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17 β[1] [The following laws apply when] a person dies after having been married to several wives. Whichever of his wives was married first has the right to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* [before the others]. None may collect [her due] without taking an oath.
The [wives who married] last are entitled to [collect their due] only from what remains after [those who married previously collect theirs]. Even the last wife [to collect] must take an oath [before] she collects what remains.
Similarly, when there is [also] a promissory note [owed by the husband's estate], if the promissory note was dated before [the *ketubot*], the promissory note should be collected first. If the *ketubot* were each dated before [the promissory note], the woman should collect [her due] first, and the person owed the promissory note [should collect from] the remainder. β[2] When does the above apply? When the land from which [the wives and the creditor] desire to collect was owned by [the deceased] at the time he married the women and took the loan. For [in such a situation], the law is that whoever's document is dated first takes precedence.
If, however, a man married several women in succession, and borrowed money - whether before marrying the women or afterwards - and [then - i.e.,] after marrying and borrowing he purchased land - it should be divided among all of them equally, for all their liens took effect at the same time. At the time he purchased the land, each one established a lien on it. None has precedence over the others. β[3] Similarly, if all the *ketubot* and promissory notes were dated on one day - or at a specific time, in a place where it is customary to [include] the time [of a legal document] - it should be divided among all of them equally; none has precedence over the others.
Under all circumstances, [if one of the creditors or one of the wives] took possession of movable property [belonging to the estate as payment for] the loan or *ketubah*, the property that they took should not be expropriated from him or her. For no creditor has precedence over another with regard to movable property. β[4] [The following rules apply when] a person divorces his wife at the time he has an outstanding promissory note, and his creditor and his divorcee come to collect [their due]. If the husband owns [enough] money and land to settle the debt and the obligations stemming from the *ketubah*, the creditor should be awarded the money, and his divorcee should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from the landed property.
If all [the husband] possesses is land that is not of sufficient value to settle both debts, and neither [his divorcee nor his creditor] has a prior claim to this land, it should be given [toward the payment of the debt owed to] the creditor. If any [land] remains [after the settlement of the debt], it should be given to the divorcee. If nothing remains, the divorcee must yield to the creditor. [The rationale is that] the creditor suffered a loss; he [lent] money [to the husband]. The woman, by contrast,did not lose anything. For more than a man desires to marry, a woman desires to be married. β[5] Similarly, if a man dies leaving a widow and a creditor, and land to which neither of them has a prior claim, the widow must yield to the creditor, and he collects the debt owed him first. β[6] Since the *geonim* ordained that a woman and a creditor may collect their due from movable property, and as is well known, no creditors are given precedence with regard to movable property [the following rules apply]. If the husband did not leave enough movable property to settle both accounts, the creditor is allowed to collect the entire debt [owed him] first. If anything remains [after the settlement of the debt] for the wife to receive [by virtue of] her *ketubah*, it should be given to her. If nothing remains, the wife must yield. β[7] [The following rule applies when] *nichsei tzon barzel* were recorded in a woman's *ketubah* and she claims that they were lost or taken by her husband. With regard to *nichsei tzon barzel*, a woman is regarded like any other creditor.
Therefore, she is required to take an oath that she did not take possession of them, give them away or forego the obligation [to her husband]. Afterwards, she receives a share in the estate together with the other creditors. β[8] When a person who has many wives and who dies or divorces them when none of them has a claim of higher priority to his property than the others, and his holdings are not of sufficient value to pay them each the money due them by virtue of their *ketubot*, how are his holdings divided? If his holdings are sufficiently valuable to provide only the wife with the *ketubah* of the least value, or if they are less valuable than that, all of his wives divide [his holdings] equally.
If his holdings are more valuable than that, they should be divided equally to provide the wife with [the money due her by virtue of] the *ketubah* of the least value. Afterwards, the remainder is divided among the remaining wives according to the same pattern.
What is implied? [To explain by example:] A man was married to four wives. The *ketubah* of the first was for 400 [*zuz*], that of the second for 300, that of the third for 200, and that of the forth for 100. The total sum is thus 1000 [*zuz*]. [The following rules apply] if he divorces all of them or dies. If his holdings are worth 400 [*zuz*] or less, they divide his holdings equally, and each receives 100 or less. If his holdings are worth 800 [it would be improper to divide them equally]. For if they were divided equally, the fourth wife would receive 200 [*zuz*], and [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* is only 100.
What is done instead? 400 [*zuz*] are set aside and divided equally, each receiving 100. Thus, the fourth wife has received [the full amount due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* and she withdraws [from the suit]. Thus, 400 [*zuz*] are left for three wives, each of whom has already received 100 *zuz*]. If the 400 were divided equally among the three of them [it would be unfair]. For the third wife would receive 233 and [the amount due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* was only 200. Therefore, 300 [*zuz*] are separated from the 400, and these are divided equally among the three. Thus, the third wife receives her 200 and withdraws [from the suit]. There remain two wives and 100 *[zuz]*. This sum is divided equally between the first and second wife. Thus, the first and second wife each received 250 *zuz*; the third wife received 200; and the fourth wife, 100. This pattern of allocation is followed even when there are 100 [wives]. β[9] A person who guarantees the value of a woman's *ketubah* is not obligated to pay [her the money due her in the event that her husband's holdings are not sufficient if he dies or divorces her]. [This applies] even when he affirmed his commitment with a contractual act. [The rationale is that] his [intent is to] perform a mitzvah, and he did not cause the woman to lose anything.
If, however, a person guarantees the *ketubah* of his son and affirms his commitment with a contractual act, he is obligated to pay. For a father will make a binding commitment on behalf of his son and decide to obligate himself.
A person who underwrites a *ketubah*, by contrast, is obligated to pay, even though he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. What is meant by a person who underwrites a *ketubah*? One who tells a woman: "Marry this man. I will give [the money for] this *ketubah*." If, however, he says: "I will guarantee this *ketubah*," "I will pay this *ketubah*," "I am obligated for it" or the like, he is not liable unless he is the father [of the groom].
When a person divorces a wife [whose *ketubah* has been underwritten in the above fashion], he must first take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect her *ketubah* from the underwriter or the [husband's] father, if he guaranteed it. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the husband remarry her, and thus the two will [have acquired] the property of [the underwriter] through subterfuge. β[10] Similarly, a person who consecrates his property and then divorces his wife must take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Only then may she collect [the money due her by virtue of her *ketubah*] from the person who redeems the property from the Temple treasury. [This precaution was instituted,] lest the two attempt to deceive the Temple treasury.
When, however, a person divorces his wife, and she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of her *ketubah*] from the [property that was sold to] purchasers, he is not required to take a vow that she is forbidden to derive benefit from him. Instead, she must take the oath required of her, and then she [is entitled to] collect [her due]. If afterwards she desires, she may return to her husband. For the purchasers know that the property was under lien to the *ketubah* of a woman, and they caused themselves the loss by taking property that was under such a lien. β[11] When a husband sold his property, and afterwards the woman agreed to [her husband's] act and wrote the purchaser: "I have no claim against you," she may, nevertheless, collect [the money due her by virtue of her *ketubah* by expropriating this property]. [This applies] even when she affirmed [her commitment] with a contractual act. [The rationale is] that she wrote this [statement to the purchaser] only so that there will not be strife between her and her husband. She can [therefore excuse herself,] saying: "I was [merely intending] to please my husband."
[A different rule applies, however, when the purchaser] enters into an agreement with the woman that she foregoes her lien on this property [before purchasing it from her husband]. If this agreement is affirmed with a contractual act, and afterwards the husband sells the property [to him], [the woman is not entitled to] expropriate this property.
Similarly, [a woman is not entitled to expropriate property sold by her husband in the following circumstance]. Her husband sold a property [on a previous occasion, and at that time] asked his wife to write the purchaser, "I have no claim to this property," and the woman refused, causing the sale to be nullified. [If,] afterwards, the husband sells [property] - whether the same field he had sold previously or another field - to another person, and after the husband's sale the woman agreed, [made a commitment] that she has no claim to this field and affirmed it with a contractual act, she may not expropriate it. For she cannot say, "I did this [merely] to please my husband," since on the previous occasion, when she did not want [to waive her rights], she did not follow her husband's desires. β[12] [The above ruling is also relevant in the following situation.] A man had two wives. He sold a field, and the purchaser had entered into a contractual act with one of [the husband's] wives, waiving her lien to this field in a manner in which the agreement was effective and the woman no longer had the privilege of claiming, "I did this [merely] to please my husband." Afterwards, the husband died or divorced both his wives.
The second wife may expropriate the property from the purchaser, for she did not enter into any agreement with him. The first wife may then expropriate [the property] from the second wife, for she had a prior claim to it, and she waived her lien only with regard to the purchaser [and not with regard to anyone else]. When the property comes into the possession of the first [wife], the purchaser may expropriate it from her, since she made an agreement with him. [The second wife can then expropriate it from the purchaser,] and the cycle continues until they reach a compromise among themselves. β[13] [In the event of her husband's death,] a widow - regardless of whether she was widowed from *erusin* or *nisu'in* - may take the oath [required of her], sell land belonging to her husband and collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*. [The sale may be carried out] in a court of expert judges, or in a court whose judges are not expert, provided it consists of three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of land. The responsibility for the sale falls on the estate belonging to the heirs. A divorcee, by contrast, may sell [her ex-husband's property] only in a court of expert judges.
Whenever a woman has property sold in court, she must have it sold after a public announcement has been made. In the laws of loans, the guidelines for the sale [of property] will be explained. When, by contrast, a woman sells property without the participation of the court, a public announcement [of the sale] need not be made. It is, nevertheless, necessary [to consult] with three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation [of property]. β[14] [The following rules apply when] a widow sells [her husband's] landed property privately in order to collect the money due her by virtue of her *ketubah*: If she sold the property at its proper value, the sale is binding. [All that is necessary is for] her to take the oath required of widows after the sale.
The above applies when she sells the property to another individual. If she takes it as her own after evaluating it, her act is of no significance. [This applies even when] she had announced the sale of the property [and received no better offer]. β[15] [In the above situation,] if the woman's *ketubah* was for 200 [*zuz*], and she sold [property] that was worth 100 [*zuz*] for 200, or property that was worth 200 for 100, she has received the value of her *ketubah* and is no longer owed anything. She must, however, take the oath required of a widow.
If her *ketubah* was for 100 [*zuz*] and she sold [property] worth 101 [*zuz*] for 100, the sale is nullified. [This applies] even if she says, "I will [accept the loss and] return the [outstanding] *dinar* to the heirs." β[16] If her *ketubah* was for 400 *zuz* and she sold [four pieces of property], three that were each worth 100 [*zuz*] for 100 [*zuz*] each, and one that was worth 101 *zuz* for 100 [*zuz* - the final sale is nullified, but the [first three] are all binding. β[17] A woman has the privilege of selling [the rights to] her *ketubah* or giving [them] as a present. If her husband dies or divorces her, [the purchaser or the recipient] is entitled to come and collect [the money due her by virtue of her *ketubah*]. If she dies in the lifetime of her husband or [after his death, but] before she takes the oath [required of widows], he is not entitled to anything. β[18] Although a woman sold [the rights to] a portion of her *ketubah*, used them as security [for a loan] or gave them as a present, she may sell landed property belonging to her husband and collect the remainder of [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*. [This sale may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men.
[A woman] may sell [portions of her husband's property] many times. [These sales may be carried out] in a court of three expert judges or through three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the evaluation of property. β[19] When a woman sells [the rights to] her *ketubah* - whether to another person or to her husband - she does not forfeit the other privileges of her *ketubah*. [As such,] if she has a son, [and she dies before her husband does,] he inherits the worth of her *ketubah* - [although it] was sold from his father's estate - in addition to his share [in the estate, as will be explained].
If, by contrast, a woman waives her *ketubah* in favor of her husband, she forfeits all the privileges associated with her *ketubah*. [Her husband] is not required to provide her even with her subsistence.
The waiver of a *ketubah* [in favor of the woman's husband] need not [be affirmed by] a contractual act nor [be observed by] witnesses, just as the forfeiture [of any obligations] does not require affirmation by] a contractual act nor [the observation of] witnesses. Through one's words alone [the forfeiture is binding], provided the statement is made seriously, [in a manner that] can be relied upon, rather than facetiously, as a joke, or rhetorically.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC