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3 ‎[1] There are four differences between a vow and a *sh'vuat bitui*:
a) With regard to a *sh'vuat bitui*, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect, and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.
b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable, and with regard to vows, one is.
c) A *sh'vuat bitui* can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice, while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.
d) A *sh'vuat bitui* can take effect with regard to an entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance. ‎[2] What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every vow that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. ‎[3] What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter, he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden. If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden. ‎[4] Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden. ‎[5] [The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day and [actually] fasted. If after years passed, he said: "Let this day be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. ‎[6] What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "*Matzah* is forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a *sukkah* on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of *tefillin*," they are forbidden to him. If he ate *matzah*, dwelled in a *sukkah*, or took *tefillin*, he is liable for lashes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat *matzah* on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. ‎[7] Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath. When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him. Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai. ‎[8] When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a *sh'vuat bitui*, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained, e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition. ‎[9] When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained. Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary. Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree. ‎[10] What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you," he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.
Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance. ‎[11] When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them. Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.
Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication. ‎[12] Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree] the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC