update State = KEYS VALID). Otherwise, the MN discards the
temporary keys.
16. The MN initiates a new RRQ that is converted to an ARQ by the
PDSN and forwarded to the RADIUS AAA Server.
17. The RADIUS AAA Server verifies the MN-AAA Authentication
Extension and sets the AAA MIP Update State Field to KEYS
VALID (0). The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Accept to
the PDSN/FA.
18. The PDSN/FA sends the RRQ to the Home Agent (HA).
19. The HA sends an Access Request to the RADIUS AAA Server. The
RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Accept to the HA with the
MN_HA key. The HA verifies the Mobile-Home Authentication
Extension using the MN_HA key.
20. The HA sends an RRP to the PDSN/FA, which forwards the RRP to
the MN. RRP Code = 0 (Success).
5. DMU Procedure Failure Operation
To improve the robustness of the DMU Procedure to account for
interruptions due to UDP message loss, RRQ retransmission, or MN
failure, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a MIP Update State
Field, for each subscription, in one of three states (0 = KEYS VALID,
1 = UPDATE KEYS, 2 = KEYS UPDATED).
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
MN PDSN/FA AAAH HA
-- ------- ---- --
---------------- | ---------------- |
| MN state = | | | AAAH state = | |
| KEYS VALID | | | UPDATE KEYS | |
---------------- | ---------------- |
| (A) RRQ | | |
|-------------->| ARQ | |
| |------------->| |
| AR(Key_Update) | |
(B) RRP (Key_Update) |<-------------| |
|<--------------| | |
---------------- | | |
| MN state = | | | |
| UPDATE KEYS | | | |
---------------- | | |
| (C) RRQ (MIP_Key_Data) | |
|-------------->| ARQ (MIP_Key_Data) |
| |------------->| |
| | ---------------- |
| | | AAAH state = | |
| | | KEYS UPDATED | |
| | ---------------- |
| AR (AAA_Auth) | |
(D) RRP (AAA_Auth) |<-------------| |
|<--------------| | |
---------------- | | |
| MN state = | | | |
| KEYS VALID | | | |
---------------- | | |
| RRQ | | |
|-------------->| ARQ | |
| |------------->| |
| | ---------------- |
| | | AAAH state = | |
| | | KEYS VALID | |
| | ---------------- |
| | AA | |
| |<-------------| RRQ |
| |------------------------------->|
| | | ARQ |
| | |<----------------|
| | | AA |
| | |---------------->|
| | | RRP |
| | RRP |<----------------|
|<-----------------------------| |
Figure 5. DMU Failure Call Flow with MN and AAA States
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Each step in Figure 5 is described as follows:
1. If (A) is lost, the MN retransmits (A). The RADIUS AAA server
expects (A). If the AAA server is in the UPDATE KEYS state,
the RADIUS AAA Server sends AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA,
and the PDSN/FA sends (B).
2. If (B) is lost, the MN retransmits (A). The RADIUS AAA server
expects (C). If it receives (A), the RADIUS AAA Server sends
AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA, and the PDSN/FA retransmits
(B).
3. If (C) is lost, the mobile retransmits (C). The RADIUS AAA
server expects (C) and updates the MIP keys appropriately. The
RADIUS AAA server transitions to KEYS UPDATED and commits the
MIP_Key_Data. The RADIUS AAA Server sends the AR with
AAA_Authenticator VSA, and the PDSN/FA replies to the MN with
(D).
4. If (D) is lost, the mobile retransmits (C) using the same key
data sent previously. The RADIUS AAA server expects (A) using
the same keys.
a. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (C) with the same keys it
received previously, it retransmits the AR with
AAA_Authenticator VSA and the PDSN replies with (D),
containing the AAA_Authenticator.
b. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (C) with different keys
than it received previously, the RADIUS AAA Server sends AR
with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA, the PDSN/FA retransmits
(B), and the RADIUS AAA server transitions to UPDATE KEYS.
c. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (A), which fails
authentication using the keys sent in (C), the RADIUS AAA
Server sends AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request, the PDSN/FA
retransmits (B), and the RADIUS AAA server transitions to
UPDATE KEYS.
5. Once the PDSN/FA receives (A), forwards the ARQ to the RADIUS
AAA server, and the MN-AAA Authenticator is verified using the
MN_AAA key, the RADIUS AAA Server transitions to the KEYS VALID
state and the DMU process is complete.
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The AAA DMU state machine is described in Figure 6.
--------------
--------------------->| KEYS VALID |---------------
| Auth success using -------------- Need Key |
| MIP_Key_Data Update |
| |
| Auth failed (invalid keys) |
| or RRQ with different MIP_Key_Data |
| --------------------------------- |
| | | |
| | v v
---------------- ---------------
| KEYS UPDATED | | UPDATE KEYS |
---------------- ---------------
| ^ ^ |
| | | |
------- ---------------------------------
RRQ with same Got MIP_Key_Data
MIP_Key_Data
Figure 6. RADIUS AAA Server DMU State Machine
6. cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO Support
Because the DMU Procedure occurs at the IP Layer, the DMU Procedure
supports MIP key distribution in either the cdma2000(R) 1X or
HRPD/1xEV-DO network. Because the cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO network
does not provide Radio Access Network (RAN) authentication, the DMU
Procedure is more susceptible to a false MN attack (than in an
cdma2000(R) 1X network with Cellular Authentication and Voice
Encryption (CAVE) RAN authentication). For this reason, the DMU
Procedure has the capability to optionally support device-to-network
authentication using the MN_Authenticator.
The method of MN_Authenticator delivery to the RADIUS AAA server is
outside the scope of this document, allowing service providers the
flexibility to determine the most efficient/least intrusive procedure
to support MN authentication during the DMU Procedure.
6.1. RADIUS AAA Support
The RADIUS AAA server MUST support three MN_Authenticator options:
1. Ignore MN_Authenticator
Depending on other potential authentication/fraud prevention
options (outside the scope of the DMU Procedure), the RADIUS AAA
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Server MUST have the capability to ignore the MN_Authenticator.
For example, when the RADIUS AAA Server decrypts the MIP_Key_Data
payload, the AAA Server silently discards the MN_Authenticator.
2. Pre-Update Validation
Prior to updating a subscription profile with the delivered MIP
keys, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST compare the MN_AuthenticatorMN
(delivered via the encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload) with the
MN_AuthenticatorAAA (possibly delivered via the service provider
customer care or billing/provisioning system).
3. Post-Update Validation
After the DMU Procedure is complete, the RADIUS AAA Server stores
the delivered MN_AuthenticatorMN and waits for delivery of the
MN_AuthenticatorAAA (via Customer Care, interactive voice response
(IVR), or some other unspecified process). Once the
MN_Authenticator is delivered to the RADIUS AAA Server, the AAA
MUST compare the MN_AuthenticatorMN (delivered via the encrypted
MIP_Key_Data payload) with the MN_AuthenticatorAAA. If the
Authenticators match, the RADIUS AAA Server authorizes access and
final update of the MIP keys.
6.2. MN Support
The Mobile Node (MN) MUST store the 24-bit MN_Authenticator.
The MN MUST display the MN_Authenticator as an 8 decimal digit number
(via LCD display on a handset or via a GUI for a modem). If the MN
resides within a handset, the user MAY display the MN_Authenticator
using the following keypad sequence: "FCN + * + * + M + I + P +
RCL". Otherwise, the MN MUST display the MN_Authenticator via the
device's GUI.
The MN MUST have the capability to reset the MN_Authenticator. In
other words, the MN MUST have the capability to randomly/pseudo-
randomly generate a new 24-bit MN_Authenticator upon user command, in
accordance with RFC 4086. The reset feature mitigates possible
compromise of the MN_Authenticator during shipment/storage. If the
MN resides within a handset, the user MAY reset the MN_Authenticator
using the following keypad sequence: "FCN + * + * + M + I + P + C +
C + RCL". Otherwise, the MN MUST reset the MN_Authenticator via the
device's GUI.
The MN manufacturer MAY pre-load the MN with the MN_Authenticator.
For example, by pre-loading the MN_Authenticator and affixing a
sticker with the MN_Authenticator (8 decimal digit representation) to
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
the MN (e.g., modem), the point-of-sale representative does not have
to retrieve the MN_Authenticator from the MN interface.
[Optional] The MN MAY maintain a separate primary and secondary queue
of MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload pairs. When the MN user
resets the primary MN_Authenticator, the MN discards the primary
MN_Authenticator (and any associated MIP_Key_Data Payload) and
assigns the MN_Authenticator in the secondary queue as the primary
MN_Authenticator (and assigns any associated MIP_Key_Data Payloads to
the primary queue). This feature enables the user/provisioner to
reset the MN_Authenticator and immediately initiate the DMU procedure
without losing the MIP_Key_Data Payload pre-encryption advantage.
Upon MN_Authenticator transfer from the secondary to primary queue,
the MN MUST generate a new MN_Authenticator and associated
MIP_Key_Data Payload for the secondary queue. The MN MUST check both
the primary and secondary MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload
queues upon power-up or application initiation. The MN MUST maintain
at least one MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload pair in each
queue.
6.3. Informative: MN_Authenticator Support
MN authentication using the MN_Authenticator gives the service
provider the maximum flexibility in determining how to deliver the
MN_Authenticator to the RADIUS AAA Server. The method of
MN_Authenticator delivery is outside the scope of this document.
However, to provide some context as to how the MN_Authenticator may
support MN authentication/fraud prevention in the HRPD/1xEV-DO
environment, we describe the following possible provisioning
scenario.
When a subscriber initially acquires their HRPD/1xEV-DO device and
service, the point-of-sale representative records the subscription
information into the billing/provision system via a computer terminal
at the point-of-sale. The billing/provisioning system delivers
certain information to the RADIUS AAA Server (e.g., NAI, MSID,
Electronic Serial Number (ESN)) including the MN_Authenticator, which
the point-of-sale representative retrieves via the MN device's
display. In the case of a modem, the manufacturer may have pre-
loaded the MN_Authenticator and placed a copy of the MN_Authenticator
on a sticker attached to the modem. The point-of-sale representative
simply copies the 8 decimal digit value of the MN_Authenticator into
the customer profile. Once the MN is loaded with the proper NAI and
powered-up, the MN initiates the DMU Procedure with the RADIUS AAA
Server. The RADIUS AAA Server compares the MN-delivered
MN_Authenticator with the billing-system-delivered MN_Authenticator.
If the authenticators match, the RADIUS AAA Server updates the
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subscriber profile with the delivered MIP keys and authorizes
service. If the Post-Update option is enabled within the RADIUS AAA
Server, the RADIUS AAA Server tentatively updates the subscription
profile until it receives the MN_Authenticator via the
billing/provision system.
As another option, the service provider MAY use an IVR system in
which the HRPD/1xEV-DO subscriber calls a provisioning number and
inputs the MN_Authenticator. The IVR system then delivers the
MN_Authenticator to the RADIUS AAA Server for final validation and
Packet Data Access.
7. Security Considerations
The DMU Procedure is designed to maximize the efficiency of MIP key
distribution while providing adequate key distribution security. The
following provides a description of potential security
vulnerabilities and their relative risk to the DMU Procedure:
7.1. Cryptographic Key Generation by the MN
Because the MN is required to properly generate the MN_AAA, MN_HA,
and CHAP key, the MN must perform cryptographic key generation in
accordance with accepted random/pseudo-random number generation
procedures. MN manufacturers MUST comply with RFC 4086 [12]
guidelines, and service providers SHOULD ensure that manufacturers
implement acceptable key generation procedures. The use of
predictable cryptographic keys could be devastating to MIP security.
However, the risk of not using acceptable random/pseudo-random key
generation is minimal as long as MN manufacturers adhere to RFC 4086
guidelines. Furthermore, if a key generation flaw is identified, the
flaw appears readily correctable via a software patch, minimizing the
impact.
7.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The DMU procedure is susceptible to a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack; however, such an attack appears relatively complex and
expensive. When Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is deployed
within cdma2000(R) 1X, the MITM Attack will be eliminated. The risk
of an MITM Attack is minimal due to required expertise, attack
expense, and impending cdma2000(R) 1X mutual authentication
protection. If a particular cdma2000(R) 1X network does not support
A-key authentication, the MN_Authenticator MAY optionally be used.
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7.3. RSA Private Key Compromise
Because one RSA Private key may be associated with millions of MNs
(RSA public key), it is important to protect the RSA Private key from
disclosure to unauthorized parties. If a MN manufacturer is
generating the RSA public/private key pair, the MN manufacturer MUST
establish adequate security procedures/policies regarding the
dissemination of the RSA Private key to the appropriate service
provider. An RSA Private key SHOULD be distributed to a legitimate
cdma2000(R) service provider only. If a service provider is
generating their own RSA public/private key pair, the service
provider MUST protect the RSA Private key from disclosure to
unauthorized parties.
7.4. RSA Encryption
Several vulnerabilities have been identified in certain
implementations of RSA; however, they do not appear applicable to the
DMU Procedure.
7.5. False Base Station/PDSN
The MN appears to be protected against a false BS denial-of-service
(DOS) attack, since only the proper RADIUS AAA server can recover the
AAA_Authenticator. This method of preventing a false base station
attack assumes security of the network messaging between the AAA and
the serving system, as discussed in Section 7.9.
7.6. cdma2000(R) 1X False MN
The cdma2000(R) 1X network appears adequately protected against a
false MN by IS-2000 challenge-response authentication. If DMU is
used outside the cellular domain, equivalent authentication
procedures are required for the same level of security.
7.7. HRPD/1xEV-DO False MN
The 1xEV-DO RADIUS AAA Server MAY optionally authenticate the MN
using the MN_Authenticator to prevent a fraudulent MN activation.
7.8. Key Lifetimes
There is no explicit lifetime for the keys distributed by DMU.
The lifetime of the keys distributed by DMU is determined by the
system operator through the RADIUS AAA server. The MN_AAA and MN_HA
key lifetimes can be controlled by initiating an update as needed.
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Furthermore, the DMU process is protected against false initiation
because the MN cannot initiate DMU. This makes it unworkable to
provide an explicit lifetime to the MN, since the MN cannot take any
action to renew the keys after expiration.
7.9. Network Message Security
The security of the MN-HA keys delivered from the RADIUS AAA server
to the MIP home agent requires confidentiality for network messages
containing such keys. The specification of security requirements for
network messages is the responsibility of the operator, and is
outside the scope of this document. (Note that similar considerations
apply to the distribution of Shared Secret Data, which is already
transmitted between nodes in the ANSI-41 network.)
If DMU is used outside the domain of a cellular operator, RADIUS
security features MAY be used, including the Request-Authenticator
and Response-Authenticator fields defined in [4] and the Message-
Authenticator attribute defined in [13].
8. Verizon Wireless RADIUS Attributes
Three new RADIUS Attributes are required to support the DMU Procedure
and are specified as follows:
Type: 26
Length: >9
Verizon Wireless Enterprise/Vendor ID: 12951
MIP_Key_Update_Request:
----------------------
The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this attribute to indicate that
MIP key update is required.
Vendor-Type = 1
Vendor-Length = 3 bytes
Vendor-Value = PKOID of the RADIUS AAA Server
MIP_Key_Data:
------------
Key data payload containing the encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator. This payload also
contains the Public Key Identifier.
Vendor-Type = 2
Vendor-Length = 134 bytes
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NOTE: Vendor-Length depends on the size of the RSA modulus. For
example, when RSA-512 is used, Vendor-Length = 70 bytes.
Vendor-Value = 128 byte RSA encryption payload (when 1024-bit RSA
used), which contains encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.
The four (4) byte Public Key Identifier is concatenated to the
encrypted payload.
AAA_Authenticator:
-----------------
The 64-bit AAA_Authenticator value decrypted by the Home RADIUS AAA
Server.
Vendor-Type = 3
Vendor-Length = 10 bytes
Vendor-Value = decrypted AAA_Authenticator from Home RADIUS AAA
Server.
Public Key Invalid:
------------------
The home RADIUS AAA Server includes this attribute to indicate that
the public key used by the MN is not valid.
Vendor-Type = 4
Vendor-Length = 2 bytes
Vendor-Value = none.
Note: An Organization may define RADIUS VSAs using its own
Organization identifier.
9. Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Extensions
Three Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-Specific
Extensions (VSEs) (RFC 3115), required to support the DMU Procedure,
are specified as follows:
Type: 38 (CVSE-TYPE-NUMBER)
Verizon Wireless Vendor ID: 12951 (high-order octet is 0 and low
order octets are the SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Code
of the Vendor in the network byte order, as defined by IANA).
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0 7 8 15 16 31
---------------------------------------------------
| Type | Reserved | Length |
---------------------------------------------------
| Vendor/Org-ID |
---------------------------------------------------
| Vendor-CVSE-Type | Vendor-CVSE-Value ... |
---------------------------------------------------
Figure 7. Critical Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension
MIP_Key_Request:
---------------
The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this extension to indicate that
MIP key update is required.
Length = 7
NOTE: The RFC 3115 Editor has stated that the Reserved field is
not included in the length determination.
Vendor-CVSE-Type = 1
Vendor-CVSE-Value = PKOID sent in the RADIUS
MIP_Key_Update_Request attribute.
MIP_Key_Data:
------------
Key data payload containing encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator. This payload also
contains the Public Key Identifier.
Length = 138
NOTE: Length depends on the size of the RSA modulus. For example,
when RSA-512 is used, Length = 74 bytes.
Vendor-CVSE-Type = 2
Vendor-CVSE-Value = 128 byte RSA encryption payload (when 1024-bit
RSA used) which contains encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.
The four (4) byte Public Key Identifier and DMUV is concatenated
to the encrypted payload.
AAA_Authenticator:
-----------------
The 64-bit AAA_Authenticator value decrypted by the Home RADIUS AAA
Server.
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Length = 14 bytes
Vendor-CVSE-Type = 3
Vendor-CVSE-Value = decrypted AAA_Authenticator from the Home
RADIUS AAA Server.
Public Key Invalid:
------------------
The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this extension to indicate that
the public key used by the MN is not valid.
Length = 6 bytes
Vendor-CVSE-Type = 4
Vendor-CVSE-Value = none.
Note: An Organization may define VSEs using their own Organization
identifier.
10. Public Key Identifier and DMU Version
The Public Key Identifier (Pub_Key_ID) is used during the Dynamic
Mobile IP Update (DMU) procedure to allow the RADIUS AAA Server to
distinguish between different public keys (which may be assigned by
different manufacturers, service providers, or other organizations).
The Public Key Identifier consists of the PKOID, PKOI, PK_Identifier,
and ATV fields. The DMU Version field enables subsequent revisions
of the DMU procedure.
----------------------------------------------
| PKOID | PKOI | PK_Expansion | ATV | DMUV |
----------------------------------------------
0 7 8 15 16 23 24 27 28 31
Figure 8. Public Key Identifier and DMUV
Each Public Key Organization (PKO) MUST be assigned a Public Key
Organization Identifier (PKOID) to enable the RADIUS AAA Server to
distinguish between different public keys created by different PKOs
(see Table 1).
If a service provider does not provide the MN manufacturer with a
(RSA) public key, the manufacturer MUST generate a unique RSA
Public/Private key pair and pre-load each MN with the RSA public key
(1024-bit modulus by default). The manufacturer MAY share the same
RSA Private key with multiple service providers as long as reasonable
security procedures are established and maintained (by the
manufacturer) to prevent disclosure of the RSA Private (decryption)
key to an unauthorized party.
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The Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) is an 8-bit field whose
value is defined at the discretion of the PKO. For example, a device
manufacturer MAY incrementally assign a new PKOI for each
Public/Private key pair when the pair is created.
The PK_Expansion field enables support for additional PKOs or
expansion of the PKOI.
The DMU Version field allows for DMU Procedure version identification
(see Table 2).
The Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) field allows for identification
of the public key algorithm and version used (see Table 3).
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Table 1. Public Key Organization Identification Table
PKOID Public Key PKOID Public Key
(HEX) Organization (PKO) (HEX) Organization (PKO)
----- ------------------ ----- ------------------
00 RESERVED 40 Sanyo Fisher Company
01 RESERVED 41 Sharp Laboratories of
America
02 RESERVED 42 Sierra Wireless, Inc.
03 RESERVED 43 Sony Electronics
04 RESERVED 44 Synertek, Inc.
05 RESERVED 45 Tantivy Communications,
Inc.
06 RESERVED 46 Tellus Technology, Inc.
07 RESERVED 47 Wherify Wireless, Inc.
08 RESERVED 48 Airbiquity
09 RESERVED 49 ArrayComm
0A Verizon Wireless 4A Celletra Ltd.
0B AAPT Ltd. 4B CIBERNET Corporation
0C ALLTEL Communications 4C CommWorks Corporation,
a 3Com Company
0D Angola Telecom 4D Compaq Computer
Corporation
0E Bell Mobility 4E ETRI
0F BellSouth International 4F Glenayre Electronics
Inc.
10 China Unicom 50 GTRAN, Inc.
11 KDDI Corporation 51 Logica
12 Himachal Futuristic 52 LSI Logic
Communications Ltd.
13 Hutchison Telecom (HK), 53 Metapath Software
Ltd. International, Inc.
