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8 [1] A person is exempt [from liability for] a *sh'vuat hapikadon* [in the following situation]: He stole an ox belonging to a colleague and slaughtered it or sold it. His colleague lodged a claim against him, telling him: "You stole my ox and you slaughtered it or sold it." [The defendant] responded: "I stole it, but did not slaughter it or sell it" and took an oath to support his claim.
[The reason for his exemption is that] were he to have acknowledged that he slaughtered or sold [the ox] on his own accord, he would not have been required to pay four and five times its worth for this is a fine, as explained in *Hilchot Genevah*. Thus it is as if he did not deny a financial obligation. Therefore he is exempt [from liability for] a *sh'vuat hapikadon*, but liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*, for he took a false oath, saying that he did not slaughter [the ox], when [in fact] he did. [2] Similarly, a person is exempt [from liability for] a *sh'vuat hapikadon* [in the following situations]. A person lodged a claim against him saying: "Your ox killed my servant," and he denied the incident and took an oath. A servant lodged a claim against his master saying: "You knocked out my tooth" or "You blinded my eye." For if he acknowledged the claim, he would not be obligated to pay because it is a fine. He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [3] When a person lodges a claim against a colleague concerning a matter that involves both a fine which he would not be obligated to pay if he admits his liability on his own initiative as explained [above] and a financial claim which he is liable to pay on his own admission, he denies the entire claim, and takes an oath, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*.
What is implied? A person lodged a claim [against a colleague,] telling him: "You raped or you seduced my daughter." [The defendant] responded: "I did not rape or seduce her" and took an oath to this effect, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. For although he would not be required to pay the fine were he to have admitted [his guilt], he is obligated to pay for the embarrassment and damages even on his own admission.
Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You stole my ox," and he says, "I did not steal it" and takes an oath, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. Although he would not obligated to make the double payment [for a stolen object] on the basis of his own admission, he would be obligated to pay the principal on the basis of his own admission. [4] When a person tells a colleague: "You inflicted a wound upon me," and [the defendant] denies it, or "Your ox killed my ox," and [the defendant] denies it, taking an oath, [the defendant] is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. Had he admitted [his act], he would be obligated to make restitution. [5] [A watchman] is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* [in the following instance]: A person entrusted his ox to an unpaid watchman, the ox died, and he lodged a claim against the watchman, saying: "Where is the ox I entrusted to you?" The watchman responded: "You did not entrust anything to me," "You entrusted it, but it was stolen," or "...lost" and took an oath [to that effect]. [The rationale is] that had he admitted and related the matter as it occurred, he would not have been liable to make financial restitution, because he is an unpaid watchman. He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [6] [Similarly, a person] is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* [in the following instance]: A person lent his ox to a colleague and then demanded its return, saying: "Where is the ox you borrowed from me?" Now the ox had died, but the borrower said: "It was stolen" or "...lost" and took an oath to this effect. [The rationale is that] he did not free himself from making restitution by his denial and is nevertheless liable to pay whether the animal died, was stolen, lost, or taken captive because he was a borrower, as will be explained in the appropriate place. He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [7] This is the general principle: Whoever does not free himself from financial responsibility unless he makes this denial is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* if he takes an oath. [This applies] whether he took the oath on his own initiative or the plaintiff administered the oath and he stated his denial even though he did not answer *Amen* nor utter the oath himself. [8] [A thief] is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* [in the following instance]: He stole his colleague's ox. [The colleague] demanded payment, telling him: "You stole my ox."
[The thief] responded: "I did not steal it."
Why, then, is it in your possession?"
"You entrusted it to me [for safekeeping]" and he took an oath to that effect.
[The rationale is that] had he admitting stealing it, he would have been liable to pay the value in any case. By saying now that it is an entrusted object, he exempts himself from liability for theft and for loss, i.e., were the ox to be lost or stolen after this admission, he is not obligated to pay. [9] Similarly, if he were to claim that he rented it and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*, for he freed himself for liability in the cases of injury or death. Similarly, if he claimed: "You lent it to me" and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*, for he freed himself for liability if it dies while performing its work, as will be explained in *Hilchot Sheilah*. [10] Therefore if one says: "I did not steal it. Instead, you entrusted it to me...", "...hired me to watch it...", or "...lent it to me. Here is your ox. Take it." If he took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*, for he admitted owing the principle and did not exempt himself from any liability with this denial. [11] Similarly, he is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* if he uses any of the following excuses and takes an oath to that effect: "You sold it to me, but I have not paid for it yet. If you want, take the money for it. If not, here is your ox," "You gave it to me as payment for work which I will perform for you. If you desire, I will perform the work. If you do not desire, take it and depart," "I found it wandering on the road and did not know that it was yours. Now that I know, take it and depart," or "It chased after my ox. Here, it's yours." He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*, for he took a false oath. [12] When a person is financially obligated to two partners, one demands payment from him, he denies his obligation and takes an oath, he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon* for he denied a financial obligation. If they both demanded payment from him and he admitted the entire obligation to one of them, but said: "I borrowed only from this one," should he take an oath to this effect, he is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*, for he did not free himself from any liability. He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*. [13] Similarly, if there was a person who owed a debt supported by a promissory note, but he denied it and took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. [The rationale is that because of] the promissory note, [the person's] landed property is placed under lien. Thus the person is denying [an obligation involving] landed property. And as we have already explained, a person who denied a claim involving landed property is not liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. He is, however, liable for a *sh'vuat bitui*, for he took a false oath. [14] If a person owed a debt to which there were witnesses, he denied [his obligation], and took an oath [to that effect], he is liable for a *sh'vuat hapikadon*. For by denying his obligation, he freed himself from the liability of paying immediately. When the witnesses will come, he will be obligated to pay and thus his denial will not be effective. It is, however, effective in that perhaps the witnesses will not come, they will come and their testimony will not be substantiated, or they will be disqualified. Therefore he is liable.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC