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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Takahashi
Request for Comments: 7203 NICT
Category: Standards Track K. Landfield
ISSN: 2070-1721 McAfee
Y. Kadobayashi
NAIST
April 2014
An Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) Extension
for Structured Cybersecurity Information
Abstract
This document extends the Incident Object Description Exchange Format
(IODEF) defined in RFC 5070 to exchange enriched cybersecurity
information among security experts at organizations and facilitate
their operations. It provides a well-defined pattern to consistently
embed structured information, such as identifier- and XML-based
information.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7203.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 7203 IODEF-SCI April 2014
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................3
3. Applicability ...................................................4
4. Extension Definition ............................................5
4.1. IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information ........5
4.2. Extended Data Type: XMLDATA ................................6
4.3. Extending IODEF ............................................6
4.4. Basic Structure of the Extension Classes ...................8
4.5. Defining Extension Classes .................................9
4.5.1. AttackPattern .......................................9
4.5.2. Platform ...........................................10
4.5.3. Vulnerability ......................................11
4.5.4. Scoring ............................................11
4.5.5. Weakness ...........................................12
4.5.6. EventReport ........................................13
4.5.7. Verification .......................................14
4.5.8. Remediation ........................................15
5. Mandatory-to-Implement Features ................................15
5.1. An Example XML Document ...................................16
5.2. An XML Schema for the Extension ...........................18
6. Security Considerations ........................................20
6.1. Transport-Specific Concerns ...............................20
6.2. Protection of Sensitive and Private Information ...........21
6.3. Application and Server Security ...........................22
7. IANA Considerations ............................................22
8. Acknowledgments ................................................24
9. References .....................................................24
9.1. Normative References ......................................24
9.2. Informative References ....................................26
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 7203 IODEF-SCI April 2014
1. Introduction
The number of incidents in cyber society is growing day by day.
Incident information needs to be reported, exchanged, and shared
among organizations in order to cope with the situation. IODEF is
one of the tools already in use that enables such an exchange.
To more efficiently run security operations, information exchanged
between organizations needs to be machine readable. IODEF provides a
means to describe the incident information, but it often needs to
include various non-structured types of incident-related data in
order to convey more specific details about what is occurring.
Further structure within IODEF increases the machine-readability of
the document, thus providing a means for better automating certain
security operations.
Within the security community there exist various means for
specifying structured descriptions of cybersecurity information, such
as [CAPEC], [CCE], [CCSS], [CEE], [CPE], [CVE], [CVRF], [CVSS],
[CWE], [CWSS], [MAEC], [OCIL], [OVAL], [SCAP], and [XCCDF]. In this
context, cybersecurity information encompasses a broad range of
structured data representation types that may be used to assess or
report on the security posture of an asset or set of assets. Such
structured descriptions facilitate a better understanding of an
incident while enabling more streamlined automated security
operations. Because of this, it would be beneficial to embed and
convey these types of information inside IODEF documents.
This document extends IODEF to embed and convey various types of
structured information. Since IODEF defines a flexible and
extensible format and supports a granular level of specificity, this
document defines an extension to IODEF instead of defining a new
report format. For clarity, and to eliminate duplication, only the
additional structures necessary for describing the exchange of such
structured information are provided.
2. Terminology
The terminology used in this document follows the terminology defined
in RFC 5070 [RFC5070].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
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3. Applicability
To maintain awareness of the continually changing security threat
landscape, organizations need to exchange cybersecurity information,
which includes the following information: attack pattern, platform
information, vulnerability and weakness, countermeasure instruction,
computer event logs, and severity assessments. IODEF provides a
scheme to describe and exchange such information among interested
parties. However, it does not define the detailed formats to specify
such information.
There already exist structured and detailed formats for describing
these types of information that can be used in facilitating such an
exchange. They include [CAPEC], [CCE], [CCSS], [CEE], [CPE], [CVE],
[CVRF], [CVSS], [CWE], [CWSS], [MAEC], [OCIL], [OVAL], [SCAP], and
[XCCDF]. By embedding them into the IODEF document, the document can
convey more detailed context information to the receivers, and the
document can be easily reused.
The use of formats for structured information facilitates more
advanced security operations on the receiver side. Since the
information is machine readable, the data can be processed by
computers, thus allowing better automation of security operations.
For instance, an organization wishing to report a security incident
wants to describe what vulnerability was exploited. In this case,
the sender can simply use IODEF, where an XML-based [XML1.0] attack
pattern record that follows the syntax and vocabulary defined by an
industry specification is embedded, instead of describing everything
in free-form text. The receiver can identify the needed details of
the attack pattern by looking up some of the XML tags defined by the
specification. The receiver can accumulate the attack pattern record
in its database and could distribute it to the interested parties as
needed, all without requiring human intervention.
In another example, an administrator is investigating an incident and
has detected a configuration problem that he wishes to share with a
partner organization to prevent the same event from occurring at the
partner organization. To confirm that the configuration was in fact
vulnerable, he uses an internal repository to access configuration
information that was gathered prior to the initial attack and that is
specific to a new vulnerability alert. He uses this information to
automatically generate an XML-based software configuration
description, embed it in an IODEF document, and send the resulting
IODEF document to the partner organization.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
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4. Extension Definition
This document extends IODEF to embed structured information by
introducing new classes that can be embedded consistently inside an
IODEF document as element contents of the AdditionalData and
RecordItem classes [RFC5070].
4.1. IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information
This extension embeds structured cybersecurity information (SCI)
defined by other specifications. The list of supported
specifications is managed by IANA, and this document defines the
needed fields for the list's entry.
Each entry for each specification has the namespace [XMLNames],
specification name, version, reference URI, and applicable classes.
Arbitrary URIs that may help readers understand the specification
could be embedded inside the Reference URI field, but it is
recommended that a standard/informational URI describing the
specification be prepared and embedded here.
The initial IANA table has only one entry, as follows:
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:mile:mmdef:1.2
Specification Name: Malware Metadata Exchange Format
Version: 1.2
Reference URI: <http://standards.ieee.org/develop
/indconn/icsg/mmdef.html>,
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups
/malware/malwg/Schema1.2/>
Applicable Classes: AttackPattern
Note that the specification was developed by The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated (IEEE), through
the Industry Connections Security Group (ICSG) of its Standards
Association.
The table is managed by IANA, following the allocation policy
specified in Section 7.
The SpecID attributes of extension classes (Section 4.5) must allow
the values of the specifications' namespace fields, but
implementations are otherwise not required to support all
specifications of the IANA table and may choose which specifications
to support. However, at a minimum, the specification listed in the
initial IANA table needs to be supported, as described in Section 5.
If an implementation received data that it does not support, it may
expand its functionality by looking up the IANA table or notify the
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
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sender of its inability to parse the data. Note that the lookup
could be done manually or automatically, but automatic download of
data from IANA's website is not recommended, since it is not designed
for mass retrieval of data by multiple devices.
4.2. Extended Data Type: XMLDATA
This extension inherits all of the data types defined in the IODEF
data model. One data type is added: XMLDATA. Embedded XML data is
represented by the XMLDATA data type. This type is defined as the
extension to the iodef:ExtensionType [RFC5070], whose dtype attribute
is set to "xml".
4.3. Extending IODEF
This document defines eight extension classes, namely AttackPattern,
Platform, Vulnerability, Scoring, Weakness, EventReport,
Verification, and Remediation. Figure 1 describes the relationships
between the IODEF Incident class [RFC5070] and the newly defined
classes. It is expressed in Unified Modeling Language (UML) syntax
per RFC 5070 [RFC5070]. The UML representation is for illustrative
purposes only; elements are specified in XML as defined in
Section 5.2.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
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+---------------+
| Incident |
+---------------+
| ENUM purpose |<>---------[IncidentID]
| STRING |<>--{0..1}-[AlternativeID]
| ext-purpose |<>--{0..1}-[RelatedActivity]
| ENUM lang |<>--{0..1}-[DetectTime]
| ENUM |<>--{0..1}-[StartTime]
| restriction |<>--{0..1}-[EndTime]
| |<>---------[ReportTime]
| |<>--{0..*}-[Description]
| |<>--{1..*}-[Assessment]
| |<>--{0..*}-[Method]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[AdditionalData]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[AttackPattern]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Vulnerability]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Weakness]
| |<>--{1..*}-[Contact]
| |<>--{0..*}-[EventData]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Flow]
| | | |<>--{1..*}-[System]
| | | |<>--{0..*}-[AdditionalData]
| | | |<>--{0..*}-[Platform]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Expectation]
| | |<>--{0..1}-[Record]
| | |<>--{1..*}-[RecordData]
| | |<>--{1..*}-[RecordItem]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[EventReport]
| |<>--{0..1}-[History]
| |<>--{0..*}-[AdditionalData]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Verification]
| | |<>--{0..*}-[Remediation]
+---------------+
Figure 1: Incident Class
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4.4. Basic Structure of the Extension Classes
Figure 2 shows the basic structure of the extension classes. Some of
the extension classes have extra elements as defined in Section 4.5,
but the basic structure is the same.
+---------------------+
| New Class Name |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 2: Basic Structure
Three attributes are defined as indicated below:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that
specifies the format of structured information. The value should
be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table
(Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for
conveying structured information based on a format that is not
listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data
formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the
value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that
specifies the format of structured information. This is usually
used to support a private schema that is not listed in the IANA
table (Section 4.1). This attribute MUST be used only when the
value of the SpecID element is "private."
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of structured
information. Depending on the extension classes, the content of
the structured information differs. This attribute enables IODEF
documents to convey the identifier of the structured information
instead of conveying the information itself.
Likewise, two elements are defined as indicated below:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of structured
information. This is a complete document that is formatted
according to the specification and its version identified by the
SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders
MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and
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the schema of the XML are consistent; if not, the namespace
identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency
SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. A reference
to structured information. This element allows an IODEF document
to include a link to structured information instead of directly
embedding it into a RawData element.
Though ContentID is an optional attribute, and RawData and Reference
are optional elements, one of them MUST be used to convey structured
information. Note that, in order to avoid confusing the receiver,
only one of them SHOULD be used.
4.5. Defining Extension Classes
This document defines eight extension classes, as described in the
subsections that follow.
4.5.1. AttackPattern
An AttackPattern is an extension class to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". It
describes attack patterns of incidents or events. It is RECOMMENDED
that the Method class [RFC5070] contain the extension elements
whenever available. An AttackPattern class is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| AttackPattern |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
+---------------------+
Figure 3: AttackPattern Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of attack pattern
information. See Section 4.4.
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Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of attack pattern
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to attack pattern information.
See Section 4.4.
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of the software platform
involved in the specific attack pattern. See Section 4.5.2.
4.5.2. Platform
A Platform is an extension class that identifies a software platform.
It is RECOMMENDED that the AttackPattern, Vulnerability, Weakness,
and System [RFC5070] classes contain the extension elements whenever
available. A Platform element is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Platform |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 4: Platform Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of platform
information. See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of platform
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to platform information. See
Section 4.4.
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4.5.3. Vulnerability
A Vulnerability is an extension class to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The
extension describes the vulnerabilities that are exposed or were
exploited in incidents. It is RECOMMENDED that the Method class
contain the extension elements whenever available. A Vulnerability
element is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Vulnerability |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
| |<>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+---------------------+
Figure 5: Vulnerability Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of vulnerability
information. See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of vulnerability
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to vulnerability information.
See Section 4.4.
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of the software platform
affected by the vulnerability. See Section 4.5.2.
Scoring: Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the
vulnerability. See Section 4.5.4.
4.5.4. Scoring
A Scoring is an extension class that describes the severity scores in
terms of security. It is RECOMMENDED that the Vulnerability and
Weakness classes contain the extension elements whenever available.
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A Scoring class is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Scoring |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 6: Scoring Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a score set. See
Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of a score set.
See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to a score set. See
Section 4.4.
4.5.5. Weakness
A Weakness is an extension class to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The
extension describes the weakness types that are exposed or were
exploited in incidents. It is RECOMMENDED that the Method class
contain the extension elements whenever available. A Weakness
element is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Weakness |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
| |<>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+---------------------+
Figure 7: Weakness Class
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
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This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of weakness
information. See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of weakness
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to weakness information. See
Section 4.4.
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of the software platform
affected by the weakness. See Section 4.5.2.
Scoring: Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the
weakness. See Section 4.5.4.
4.5.6. EventReport
An EventReport is an extension class to the
Incident.EventData.Record.RecordData.RecordItem element with a dtype
of "xml". The extension embeds structured event reports. It is
RECOMMENDED that the RecordItem class contain the extension elements
whenever available. An EventReport element is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| EventReport |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 8: EventReport Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
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ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an event report.
See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of an event
report. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to an event report. See
Section 4.4.
4.5.7. Verification
A Verification is an extension class to the Incident.AdditionalData
element with a dtype of "xml". The extension elements describe
information on verifying security, e.g., a checklist, to cope with
incidents. It is RECOMMENDED that the Incident class contain the
extension elements whenever available. A Verification class is
structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Verification |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 9: Verification Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of verification
information. See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of verification
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to verification information.
See Section 4.4.
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4.5.8. Remediation
A Remediation is an extension class to the Incident.AdditionalData
element with a dtype of "xml". The extension elements describe
incident remediation information, including instructions. It is
RECOMMENDED that the Incident class contain the extension elements
whenever available. A Remediation class is structured as follows:
+---------------------+
| Remediation |
+---------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| String ContentID |
+---------------------+
Figure 10: Remediation Class
This class has the following attributes:
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. See Section 4.4.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. See Section 4.4.
ContentID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of remediation
information. See Section 4.4.
Likewise, this class has the following elements:
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. An XML document of remediation
information. See Section 4.4.
Reference: Zero or more. A reference to remediation information.
See Section 4.4.
5. Mandatory-to-Implement Features
Implementations compliant with this document MUST be capable of
sending and receiving the extended IODEF documents that contain XML
documents conforming to the specification listed in the initial IANA
table described in Section 4.1 without error. The extended IODEF
document is an XML document that MUST be well-formed and MUST be
valid according to schemata, including extension schemata, available
to the validator and applicable to the XML document. Note that the
receiver can look up the namespace in the IANA table to understand
what specifications the embedded XML documents follow.
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For the purpose of facilitating the understanding of mandatory-to-
implement features, the following subsections provide an XML document
conformant to this memo, and a corresponding schema.
5.1. An Example XML Document
An example IODEF document for checking an implementation's conformity
with mandatory-to-implement features is provided here. The document
carries Malware Metadata Exchange Format (MMDEF) metadata. Note that
the metadata is generated by genMMDEF [MMDEF] with EICAR [EICAR]
files. Due to the limit of 72 characters per line, some line breaks
were added in this example.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<Incident purpose="reporting">
<IncidentID name="sci.example.com">189493</IncidentID>
<ReportTime>2013-06-18T23:19:24+00:00</ReportTime>
<Description>a candidate security incident</Description>
<Assessment>
<Impact completion="failed" type="admin" />
</Assessment>
<Method>
<Description>A candidate attack event</Description>
<AdditionalData dtype="xml">
<sci:AttackPattern SpecID=
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:mile:mmdef:1.2">
<sci:RawData dtype="xml">
<malwareMetaData xmlns="http://xml/metadataSharing.xsd"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://xml/metadataSharing.xsd
file:metadataSharing.xsd" version="1.200000" id="10000">
<company>N/A</company>
<author>MMDEF Generation Script</author>
<comment>Test MMDEF v1.2 file generated using genMMDEF
</comment>
<timestamp>2013-03-23T15:12:50.726000</timestamp>
<objects>
<file id="6ce6f415d8475545be5ba114f208b0ff">
<md5>6ce6f415d8475545be5ba114f208b0ff</md5>
<sha1>da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709</sha1>
<sha256>e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e464
9b934ca495991b7852b855</sha256>
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<sha512>cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b
5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff83
18d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927
da3e</sha512>
<size>184</size>
<filename>eicar_com.zip</filename>
<MIMEType>application/zip</MIMEType>
</file>
<file id="44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f">
<md5>44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f</md5>
<sha1>3395856ce81f2b7382dee72602f798b642f14140</sha1>
<sha256>275a021bbfb6489e54d471899f7db9d1663fc695ec
2fe2a2c4538aabf651fd0f</sha256>
<sha512>cc805d5fab1fd71a4ab352a9c533e65fb2d5b88551
8f4e565e68847223b8e6b85cb48f3afad842726d99
239c9e36505c64b0dc9a061d9e507d833277ada3
36ab</sha512>
<size>68</size>
<crc32>1750191932</crc32>
<filename>eicar.com</filename>
<filenameWithinInstaller>eicar.com
</filenameWithinInstaller>
</file>
</objects>
<relationships>
<relationship type="createdBy" id="1">
<source>
<ref>file[@id="6ce6f415d8475545be5ba114f208b0ff"]
</ref>
</source>
<target>
<ref>file[@id="44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f"]
</ref>
</target>
<timestamp>2013-03-23T15:12:50.744000</timestamp>
</relationship>
</relationships>
</malwareMetaData>
</sci:RawData>
</sci:AttackPattern>
</AdditionalData>
</Method>
<Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<ContactName>sci.example.com</ContactName>
<RegistryHandle registry="arin">sci.example-com
</RegistryHandle>
<Email>contact@csirt.example.com</Email>
</Contact>
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<EventData>
<Flow>
<System category="source">
<Node>
<Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.200</Address>
<Counter type="event">57</Counter>
</Node>
</System>
<System category="target">
<Node>
<Address category="ipv4-net">192.0.2.16/28</Address>
</Node>
<Service ip_protocol="4">
<Port>80</Port>
</Service>
</System>
</Flow>
<Expectation action="block-host" />
<Expectation action="other" />
</EventData>
</Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
5.2. An XML Schema for the Extension
An XML schema describing the elements defined in this document is
given here.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xsd:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xsd:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0" schemaLocation=
"http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/iodef-1.0.xsd"/>
<xsd:complexType name="XMLDATA">
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:restriction base="iodef:ExtensionType">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name="dtype" type="iodef:dtype-type"
use="required" fixed="xml"/>
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<xsd:attribute name="ext-dtype" type="xsd:string"
use="prohibited"/>
<xsd:attribute name="meaning" type="xsd:string"/>
<xsd:attribute name="formatid" type="xsd:string"/>
<xsd:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name="BasicStructure">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:element name="RawData" type="sci:XMLDATA"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"/>
<xsd:attribute name="ContentID" type="xsd:string"/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name="Scoring" type="sci:BasicStructure"/>
<xsd:element name="Platform" type="sci:BasicStructure"/>
<xsd:element name="EventReport" type="sci:BasicStructure"/>
<xsd:element name="Verification" type="sci:BasicStructure"/>
<xsd:element name="Remediation" type="sci:BasicStructure"/>
<xsd:element name="AttackPattern">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base="sci:BasicStructure">
<sequence>
<xsd:element ref="sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="Vulnerability">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base="sci:BasicStructure">
<sequence>
<xsd:element ref="sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="sci:Scoring" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
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</sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
<xsd:element name="Weakness">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base="sci:BasicStructure">
<sequence>
<xsd:element ref="sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="sci:Scoring" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:schema>
6. Security Considerations
This document specifies a format for encoding a particular class of
security incidents appropriate for exchange across organizations. As
merely a data representation, it does not directly introduce security
issues. However, it is guaranteed that parties exchanging instances
of this specification will have certain concerns. For this reason,
the underlying message format and transport protocol used MUST ensure
the appropriate degree of confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity for the specific environment. Specific security
considerations are detailed in the messaging and transport documents,
where the exchange of formatted information is automated; see
Sections 9 and 10 of "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)"
[RFC6545] and Section 4 of "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS" [RFC6546] for a detailed
overview of security requirements and considerations.
It is RECOMMENDED that organizations that exchange data using this
document develop operating procedures that consider, at a minimum,
the following areas of concern.
6.1. Transport-Specific Concerns
The underlying messaging format, IODEF, provides data markers to
indicate the sensitivity level of specific classes within the
structure as well as for the entire XML document. The "restriction"
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attribute accomplishes this with four attribute values in IODEF
[RFC5070]. These values are RECOMMENDED for use at the application
level, prior to transport, to protect data as appropriate. A
standard mechanism to apply XML encryption using these attribute
values as triggers is defined in RID [RFC6545], Section 9.1. This
mechanism may be used whether or not the RID protocol [RFC6545] and
its associated transport binding [RFC6546] are used in the exchange
to provide object-level security on the data to prevent possible
intermediary systems or middleboxes from having access to the data
being exchanged. In areas where transmission security or secrecy is
questionable, the application of an XML digital signature [XMLDSIG]
and/or encryption on each report will counteract both of these
concerns. The data markers are RECOMMENDED for use by applications
for managing access controls; however, access controls and management
of those controls are out of scope for this document. Options such
as the usage of a standard language (e.g., eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language [XACML]) for the expression of authorization policies
can be used to enable source and destination systems to better
coordinate and align their respective policy expressions.
Any transport protocol used to exchange instances of IODEF documents
MUST provide appropriate guarantees of confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity. The use of a standardized security protocol is
encouraged. The RID protocol [RFC6545] and its associated transport
binding [RFC6546] provide such security with options for mutual
authentication session encryption and include application-level
concerns such as policy and workflow.
The critical security concerns are that structured information may be
falsified, accessed by unintended entities, or become corrupt during
transit. We expect that each exchanging organization will determine
the need, and mechanism, for transport protection.
6.2. Protection of Sensitive and Private Information
For a complete review of privacy considerations when transporting
incident-related information, please see RID [RFC6545], Section 9.5.
Whether or not the RID protocol is used, the privacy considerations
are important to consider, as incident information is often sensitive
and may contain privacy-related information about individuals/
organizations or endpoints involved. Organizations will often
require the establishment of legal reviews and formal policies that
outline specific details of what information can be exchanged with
specific entities. Typically, identifying information is anonymized
where possible and appropriate. In some cases, information brokers
are used to further anonymize the source of exchanged information so
that other entities are unaware of the origin of a detected threat,
whether or not that threat was realized.
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It is RECOMMENDED that policies and procedures for the exchange of
cybersecurity information be established prior to participation in
data exchanges. Policy and workflow procedures for the exchange of
cybersecurity information often require executive-level approvals and
legal reviews to appropriately establish limits on what information
can be exchanged with specific organizations. RID [RFC6545],
Section 9.6 outlines options and considerations for application
developers to consider for policy and workflow design.
6.3. Application and Server Security
The cybersecurity information extension is merely a data format.
Applications and transport protocols that store or exchange IODEF
documents using information that can be represented through this
extension will be a target for attacks. It is RECOMMENDED that
systems and applications storing or exchanging this information be
properly secured, have minimal services enabled, and maintain access
controls and monitoring procedures.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemata
[XMLschemaPart1] [XMLschemaPart2] conforming to a registry mechanism
described in [RFC3688].
The following IODEF structured cybersecurity information extension
namespace has been registered:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0
Registrant Contact: Refer to the Authors' Addresses section of
this document.
XML: None.
The following IODEF structured cybersecurity information extension
XML schema has been registered:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-sci-1.0
Registrant Contact: Refer to the Authors' Addresses section of
this document.
XML: Refer to the XML schema in Section 5.2 of this document.
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This memo creates the following registry, which is managed by IANA:
Name of the registry: "Structured Cybersecurity Information (SCI)
Specifications"
Name of its parent registry: "Incident Object Description Exchange
Format (IODEF)"
URL of the registry: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/iodef>
Namespace details: A registry entry for a Structured Cybersecurity
Information Specification (SCI specification) consists of:
Namespace: A URI [RFC3986] that identifies the XML namespace
used by the registered SCI specification. In the case where
the registrant does not request a particular URI, the IANA will
assign it a Uniform Resource Name (URN) that follows RFC 3553
[RFC3553].
Specification Name: A string containing the spelled-out name of
the SCI specification in human-readable form.
Reference URI: A list of one or more of the URIs [RFC3986] from
which the registered specification can be obtained. The
registered specification MUST be readily and publicly available
from that URI.
Applicable Classes: A list of one or more of the extension
classes specified in Section 4.5 of this document. The
registered SCI specification MUST only be used with the
extension classes in the registry entry.
Information that must be provided to assign a new value: The above
list of information.
Fields to record in the registry: Namespace/Specification Name/
Version/Reference URI/Applicable Classes. Note that it is not
necessary to include a defining reference for all assignments in
this new registry.
Initial registry contents: Only one entry, with the following
values:
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:mile:mmdef:1.2
Specification Name: Malware Metadata Exchange Format
Version: 1.2
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Reference URI:
<http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/icsg/mmdef.html>,
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/malware/malwg/Schema1.2/>
Applicable Classes: AttackPattern
Allocation policy: Specification Required (which includes Expert
Review) [RFC5226].
The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the MILE (Managed
Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group, or its successor if any
such working group exists (e.g., via email to the working group's
mailing list). The Designated Expert is expected to retrieve the SCI
specification from the provided URI in order to check the public
availability of the specification and verify the correctness of the
URI. An important responsibility of the Designated Expert is to
ensure that the registered applicable classes are appropriate for the
registered SCI specification.
8. Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge David Black from EMC, who kindly
provided generous support, especially on the IANA registry issues.
We also would like to thank Jon Baker from MITRE, Eric Burger from
Georgetown University, Paul Cichonski from NIST, Panos Kampanakis
from Cisco, Ivan Kirillov from MITRE, Pearl Liang from IANA, Robert
Martin from MITRE, Alexey Melnikov from Isode, Thomas Millar from
US-CERT, Kathleen Moriarty from EMC, Lagadec Philippe from NATO, Sean
Turner from IECA, Inc., Anthony Rutkowski from Yaana Technology,
Brian Trammell from ETH Zurich, David Waltermire from NIST, James
Wendorf from IEEE, and Shuhei Yamaguchi from NICT, for their sincere
discussion and feedback on this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[MMDEF] ICSG Malware Metadata Exchange Format Working Group,
"Malware Metadata Exchange Format", IEEE Standards
Association, November 2011,
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/malware/malwg/Schema1.2/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 7203 IODEF-SCI April 2014
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
December 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC6545] Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",
RFC 6545, April 2012.
[RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546,
April 2012.
[XML1.0] Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Maler, E., and
F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth
Edition)", W3C Recommendation, November 2008,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/>.
[XMLschemaPart1]
Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M., and N. Mendelsohn,
"XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition", W3C
Recommendation, October 2004,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-1/>.
[XMLschemaPart2]
Biron, P. and A. Malhotra, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes
Second Edition", W3C Recommendation, October 2004,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-2/>.
[XMLNames]
Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H.
Thompson, "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)", W3C
Recommendation, December 2009,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/>.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
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9.2. Informative References
[RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, June 2003.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[CAPEC] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC)", <http://capec.mitre.org/>.
[CCE] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Common
Configuration Enumeration (CCE)",
<http://nvd.nist.gov/cce/index.cfm>.
[CCSS] Scarfone, K. and P. Mell, "The Common Configuration
Scoring System (CCSS): Metrics for Software Security
Configuration Vulnerabilities", NIST Interagency
Report 7502, December 2010, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistir/ir7502/nistir-7502_CCSS.pdf>.
[CEE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Event Expression (CEE)",
<http://cee.mitre.org/>.
[CPE] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Common
Platform Enumeration", June 2011,
<http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/cpe/>.
[CVE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE)", <http://cve.mitre.org/>.
[CVRF] ICASI, "The Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework
(CVRF)", <http://www.icasi.org/cvrf>.
[CVSS] Mell, P., Scarfone, K., and S. Romanosky, "The Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Its Applicability
to Federal Agency Systems", NIST Interagency Report 7435,
August 2007, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/
ir7435/NISTIR-7435.pdf>.
[CWE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE)", <http://cwe.mitre.org/>.
[CWSS] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Weakness Scoring System
(CWSS(TM))", <http://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/>.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 26]
RFC 7203 IODEF-SCI April 2014
[EICAR] EICAR - European Expert Group for IT-Security,
"Anti-Malware Testfile", 2003,
<http://www.eicar.org/86-0-Intended-use.html>.
[MAEC] The MITRE Corporation, "Malware Attribute Enumeration and
Characterization", <http://maec.mitre.org/>.
[OCIL] Waltermire, D., Scarfone, K., and M. Casipe,
"Specification for the Open Checklist Interactive Language
(OCIL) Version 2.0", NIST Interagency Report 7692,
April 2011, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/
ir7692/nistir-7692.pdf>.
[OVAL] The MITRE Corporation, "Open Vulnerability and Assessment
Language (OVAL)", <http://oval.mitre.org/>.
[SCAP] Waltermire, D., Quinn, S., Scarfone, K., and A.
Halbardier, "The Technical Specification for the Security
Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2",
NIST Special Publication 800-126 Revision 2,
September 2011, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
nistpubs/800-126-rev2/SP800-126r2.pdf>.
[XACML] Rissanen, E., "eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) Version 3.0", January 2013,
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/
xacml-3.0-core-spec-os-en.pdf>.
[XCCDF] Waltermire, D., Schmidt, C., Scarfone, K., and N. Ziring,
"Specification for the Extensible Configuration Checklist
Description Format (XCCDF) version 1.2 (DRAFT)", NIST
Interagency Report 7275, Revision 4, September 2011,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7275-rev4/
NISTIR-7275r4.pdf>.
[XMLDSIG] W3C Recommendation, "XML Signature Syntax and Processing
(Second Edition)", June 2008,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/>.
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 27]
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Authors' Addresses
Takeshi Takahashi
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
4-2-1 Nukui-Kitamachi Koganei
184-8795 Tokyo
Japan
Phone: +80 423 27 5862
EMail: takeshi_takahashi@nict.go.jp
Kent Landfield
McAfee, Inc.
5000 Headquarters Drive
Plano, TX 75024
USA
EMail: Kent_Landfield@McAfee.com
Youki Kadobayashi
Nara Institute of Science and Technology
8916-5 Takayama, Ikoma
630-0192 Nara
Japan
EMail: youki-k@is.aist-nara.ac.jp
Takahashi, et al. Standards Track [Page 28]