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6 [1] [The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the *kiddushin* are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.
Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard to *kiddushin*, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules. [2] These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:
a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];
b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;
c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;
d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.
If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met. [3] What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 *zuz*, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the *dinar*, the condition is valid, and the *kiddushin* are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 *zuz*, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated. [4] If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*," gave her the *dinar* in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 *zuz* you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.
[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time; she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all. [5] Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 *zuz* you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*," and then places the *dinar* in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything. [6] Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 *zuz*, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 *zuz*, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*," and then places the *dinar* in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything. [7] Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the *dinar* in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the *kiddushin* are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner. [8] [The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your *get*. But if you do not eat it, the *get* is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the *dinar* or the *get* in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced. [9] With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say: "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?
When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you." [10] What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding, for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.
Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks, she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations. [11] If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of *kiddushin* or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances. [12] If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances. [13] Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence. [14] Some of the later *geonim* maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to *kiddushin* and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.
It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither *kiddushin* nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great *geonim* of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it. [15] When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the *kiddushin* become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] *kiddushin*.
What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 *zuz* this year, you are consecrated to me with this *dinar*. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the *dinar* in Nisan, but gave her the 200 *zuz* that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.
Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed. [16] When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this *dinar* if I give you 200 *zuz*," when at a later date he gives her the 200 *zuz* she is consecrated. Retroactively, the *kiddushin* are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. [17] Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved. Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.
When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording *al menat* ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply. It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved. [18] What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 *zuz*," "here is your *get* on condition that you give me 200 *zuz*," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 *zuz*," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200 *zuz*. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.
[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the *kiddushin* or the *get* in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC