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Mishneh Torah, Divorce 10:1

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Sefer Nashim

10 β€Ž[1] Whenever in this text we have used the terms "the *get* is void," or "the divorce is not effective," the intent is that the *get* is void according to Scriptural law. The woman is married in the full sense of the term. If she remarries, she must leave [her second husband]; any child she bears him is illegitimate.

If the husband [of a woman who receives such a *get*] is a priest, she is not forbidden to him as a divorced woman, with one exception: a person who divorces his wife and tells her: "You are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to marry anyone else." Although such a divorce is not binding, according to Rabbinic law such a woman is forbidden to marry a priest, as [implied by Leviticus 21:7]: "[They may not take] a woman divorced from her husband." Our Sages interpreted this to mean: "Even if she is divorced only from her husband and not permitted to marry any one else, she is forbidden to the priesthood. This is the "wisp of a *get*" that disqualifies [a woman] from [marrying a member of] the priesthood by Rabbinic decree. β€Ž[2] Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the *get* is unacceptable," the intent is that the *get* is unacceptable merely according to Rabbinic decree. Thus, according to Scriptural law, the woman is forbidden to the priesthood.

Should it be impossible to have a second [*get*] composed, if her second husband is scrupulous and voluntarily divorces her this is praiseworthy, provided she has not borne [him] children. If, however, she has borne him children, he should not divorce her because of [our Sages'] disqualification of her *get*, lest this cause his sons' reputation to be sullied. β€Ž[3] Whenever, in this text, we have used the term "the status of the divorce is in doubt," the woman should not remarry. If she has remarried, she must leave her second husband, and there is a doubt regarding the legimitacy of any children that she bears [her second husband], for her own status is in doubt, and she may be forbidden to engage in marital relations.

If [a man] divorces his wife with an unacceptable *get*, or the status of [their] divorce is in doubt, and he desires to remarry her, she is permitted to her husband. He does not have to renew the marriage, recite the seven marriage blessings, or write her a new marriage contract, unless she has been divorced in a manner that is binding. β€Ž[4] Our Sages ordained that whenever [a woman] who was given a *get* that is void remarries, she must be divorced by her second husband, lest people say: "A married woman has been allowed to remarry without [receiving] a *get*." And she must receive a [second] *get* from her first husband, so that she be permitted to marry anyone else.

She is forbidden to remarry both her first and second husband forever. [This applies] even if she entered into marital relations [with her second husband] without knowing of the prohibition involved. [This prohibition was instituted] lest people say: "The man remarried his divorcee after she was married [to another man]." If one of the two transgressed and remarried her, he should be compelled to send her away. β€Ž[5] A similar law applies when a woman remarries [after] witnesses testified that her [first] husband died, and later her first husband returns. [This applies] regardless of whether her [first] husband was a mentally sound individual or a deaf-mute, or whether she remarried a mentally sound person or a deaf-mute, who cannot establish a marriage bond in a complete sense. She must be divorced by both of them; both must give her a *get*, and she is forbidden to engage in marital relations with either of them again. β€Ž[6] If [after witnesses testified that a woman's husband died or that she was given a *get*], she was consecrated [but the marriage bond was not yet consummated], and then her first husband returned, or it was discovered that the *get* was void, she is permitted to her first husband. Nor must she be divorced by the second husband, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman who is forbidden because of a severe prohibition.

[In this instance, we do not require a divorce out of fear that] someone say: "A married woman is being released without a *get*." Since the marriage was not consummated, the person will rationalize: "The consecration was made on condition, and that condition was not fulfilled." β€Ž[7] [The following laws apply when] a woman married, and afterwards it was discovered that her *get* was void, or [it had been reported that her first husband died,] and he returned. Neither her first nor her second husband is entitled to an ownerless object that she discovers nor to the profits from her work. Neither can he annul her vows. None of the benefits that either of them received after she married [her second husband] should be expropriated from them. Neither of them is obligated to pay her the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, nor to fulfill any of the stipulations of the marriage contract.

Neither of them is required to pay for her sustenance. If she took [money or property for this purpose] from either of them, she must return it. Neither of them is held responsible for any of the property she brought to the marriage that became worn out or was lost, even *nichsei tzon barzel*.

A child born to [the second husband] is illegitimate. If the first husband engages in relations with her before she is divorced by the second husband, a child born of this union is illegitimate by virtue of Rabbinic decree.

If the second [husband] divorced her and she received the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract, and afterwards her [first] husband came or it was discovered that the divorce was void, we do not expropriate the money she received for her sustenance or by virtue of her marriage contract. β€Ž[8] Similar laws apply when one of two brothers consecrated a woman. The brother who consecrated the woman departed, and afterwards it was reported that he died. The other brother performed the rite of *yibbum*, marrying his brother's wife, and then the brother returned.

The woman must be divorced by both husbands, receiving a *get* from both of them, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to her. Similarly, if a man consecrated a woman, she journeyed to another country, the husband heard that she died and married her sister, and afterwards it was discovered that she had not died: he must divorce both women, and all the stringencies mentioned above apply to both of them. β€Ž[9] [Different rules apply, however, if a man] married a woman who journeyed to another country, he heard that she died, he married her sister, and then it was discovered that his [first] wife was alive. The sister does not require a *get*, and his [first] wife is permitted to him.

Similar laws apply with regard to other women forbidden by severe prohibitions who were married under the assumption that the marriage was permitted, and it is discovered that the prohibition still applied. They do not require a divorce, for a marriage bond cannot be established with a woman forbidden by such a severe prohibition. β€Ž[10] Why did they require that the sister of the woman whom the man consecrated be given a *get*? Lest people say that the [first] *kiddushin* were given conditionally, [the condition was not fulfilled,] and thus the law would allow marriage to her sister. Since the [first] woman's sister was divorced with a *get*, she - i.e., the man's first *arusah* - is forbidden [to him], lest people think that he married his divorcee's sister. β€Ž[11] A scribe composed [a *get*], but erred and gave the *get* to the husband and the receipt [for the woman's marriage contract] to the woman, or the man and wife erred, and the husband took the *get* and the wife the receipt, and thus they thought they were divorced.

[The following rules apply] if afterwards the *get* is discovered in the possession of the man. If the woman has not remarried, she is considered as if she has not been divorced; it [appears to] have been revealed that the divorce did not ever take place. The husband should give her the *get* in the presence [of witnesses], and the divorce takes effect from the time the *get* is given.

If, however, she had [already] remarried, and afterwards the husband produces the *get*, claiming that she has not been divorced, for he is in possession of the *get* and it never reached her, we do not accept his claim. She is not forbidden to her [second] husband. Instead, we operate under the presumption that she has been divorced, the *get* fell from her hand and was found by [her first husband], who desires to cause her to be forbidden to her second husband. β€Ž[12] When a person divorces his wife because of unsavory reports, or because she is indiscriminate with regard to vows, he is told: "Inform her that you are divorcing her to chastise her, and know that you will never be able to remarry her."

Why is [a man forbidden] to remarry such a woman? This is a decree, [instituted] lest she marry another man, repent and live chastely with him. Her first [husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, it resembles a divorce given on a condition that was not fulfilled, in which case, retroactively, the *get* would be void. Therefore, we tell him: "Make a firm resolve to divorce her, knowing that you will never remarry her."

If, however, he transgresses and remarries her before she is consecrated to another man, he need not divorce her. β€Ž[13] Similarly, if [a man] divorces his wife because she is an *aylonit* or because she always experiences menstrual bleeding in the midst of sexual relations, he should never remarry her.

[This is a decree, instituted] lest she marry another man and have children if she was an *aylonit*, or her condition be healed if she suffered from menstrual bleeding. [Her first husband] may then say: "If I had known that this would be the case, I would not have divorced her." Thus, [it would appear] that her *get* is void and her children illegitimate. If, however, he transgresses and remarries her [before she is consecrated to another man], he need not divorce her. β€Ž[14] When an agent brings a *get* from the diaspora and says, "It was written and signed in my presence" [to validate the signatures to the *get*], he should not marry her. We fear that perhaps he was attracted to her and therefore testified on her behalf.

[For this same reason,] when one witness testifies that a woman's husband died, and she [is given license to] marry on the basis of his testimony, he should not marry her. Similarly, a sage who ruled that a woman is forbidden to her husband because of a vow should not marry her.

Similarly, when a man is reputed to have had relations with a maid-servant, and afterwards she was granted her freedom, or when [a man is reputed to have had relations] with a gentile woman, and afterwards she converted, he should not marry her. Similarly, if a gentile or a servant had relations with a Jewish woman, and afterwards the gentile converted or the servant was freed, he should not marry this woman. In all these instances, if a couple transgress and marry, they should not be forced to separate. β€Ž[15] In all the above instances, if these men had wives and their wives died, or they divorced their wives at their wives' initiative, they are permitted to marry [the women mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation.

Similarly if these women married other men and became widowed or were divorced, they are permitted to marry [the men mentioned above]; there is no need for hesitation. β€Ž[16] All these women are permitted to marry [any relatives of the men involved]. [A woman may marry] the son of the witness who testified on her behalf, the son of the sage who declared that she was forbidden to her husband, the son of the man with whom she was reputed to have had relations, or any other relative of theirs. [The rationale for this leniency is that] a person will not commit a sin so that another person will benefit.

A woman is permitted to marry one of [the two witnesses] to her divorce or to her *mi'un*, or to marry one of the judges in whose presence she performed the rite of *chalitzah*. Our suspicions are aroused only when [the woman's license to marry depends on] the testimony of one witness.

A person should always shy away from serving as a witness to *mi'un*, and make himself available [as a witness to enable] the rite of *chalitzah* [to be performed]. β€Ž[17] When a man divorces his wife and then engages in relations with her in the the presence of witnesses before she marries another man, we assume that since she was [originally] his wife, he remarried her and engaged in relations with the intent of consecrating her, and not as a licentious act.

[The above rule applies] regardless of whether they were divorced after marriage, or only after consecration. And this applies even if we saw that he paid her money. For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not enter into sexual relations with his wife with a licentious intent, when he has the possibility of having these relations considered to be a mitzvah.

For this reason, this woman is definitely considered to be consecrated, and requires a second divorce [in order to marry another man]. β€Ž[18] [There is an extension to the above principle.] If a man entered into privacy with his divorcee in the presence of witnesses, the two witnesses observed [their conduct] simultaneously, and [the couple] had been married previously, we suspect that they engaged in sexual relations.

The witnesses to their entrance into privacy are thus considered to be witnesses to sexual relations. For a person who consecrates his wife via sexual relations need not engage in relations in the presence of witnesses. [All that] is necessary that [the couple] enter into privacy in the presence of witnesses and engage in relations in privacy, as explained.

Since [it is possible that the couple engaged in relations], the status of the woman is in doubt, because we suspect that she has been consecrated. Because of this suspicion, she requires a [second] *get*. If, however, the woman had merely been consecrated and was divorced [before she was married], we do not suspect [that they engaged in sexual relations], because they did not share such familiarity. β€Ž[19] Several of the *geonim* have ruled that any woman with whom a man engaged in sexual relations in the presence of witnesses requires a *get*, [the rationale for their ruling being that] a person will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.

[Moreover,] they extended [the application of] this principle, until they decided to rule that when a man's maidservant bore him a son, we take the matter into account, and the man's wife is not [allowed to perform] the rite of *yibbum* [if he dies without children], lest he have freed his maidservant and afterwards engaged in relations with her [with the intent of consecrating her]. And there are those who ruled that we can definitely assume that he freed her [and consecrated her], for a man will not carry out sexual relations with a licentious intent.

I considered these opinions to be far from the paths of the Torah judgment, and it is not fit for one to rely on them. Our Sages made such statements only with regard to [a man's] wife whom he divorced, or to a person who consecrated a woman conditionally and then entered into sexual relations without clarifying his intent. For in these instances the woman is the man's wife, and with regard to a man's wife we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent unless he explicitly states that this is his intent, or that he is entering into these relations with a condition in mind.

With regard to other women, however, [we do not follow this assumption]. Instead, whenever [a man enters into relations with] a wanton woman, we assume that he had a licentious intent, unless he explicitly states that he intends to consecrate her. Needless to say, this applies with regard to a maidservant or to a gentile woman, for our marriage laws do not apply with regard to them at all, and we have no suspicions [with regard to marriage] at all. A son born by them is assumed to be a gentile or a servant until it is definitively substantiated that his mother was freed or converted. β€Ž[20] When it has been assumed that a woman is either married or consecrated, and a rumor is spread in [her] city that she has been divorced, [the rumor] is not given credence, and we continue to operate under the assumption [that there was no change in her status]. [This applies] even if the majority, or even the entire city spread this rumor.

[Different rules apply, however, in the following instance.] A rumor was spread through the city that a woman was consecrated, and that rumor was reported in court, in which case we suspect that the woman was consecrated, as explained. Afterwards, a rumor was spread that she was divorced from those *kiddushin*; we consider her to be divorced. [Since] she was forbidden on the basis of a rumor, she is permitted on the basis of a rumor. β€Ž[21] [A man] should not marry a woman if he intends to divorce her. Nor should he maintain her as a wife and live with her, if he intends to divorce her.

A man should not divorce his first wife unless he discovers an incident of sexual misconduct,, as [Deuteronomy 24:1] states: "When he finds evidence of sexual misconduct...." One should not hurry to divorce one's first wife. With regard to a second wife, by contrast, if one hates her, one may send her away. β€Ž[22] It is a mitzvah to divorce a woman who possesses unsavory character traits and does not conduct herself modestly, as is the practice of proper daughters of Israel, as [implied by Proverbs 22:10]: "Drive away the scoffer, and contention will depart."

When a woman has been divorced for loose moral conduct, it is not fitting for a proper man to marry her, lest people say: "This one sent away this wicked woman, and this one brought her home." β€Ž[23] When a man's wife becomes a deaf-mute, he may divorce her, [by giving her] a *get*, and the divorce is effective. If, however, [his wife] loses control of her mental or emotional faculties, he may not divorce her until she regains stability.

This is a prescript ordained by our Sages so that she will not [be divorced and left] unattended, [and be violated] by immoral people, for she is unable to care for herself. Therefore, [her husband] should provide a place for her, provide her with food and drink from her own resources, and marry another woman. He is not obligated to provide her with her sustenance, garments and conjugal rights. [For although our Sages compelled the husband to remain married to such a woman, they did not compel him to live with her as man and wife,] because a mentally sound individual cannot endure living with a mentally incapable person in one dwelling.

[The husband] is not obligated to provide her with medical treatment, nor to redeem her if she is taken captive. If he divorces her, the divorce is binding. He should remove her from his home, and he is not obligated to care for her.

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Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI

License: CC-BY-NC

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