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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Chen
Request for Comments: 9468 Palo Alto Networks
Category: Standards Track N. Shen
ISSN: 2070-1721 Zededa
R. Raszuk
Arrcus
R. Rahman
Equinix
August 2023
Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Sessionless
Applications
Abstract
For operational simplification of "sessionless" applications using
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), in this document, we
present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to
be initiated by only one side and established without explicit per-
session configuration or registration by the other side (subject to
certain per-interface or global policies).
We also introduce a new YANG module to configure and manage
"unsolicited BFD". The YANG module in this document is based on YANG
1.1, as defined in RFC 7950, and conforms to the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA), as described in RFC 8342. This
document augments RFC 9314.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9468.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD
3. State Variables
4. YANG Data Model
4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy
4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module
4.3. Data Model Example
5. IANA Considerations
6. Security Considerations
6.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations
6.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations
6.3. YANG Module Security Considerations
7. References
7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The current implementation and deployment practice for BFD ([RFC5880]
and [RFC5881]) usually requires that BFD sessions be explicitly
configured or registered on both sides. This requirement is not an
issue when an application like BGP [RFC4271] has the concept of a
"session" that involves both sides for its establishment. However,
this requirement can be operationally challenging when the
prerequisite "session" does not naturally exist between two endpoints
in an application. Simultaneous configuration and coordination may
be required on both sides for BFD to take effect. For example:
* When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the next hop
of static routes. Although only one side may need the BFD
functionality, currently, both sides need to be involved in
specific configuration and coordination, and in some cases, static
routes are created unnecessarily just for BFD.
* When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the third-
party next hop of BGP routes received from the Route Server
[RFC7947] at an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). As the third-party
next hop is different from the peering address of the Route
Server, for BFD to work, currently, two routers peering with the
Route Server need to have routes and next hops from each other
(although indirectly via the Route Server).
Clearly, it is beneficial and desirable to reduce or eliminate
unnecessary configurations and coordination in these "sessionless"
applications using BFD.
In this document, we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that
allow a BFD session to be initiated by only one side and established
without explicit per-session configuration or registration by the
other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).
Unsolicited BFD impacts only the initiation of BFD sessions. There
is no change to all the other procedures specified in [RFC5880], such
as, but not limited to, the Echo function and Demand mode.
With "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for excessive
resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate
such risks, several mechanisms are recommended in the Security
Considerations section.
The procedure described in this document could be applied to BFD for
multihop paths [RFC5883]. However, because of security risks, this
document applies only to BFD for single IP hops [RFC5881].
Compared to the "Seamless BFD" [RFC7880], this proposal involves only
minor procedural enhancements to the widely deployed BFD itself.
Thus, we believe that this proposal is inherently simpler in the
protocol itself and deployment. As an example, it does not require
the exchange of BFD discriminators over an out-of-band channel before
BFD session bring-up.
When BGP ADD-PATH [RFC7911] is deployed at an IXP using a Route
Server, multiple BGP paths (when they exist) can be made available to
the clients of the Route Server, as described in [RFC7947].
Unsolicited BFD can be used by BGP route selection's route
resolvability condition (Section 9.1.2.1 of [RFC4271]) to exclude
routes where the NEXT_HOP is not reachable using the procedures
specified in this document.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD
With "unsolicited BFD", one side takes the "Active role" and the
other side takes the "Passive role", as described in [RFC5880],
Section 6.1.
Passive unsolicited BFD support MUST be disabled by default and MUST
require explicit configuration to be enabled. On the passive side,
the following BFD parameters, from [RFC5880], Section 6.8.1, SHOULD
be configurable:
* bfd.DesiredMinTxInterval
* bfd.RequiredMinRxInterval
* bfd.DetectMult
The passive side MAY also choose to use the values of the parameters
listed above that the active side uses in its BFD Control packets.
However, the bfd.LocalDiscr value MUST be selected by the passive
side to allow multiple unsolicited BFD sessions.
The active side starts sending the BFD Control packets, as specified
in [RFC5880]. The passive side does not send BFD Control packets
initially; it sends BFD Control packets only after it has received
BFD Control packets from the active side.
When the passive side receives a BFD Control packet from the active
side with 0 as "Your Discriminator" and does not find an existing BFD
session, the passive side SHOULD create a matching BFD session toward
the active side, unless not permitted by local configuration or
policy.
When the passive side receives an incoming BFD Control packet on a
numbered interface, the source address of that packet MUST belong to
the subnet of the interface on which the BFD packet is received, else
the BFD Control packet MUST NOT be processed.
The passive side MUST then start sending BFD Control packets and
perform the necessary procedure for bringing up, maintaining, and
tearing down the BFD session. If the BFD session fails to get
established within a certain amount of time (which is implementation
specific but has to be at least equal to the local failure detection
time) or if an established BFD session goes down, the passive side
MUST stop sending BFD Control packets and SHOULD delete the BFD
session created until BFD Control packets are initiated by the active
side again.
When an unsolicited BFD session goes down, an implementation may
retain the session state for a period of time. Retaining this state
can be useful for operational purposes.
3. State Variables
This document defines a new state variable called Role:
bfd.Role
This is the role of the local system during BFD session
initialization, as per [RFC5880], Section 6.1. Possible values are
Active or Passive.
4. YANG Data Model
This section extends the YANG data model for BFD [RFC9314] to cover
unsolicited BFD. The new module imports the YANG modules described
in [RFC8349] since the "bfd" container in [RFC9314] is under
"control-plane-protocol". The YANG module in this document conforms
to the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].
4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy
Configuration for unsolicited BFD parameters for IP single-hop
sessions can be done at 2 levels:
* globally, i.e., for all interfaces
* for specific interfaces (this requires support for the
"unsolicited-params-per-interface" feature)
If configuration exists at both levels, per-interface configuration
takes precedence over global configuration.
For operational data, a new "role" leaf node has been added for BFD
IP single-hop sessions.
The tree diagram below uses the graphical representation of data
models, as defined in [RFC8340].
module: ietf-bfd-unsolicited
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh:
+--rw unsolicited?
+--rw local-multiplier? multiplier
+--rw (interval-config-type)?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:interfaces:
+--rw unsolicited
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw local-multiplier?
bfd-types:multiplier
{bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--rw (interval-config-type)?
{bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {bfd-types:single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session:
+--ro role? bfd-unsol:role
4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bfd-unsolicited@2023-08-31.yang"
module ietf-bfd-unsolicited {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited";
prefix bfd-unsol;
import ietf-bfd-types {
prefix bfd-types;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-bfd {
prefix bfd;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-bfd-ip-sh {
prefix bfd-ip-sh;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-routing {
prefix rt;
reference
"RFC 8349: A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version)";
}
organization
"IETF BFD Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/bfd/>
WG List: <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
Editors: Enke Chen (enchen@paloaltonetworks.com),
Naiming Shen (naiming@zededa.com),
Robert Raszuk (robert@raszuk.net),
Reshad Rahman (reshad@yahoo.com)";
description
"This module contains the YANG definition for unsolicited BFD,
as per RFC 9468.
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons
identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9468; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Sessionless Applications";
revision 2023-08-31 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
for Sessionless Applications";
}
/*
* Feature definitions
*/
feature unsolicited-params-per-interface {
description
"This feature indicates that the server supports per-interface
parameters for unsolicited sessions.";
reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
for Sessionless Applications";
}
/*
* Type Definitions
*/
identity role {
description
"Base identity from which all roles are derived.
Role of local system during BFD session initialization.";
}
identity active {
base bfd-unsol:role;
description
"Active role.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}
identity passive {
base bfd-unsol:role;
description
"Passive role.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}
/*
* Augments
*/
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD parameters.";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop unsolicited top-level container.";
uses bfd-types:base-cfg-parms;
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"
+ "bfd-ip-sh:interfaces" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD on IP single-hop
interface.";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop interface unsolicited top-level
container.";
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Unsolicited BFD is enabled on this interface.";
}
/*
* The following is the same as bfd-types:base-cfg-parms, but
* without default values (for inheritance)
*/
leaf local-multiplier {
if-feature "bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface";
type bfd-types:multiplier;
description
"Multiplier transmitted by the local system. Defaults to
../../unsolicited/local-multiplier.
