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8 ‎[1] If one vows: **Wine is** forbidden to me **as if** it were **an offering [*konam*],** and for **that** reason **I** will not **taste** it **today,** he is **prohibited** from drinking wine **only until** the conclusion of that day at **nightfall,** and not for a twenty-four hour period. If one vows not to drink wine **this week,** he is **prohibited** from drinking wine **for the entire** remainder of the **week. And** as **Shabbat** is considered part of the week **that passed,** i.e., it is the end of the week, he is prohibited from drinking wine on the upcoming Shabbat. If one vows not to drink wine **this month,** wine is **forbidden** to him **for the entire** remainder of the **month; and** as **the New Moon** of the following month is considered part **of the next** month, he is permitted to drink wine on that day. If he vowed not to drink wine **this year,** he is **prohibited** from drinking wine **for the entire** remainder of the **year; and** as **Rosh HaShana** is considered to be part **of the upcoming** year, not the current one, he is permitted to drink wine on that day. If he vowed not to drink wine during **this seven-year** Sabbatical cycle, wine is **forbidden** to him **for the entire** remainder of the **seven-year** cycle; **and** as **the Sabbatical** Year is considered part of the cycle **that passed,** he is prohibited from drinking wine during the upcoming Sabbatical Year. All this applies if he said that he would not drink wine on this day or this week, **but if he said** that wine is forbidden to him for **one day,** or **one week,** or **one month,** or **one year,** or **one seven-year** cycle, he is **prohibited** from drinking wine **from** the **day** and time he took the vow **to** the same time the next **day,** or week, etc.
‎[2] If he takes a vow that wine is forbidden to him **until Passover, it is forbidden** to him **until** Passover **arrives.** If he said: **Until it will be** Passover, **it is forbidden** to him **until** Passover **ends,** as he may have intended for the vow to apply as long as it was still Passover (Rosh). If he said: **Until before Passover, Rabbi Meir says:** It is **forbidden** to him **until** Passover **arrives. Rabbi Yosei says: It is forbidden** to him **until it ends.**
‎[3] If one takes a vow that something is forbidden to him **until the grain harvest,** or **until the grape harvest,** or **until the olive harvest, it is forbidden** to him **only until the arrival** of that season. **This is the principle:** With regard to **any** occasion **whose time is fixed, and one said: Until it arrives,** it is **forbidden** to him **until** the specified occasion **arrives.** If he **said: Until it will be,** it is **forbidden** to him **until** the specified occasion **ends. And** with regard to **any** occasion **whose time is not fixed,** i.e., it does not fall on a precise date, **whether he said: Until it will be,** or: **Until it arrives,** it is **forbidden** to him **only until** the specified occasion **arrives.**
‎[4] If he said: **Until the summer [*kayitz*],** or: **Until it will be summer,** the vow remains in effect **until the people begin to bring** fruit **into** their houses **in baskets.** If he said: **Until the summer has passed,** the vow remains in effect **until** the people **set aside [*yakpilu*] the knives** [***hamaktzuot***] with which the figs are cut after being harvested, and return them to their place of storage. If one takes a vow **until the harvest,** the vow remains in effect **until people begin to harvest.** This is referring to **the wheat harvest but not the barley harvest.** As for the exact date of this event, **all** is determined **according to the place** where he took **his vow. If he was on a mountain,** it is assumed that he referred to the time of the harvest on **the mountain, and if he was in a valley,** it is assumed that he meant the time of the harvest **in the valley.**
‎[5] If one takes a vow **until the rains,** or **until there are rains,** the vow remains in effect **until the second rain** of the rainy season **falls. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Until the time of the** second **rainfall arrives,** even if rain does not fall. If one takes a vow **until** the **rains end,** the vow remains in effect **until the entire** month of **Nisan has ended;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until Passover has passed.** In the case of one who said: **Wine is *konam*** for me, and for **that** reason **I will not taste** it **for the** entire **year,** if **the year was extended,** i.e., it was declared to be a leap year, he is **prohibited** from drinking wine **during** the year **and its intercalated** month. If he vowed **until the beginning of** the month of **Adar,** the vow remains in effect **until the beginning** of **the first Adar.** Similarly, if he says that his vow applies **until the end of Adar,** the vow remains in effect **until the end of the first Adar.** **Rabbi Yehuda says:** In the case of one who says: **Wine is *konam*** for me, and for **that** reason **I will not taste** it **until it will be Passover,** it is understood that **this** individual **intended** for his vow to apply **only until the night of Passover,** i.e., **until the time when it is customary for people to drink wine** in order to fulfill the mitzva of drinking the four cups, but he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to fulfill this mitzva.
‎[6] Similarly, if he said: **Meat is *konam*** for me, and for **that** reason **I will not taste** it **until it will be the fast** of Yom Kippur, **he is prohibited** from eating meat **only until the eve of [*leilei*] the fast.** This is **because** it is understood that **this** individual **intended** for his vow to apply **only until the time when it is customary for people to eat meat** in the festive meal before the fast, and he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to participate in that meal. **Rabbi Yosei, his son, says:** One who vows: **Garlic is *konam*** for me, and for **that** reason **I** will not **taste** it **until it will be Shabbat, it is prohibited** for him to eat garlic **only until the eve of Shabbat, as** it is understood that **this** individual **intended** for his vow to apply **only until the time when it is customary for people to eat garlic.**
‎[7] In the case of **one who says to another: Benefiting from you is *konam* for me,** i.e., I am prohibited from deriving benefit from you, **if you do not come and take for your son one *kor* of wheat and two barrels of wine** as a gift, **this** other individual **can dissolve his vow without** the **consent** of **a halakhic authority.** This is because **he** can **say to him:** Did **you say** your vow for **any** reason **other than due to my honor,** in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? **This is my honor,** that I refrain from accepting the gift, and consequently the vow is annulled. **And, so too,** in the case of **one who says to another: Benefiting from me is *konam* for you,** i.e., you are prohibited from deriving benefit from me, **if you do not come and give my son one *kor* of wheat and two barrels of wine, Rabbi Meir says:** It is **prohibited** for the other individual to benefit from the speaker **until he gives** the gifts to his son. However, **the Rabbis say: Even this** individual who took the vow **can dissolve his** own **vow without** the **consent of a halakhic authority.** This is because **he** can **say to him: I hereby** consider it **as though I have received** the gift. If an individual **was urging** another **to marry the daughter of his sister, and** in order to deflect the pressure, the other man **said: Benefiting from me is *konam* for her forever,** i.e., she is prohibited from deriving any benefit from me forever, **and, so too,** if there is **one who divorces his wife** and **says: Benefiting from me is *konam*** for **my wife forever, these** women **are permitted to** derive **benefit from him, as this** man **intended** to take this vow **only for the purpose** of prohibiting **marriage** between them, but not to prohibit all forms of benefit. Similarly, if one **was urging another** to **eat with him,** and the latter **said: Entering your house** is ***konam*** for **me,** as is **tasting** even **a drop of cold liquid of yours,** the individual who took the vow is nevertheless **permitted to enter his house and to drink a cold** beverage **of his.** This is **because this** individual **intended** to take this vow **only for the purpose of eating and drinking** a meal, but not to prohibit himself from entering the house entirely or from drinking in small quantities (Commentary on *Nedarim*).
9 ‎[1] **Rabbi Eliezer says:** When halakhic authorities are approached with regard to the dissolution of a vow, they **may broach** dissolution **with a person** who took a vow **by** raising the issue of how taking the vow ultimately degraded **the honor of his father and mother,** asking him the following: Had you known that your parents would experience public shame due to your lax attitude toward your vow, would you still have taken the vow? **But the Rabbis** disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and **prohibit** broaching dissolution of a vow with this particular question. To support the opinion of the Rabbis, **Rabbi Tzadok said: Instead of broaching** dissolution **with him by** raising the issue of **the honor of his father and mother, let them broach** dissolution **with him by** raising the issue of **the honor of the Omnipresent.** They should point out that a vow taken in the name of God lessens the honor of God, so they could ask him: If you had known that your vow would diminish the honor of God, would you have taken your vow? And **if so,** if this is a valid method of broaching dissolution, **there are no vows.** Nevertheless, **the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to** a vow concerning **a matter that is between him and his father and mother, that** they **may broach** dissolution **with him by** raising the issue of **the honor of his father and mother,** as in this case the extenuation is connected to this particular vow.
‎[2] **And Rabbi Eliezer further said:** They **may broach** dissolution **by** asking about **a new situation, but the Rabbis prohibit** it. **How** might they broach dissolution by asking about a new situation? If one **said: It is** forbidden to me **like an offering [*konam*] that I will** therefore not **derive benefit from so-and-so, and** that person later **became a scribe [*sofer*],** and the one who took the vow now requires his services, **or if** the one forbidden by the vow **was marrying off his son** and prepared a feast for all the residents of his town, **and** the one that had taken the vow **said: Had I known that he would become a scribe, or that he would be marrying off his son in the near** future, **I would not have vowed.** The mishna cites another example of a new situation. If one said: **Entering this house is *konam*** for me, **and** that house **became a synagogue,** and **he said: Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed,** in this and all such cases **Rabbi Eliezer permits** the halakhic authority to use this as a basis for the dissolution of the vow, **and the Rabbis prohibit** it.
‎[3] As a continuation of the opinion of the Rabbis in the previous mishna that they may not broach dissolution of a vow based on a new situation, **Rabbi Meir says: There are matters that are,** at first glance, **like a new situation but are not** in fact **like a new situation, and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so?** For example, **one said: Marrying so-and-so is *konam*** for me, **as her father is evil,** and **they told him** that her father **died, or that** he **repented.** Or he said: **Entering this house is *konam*** for me, **as there is a bad dog inside it, or a snake inside it,** and **they told him** that **the dog died, or that the snake was killed. This is** at first glance perceived **like a new situation, and** yet **it is not** in fact **like a new situation,** and this claim may be used to broach dissolution. **But the Rabbis do not concede to him.**
‎[4] **And Rabbi Meir further said:** The halakhic authorities **may broach** dissolution **with him from that which is written in the Torah, and** they **may say to him: Had you known that** through your vow **you are transgressing** the prohibition **“you shall not take vengeance”** (Leviticus 19:18) **and** the prohibition **“nor bear any grudge”** (Leviticus 19:18), **and** the prohibition **“you shall not hate your brother in your heart”** (Leviticus 19:17), and **“you shall love your neighbor as yourself”** (Leviticus 19:18), as well as **“and your brother** should **live with you”** (Leviticus 25:36), **as he,** the one prohibited by the vow, **is poor and** now **you are not able to provide him** with a livelihood due to your vow, would you have vowed in that case? If **he said** in reply: **Had I known that it is so,** that my vow involved all these prohibitions, **I would not have vowed; it is dissolved.**
‎[5] The halakhic authorities **may broach** dissolution **with a man by** raising the issue of **his wife’s marriage contract.** If one takes a vow that would require him to divorce his wife, e.g., he prohibits her from deriving benefit from him, his vow may be dissolved by asking him whether he had considered how difficult it would be to pay her marriage contract. The mishna relates: **And an incident** occurred **with regard to one who vowed** against **his wife** deriving **benefit from** him, **and her marriage contract was** worth **four hundred dinars. And he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he obligated him to give her** the payment of **her marriage contract. He said to** Rabbi Akiva: **My teacher,** my **father left eight hundred dinars** as our inheritance, of which **my brother took four hundred and I** took **four hundred. Isn’t it enough for** my wife **to take two hundred and I** will have **two hundred? Rabbi Akiva said to him:** Your claim is not accepted, as **even if you sell the hair on your head, you must give her** the full payment of **her marriage contract. He said to him: Had I known that it was so,** that I would have to give her all my property, **I would not have vowed. And Rabbi Akiva permitted her** to derive benefit from him.
‎[6] If one vowed that certain food or drink or all food and drink be forbidden to him, the halakhic authorities **may broach** dissolution **by** raising the issue of **Festivals and *Shabbatot*.** They ask him whether he realized at the time he stated his vow that he would have to uphold it on these festive days as well. **At first they said** that on **those days** that he did not intend to include in his vow, that item **is permitted, but** on **all the rest of the days,** food and drink ar**e** still **forbidden** by his vow, **until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved entirely.**
‎[7] **How so?** In the case of one who **said** to a group of people: **I will not benefit from all of you** as **it is *konam*** for me, if benefit from **one of them was permitted** for whatever reason, benefit from **all of them is permitted.** However, if one said: **I will not benefit from this** one **and from that** one as it is *konam* for me, then if benefit from **the first** one **was permitted** for whatever reason, benefit from **all** of them **is permitted.** But if benefit from **the last** one **was permitted,** benefit from **the last** one alone **is permitted, but** benefit from **all** the others **is forbidden,** as the benefit from each is considered to have been prohibited by a separate vow. If benefit from **the middle** one **was permitted,** then **from him and below,** i.e., all those enumerated after him, benefit **is permitted; from him and above,** i.e., those listed before him, benefit **is forbidden.** The mishna gives another example of interconnected vows: If one stated: **I will** not **benefit from this** one, as if he were **an offering, and from that** one, as if he were **an offering,** then **an extenuation** enabling the dissolution of a vow **is required for each and every one,** as they have the status of separate vows.
‎[8] The mishna gives another example of a vow that was partially dissolved. If one stated in a vow: **Wine is *konam*** for me and **I** will not **taste it, as wine is bad for the intestines,** and **they said to him: But aged wine is good for the intestines,** then the vow **is dissolved with regard to aged wine. And not only with regard to aged wine is it dissolved, but with regard to all** types of **wine,** since a vow that has been partially dissolved is entirely dissolved. Likewise, if one stated in a vow: **Onions are *konam*** for me and **I will not taste them, as onions are bad for the heart,** and **they said to him: But the *kuferi*** onion **is good for the heart,** then, in this case too, **it is dissolved with regard to *kuferi*** onions, **and not only with regard to *kuferi*** onions is it dissolved, **but with regard to all** types of **onions.** The mishna relates that **an incident** of this kind **occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved** the vow **with regard to all** types of **onions.**
‎[9] The halakhic authorities **may broach** dissolution **for a person by** raising the issue of **his own honor and the honor of his children.** For example, if he took a vow that resulted in his needing to divorce his wife, they may **say to him: Had you known that tomorrow people will say about you: This is the habit [*veset*] of so-and-so,** that **he divorces his wives** due to vows, **and they will say about your daughters: They are daughters of divorce,** or they will ask: **What did their mother see to divorce,** thereby giving them a bad reputation. **And** if the man who vowed **said: Had I known it was so, I would not have vowed, it is dissolved.**
‎[10] The mishna continues: If a man said: **Marrying ugly so-and-so is *konam* for me, and she is** in fact **beautiful,** or if, in vowing not to marry her, he called her **black, and she is** in fact **white,** or if, in vowing not to marry her, he called her **short, and she is** in fact **tall, he is permitted to her. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and became white,** or **short and became tall,** but **rather, because the vow was mistaken** from the outset. The Gemara relates: **And an incident** occurred **with regard to one who vowed** against deriving **benefit from the daughter of his sister,** as he did not wish to marry her. **And they brought her into** the **house of Rabbi Yishmael and he beautified her.** When she was later brought before the one who took the vow, **Rabbi Yishmael said to him: My son, did you vow** that you would not derive benefit **from this** woman? **He said to him: No, and Rabbi Yishmael permitted her** to him, as he demonstrated that the vow had been made in error. **At that time Rabbi Yishmael wept and said: The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty makes them ugly. And when Rabbi Yishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lamentation, saying: Daughters of Israel, weep for Rabbi Yishmael. And it likewise states about Saul,** who also concerned himself with the welfare of the daughters of Israel: **“Daughters of Israel, weep over Saul,** who clothed you in scarlet with other delights, who put ornaments of gold upon your apparel” (II Samuel 1:24).
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