14 IUSACELL 54 Metawave Communications
15 Komunikasi Selular 55 Openwave Systems Inc.
Indonesia (Komselindo)
16 Korea Telecom Freetel, 56 ParkerVision, Inc.
Inc.
17 Leap 57 QUALCOMM, Inc.
18 LG Telecom, Ltd. 58 QuickSilver Technologies
19 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam 59 Research Institute of
Limited (MTNL) Telecommunication
Transmission, MII (RITT)
1A Nextel Communications, 5A Schema, Ltd.
Inc.
1B Operadora UNEFON SA de CV 5B SchlumbergerSema
1C Pacific Bangladesh 5C ScoreBoard, Inc.
Telecom Limited
1D Pegaso PCS, S.A. DE C.V. 5D SignalSoft Corp.
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PKOID Public Key PKOID Public Key
(HEX) Organization (PKO) (HEX) Organization (PKO)
----- ------------------ ----- ------------------
1E Pele-Phone 5E SmartServ Online,
Communications Ltd. Inc.
1F Qwest 5F TDK Corporation
20 Reliance Infocom Limited 60 Texas Instruments
21 Shinsegi Telecomm, Inc. 61 Wherify Wireless, Inc.
22 Shyam Telelink Limited 62 Acterna
23 SK Telecom 63 Anritsu Company
24 Sprint PCS 64 Ericsson
25 Tata Teleservices Ltd. 65 Grayson Wireless
26 Telecom Mobile Limited 66 LinkAir Communications,
Inc.
27 Telstra Corporation 67 Racal Instruments
Limited
28 Telus Mobility Cellular, 68 Rohde & Schwarz
Inc.
29 US Cellular 69 Spirent Communications
2A 3G Cellular 6A Willtech, Inc.
2B Acer Communication & 6B Wireless Test Systems
Multimedia Inc.
2C AirPrime, Inc. 6C Airvana, Inc.
2D Alpine Electronics, Inc. 6D COM DEV Wireless
2E Audiovox Communications 6E Conductus, Inc.
Corporation
2F DENSO Wireless 6F Glenayre Electronics
Inc.
30 Ditrans Corporation 70 Hitachi Telecom (USA),
Inc.
31 Fujitsu Network 71 Hyundai Syscomm Inc.
Communication, Inc.
32 Gemplus Corporation 72 ISCO
33 Giga Telecom Inc. 73 LG Electronics, Inc.
34 Hyundai CURITEL, Inc. 74 LinkAir Communications,
Inc.
35 InnovICs Corp 75 Lucent Technologies,
Inc.
36 Kyocera Corporation 76 Motorola CIG
37 LG Electronics, Inc. 77 Nortel Networks
38 LinkAir Communications, 78 Repeater Technologies
Inc.
39 Motorola, Inc. 79 Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd.
3A Nokia Corporation 7A Starent Networks
3B Novatel Wireless, Inc. 7B Tahoe Networks, Inc.
3C OKI Network Technologies 7C Tantivy Communications,
Inc.
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RFC 4784 Dynamic MIP Key Update June 2007
PKOID Public Key PKOID Public Key
(HEX) Organization (PKO) (HEX) Organization (PKO)
----- ------------------ ----- ------------------
3D Pixo 7D WaterCove Networks
3E Research In Motion 7E Winphoria Networks, Inc.
3F Samsung Electronics 7F ZTE Corporation
Co., Ltd.
Note: 80 through FF will be assigned by the PKOID administrator
(Verizion Wireless).
Table 2. DMU Version
DMU Version DMU Version
Value
----------- -----------
00 RFC 4784
01 Reserved
02 Reserved
03 Reserved
04 Reserved
05 Reserved
06 Reserved
07 Cleartext Mode
Table 3. Algorithm Type and Version
ATV Public Key Algorithm
Value Type and Version
----- --------------------
00 Reserved
01 RSA - 1024
02 RSA - 768
03 RSA - 2048
04 Reserved
05 Reserved
06 Reserved
07 Reserved
11. Conclusion
The Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update (DMU) Procedure enables the
efficient, yet secure, delivery of critical Mobile IP cryptographic
keys. The use of cryptographic keys (and hence, the bootstrapping of
such MIP keys using the DMU Procedure) is essential to commercial
delivery of Mobile IP service in cdma2000 1xRTT and HRPD/1xEV-DO
networks or other networks that utilize Mobile IP.
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12. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
13. Informative References
[2] TIA/EIA/IS-2000 Series, Revision A, Telecommunications Industry
Association, March 2000.
[3] TIA/EIA/IS-856, cdma2000(R) High Rate Packet Data Air Interface
Specification, Telecommunications Industry Association, November
2000.
[4] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
2000.
[5] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[6] TIA/EIA/IS-835-A, cdma2000(R) Wireless IP Network Standard,
Telecommunications Industry Association, May 2001.
[7] ANSI/TIA/EIA-41-D-97, Cellular Radiotelecommunications
Intersystem Operations, Telecommunications Industry Association,
December 1997
[8] ANSI/TIA/EIA-683-B-2001, Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of
Mobile Stations in Spread Spectrum Systems, Telecommunications
Industry Association, December 2001
[9] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC
3447, February 2003.
[10] Dommety, G. and K. Leung, "Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-
Specific Extensions", RFC 3115, April 2001.
[11] TIA-2001-A, Interoperability Specifications (IOS) for
cdma2000(R) Access Network Interfaces, Telecommunications
Industry Association, August 2001.
[12] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[13] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Extensions",
RFC 2869, June 2000.
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14. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Jeffrey Dyck (Qualcomm), James Willkie (Qualcomm), Jayanth
Mandayam (Qualcomm), Marcello Lioy (Qualcomm), Michael Borella
(CommWorks), Cliff Randall (CommWorks), Daniel Cassinelli
(CommWorks), Edward Dunn (CommWorks), Suresh Sarvepalli (CommWorks),
Gabriella Ambramovici (Lucent), Semyon Mizikovsky (Lucent), Sarvar
Patel (Lucent), Peter McCann (Lucent), Ganapathy Sundaram (Lucent),
Girish Patel (Nortel), Glen Baxley (Nortel), Diane Thompson
(Ericsson), Brian Hickman (Ericsson), Somsay Sychaleun (Bridgewater),
Parm Sandhu (Sierra Wireless), Iulian Mucano (Sierra Wireless), and
Samy Touati (Ericsson) for their useful discussions and comments.
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Appendix A: Cleartext-Mode Operation
DMU supports a cleartext mode for development testing where DMUV = 7.
The MIP_Key_Data payload will assume the same size as if RSA 1024-bit
encryption were applied to the payload. In this mode, the
MIP_Key_Data RADIUS Attribute and MIP Vendor Specific Extension will
be 134 bytes and 138 bytes in length, respectively. Thus, in
cleartext mode, the payload MUST consist of 48 bytes of keys (MN_AAA,
MN_HA, and CHAP key), 8-byte AAA_Authenticator, 3-byte
MN_Authenticator. The next 69 bytes will be padded with "0" bits.
MIP_Key_Data = MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, CHAP_key, MN_Authenticator,
AAA_Authenticator, Padding (69 bytes), Public_Key_IDi, DMUV
Where:
MN_AAA key = 128-bit random MN / RADIUS AAA Server key.
MN_HA key = 128-bit random MN / Home Agent (HA) key.
CHAP_key = 128-bit random Simple IP authentication key.
MN_Authenticator = 24-bit random number.
AAA_Authenticator = 64-bit random number used by MN to
authenticate the RADIUS AAA Server.
Padding = 69 bytes of 0's.
DMU Version (DMUV) = 4-bit identifier of DMU version.
Public Key Identifier (Pub _Key_ID) = PKOID, PKOI, PK_Expansion, ATV
Where:
Public Key Organization Identifier (PKOID) = 8-bit serial number
identifier of the Public Key Organization (PKO) that created
the Public Key.
Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) = 8-bit serial number used at
PKO discretion to distinguish different Public/Private key
pairs.
PK_Expansion = 8-bit field to enable possible expansion of PKOID
or PKOI fields. (Note: Default value = 0xFF)
Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) = 4-bit identifier of the
algorithm used.
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Authors' Addresses
Christopher Carroll*
Ropes & Gray LLP
Fish & Neave IP Group
One International Place
Boston, MA 02110
Phone: 617-951-7756
EMail: Christopher.Carroll@ropesgray.com
* This document was developed while at Verizon Wireless.
Frank Quick
Qualcomm Incorporated
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, CA 92121 USA
Phone: 858-658-3608
EMail: fquick@qualcomm.com
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