πŸ’Ύ Archived View for scholasticdiversity.us.to β€Ί scriptures β€Ί jewish β€Ί t β€Ί Mishneh%20Torah%2C%20Marri… captured on 2024-05-10 at 12:13:18. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content

View Raw

More Information

-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 16:19

Home

Sefer Nashim

16 β€Ž[1] The property that a woman brings to her husband's [resources] - be it landed property, movable property or servants - is not referred to with the term *ketubah*, but rather with the term *nedunyah*.

[More particularly, there are two subdivisions within this category.] When the husband accepts responsibility for the *nedunyah* and it is considered to be his property - i.e., if it decreases in value he suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is his - the property is referred to as *nichsei tzon barzel*.

If the husband did not accept responsibility for the *nedunyah*, and it instead remained the property of the woman - if it decreases in value she suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is hers - the property is referred to as *nichsei m'log*. β€Ž[2] Similarly, all the property that a woman owns that she did not bring to her husband's household, nor had written in her *ketubah*, but rather left as her own, or property that came to her as an inheritance, or that was given to her as a present - all of this is referred to as *nichsei m'log*, for it is all in her possession.

The term *ketubah*, by contrast, refers only to the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - i.e., 100 [*zuz* for a non-virgin] or 200 [*zuz* for a virgin] and the additional amount that [the husband promised]. β€Ž[3] We have already explained that our Sages established the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, and that the laws governing the additional amount [promised by the husband] are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement.

[Our Sages] did not grant a woman the option of collecting [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* whenever she desired. Instead, it is like a debt, which is not payable until a given date. For a *ketubah*, the time when payment is due is not until after the woman's husband dies or divorces her.

Similarly, our Sages ordained that if a husband has fields [of varying quality] - good, bad and intermediate - when the woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from this property, she is entitled to collect only from the inferior fields. They are referred to as *ziboorit*. β€Ž[4] Similarly, our Sages ordained that when a woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* after her husband's death, she may not collect [this sum] until she takes an oath while holding a sacred article, that her husband did not leave any property in her possession, that she had not sold her *ketubah* to him, nor waived payment of it. [Her wardrobe, even] the garments she is wearing should be evaluated and the sum deducted from [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*.

If, however, he voluntarily divorces her, she may collect [the money due her] without taking an oath, nor should [her wardrobe] be evaluated. [The rationale is that] he bought them for her, she acquired them, and it is he who desires to divorce her, and not the reverse. β€Ž[5] Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that a widow should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from landed property only. [Moreover,] she may not collect [her due] from the increment in the value of that property after the husband died. Similarly, after their father's death, [the woman's] daughters do not receive their subsistence from the increment in the value of that property after his death.

Similarly, a woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from the increment in the value of [landed] property accomplished through the efforts of a purchaser, although other creditors are entitled to collect their due from that increment. These rulings are among the leniencies [granted with regard to the the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her *ketubah*. β€Ž[6] Similarly, among the leniencies [granted with regard to the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her *ketubah* is that a woman will collect the money due her from the coinage that is of least value.

What is implied? A man married a woman in one country and divorced her in another. If the coinage of the country in which the couple married is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they divorced, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they divorced. If, by contrast, the coinage of the country in which the couple divorced is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they married, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they married.

When does the above apply? When her *ketubah* states a sum of coins without specification. If, however, a specific type of coin is explicitly mentioned, whether with regard to the fundamental requirement of the *ketubah*, or with regard to the extra amount added by the husband, the law is the same as when a person lends a colleague a specific type of coin - he must return the loan in the coinage that he took, as will be explained in *Hilchot Halva'ah*. β€Ž[7] The *geonim* of all the *yeshivot* ordained that after the death of a man, a woman should be able to collect her [money due her by virtue of her] *ketubah* from movable property, just as they ordained that a creditor can collect the debt owed him from movable property. This mandate spread throughout the majority of the Jewish people.

Similarly, the other conditions of a woman's *ketubah* are governed by the same rules as [the fundamental requirement of] the *ketubah*, and they are binding on the movable property of the deceased's estate, as well as on the landed property. There is, however, one exception - the right of the sons to inherit their mother's *ketubah*. Since the custom of granting them this inheritance was not universally accepted by all the *yeshivot*, I maintain that the law of the Talmud should be applied in this instance, and they should inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her *ketubah* only from the landed property [within the estate]. β€Ž[8] In all the [Jewish] communities of which I know and have heard reports from, it has already become the custom to write the *ketubah* so that [its obligations are binding] on both the landed property and the movable property [in the estate].

[Making] this addition is a great asset; it was ordained by learned men of great stature. For it is a monetary stipulation, and thus a widow is entitled to collect [the money due her] from the movable property [in her husband's] estate by virtue of this stipulation, and not by virtue of the mandate of the later sages. β€Ž[9] [The following rules apply when] this stipulation was not included in the text of the *ketubah*, but instead [the couple] married without making an explicit statement [in this regard]. If the husband knew of this ordinance established by the *geonim*, the woman may collect [the money due her from the movable property in his estate].

If, however, he was not [aware of this ordinance], or we are unsure whether he knew of it, we deliberate at length concerning this matter. For an ordinance of the *geonim* does not have the power to be applied and to have money expropriated from the heirs because of it, when it was not explicitly stated, as is the law regarding the conditions of the *ketubah*. [The distinction between the two is that the conditions of the *ketubah*] are ordinances instituted by the Great *Sanhedrin*. β€Ž[10] Our Sages also ordained that all of a husband's property should be on lien for the woman's *ketubah*. Even if the woman's *ketubah* is [only 100 *zuz*] and [her husband] owns property worth several thousand gold pieces, it is all under lien to her *ketubah*.

[Her husband] is entitled to sell all his property if he desires, and his sale is binding. Nevertheless, all the property that he sells after his marriage can be expropriated [from the purchaser] by his widow [in lieu of payment for] her *ketubah* when he divorces her or when he dies, if he does not possess property that has not been sold.

When a woman expropriates property [from a purchaser], she must take an oath holding a sacred article, as is taken by any of [a person's] creditors [who seek to expropriate property from its purchasers]. This provision was instituted so that he should not view [the obligation of] the *ketubah* lightly. β€Ž[11] When the court or the heirs require a widow to take an oath when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*, the oath should be taken only outside the court. For the court would refrain from administering the oath, lest she not be precise with herself when making it.

If the heirs desired that she make a vow [instead of an oath], she may make a vow linked to any object they desire. This vow may be administered in a court. Afterwards, she should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*. β€Ž[12] If a widow dies before taking this oath, her heirs should not inherit her *ketubah* at all, for she does not have any rights to her *ketubah* until she takes an oath.

If the woman marries [a second time] before taking an oath [with regard to [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from her previous husband's estate], she may take an oath after her remarriage and collect her due whenever she desires. She does not, however, have the option of making a vow, lest her [second] husband annul it. β€Ž[13] If [a woman's husband] designated a plot of land for her in her *ketubah*, whether he specified [only] one of its borders or all four of its borders, she may collect her *ketubah* from this plot of land without taking an oath.

Similarly, if he specified movable property [in the *ketubah*] and this movable property exists, she may take it without taking an oath. [Moreover,] if the [movable property that was specified] was sold and other movable property purchased with the proceeds, it being known that these goods were purchased with the proceeds of [the movable property specified in the *ketubah*], she may take them without taking an oath. β€Ž[14] A woman who diminishes [the amount of money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* may collect her due only after taking an oath.

What is implied? A woman produces a *ketubah* that states [that she is due] 1000 *zuz*. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims to have received only a portion of the amount. Even if there are witnesses who testify that she received the amount that she admits to having received, and even if she is extremely precise in accounting what she took, mentioning even [the last] half-*p'rutah*, she may collect the remainder only after taking an oath. β€Ž[15] [An oath is also required in the following instance.] The husband claims that [his wife] received all [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*], while the woman claims not to have received the money, and one witness testifies that she received either the entire sum or a portion of it. [The woman] may collect the entire [sum mentioned in] the *ketubah*, but only after taking an oath. β€Ž[16] [When a divorcee collects [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*] outside the presence of her husband, she must take an oath before doing so.

What is implied? A man divorced his wife and departed. After his wife takes an oath, the court should expropriate his property and give [the woman the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*.

The above applies when the husband is in a distant place, where there is difficulty in notifying him. If, however, he is in a nearby place [where it is possible] to notify him, a message should be sent to notify him [of the court's impending action]. If he does not come, the woman should take the oath and collect [her due]. β€Ž[17] A woman who reduces the value of her *ketubah* is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].

What is implied? A woman produces a *ketubah* that states [that she is due] 1000 *zuz*. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims not to have received anything at all, but she admits: "I am owed only 500 *zuz*. Although he wrote 1000 for me [in the *ketubah*], there was an understanding between me and him [concerning this]." In this instance, she is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].

If, however, [in the above situation,] the woman says: "My *ketubah* states only 500 *zuz*," she may not collect with this document that says [she is due] 1000 *zuz*, for she has negated it. It is as if she has admitted that it is false. Therefore, [the husband] may take a rabbinic oath [to support his claim]; he is then freed [of all obligations]. β€Ž[18] Whenever we have stated that a woman may not collect [her due] unless she takes an oath, the court tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." Whenever we said that she may collect her due without an oath, [the court] tells the husband: "Give her [what is due her]. Your claim is not acceptable until you bring proof to support it." β€Ž[19] If [in the latter instances], on his own initiative, the husband asks that [the woman] take an oath [denying] his claim, [the court] tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." She must take this oath holding a sacred article.

If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from him [in the event of a divorce] without taking any oath at all. [In the event of his death,] however, she must take an oath before collecting [her due] from his heirs. β€Ž[20] If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* from his heirs without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted by his heirs regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from the heirs without taking any oath at all.

If, however, she comes to collect [her due] from property that has been sold, she must take an oath before collecting. Although her husband was willing to accept her word, the stipulation he made is binding only on himself and [the estate he left to] his heirs. It does not have the power to cause others to incur a financial loss. β€Ž[21] A widow who is in possession of her [the document recording her] *ketubah* may collect her due, after taking an oath, even though 100 years have passed since her husband's death. This applies regardless of whether she resides in her [deceased] husband's home or in her father's home.

If, however, she does not have possession of her *ketubah*, she is not entitled to anything, even if she makes her claim on the day her husband dies. Similarly, a divorcee is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the *ketubah* until she produces her *ketubah*. β€Ž[22] When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to compose a document [recording] the *ketubah*. [Different rules apply,] however, in a place where it is not customary to compose a document [recording] the *ketubah*, and instead, [the couple] rely on the conditions established by the Jewish court.

[In such a situation, the woman is entitled to] collect the essential requirement of the *ketubah* even when she is not in possession of a document recording the *ketubah*, regardless of whether she was widowed or divorced, or whether she [continues to] reside in her husband's home or [has returned to] her father's home. She is not, however, given [anything she claims her husband promised her] in addition unless she has definite proof [of such an obligation]. β€Ž[23] Until when is a widow entitled to collect the essential requirement of the *ketubah* in a place where it is not customary to compose a *ketubah*? If she [continues to reside] in her husband's home, there is no limit on the time she is granted. If she [resides] in her father's home, [she has this prerogative] for twenty-five years.

If, [however,] she comes to collect [the money due her because of her *ketubah*] after twenty-five years, she is not entitled to anything. [The rationale is that] had she not foregone [the money due her], she would not have remained silent for this long. Nor is she living together with the heirs, so that she could [excuse her silence,] explaining that she was embarrassed to sue them while she was living together with them in [one] home. β€Ž[24] For this reason, if [one of] the heirs was in the habit of bringing her subsistence while she was residing in her father's home and caring for her needs, she has the prerogative of demanding [her due] even after twenty-five years have passed. The reason why she remained silent and did not present her claim is that she was ashamed [to sue] the heir. β€Ž[25] [The following rules apply when there is a difference between the claims of a husband - or his heirs - and his wife regarding the size of the essential requirement of her *ketubah*.] She says, "I was a virgin when I married, and the essential requirement of my *ketubah* is 200 [*zuz*]." Her husband or his heirs claim, "She was not a virgin, and she is due only 100."

If there are witnesses who saw that the customs that people in that locale carry out when virgins are wed were carried out on her behalf - e.g., there were different types of celebrations, [she wore a] crown or a particular garment [designated for this purpose], or other rites that are performed only for the sake of virgins were performed [for her] - she is entitled to 200 [*zuz*]. If there are no witnesses to this, she is entitled to only 100 [*zuz*].

[In the latter instance,] if her husband is alive, she can require him to take an oath required by the Torah, for he has acknowledged a portion of a claim.

[In cases of this nature,] testimony is accepted [from a person] once he became an adult, who says: "I remember that when I was a child, the rites performed for virgin brides were performed on behalf of such and such."

As mentioned, all the above applies [only] in places where it is customary not to compose a document recording the *ketubah*. β€Ž[26] When a woman tells her husband, "You divorced me," her word is accepted. [The rationale is that if this were not the truth,] she would not speak so boldly to her husband.

Accordingly, when a woman produces her *ketubah*, [even] without having a bill of divorce, and tells her husband: "You divorced me. I lost my bill of divorce. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my *ketubah*," [her claim is accepted, and her husband] is obligated to pay her the essential requirement of the marriage contract, even though he claims that he never divorced her. He is not, however, [obligated to] give her the additional amount he promised, unless she brings proof that she has been divorced, or she manifests possession of both the bill of divorce and her *ketubah*. β€Ž[27] [In the above situation,] if [the woman's] husband said: "This is what happened. I divorced her and paid her all [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*, both the essential requirement and the additional amount. She wrote me a receipt, but I lost it" [the following rules apply]. He requires her to take an oath while holding a sacred article [that he is liable to pay her] the essential requirement [of the *ketubah*], and then he must give her [that sum].

With regard to the additional amount, his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] he could have claimed that he never divorced her, and in such an instance he would not be held liable for the additional amount. [We assume that had he desired to lie, he would have used that alternative.] He is, however, required to take a rabbinic oath with regard to the additional amount. β€Ž[28] [The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce, but does not have her *ketubah* in her possession. If the local custom is not to compose a *ketubah*, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her *ketubah* by [virtue of] the bill of divorce she is holding. If, however, it is the local custom to compose a *ketubah*, she is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the *ketubah* until she produces her *ketubah*, as was explained. Her husband must take a rabbinic oath denying her claim, and he is freed of liability. β€Ž[29] [When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and two *ketubot*, she is entitled to collect the amount due her by virtue of both *ketubot*. If she produces two *ketubot* and one bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect only [the money due her for] one *ketubah*.

Which *ketubah* should she collect? If they are both for the same amount, the later *ketubah* negates the earlier one, and she is entitled to collect [property that was sold to others] from the date of the later [*ketubah*]. If one of them is for a greater sum than the other, she may collect whichever she desires, and the other one is voided. β€Ž[30] [When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and one *ketubah*, she has [the right to collect] only [the amount due her by virtue of] one *ketubah*. For when a man divorces his wife and remarries her without specifying any conditions, [it can be assumed] that he remarried her with the intent that her original *ketubah* [become binding again].

[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce and a *ketubah* after the death of her husband: If the bill of divorce is dated prior to the *ketubah*, [in a place where] it is not customary to compose a *ketubah*, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her *ketubah* by [virtue of this] bill of divorce, and she is entitled to collect the entire sum [mentioned] in the second *ketubah*, for she acquires this sum by virtue of [her husband's] death.

If her *ketubah* is dated prior to the bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the *ketubah* only once. [We assume] that when he remarried her, his intent was that her original *ketubah* [become binding again]. β€Ž[31] A woman's word is accepted if she says: "My husband died," so that she [be granted permission to] remarry, as will be explained in *Hilchot Gerushin*. One of the conditions of the *ketubah* is that if a woman remarries after the death of her husband, she is entitled to collect the entire sum written in her *ketubah*.

Therefore, if she came to the court and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry," without mentioning [the collection of the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah* at all, she is granted permission to remarry. [Afterwards,] she is required to take an oath, and then she is given [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*.

If she says, "My husband died. Give me the money due me by virtue of my *ketubah*," [not only is she not granted this money,] she is not even permitted to remarry. [We assume that] she came [only] because of the matter of the *ketubah*. Our presumption is that her husband has not died. Her intent is not to remarry, but merely to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the *ketubah* during [her husband's] lifetime.

If she came and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry and give me [the money due me by virtue of] my *ketubah*," she is permitted to remarry and is granted [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*. The rationale is that her primary intent is remarriage. If, however, she comes and says: "My husband died. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my *ketubah*, and grant me permission to remarry," she is permitted to remarry, but she is not granted [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*. If, however, she seizes possession [of this sum], the court should not expropriate it from her possession.

Previous

Next

Version Info

Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI

License: CC-BY-NC

Jewish Texts

Powered by Sefaria.org