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I much enjoyed Ayerâs Language, Truth and Logic from the first time I got a hold of it. The entire book can be seen as an expansion of a single quote by Hume.
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
The basic idea is that you can talk about what you have deduced (â2+2 = 4â, âIf Harry is a bachelor then Harry has no wifeâ) and you can talk about what you have experienced (âThe morning sunrise was wondrousâ, âA guy I met in the pub said aliens spoke to himâ) but you canât meaningfully talk about anything else. An example of an obvious âelseâ would be
Iâve always felt that blue-coloured food is better. Not exactly healthier or more aesthetic, but better.
Upwards ought to be brown
People looking at the night sky see ânothingâ rather than not seeing anything there, for the nothing is a literal something when thought of as an apparent absence.
If transcendental numbers werenât transcendental then they would probably start with 3.
Chipper halt red squares!
We can plainly see that some things are meaningless. While most language explains something, some relation, something, someone - itâs possible to construct a sentence which does nothing but make noises. The theory of logical positivism was that all sentences have to be confirmable and testable, at least in theory, by empirical evidence (e.g. go and actually look at the bloody thing) or by definitions (i.e. do the maths). If someone says something which cannot be tested by any means then theyâre talking unconfirmable bollocks.
For example, we may say that Grumpy Cat is funny, but to say that Tard really is funnier than Maru isnât something we can test. We can test how many people watched videos on each, test reactions, but actually testing how funny something is? Itâs not only not going to happen, it canât happen.
One advantage of pointing out which topics are complete nonsense (literally not relating to our senses and thus barring us from experiencing the matter) is that we can clearly see which arguments are fruitless and why. It is fruitless to debate objective qualities of beauty, it is fruitless to argue over the meaning of dreams. And it is fruitless to argue over gods.
Gods! Thereâs an old one. Old school gods were something on which one could have a sensible debate. One side claims that Zeus makes the lightning and curses bad hosts. The other side claims that lightning bolts are atoms and that bad hosts do not have especially bad luck on average. Tests are run and to nobodyâs surprise it turns out Zeus was nowhere to be seen. We can even wander about on Mount Olympus - the gods are nowhere to be found. Of course modern gods are much slipperier. They hide in patches of black ignorance, slink along murky areas and altogether run fleeing from analysis. The modern Christian god is supposed to have strength and ability to perform miracles, but is outside time. It cares for humanity but is so mysterious that its effects can only be guessed at. It is supposed to be so mysterious that we cannot understand a single testable or verifiable property, and is even allowed to completely defy logic according to some theologians. At this point, Ayer suggested that instead of debating with these people, we simply call them cheaters and be done with it. Itâs an eloquent solution, and one to keep in mind for any debate.
The theory seems to have been largely abandoned now, due to a large number of terrible arguments rather than a single good point.
One argument common among beginner Philosophers is that Ayerâs Logical Positivism fails its own test.
If everything is meant to be true by definition or empirically testable, then is Logical Positivism empirically testable? Can you search in the world and find out if propositions are true or false? Can you know that Logical Positivism is true by definition? Apparently if Logical Positivism is true then itâs also nonsense, as it fails its own test
It astounds me that Iâve seen full hallways of trainee philosophers lapping this stuff up. The popular opinion seems to be that Ayer has failed in his attempt to banish some topics to the Abyss of silliness.
Iâd argue that Ayerâs definition is both true by definition and empirically verifiable.
Philosophers quite rightly divide the world into what can be known by definition (mathematical and logical notions) and what can be known by looking at things. If we want to know how badgers smell, the size ratios of a particular triangle or where the onions are stored in the kitchen, thereâs nothing quite so good as actually being there and experiencing the thing, or getting the information from a trustworthy source who has already perceived the situation. All other information is about maths. Maths can get you not only the size relations of particular triangles but the size relations of all triangles. It will tell you about bad argument structures and how common a group of random events might be. And thatâs all the information there is. No other information has ever been available to us. Thereâs never been a serious suggestion of âInformation by the senses, information by maths and information gained by really good guessingâ. No - information comes in only these two forms.
And how could it come in other forms? Even in principle, empirical information is information about literally everything which exists, and maths covers how relations have to work. Anything which one might know is automatically going to be jolted into one of these two categories.
So, if there were something which didnât fit either category, we could know, by simple deduction, that this thing is not information. If a sentence pertains to some supposed event which nobody could know, then it is not meaningful. If a relation is supposed which could not be the case then it really isnât knowledge of any kind. At best it could be poetry.
I propose a test of Ayerâs work. Two lists will be jotted down. The first will be a series of statements known to be meaningful. The second will be a series of statements which are not meaningful. Weâll then empirically check if Ayerâs test works, and note how many cases in which it works. In order not to bias the test, Iâm going to take the nonsensicle statements from a qualia soup video[a].
Now letâs have a look at some standard, sensible propositions:
So - we have our lists. Letâs test Ayerâs version of logical positivism to see if it works. On our sensible list, we can easily see that every single proposition passes the test - it is either verifiable through mathematics or verifiable through sense experience and some reasoning. When we come to the nonsense propositions we find that they too pass Ayerâs test - none can be tested in any way.
So inductively, we have found that Ayerâs test sorts sensible statements (or at least meaningful ones) from nonsense statements. We can extend these lists as far as we like, so long as we remain within the bounds of areas we all agree upon. Therefore, by induction, Ayer has provided us with a good test for nonsense.