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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Boucadair
Request for Comments: 9464 Orange
Category: Standards Track T. Reddy.K
ISSN: 2070-1721 Nokia
D. Wing
Cloud Software Group
V. Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
November 2023
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for
Encrypted DNS
Abstract
This document specifies new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types to assign DNS resolvers
that support encrypted DNS protocols, such as DNS over HTTPS (DoH),
DNS over TLS (DoT), and DNS over QUIC (DoQ).
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9464.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types for Encrypted DNS
3.1. ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes
3.2. ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute
4. IKEv2 Protocol Exchange
5. Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) Hash
6. Security Considerations
7. Privacy Considerations
8. IANA Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Configuration Payload Examples
A.1. Configuration of Encrypted IPv6 DNS Resolvers without
Suggested Values
A.2. Configuration of Encrypted IPv6 DNS Resolvers with
Suggested Values
A.3. Split DNS
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
This document specifies a mechanism for assigning encrypted DNS
configurations to an Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
initiator [RFC7296]. Specifically, it assigns one or more
Authentication Domain Names (ADNs) of DNS resolvers that support
encrypted DNS protocols. The specific protocols supported are
described using the Service Parameters format defined in [RFC9460];
supported protocols include DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS over
TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], and DNS over QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250].
This document introduces three new IKEv2 Configuration Payload
Attribute Types (Section 3) to add support for encrypted DNS
resolvers. The ENCDNS_IP4 and ENCDNS_IP6 attribute types
(Section 3.1) are used to provision ADNs, a list of IP addresses, and
a set of service parameters. The ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute
(Section 3.2) additionally allows a specific resolver certificate to
be indicated by the IKEv2 responder.
The encrypted DNS resolver hosted by a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
provider can get a domain-validated certificate from a public
Certificate Authority (CA). The VPN client does not need to be
provisioned with the root certificate of a private CA to authenticate
the certificate of the encrypted DNS resolvers. The encrypted DNS
resolver can run on private IP addresses, and its access can be
restricted to clients connected to the VPN.
For many years, typical designs have often assumed that the DNS
resolver was usually located inside the protected domain, but they
don't consider implementations where the DNS resolver could be
located outside of it. With encrypted DNS, implementing the latter
scenario becomes plausible. Note that existing VPN client
implementations might not expect the discovered DNS resolver IP
addresses to be outside of the covered IP address ranges of the VPN
tunnel.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terms defined in [RFC8499].
Also, this document uses the terms defined in [RFC7296]. In
particular, readers should be familiar with the terms "initiator" and
"responder" as used in that document.
This document makes use of the following terms:
Do53: Refers to unencrypted DNS.
Encrypted DNS: Refers to a scheme where DNS messages are sent over
an encrypted channel. Examples of encrypted DNS are DoT, DoH, and
DoQ.
ENCDNS_IP*: Refers to any of the IKEv2 Configuration Payload
Attribute Types defined in Section 3.1.
3. IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types for Encrypted DNS
3.1. ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes
The ENCDNS_IP* IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types,
ENCDNS_IP4 and ENCDNS_IP6, are used to configure an initiator with
encrypted DNS resolvers. Both attribute types share the format shown
in Figure 1. The information included in these attributes adheres to
the recommendation in Section 3.1.9 of [RFC9463].
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+
| Service Priority | Num Addresses | ADN Length |
+-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
~ IP Address(es) ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Authentication Domain Name ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Service Parameters (SvcParams) ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Format of ENCDNS_IP4 and ENCDNS_IP6 Configuration
Attributes
The description of the fields shown in Figure 1 is as follows:
R (Reserved, 1 bit): This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt (see Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296] for details).
Attribute Type (15 bits): Identifier for the Configuration Attribute
Type. This is set to 27 for ENCDNS_IP4 or 28 for ENCDNS_IP6, as
registered in Section 8.
Length (2 octets, unsigned integer): Length of the enclosed data in
octets. In particular, this field is set to:
* 0, if the Configuration payload has type (1) CFG_REQUEST and no
specific DNS resolver is requested or (2) CFG_ACK. If the
"Length" field is set to 0, then the subsequent fields shown in
Figure 1 are not present.
* (4 + 'Length of the ADN' + N * 4 + 'Length of SvcParams') for
ENCDNS_IP4 attributes if the Configuration payload has type
CFG_REQUEST, CFG_REPLY, or CFG_SET, with N being the number of
included IPv4 addresses ("Num Addresses").
* (4 + 'Length of the ADN' + N * 16 + 'Length of SvcParams') for
ENCDNS_IP6 attributes if the Configuration payload has type
CFG_REQUEST, CFG_REPLY, or CFG_SET, with N being the number of
included IPv6 addresses ("Num Addresses").
Service Priority (2 octets): The priority of this attribute compared
to other ENCDNS_IP* instances. This 16-bit unsigned integer is
interpreted following the rules specified in Section 2.4.1 of
[RFC9460]. As AliasMode (Section 2.4.2 of [RFC9460]) is not
supported, this field MUST NOT be set to 0. Note that AliasMode
is not supported because such a mode will trigger additional Do53
queries while the data can be supplied directly in the IKE
response.
Num Addresses (1 octet): Indicates the number of enclosed IPv4 (for
ENCDNS_IP4) or IPv6 (for ENCDNS_IP6) addresses. This value MUST
NOT be set to 0 if the Configuration payload has type CFG_REPLY or
CFG_SET. This may be set to 0 in CFG_REQUEST to indicate that no
IP address is encoded in the attribute.
ADN Length (1 octet): Indicates the length of the "Authentication
Domain Name" field in octets. When set to 0, this means that no
ADN is enclosed in the attribute.
IP Address(es) (variable): Includes one or more IP addresses that
can be used to reach the encrypted DNS resolver identified by the
ADN. For ENCDNS_IP4, this field contains one or more 4-octet IPv4
addresses, and for ENCDNS_IP6, this field contains one or more
16-octet IPv6 addresses.
Authentication Domain Name (variable): A fully qualified domain name
of the encrypted DNS resolver, in DNS presentation format and
using an Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)
A-label [RFC5890]. The name MUST NOT contain any terminators
(e.g., NULL, CR).
An example of a valid ADN for a DoH server is "doh1.example.com".
Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable): Specifies a set of
service parameters that are encoded following the same rules for
encoding SvcParams using the wire format specified in Section 2.2
of [RFC9460]. Section 3.1.5 of [RFC9463] lists a set of service
parameters that are recommended to be supported by
implementations.
The service parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint"
SvcParams, as they are superseded by the included IP addresses.
If no "port" service parameter is included, this indicates that
default port numbers should be used. As a reminder, the default
port number is 853 for DoT (Section 6 of [RFC7858]), 443 for DoH
(Section 8.1 of [RFC8484]), and 853 for DoQ (Section 8 of
[RFC9250]).
The service parameters apply to all IP addresses in the ENCDNS_IP*
Configuration Payload Attribute.
3.2. ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute
The ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute (Figure 2)
allows IKEv2 responders to specify a certificate digest that
initiators can use when validating TLS connections to encrypted
resolvers. This attribute can also be sent by the initiator to
request specific hash algorithms for such digests.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Num Hash Algs | ADN Length | |
+---------------+---------------+ +
~ Authentication Domain Name ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ List of Hash Algorithm Identifiers ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Certificate Digest ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Attribute Format
Some of the fields shown in Figure 2 can be omitted, as further
detailed below.
The format of the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute if the Configuration
payload has type CFG_REQUEST is shown in Figure 3.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Num Hash Algs | ADN Length | |
+---------------+---------------+ +
~ List of Hash Algorithm Identifiers ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Attribute Format in CFG_REQUEST
The description of the fields shown in Figure 3 is as follows:
R (Reserved, 1 bit): This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt (see Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296] for details).
Attribute Type (15 bits): Identifier for the Configuration Attribute
Type. This is set to 29; see Section 8.
Length (2 octets, unsigned integer): Length of the enclosed data in
octets. This field MUST be set to "2 + (2 * 'number of included
hash algorithm identifiers')".
Num Hash Algs (1 octet): Indicates the number of identifiers
included in the "List of Hash Algorithm Identifiers" field. This
field MUST be set to "(Length - 2)/2".
ADN Length (1 octet): MUST be set to 0.
List of Hash Algorithm Identifiers (variable): Specifies a list of
16-bit hash algorithm identifiers that are supported by the
encrypted DNS client. This list may be controlled by a local
policy.
The values of this field are identifiers taken from "IKEv2 Hash
Algorithms" on IANA's "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry [IANA-IKE-HASH].
There is no padding between the hash algorithm identifiers.
Note that SHA2-256 is mandatory to implement (see Section 5).
The format of the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute if the Configuration
payload has type CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET is shown in Figure 4.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| Num Hash Algs | ADN Length | |
+---------------+---------------+ +
~ Authentication Domain Name ~
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Hash Algorithm Identifier | ~
+-------------------------------+ +
~ Certificate Digest ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Attribute Format in CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET
The description of the fields shown in Figure 4 is as follows:
R (Reserved, 1 bit): This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt (see Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296] for details).
Attribute Type (15 bits): Identifier for the Configuration Attribute
Type. This is set to 29; see Section 8.
Length (2 octets, unsigned integer): Length of the data in octets.
Num Hash Algs (1 octet): MUST be set to 1.
ADN Length (1 octet): Indicates the length of the "Authentication
Domain Name" field in octets. When set to 0, this means that the
digest applies on the ADN conveyed in the ENCDNS_IP* Configuration
Payload Attribute.
Authentication Domain Name (variable): A fully qualified domain name
of the encrypted DNS resolver following the syntax defined in
[RFC5890]. The name MUST NOT contain any terminators (e.g., NULL,
CR). A name is included only when multiple ADNs are included in
the ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attribute.
Hash Algorithm Identifier (2 octets): Specifies the 16-bit hash
algorithm identifier selected by the DNS resolver to generate the
digest of its certificate.
Certificate Digest (variable): Includes the Subject Public Key Info
(SPKI) hash (Section 5) of the encrypted DNS resolver certificate
using the algorithm identified in the "Hash Algorithm Identifier"
field. The length of this field is "Length - 4 - 'ADN Length'".
The ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute may be present in the Configuration
payload of CFG_ACK. In such a case, the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO MUST be
returned with zero-length data.
As discussed in Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296], there are no defined
uses for the CFG_SET/CFG_ACK exchange. The use of the
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute for these messages is provided for
completeness.
4. IKEv2 Protocol Exchange
This section describes how the attributes defined in Section 3 are
used to configure an IKEv2 initiator with one or more encrypted DNS
resolvers. As a reminder, badly formatted attributes or unacceptable
fields are handled as per Section 2.21 of [RFC7296].
Initiators first indicate support for encrypted DNS by including
ENCDNS_IP* attributes in their CFG_REQUEST payloads. Responders
supply encrypted DNS configuration by including ENCDNS_IP* attributes
in their CFG_REPLY payloads. Concretely:
* If the initiator supports encrypted DNS, it includes either or
both of the ENCDNS_IP4 and ENCDNS_IP6 attributes in its
CFG_REQUEST. If the initiator does not want to request specific
DNS resolvers, it sets the "Length" field to 0 for the attribute.
For a given attribute type, the initiator MAY send either an empty
attribute or a list of distinct suggested resolvers. The
initiator MAY also include the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute with a
list of hash algorithms that are supported by the encrypted DNS
client.
* If the request includes multiple bitwise identical attributes,
only the first occurrence is processed, and the rest SHOULD be
ignored by the responder. The responder MAY discard the full
request if the count of repeated attributes exceeds an
(implementation-specific) threshold.
* For each ENCDNS_IP* attribute from the CFG_REQUEST, if the
responder supports the corresponding address family, and absent
any policy restrictions, the responder sends back one or more
ENCDNS_IP* attributes in the CFG_REPLY with an appropriate list of
IP addresses, service parameters, and an ADN. The list of IP
addresses MUST include at least one IP address. The service
parameters SHOULD include at least the "alpn" service parameter.
The "alpn" service parameter may not be required in contexts such
as a variant of DNS over the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) where the messages are encrypted using Object Security for
Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613].
* The responder MAY ignore suggested values from the initiator (if
any). Multiple instances of the same ENCDNS_IP* attribute MAY be
returned if distinct ADNs or service parameters need to be
assigned to the initiator. In such instances, the different
attributes can have matching or distinct IP addresses. These
instances MUST be presented to a local DNS client following their
service priority (i.e., a smaller service priority value indicates
a higher preference).
* In addition, the responder MAY return the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
attribute to convey a digest of the certificate of the encrypted
DNS and the identifier of the hash algorithm that is used to
generate the digest.
* If the CFG_REQUEST includes an ENCDNS_IP* attribute but the
CFG_REPLY does not include an ENCDNS_IP* attribute matching the
requested address family, this is an indication that the requested
address family is not supported by the responder or the responder
is not configured to provide corresponding resolver addresses.
* If the initiator receives both ENCDNS_IP* and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attributes, it is RECOMMENDED that the initiator
use the encrypted DNS resolvers.
The DNS client establishes an encrypted DNS session (e.g., DoT, DoH,
or DoQ) with the address or addresses conveyed in ENCDNS_IP* and uses
the mechanisms discussed in Section 8 of [RFC8310] to authenticate
the DNS resolver certificate using the ADN conveyed in ENCDNS_IP*.
If the CFG_REPLY includes an ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute, the client
has to create an SPKI hash (Section 5) of the DNS resolver
certificate received in the TLS handshake using the negotiated hash
algorithm in the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute. If the computed
digest for an ADN matches the digest sent in the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
attribute, the encrypted DNS resolver certificate is successfully
validated. If so, the client continues with the TLS connection as
normal. Otherwise, the client MUST treat the resolver certificate
validation failure as a non-recoverable error. This approach is
similar to certificate usage PKIX-EE(1) with selector SPKI(1) as
defined in [RFC7671], but without PKIX validation.
If the IPsec connection is a split-tunnel configuration and the
initiator negotiated INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN as per [RFC8598], the DNS
client resolves the internal names using ENCDNS_IP* DNS resolvers.
Note: [RFC8598] requires that the INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attribute be present when INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is
included. This specification relaxes that constraint in the
presence of ENCDNS_IP* attributes. That is, if ENCDNS_IP*
attributes are supplied, responders are allowed to include
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN even in the absence of INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attributes.
5. Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) Hash
The SPKI hash of the encrypted DNS resolver certificate is the output
of a cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded
ASN.1 representation of the SPKI.
Implementations MUST support SHA2-256 [RFC6234].
6. Security Considerations
This document adheres to the security considerations defined in
[RFC7296]. In particular, this document does not alter the trust
that the initiator has placed on the DNS configuration provided by a
responder.
Networks are susceptible to internal attacks as discussed in
Section 3.2 of [INT-THREAT-MOD]. Hosting encrypted DNS resolvers
even in the case of split-VPN configuration can minimize the attack
vector (e.g., a compromised network device cannot monitor/modify DNS
traffic). This specification describes a mechanism for restricting
access to the DNS messages to only the parties that need to know.
If the IKEv2 responder has used the NULL Authentication method
[RFC7619] to authenticate itself, the initiator MUST NOT use returned
ENCDNS_IP* resolvers configuration unless the initiator is
preconfigured, e.g., in the operating system or the application.
This specification does not extend the scope of accepting DNSSEC
trust anchors beyond the usage guidelines defined in Section 6 of
[RFC8598].
7. Privacy Considerations
As discussed in [RFC9076], the use of encrypted DNS does not reduce
the data available in the DNS resolver. For example, the reader may
refer to Section 8 of [RFC8484] or Section 7 of [RFC9250] for a
discussion on specific privacy considerations for encrypted DNS.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following new IKEv2 Configuration Payload
Attribute Types in the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types"
namespace available at [IANA-IKE-CFG].
+=======+====================+=============+===========+===========+
| Value | Attribute Type | Multivalued | Length | Reference |
+=======+====================+=============+===========+===========+
| 27 | ENCDNS_IP4 | YES | 0 or more | RFC 9464 |
+-------+--------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+
| 28 | ENCDNS_IP6 | YES | 0 or more | RFC 9464 |
+-------+--------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+
| 29 | ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO | YES | 0 or more | RFC 9464 |
+-------+--------------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+
Table 1
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[IANA-IKE-HASH]
IANA, "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8310] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
[RFC8598] Pauly, T. and P. Wouters, "Split DNS Configuration for the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 8598, DOI 10.17487/RFC8598, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598>.
[RFC9460] Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service Binding
and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS
Resource Records)", RFC 9460, DOI 10.17487/RFC9460,
November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9460>.
9.2. Informative References
[IANA-IKE-CFG]
IANA, "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/>.
[INT-THREAT-MOD]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Challenges and Changes in the
Internet Threat Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-04, 13 July 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-
farrell-arch-model-t-04>.
[RFC7619] Smyslov, V. and P. Wouters, "The NULL Authentication
Method in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 7619, DOI 10.17487/RFC7619, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7619>.
[RFC7671] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
[RFC9076] Wicinski, T., Ed., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 9076,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9076, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9076>.
[RFC9250] Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9250>.
[RFC9463] Boucadair, M., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Wing, D., Cook, N.,
and T. Jensen, "DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for
the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)",
RFC 9463, DOI 10.17487/RFC9463, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9463>.
Appendix A. Configuration Payload Examples
A.1. Configuration of Encrypted IPv6 DNS Resolvers without Suggested
Values
Figure 5 depicts an example of a CFG_REQUEST to request the
configuration of IPv6 DNS resolvers without providing any suggested
values. In this example, the initiator uses the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
attribute to indicate that the encrypted DNS client supports SHA2-256
(2), SHA2-384 (3), and SHA2-512 (4) hash algorithms for certificate
digests. The label of these algorithms is taken from
[IANA-IKE-HASH]. The use of INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS is explained in
[RFC7296] and thus is not reiterated here.
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
ENCDNS_IP6()
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO(0, (SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512))
Figure 5: Example of a CFG_REQUEST
Figure 6 depicts an example of a CFG_REPLY that can be sent by a
responder as a response to the above CFG_REQUEST. This response
indicates the following information to identify the encrypted DNS
resolver:
* Its service priority, which is 1.
* Its single (1) IPv6 address (2001:db8:99:88:77:66:55:44).
* Its ADN (doh.example.com). This ADN has a length of 15.
* Its supported HTTP version (h2).
* The relative form of the URI Template (/dns-query{?dns}).
* The SPKI hash of the resolver's certificate using SHA2-256
(8b6e7a5971cc6bb0b4db5a71...).
CP(CFG_REPLY) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:db8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
ENCDNS_IP6(1, 1, 15,
(2001:db8:99:88:77:66:55:44),
"doh.example.com",
(alpn=h2 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}))
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO(0, SHA2-256,
8b6e7a5971cc6bb0b4db5a71...)
Figure 6: Example of a CFG_REPLY
In the example depicted in Figure 6, no ADN is included in the
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute because only one ADN is provided in the
ENCDNS_IP6 attribute. Identifying the encrypted resolver associated
with the supplied digest is therefore unambiguous.
A.2. Configuration of Encrypted IPv6 DNS Resolvers with Suggested
Values
An initiator may provide suggested values in the CFG_REQUEST when
requesting an encrypted DNS resolver. For example, the initiator
may:
* Indicate a preferred resolver that is identified by an IPv6
address (see Figure 7).
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
ENCDNS_IP6(1, 1, 0,
(2001:db8:99:88:77:66:55:44))
Figure 7: Example of a CFG_REQUEST with a Preferred Resolver
Identified by Its IP Address
* Indicate a preferred resolver that is identified by an ADN (see
Figure 8).
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
ENCDNS_IP6(1, 0, 15, "doh.example.com")
Figure 8: Example of a CFG_REQUEST with a Preferred Resolver
Identified by Its ADN
* Indicate a preferred transport protocol (DoT, in the example
depicted in Figure 9).
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
ENCDNS_IP6(1, 0, 0, (alpn=dot))
Figure 9: Example of a CFG_REQUEST with a Preferred Transport
Protocol
* or any combination thereof.
A.3. Split DNS
An initiator may also indicate that it supports Split DNS by
including the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute in a CFG_REQUEST as shown
in Figure 10. In this example, the initiator does not indicate any
preference for the requested encrypted DNS server, nor does it
indicate which DNS queries will be forwarded through the IPsec
tunnel.
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
ENCDNS_IP6()
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN()
Figure 10: Example of a CFG_REQUEST with Support for Split DNS
Figure 11 shows an example of the responder's reply. Absent any
prohibited local policy, the initiator uses the encrypted DNS server
(doh.example.com) for any subsequent DNS queries for "example.com"
and its subdomains.
CP(CFG_REPLY) =
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:db8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
ENCDNS_IP6(1, 1, 15,
(2001:db8:99:88:77:66:55:44),
"doh.example.com",
(alpn=h2 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}))
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com)
Figure 11: Example of a CFG_REPLY with INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Yoav Nir, Christian Jacquenet, Paul Wouters, and Tommy
Pauly for their reviews and comments.
Yoav and Paul suggested the use of one single attribute carrying both
the name and an IP address instead of depending on the existing
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS and INTERNAL_IP4_DNS attributes.
Thanks to Tero Kivinen for the Shepherd review and Roman Danyliw for
the AD review.
Thanks to Stewart Bryant for the gen-art review, Dhruv Dhody for the
ops-dir review, and Patrick Mevzek for the dns-dir review.
Thanks to Paul Wouters, Zaheduzzaman Sarker, Éric Vyncke, and Robert
Wilton for their comments during the IESG review.
Authors' Addresses
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
35000 Rennes
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
Nokia
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Dan Wing
Cloud Software Group Holdings, Inc.
United States of America
Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
Valery Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
Russian Federation
Email: svan@elvis.ru