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9 [1] [When a man] divorces his wife and [asserts that the divorce] will not take effect until a specific time passes, the divorce takes effect when that time arrives. Thus, this resembles [a *get* given on] a conditional basis, and yet it is not a conditional *get*.
It resembles [a *get* given on] a conditional basis because the divorce takes effect when the specified time arrives [as in the case of a conditional *get*, which is completed when the condition is fulfilled]. Nevertheless, it is not considered a conditional *get* because a person who divorces [his wife] conditionally has already performed the divorce, and in this instance, the man has not divorced her until the time arrives.
For this reason, a person who gives a conditional *get* must restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], while this person does not have to restate his words. Nor must he comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained.. [2] What is implied? [When a husband] tells his wife: "This is your *get*, but the divorce does not take effect until 30 days pass," she is not divorced until after the passage of 30 days. If her husband dies, or the *get* is lost or consumed by fire in the interim, she is not divorced. [3] [When the woman] went and placed [the *get*] in [a place] at the side of the public domain, and after 30 days passed it was stolen or lost, the divorce is effective. Since the *get* existed on the day when it took effect, and it was set aside in a designated place that is not public domain [it can serve as the medium for the divorce]. [The governing principle is that the area at] the sides of the public domain is not the same as the public domain itself. [4] Similarly, if the husband makes the divorce dependent on an action, the same rules that govern a *get* that takes effect after a specific time apply. For example, [a husband] said to [his] wife: "This is your *get*, but the divorce does not take effect until you give me 200 *zuz*." After [the woman] gives [the money], the divorce takes effect.
In this instance [as well], there is no need to restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], nor to comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained. For this person has not divorced [his wife] conditionally - he has not yet divorced her at all. Instead, he made the divorce dependent on a specific action, and after [that action is completed], the divorce will take effect. [5] What is the difference between a conditional divorce and a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time, or a divorce dependent on an action? With regard to a conditional divorce, the divorce is a fact; it is, however, not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect as long as the *get* exists, even if it is not in the woman's possession. When the condition is fulfilled, there is no need for [the woman] to pick up [the *get*] or take possession, for it was given to her for the purpose of divorce. If she married before the condition was fulfilled, she need not leave [her second husband], as explained.
With regard to a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time or a divorce dependent on an action, by contrast, she was not given the *get* for the [immediate] purpose of divorce. Instead, it is considered to be an entrusted object until the specified time arrives or she performs the action. Therefore, it is necessary that the *get* be in her possession at that time, that she take [possession of it], or that it be in a place that she designated for it even though it is not in her domain, as we have explained. Only then, is she divorced by virtue [of this *get*].
If she marries before the specified time arrives, or before she performs the action on which the divorce is dependent, she must leave her second husband, and any child [born of their union] is considered illegitimate. For she is a married woman, and the divorce is not [yet] effective. [6] When [a man] gives his wife a *get* and tells her: "If you do not give me 200 *zuz*, this *get* is not effective," or "...you are not divorced," he is not considered to have performed a divorce at all. For the *get* was not given on a conditional basis, nor was it made dependent on an action. The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations. [7] When a person would like to give a conditional divorce, with the condition being that the divorce not take effect until a particular time, he should express the concept in a conditional statement, making the condition dependent on his departure or return at a specific time.
What is implied? He tells her: "If I do not return between the present time and 30 days, this *get* is effective. If I do return within 30 days, this *get* is not effective." He [then] gives her the *get*. Alternatively, he should tell her: "This is your *get* on condition that I do not return to this country within 30 days." The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations. [8] When a person divorces [his wife] on the condition that he not return to this country within 30 days, and he set out to return within 30 days, but became ill or was prevented [from returning by a flooding] river and did not return until after 30 days, the *get* is effective. Even if he protests, "I am being held back by forces beyond my control" [the *get* is effective].
[The rationale is that the claim,] "I was prevented by forces beyond my control," is not accepted with regard to *gittin*, even if the husband makes it evident that he does not desire that the divorce take effect. [9] [The following rules apply when a man gives a] divorce on the condition that it become effective if 30 days pass without [his seeing his wife's] face. If he repeatedly came [and appeared before her], but never entered into privacy with her, and then 30 days [passed without his seeing her], the *get* is effective. Although he came [and appeared before her] within 30 days [after the *get* was given], since he did not enter into privacy with her, [once the condition was fulfilled,] the *get* is effective.
When does the above apply? When he made the condition and said: "I accept her word with regard to [whether or] not I appeased her." If, however, he did not accept her word, we suspect that perhaps he placated her when he came and visited her, she was willing to forego [her desire to be with him], and he nullified the *get*. For this reason, the *get* is unacceptable [even] after 30 days [pass without the husband seeing her].
