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22 [1] The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate.
When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the *chuppah*. Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate]. [2] What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the *chuppah*, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home.
Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage, and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate].
If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn. [The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage. [3] Similarly, when a *bogeret*, an orphan, or a widow goes from her father's house to her husband's home on her own initiative without being accompanied by her husband or his agents, and dies on the way, her husband does not inherit [her estate]. [4] Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding. Similarly, a man who marries a *k'tanah* [after her father's death] inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely.
When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies. When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property. [5] When a *k'tanah* was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained. [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage. [6] The *geonim* ruled that when a woman falls sick and asks her husband to divorce her so that he will not inherit her estate, her words are of no consequence, [even if] she [agrees to] forfeit her *ketubah*. Even if she says: "I hate him and no longer desire to live with him," her words are not heeded, and she is not judged as a woman who rebels against her husband. This is a desirable ruling. [7] During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as *nichsei tzon barzel* or *nichsei m'log*. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything.
Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as *nichsei m'log* after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as *nichsei m'log*, until his wife dies.
If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers without paying them for it. If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own]. [8] When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew. When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding.
Similarly, if a woman sells [property] between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated. [9] When a woman signs over all of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in *Hilchot Matanah* - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.
[The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it.
Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent." [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent, her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it. [10] While a woman is waiting for her *yavam* [to marry her according to the rite of *yibbum*], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status. Until he marries the *yevamah*, the *yavam* has no right to benefit from the property, even the *nichsei tzon barzel*, that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household.
If the *yevamah* dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her *nichsei m'log* and half of her *nichsei tzon barzel*. Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* and the remaining half of her *nichsei tzon barzel*, and they are responsible for her burial. [11] The money due a *yevamah* by virtue of her *ketubah* is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a *yavam* is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property - neither before *yibbum* nor after *yibbum*.
If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before *yibbum* or after *yibbum* - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from it. [12] When a man marries his *yevamah* at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold, and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the *yavam* will derive the benefit that accrues. [13] When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the *yavam*. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the *yevamah's*] objections are of no consequence.
[The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from movable property stems only from an enactment of the *geonim*, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the *yavam* from taking possession] of his brother's property, and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien. [14] [The following rules apply when] a *yevamah's* [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a *ketubah* or [when] she waived her *ketubah* in his favor. The *yavam* acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his *yevamah*, he is obligated to compose a *ketubah* for 100 [*zuz*]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the *ketubah*, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a *ketubah*. [15] When a woman sells *nichsei tzon barzel* - whether to her husband or to others - after she marries, her act is of no consequence.
Similarly, if her husband sells landed property belonging to his wife - whether it be *nichsei tzon barzel* or *nichsei m'log* - his act is of no consequence. [16] [Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as *nichsei tzon barzel* - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding.
If both [the husband and the wife] sell *nichsei m'log*, the sale is binding, regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband. [17] Similarly, when a woman sells her *nichsei m'log* to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband." With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization. [18] What is implied? When a woman sells her *nichsei tzon barzel* to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her *ketubah* or a field that [her husband mentioned in her *ketubah*] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry].
[In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires. [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home.
Accordingly, a husband has no way of substantiating his claim to his wife's property except with regard to *nichsei m'log*, as explained [in the previous halachah]. [19] It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her *nichsei tzon barzel* were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses.
To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as *nichsei tzon barzel*] and considers it instead *nichsei m'log*. For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue].
If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be *nichsei tzon barzel*, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband." [20] When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses.
[Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative. [21] [The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are *nichsei tzon barzel*, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises.
If they are *nichsei m'log* - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues]. [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues. [22] Similarly, if a woman was injured by others, all the money that is ordained to be given to her should be used to purchase land, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues, as stated in *Hilchot Chovel*. [23] [The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household.
[The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues. [24] When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property]. When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man. [25] A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as *nichsei m'log*. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as *nichsei m'log* belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as *nichsei m'log* belongs to the husband.
If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as *nichsei m'log* and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative. [26] [The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as *nichsei tzon barzel*. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 *zuz*; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 *zuz*. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 *zuz* that she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative. [27] When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given].
Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires, [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present.
Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her *ketubah* [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death], the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it. [28] When a calf born from cattle that was classified as *nichsei m'log* is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband].
When a man injures his wife, the entire [amount he must pay] - the damages and the restitution for the pain and the embarrassment - belongs to the woman, and the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from [property purchased with this money], as explained in *Hilchot Chovel*. [29] [The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding, and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land.
If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property, from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue. [30] When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted. [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements. [The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues.
If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made]. [The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise. [31] If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds]. [32] One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor. If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman. If she dies, one should return it to her husband.
If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit.
[The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs. [33] [The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep, regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself, lest the entire property be used and the principal lost. [34] [The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling.
Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as *nichsei m'log*, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any *nichsei m'log* that became worn out. [35] The *geonim* [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of *nichsei tzon barzel*. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's *ketubah* is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time.
If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage.
This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom. On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value.
A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him in the home of another woman he has married. [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified as *nichsei m'log* or *nichsei tzon barzel*. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC