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1 ‎[1] However, this still does not prove conclusively that the *baraita* is corrupt, as **perhaps it is** the opinion of **Rabbi Natan. As it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Natan says: From where** is it derived **that** in the case of one who **claims one hundred dinars of another, and the other** claims money **of another, that one appropriates** the money **from this one,** the last borrower, **and gives it to this one,** the first lender, without each party claiming the money from the one with whom he did business? **The verse states: “And he shall give it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty”** (Numbers 5:7). The words “whom he has been guilty” are expounded to mean that the borrower pays the one who is owed by his creditor, since the borrower is a party to this case despite the fact that he never incurred direct liability to him. It is possible to explain the *baraita* cited by Rav Yosef based on this reasoning as well.
‎[2] **Rather,** a different justification exists for rejecting the *baraita*: **We have not found a *tanna* who is stringent** with these **two stringencies with regard to a marriage contract. Rather,** one rules **either in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir** that movable property is mortgaged for a marriage contract, **or in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Natan.** No one accepts both of these stringencies, and yet this *baraita* can be explained only by a combination of the two opinions. It must therefore be rejected as non-authoritative.
‎[3] **Rava said: If so, that** is the meaning of that **which I heard from Abaye, who said: This is not a mishna, and I did not know what it is.** Rava initially did not understand why the teaching should be dismissed, but he subsequently realized what Abaye was saying.
‎[4] The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was **a certain man who had a *yevama* happen before him** for levirate marriage **in** the town of **Mata Meḥasya,** and **his brother wanted to disqualify her from him by** means of **a bill of divorce.** The man **said to** his brother: **What is your opinion?** Why are you doing this? **If** you are doing this **due to the property** of the dead brother, **I will divide the property with you.** The brother **said to him: I am scared that you will do to me like the swindler from Pumbedita did,** in the above story, when the man from Pumbedita promised he would share the inheritance and later retracted. The man **said to him: If you wish, divide it for yourself from now.** I am prepared for you to take the property already, although the acquisition will take effect only after I marry the *yevama*.
‎[5] **Mar bar Rav Ashi said** that **although when Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael **he said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan** said: In the case of **one who says to another: Go and pull this cow and it will be acquired for you only after thirty days, after thirty days he has acquired** it through the act of pulling, **and** this is the *halakha* **even** if at the end of the thirty days the cow **was standing in a meadow,** i.e., a distant place that does not belong to the one acquiring the cow. This indicates that the present act of pulling is effective for later. Despite this *halakha*, Mar bar Rav Ashi claims that a difference exists between that case and the one currently under discussion.
‎[6] Mar bar Rav Ashi elaborates: **There,** with regard to the cow, it is **in** the seller’s **power** to transfer ownership at the present time, when the instruction to pull the cow is given, and therefore he can delay the acquisition. **Here,** however, it is **not in his power** to divide up the property, as he has yet to perform levirate marriage and the brother’s property does not belong to him. Consequently, he cannot transfer its ownership at the present time.
‎[7] The Gemara asks: **But when Ravin came** from Eretz Yisrael **he said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan** said: If one is instructed to pull a cow, but the acquisition will take effect only after thirty days, he has **not acquired** it. This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own ruling. The Gemara answers: This is **not difficult,** as **this** case, when one acquires it, is referring to a situation **when he says to him: Acquire** it **from now,** so that once thirty days have passed it should belong to him retroactively, but **that** case, when one does not acquire it, is **when he did not say to him: Acquire** it **from now.** If the acquisition does not take effect now, it cannot take effect later.
‎[8] **They inquired of Ulla:** If the *yavam* **performed levirate marriage** with the woman **and afterward divided** the property he promised to share with his brother, **what is** the *halakha*? He replied: **He has done nothing.** They further asked: If **he divided** the property **and afterward performed levirate marriage, what is** the *halakha*? He once again responded: **He has done nothing.**
‎[9] **Rav Sheshet objects to this** version of the discussion: **Now** if, when **he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided** the property when it was in his possession, Ulla answered that **he has done nothing,** then in a case where he **divided** it **and afterward performed levirate marriage, is it necessary** to inquire as to the *halakha*? It is obvious that such an action is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: Ulla was not asked these two questions on the same occasion. Rather, **there were two incidents** in which people raised these issues before Ulla, and he answered each inquiry separately.
‎[10] **When Ravin came** from Eretz Yisrael **he said** that **Reish Lakish** said: **Whether he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided** the property, or **whether he divided** the property and **afterward performed levirate marriage, he has done nothing.** The Gemara concludes: **And the** practical ***halakha*** is that **he has done nothing.**
‎[11] § The mishna states: **And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his.** The Gemara asks: **Why** is this so? **Doesn’t all of his property** serve as a **guarantee and security for her marriage contract? Reish Lakish said:** Emend the text and **teach:** Produce that is attached to the ground is **hers.**
‎[12] The mishna further stated that if **he married her, she is like his** regular **wife.** The Gemara asks: **With regard to what *halakha*** was this stated? **Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said:** The mishna means **to say that he divorces her with a bill of divorce and** that **he may remarry her** afterward without violating a prohibition. The Gemara asks: The *halakha* that **he divorces her with a bill of divorce** is **obvious;** how else can he divorce her?
‎[13] The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this **lest you say** that since **the Merciful One states** in the Torah: “And he will take her to him to be his wife **and consummate the levirate marriage”** (Deuteronomy 25:5), **and** here the status of **the first levirate marriage is still upon her,** this would mean that **it should not suffice for her** to leave **by a bill of divorce, but** rather she can leave him only **by** performing ***ḥalitza*** as well. The *tanna* therefore **teaches us** that *ḥalitza* is not required, as once he has married her she is like any other woman, who can be divorced by a bill of divorce alone.
‎[14] The Gemara asks with regard to the second part of the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, that **he may remarry her:** It is **obvious** that he may remarry her if the couple chooses to do so.
Version: William Davidson Edition - English
Source: https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1
License: CC-BY-NC