Similarly, when a man tells a woman: "This is your *get* and [it becomes effective] after twelve months pass," if he lives in the same city as she does, we suspect that he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word that I did not appease her." [10] A similar [principle applies with regard to] all conditions that are dependent on her will, and the *get* would be nullified if she was willing to forego these conditions in favor of her husband. We suspect that perhaps he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word...."
When does the above apply? When the woman is divorced after *nisu'in*, for he is familiar with her. When, however, [a husband] divorces [his wife] after [merely] consecrating her, we do not suspect that he appeased her. [11] [When a man gives his wife a *get* and tells her:] "This is your *get* [and it is effective] from the present time onward if I do not return within twelve months," we do not suspect that perhaps he returned in secrecy, for people do not generally come in secrecy. [Therefore,] if the time period he specified passes without his coming, the divorce is effective.
If he dies within the twelve months, although the divorce [will become] effective, for there is no way that he can come, if she would have been obligated to perform the rite of *yibbum*, she should not marry until the twelve months pass and the condition is fulfilled. [12] When a healthy person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the *get* take effect if he dies, and when a sick person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the *get* take effect if he dies from the illness afflicting him, their statements are of no consequence. The expression "if I die" implies [that it takes effect] after his death. [Alternatively,] the intent is that [it take effect] retroactively [if he dies]. [Because of the doubt involved,] if [a man] uses the expression "If I die...," it is considered as if he said "after my death." [The *get* is therefore void, because] there is no concept of divorce after a person's death. [13] If, [however, the husband] tells her: "This is your *get*. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time," or "...If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present day," the *get* is valid. When he dies, [his wife] is divorced. [14] [If a husband] says: "This is your *get*. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time - or from the present day - after my death," when [the husband] dies, the status of his wife's divorce is in doubt. [We suspect that] perhaps, after saying "from the present time," he changed his mind and [did not desire that the *get* become effective] from the present time, and instead take effect after his death. And there is no concept of divorce after a person's death. [15] [If a husband] says: "This is your *get*. [It becomes effective] when the sun emerges from its shield," it is not effective if he dies that night. [If he gave the *get*] on the condition that the sun shine and he dies that night, the *get* is effective, for when the sun shines [on the following day], the condition that he established becomes fulfilled.
If [the husband gives a *get* and] establishes a condition: "If the sun shines, the *get* is effective. But if it does not shine, it is not effective," [the *get*] is not effective if he dies at night. For the condition was not fulfilled until after he died, and there is no concept of divorce after a person's death. [16] When a person who is mortally ill has a *get* written for his wife and divorces her and then recovers, he cannot retract the divorce. A divorce [performed by a person in such a state] is not [governed by] the same laws as a present he gives. [The rationale for this distinction is] that if he were given the prerogative of retracting, the divorce would appear to take effect after death, in the same way that a present he gives is not legally transferred until after death. [17] [If a husband says:] "This is your *get*. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake, devoured by a lion or dies because of other similar causes, the divorce is not effective. [18] [If, by contrast,] he tells her: "...if I do not arise from this sickness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake or devoured by a lion, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
[The following rules apply when a husband tells his wife:] "Here is your *get*. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and then rises [from his sickbed], walks in the marketplace, and afterwards falls ill and dies. We make an assessment. If he died from the first illness, the divorce is effective. If not, it is not effective. If he progresses from one illness to another illness, and does not arise [and walk] in the marketplace, the divorce is effective. There is no need to make an assessment. [19] With regard to all the conditions [mentioned above], during the days between the giving of the *get* and his death [with its consequent] fulfillment of the condition, she is considered to be a divorced woman with regard to all matters, provided he does not enter into privacy with her, as explained. [20] [The following rules apply when] a sick person desires to divorce his wife conditionally, so that if he dies she will not be obligated to perform the rite of *yibbum*, but if he recovers, the divorce will not be effective; he does not desire that the *get* take effect [retroactively] from the time he gives it, lest the matter be overly disturbing for him.
He should write the following in the *get* after writing the essential portion; alternatively, he should make these statements when he gives [his wife] the *get*: "If I do not die, this *get* will not be effective. If I die, this *get* will be effective. If I do not die, this *get* will not be effective." In this manner, the conditional factor is repeated. The positive factor is stated before the negative factor, and the person's opening remarks do not speak of misfortune.
[If a *get* is given with such a condition,] the divorce will take effect when [the husband] dies, provided that the *get* reaches the woman before his death. [21] When a husband tells a colleague: "Acquire this *get* on behalf of my wife, so that she will not be required to fulfill the rite of *yibbum*," and gives him the *get*, but the husband dies before the *get* reaches [the woman], the status of the divorce is in doubt. [Although there are times when a woman would be willing to marry the *yavam*,] it is to the advantage of most women not to be required to fulfill the rite of *yibbum*. Therefore, even though the *get* did not reach the woman, since another person acquired it on her behalf, the status of the divorce is in doubt. [22] When [a man] tells witnesses: "Write a *get* for my wife after twelve months," or "Write a *get* for my wife and give it to her after twelve months," they should write [the *get*] and give it to her after the time he specified. If they write it within the time he specified, it is void, even if they do not give it to the woman until afterwards.
If they write it after the time he specified, but [the husband] dies before they give it to her, it is void. If it is not known whether he died before the *get* was given, or the *get* was given before he died, the status of the divorce is in doubt. [23] [If a husband] instructs [agents]: "Write a *get* for my wife and give it to her after the Sabbatical cycle," they must write it within the first year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical cycle. If he told them: "...after a year," they must write it during the first month of the coming year.
If he told them: "...after a month," they must write it during the first week of the coming month. If he told them: "...after the Sabbath," they must write it before the end of Tuesday. If he told them: "...before the Sabbath," they must write it between Wednesday and the end of Friday. [24] If they delayed and did not write and give the *get* at the time he specified - e.g., he told them "after a month," and they wrote the *get* and gave it to her after two weeks had passed in the second month, the *get* is unacceptable. [25] If [the husband] entered into privacy with [his wife] after he told [agents] to write [a *get*], sign it and give it to her, they should not write it. One can make an [obvious] inference. If a *get* that he gave her is disqualified when he enters into privacy with her, lest they have engaged in marital relations, how much more so should a *get* that was not yet written [be left unwritten]. If [the agents] wrote the *get* and gave it to her after he entered into privacy with her, the *get* is void. [26] [If a man] tells ten people: "Write a *get* for my wife," one of them should write it on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, write it," one should write it in the presence of all of them.
[If he tells them:] "Bring this *get* to my wife," one of them should bring it to her on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, bring this *get* to my wife," one should bring it [to her] in the presence of all of them. [27] [If a man] tells ten people: "Write a *get*, sign it and give it to my wife," one of them should write it, two should sign it, and one should give it to her. It is acceptable even if one person writes it, he serves as one of the two witnesses who signs it, and he serves as the agent who gives it to her.
If [the husband] tells them: "All of you sign it," they must all sign it. If the husband counted the people - whether he counted all of them or merely some of them - and told them to sign it, it is considered as if he told all of them to sign it. The two who sign it at the outset act as witnesses, while the others [should sign it to complete] the stipulation [the husband] made.
Accordingly, if the remaining witnesses were unacceptable, or one signed it on the day the *get* was written and the others on subsequent days - even several days after [the *get* was written], the *get* is acceptable.
If one of them died before signing it, the *get* is void. If one of the first witnesses who signed it was unacceptable, the *get* is unacceptable, lest it be said that an unacceptable witness may sign other legal documents when many witnesses sign. The only reason [our Sages] accepted [such signatures] with regard to a *get* signed by many witnesses is that the witnesses who observe the transfer are of fundamental importance. [28] Our Sages established the [following] rules with regard to a person who tells many people to write, sign, or bring a *get* for his wife. With regard to writing, he should tell them: "Any one of you may write a *get* for my wife." Similarly, with regard to bringing [the *get*], [he should say]: "Any one of you may bring...." With regard to signing, he should tell them: "Any pair of you should sign this *get* and give it to my wife." [29] Why did our Sages state that the witnesses to a *get* should sign only in each other's presence? [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest a person tell many others: "All of you sign [as witnesses]." If it were possible for witnesses to sign outside the presence of the other witnesses, two witnesses might sign the *get*, and the woman might take it and think that it does not require any more witnesses, [when in fact] the condition that [the husband made] was not fulfilled. [30] If [a man] tells three people, including a father and a son, "Two of you should write a *get* for my wife, sign it and give it to her," the *get* is acceptable whether the son signs with the other person or the father signs with the other person. [The son may serve in this capacity] because a person may appoint a son as an agent instead of his father. [31] When [a man] tells two [colleagues]: "Write [a *get*], sign it and give it to so and so to bring to my wife," or "...give it to [my] agent to bring to her," one of them should write it, and they should both sign it and give it to the agent. If they bring it to the woman themselves, the divorce is not effective, for they were not appointed as agents to effect the divorce.
What should they do [if in error they gave it to the woman]? They should take it back from her and give it to the agent, who should in turn give it back to the woman in their presence or in the presence of other [witnesses].
My teachers issued a ruling with regard to such a *get* that does not appear to be appropriate, because of a flaw that existed in the versions [of the Talmud] that they possessed. [32] [Our Sages ruled that] the status of a divorce is in doubt [in the following situation: A husband] tells a scribe: "Write me a *get* for my wife." [The scribe] wrote it and gave it to the husband, without this being observed by witnesses. The husband took it, gave it to an agent, and told him: "Give this *get* to my wife in the presence of witnesses." The agent [carried out the instructions] and gave it to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses.
[The rationale is] that since he is only a single witness, an agent's statements would not be accepted [as grounds] to permit a woman who was [previously] forbidden to marry, except for the fact [that his statements are supported by] the written statements of the witnesses who signed the *get*. [For the witnesses' statements] are considered as if they were testimony given in court until [the husband] lodges a protest, as we have explained. If there are two witnesses who observed the husband giving the *get* to the agent and instructing him to use it for the divorce, the divorce is binding. [33] [When a husband] tells an agent: "Give this *get* to my wife in this and this place," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to her in another place. "...She is in this and this place," and the agent gave it to her in another place, [the *get*] is binding; he is merely pointing out the place.
Similarly, if he tells [the agent]: "Do not give it to her [anywhere] except in the house," and he gives it to her in the loft; "Do not give it to her except with your right hand," and he gives it to her with his left; "Give it to her on this and this day," and he gives it to her before that date; the divorce is not effective. "Do not give it to her except on this and this day," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to the woman before or afterwards, for he indicated that he wanted the *get* to be given on that date. Similar rulings apply in all analogous situations. [34] Similarly, when a woman tells her agent: "Receive my *get* for me in this and this place," and he receives it for her in another place, the divorce is not effective. [When she tells him:] "Bring me my *get* in this and this place," the *get* is acceptable if he brings it to her in another place. [35] When [a man] tells an agent: "Bring this *get* to my wife," the agent may send the *get* with another person if he becomes ill or is otherwise prevented [from bringing it to her] by forces beyond his control. [This applies] regardless of whether he told him: "Bring it [to her]," or "You bring it [to her]."
If, however, [the husband] told [the agent]: "Take the following article from her and give her this *get*," the agent should not send the *get* via another individual. If [the agent] did send [the *get*] via another individual, and the woman came out to greet the agent and she gave him the article, and afterwards he gave her the *get*, the divorce is binding. [36] If the agent - i.e., [either] the first [or the second] agent - gave the woman the *get* first and then she gave him the article, the divorce is not effective. [The rationale is] that [the agent] violated the husband's instructions with regard to a matter which, in general, would cause people to object. For the husband told him: "Take the article first and then give her the *get*," and he gave [the *get*] first and then took [the article]. [37] [If the husband] told the agent: "Give her the *get* and take this and this article from her," [the agent] should not send the *get* via another person, for [the principal] would not desire that his article be entrusted to a person [other than the one he appointed].
If, however, the agent sent it with another person, the divorce is binding. [This applies] regardless of whether she gave the article before [receiving the *get*] or afterwards. [38] [If the husband] gives an agent a *get* and tells him: "No one other than you should give it to her," the divorce is not effective, if the agent gives [the *get*] to another person who gives it to the woman.
Similarly, [if the husband] told the agent: "Do not give it to her yourself. Give it to so and so, and he will give it to her," the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives it to the woman. For he was not appointed as an agent to effect the divorce. [39] [A husband] gave [an agent] a *get* and told him: "Bring this *get* to my wife."
The agent told him: "I do not know who she is."
The husband replied: "Give it to so and so. He knows who she is."
The [first] agent has not been appointed as an agent to effect the divorce. All he can do is give the *get* to the person whom the husband designated. That person is the agent appointed to effect the divorce. He must bring [the *get* to the woman] or send it via another agent if he becomes ill or is prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control. [40] When [a husband] gives an agent a *get* and tells him: "Do not give this *get* to my wife until after 30 days," [the agent] may send it to her via a second agent [whom he appoints] within the 30 days, if he becomes ill or is prevented from giving it to her by forces beyond his control.
[The rationale is that] even though at the time [he appoints the second agent] he is not charged with effecting the divorce, since he will function in that capacity after 30 days pass, he has the authority to appoint a second agent within the 30 days. [41] When does the above apply? When the husband was not in the same city as his wife, or he was divorcing her after consecration,[but before the marriage bond has been consummated].
If, however, the marriage bond has been consummated, we suspect that perhaps the husband appeased her. Therefore, the agent should not appoint another agent within the 30 days unless the husband said: "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her." After 30 days pass, [the agent] should give her the *get*. However, we suspect [that perhaps it was nullified], as explained, unless [the husband] said, "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her."
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC