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23 [1] [The following rules apply when] a woman makes a provision with her husband in which he agrees to forgo one of the privileges that a husband is granted. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after she was consecrated, but before *nisu'in*, there is no need to formalize the matter with an act of contract; everything he wrote to her is binding. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after *nisu'in*, he must formalize the matter with an act of contract. [2] If, [after *nisu'in*,] the husband stipulates that he will have no say with regard to [his wife's] property, and she sells it or gives it away as a present, the sale or the present is binding. Nevertheless, [the husband] is entitled to the benefits [that accrue from the property] during the time it is in her possession.
If he affirmed these statements with an act of contract between consecration [and *nisu'in*], he is considered to have waived his rights to the land itself, and he no longer has any rights to the benefits that accrue from her property.
His words are not heeded if he protests this action, saying: "I did not realize that this act of contract formalized my waiver of all rights to benefit from the property. [I thought that it only entitled my wife] to make a binding sale. [This interpretation is justified,] for no one will marry a woman without property." Instead, he is considered to have waived [all] rights to the land itself. [3] If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, he is not entitled to this benefit. Nevertheless, the benefit that accrues should be converted to financial resources, landed property should be purchased, and [the husband] is entitled to the benefits from that property. For he waived only the rights to the property [she owned originally]. [4] If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, nor to receive the benefit that results from property purchased with the income from her original property, the proceeds from that property should be used to purchase other property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefits that accrue. These are called "the fruit of the fruit's fruit."
This pattern continues until the husband makes a provision that he has no right to any by-product of the proceeds from [his wife's property]. [If he makes such a provision,] he has no right to any benefit during her lifetime, but if she dies, he inherits her entire estate. [5] If he makes a provision that he will not inherit [his wife's] property, the provision is binding. He is, however, entitled to receive the benefits that accrue [from this property] during her lifetime.
Similarly, [his word] is binding if he stipulates that he will inherit [only] a portion of her estate, or if he stipulates that if she dies without bearing children, her estate will return to her father's household. [6] When does the above apply? When he made this provision before *nisu'in*. For a man has the prerogative to forgo an inheritance that comes to him from a source outside his family before he acquires the rights to it. If, however, he made the provision after *nisu'in*, his provision is not binding, and he inherits her estate as we explained. [7] When, after *nisu'in*, [a husband] stipulates that he has no say with regard to his wife's property - not with regard to the benefits from that property nor any eventual byproducts from them during her lifetime - then after her death he is not entitled to any benefit from this property at all. If she dies, however, he inherits her estate, as explained [above]. [8] [The following rules apply] when a husband spends money [to improve property belonging to his wife that is classified as] *nichsei m'log*. Whether he spent a small amount and derived much benefit, or spent a large amount and derived little benefit [he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.
[The above applies] even if he ate only one dried fig in a respectful manner, if he ate a *dinar's* worth of produce in a haphazard manner, or if he did not even take produce [from the field on which he spent money] and took merely a bundle of twigs. [9] Similar [laws apply] if a woman inherited funds in a distant place, and the husband undertook expenses in order to bring them [to their home], or [expenses were required] to take them from the person who was holding them. If [the husband] purchased land [with these funds] and ate the measure of fruit [mentioned above, he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.
[The following procedure is adhered to if] a husband incurred expenses [on behalf of his wife's property] and did not derive any benefit or derived less benefit than the above measure. We evaluate the increment to the property, and we ask him the extent of his expenses.
If the increment is greater than the expenses, the husband must take an oath holding a sacred object, stating how much he spent. He is then reimbursed for those expenses. If the increment is less than the expenses, he receives only the amount of the expenses that is justified by the increment, and he must take an oath [with regard to the extent of those expenses]. [10] When does the above apply? When a husband divorces his wife [under ordinary circumstances]. [Different rules apply regarding] a woman who rebels against her husband [and denies him intimacy]. Even if he derived much benefit, the benefit that he derives should be evaluated and subtracted from the amount fit to be given him for the expenses he undertook. After he takes an oath [affirming his claim], he is entitled to collect it. For he did not [incur these expenses on behalf of his wife] so that she would take them and leave him on her own accord.
Similarly, [different rules apply when] a man undertakes expenses [to develop] property belonging to his wife who is below the age of majority, and she dissolves the marriage through the right of *mi'un*. We evaluate the amount of benefit he received, the amount of his expenses, the extent of the property's increment - and then he is given the share usually allocated to a sharecropper.[This consideration is taken] because he had permission to work [his wife's property]. [11] There are various customs regarding [a woman's] dowry. In certain places it is customary to [state a higher figure] in the *ketubah* [with regard to the value of the dowry], increasing by a third, a fifth or a half. For example, if the dowry was 100 [zuz], it is written [in the *ketubah*] that the woman brought 150 [to the household], in order to appear more generous in the eyes of the people. [Therefore,] when the woman comes to collect her dowry, she collects only 100.
Conversely, there are places where it is customary to write a lesser amount. If it is agreed that she will bring utensils worth 100 [zuz to the household], she must bring a value of 120 or 150, and yet, [in the *ketubah*,] it is written that she brought only [a value of] 100. And there are other places where it is customary to write a value of 100 [zuz] as 100.
There are places where it is customary for a man to give a set amount of money proportionate to the dowry, for the bride to adorn herself and purchase perfume and the like. There are places where [it is customary for] the man to add an additional sum of his own for his wife and add it to her dowry, for her to appear attractive. [12] When a man marries a woman without specifying any conditions, he should write her a *ketubah*, giving her a sum that is customarily given in that locale. Similarly, if she makes a commitment to bring [utensils to the household], she must bring what is customarily brought in that locale. And when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her *ketubah*, she collects as is customary in that locale.
In this and in all similar matters, local custom is a fundamental principle, and it is used as a basis for judgment, provided that the custom is commonly accepted in the locale. [13] [The following rules apply when a man and a woman were engaged to each other. When he asks her, "What is the value [of the utensils] you are bringing [to the household]?", and she answers him with an amount, and she asks him, "How much will you give me [for my *ketubah*]?", and he answers with an amount, and afterwards he arises and consecrates her, the commitments are binding even though they were not formalized with an act of contract.
Similarly, a commitment made by a father on behalf of his son or daughter [is binding]. For example, if he is asked, "How much will you give on behalf of your son?", and he specifies an amount, or he is asked "How much will you give on behalf of your daughter?", and he specifies an amount, [his commitment is binding].
These are commitments that are established through speech alone. [14] When does the above apply? When a father made a commitment on behalf of his daughter, whether she is a minor or past majority, or on behalf of his son, for their first marriage. For a man feels an inner connection to his son, and because of his happiness at his first marriage, he makes a definite commitment, and designates [the sum] for him with a verbal statement [alone].
[Different rules apply when], by contrast, a brother makes a commitment on behalf of his sister, a woman makes a commitment on behalf of her daughter, [when a commitment is made by] other relatives, and similarly, when a father makes a commitment on behalf of his son or daughter for a second marriage. The commitment is not binding until the person making it formalizes it with an act of contract and states the amount he will give. [15] When a father makes a commitment for his daughter, the daughter does not acquire that present until her husband consummates the marriage with her. Similarly, a son does not acquire [the present that he was promised] until he consummates his marriage. For whenever one makes [such] a commitment, his intent is that [it be fulfilled when] the marriage is consummated.
Therefore, when a man makes a commitment to his [prospective] son-in-law, but the son-in-law dies [after *erusin*, but] before the marriage is consummated, and the woman is bound to his brother, [if he desires to perform the rite of] *yibbum*, [the woman's] father may [retract his commitment], saying: "I desired to give your brother; I do not desire to give you." [This applies] even if the first husband was an unlearned man and the second is a Torah scholar, and even if the woman desires [to marry] the second man. [16] When a man makes a financial commitment to his son-in-law and then moves to another country [without fulfilling his commitment], the woman has the prerogative of telling her [prospective] husband: "I did not make this commitment myself. What can I do? Either consummate the marriage without a dowry or divorce me."
If, however, she made such a commitment herself, and she was not able to muster the funds, she must remain [in this intermediate state] until she accumulates the sum to which she committed herself or until she dies.
Why does she not release herself from her obligation by becoming a *moredet* against her husband? [Because there is a difference between these two instances.] With regard to a *moredet* who has [merely] been consecrated, the husband desires to consummate the marriage; it is she who does not desire. In this instance, by contrast, the husband does not want [to consummate his marriage with] her until she gives the dowry to which she committed herself. She, however, desires him, [as reflected by] her request: "Either consummate [the marriage] or divorce me."
When does the above apply? To a woman past majority. If, however, a woman makes a financial commitment while she is still a minor, we compel [her prospective husband] either to divorce her or to consummate the marriage without a dowry. [17] When a man marries a woman and makes a commitment to support her daughter for [an explicit number of] years, he is obligated to support her for [all] the years to which he committed himself, provided he made this commitment at the time of the woman's consecration.
If, however, he made the commitment [after] the *kiddushin* [were given], the commitment is not binding until he affirms it with an act of contract or composes a document to that effect, as will be explained in the laws of business transactions.
[The following rules apply when] a woman is divorced within the time that her husband committed himself to support her daughter, and she married another man who also committed himself to support her daughter for a particular number of years. The first husband does not have the prerogative to say: "If she comes to my house, I will support her." Instead, he must bring her support to the place where she is staying together with her mother. Similarly, both husbands do not have the prerogative of saying: "We will together provide for her support." Instead, one of the husbands must provide for her support, and the other must give her the financial value of her support. [18] [The following rules apply when the woman's] daughter marries during the time [in which her mother's husbands] obligated themselves to supply her with her sustenance. Her own husband is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, and both of her mother's husbands are obligated to give her the financial value of her support.
[Even when the men] who obligated themselves to support her die, if they affirmed their commitment to her mother with an act of contract or they composed a formal document recording their obligation, [the daughter] is considered to be a creditor whose claim is supported by a deed, and she has the prerogative of collecting her due from property that has been sold until the conclusion of the time period for which he committed himself.
If the commitment was made at the time of the *kiddushin*, and was not affirmed by an act of contract, it is a commitment that was not to be recorded in a contract, and [the daughter] does not have the prerogative of expropriating property [from purchasers] for her support.
Version: Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007
Source: https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI
License: CC-BY-NC