A multiplier configured under an interface takes
precedence over the multiplier configured at the global
level.";
}
choice interval-config-type {
if-feature "bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface";
description
"Two interval values or one value used for both transmit
and receive. Defaults to
../../unsolicited/interval-config-type. An interval
configured under an interface takes precedence over any
interval configured at the global level.";
case tx-rx-intervals {
leaf desired-min-tx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Desired minimum transmit interval of control
packets.";
}
leaf required-min-rx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Required minimum receive interval of control
packets.";
}
}
case single-interval {
if-feature "bfd-types:single-minimum-interval";
leaf min-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Desired minimum transmit interval and required
minimum receive interval of control packets.";
}
}
}
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"
+ "bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD on IP single-hop session.";
leaf role {
type identityref {
base bfd-unsol:role;
}
config false;
description
"Role.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
4.3. Data Model Example
This section shows an example on how to configure the passive end of
unsolicited BFD:
* We have global BFD IP single-hop unsolicited configuration with a
local-multiplier of 2 and min-interval at 50 ms.
* BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth0 with a
local-multiplier of 3 and min-interval at 250 ms.
* BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth1. Since
there is no parameter configuration for eth1, it inherits from the
global configuration.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<interfaces xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces">
<interface>
<name>eth0</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
<interface>
<name>eth1</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
</interfaces>
<routing xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing">
<control-plane-protocols>
<control-plane-protocol>
<type xmlns:bfd-types=
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-types">
bfd-types:bfdv1</type>
<name>name:BFD</name>
<bfd xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd">
<ip-sh xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-ip-sh">
<unsolicited>
<local-multiplier>2</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>50000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth0</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<local-multiplier>3</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>250000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth1</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
</ip-sh>
</bfd>
</control-plane-protocol>
</control-plane-protocols>
</routing>
</config>
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered the following namespace URI in the "ns"
subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
Names" registry [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Maintained by IANA: N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Prefix: bfd-unsol
Reference: RFC 9468
6. Security Considerations
6.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations
The same security considerations and protection measures as those
described in [RFC5880] and [RFC5881] apply to this document. In
addition, with "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for
excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To
mitigate such risks, implementations of unsolicited BFD MUST:
* Limit the feature to specific interfaces and to single-hop BFD
sessions using the procedures from [RFC5082]. See Section 5 of
[RFC5881] for the details of these procedures.
* Apply policy to process BFD packets only from certain subnets or
hosts.
* Deploy the feature only in an environment that does not offer
anonymous participation. Examples include an IXP, where the IXP
operator will have a business relationship with all IXP
participants, or between a provider and its customers.
6.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations
Implementations of unsolicited BFD are RECOMMENDED to use BFD
authentication; see [RFC5880]. If BFD authentication is used, the
strongest BFD authentication mechanism that is supported MUST be
used.
In some environments, such as IXPs, BFD authentication cannot be used
because of the lack of coordination for the operation of the two
endpoints of the BFD session.
In other environments, such as when BFD is used to track the next hop
of static routes, it is possible to use BFD authentication. This
comes with the extra cost of configuring matching key chains between
the two endpoints.
6.3. YANG Module Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer
is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure
transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer
is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS
[RFC8446].
The Network Configuration Access Control Mode (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/unsolicited:
* Data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP
single-hop sessions globally, i.e., on all interfaces. See
Section 6.1.
* Data nodes "local-multiplier", "desired-min-tx-interval",
"required-min-rx-interval", and "min-interval" all impact the
parameters of the unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions.
Write operations to these nodes change the rates of BFD packet
generation and detection time of the failures of a BFD session.
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/interfaces/interface/unsolicited:
* Data node "enabled" enables the creation of unsolicited BFD IP
single-hop sessions on a specific interface. See Section 6.1.
* Data nodes "local-multiplier", "desired-min-tx-interval",
"required-min-rx-interval", and "min-interval" all impact the
parameters of the unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions on the
interface.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/sessions/session/role:
Access to this information discloses the role of the local system
in the creation of the unsolicited BFD session.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8349] Lhotka, L., Lindem, A., and Y. Qu, "A YANG Data Model for
Routing Management (NMDA Version)", RFC 8349,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8349, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8349>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9314] Jethanandani, M., Ed., Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed.,
Pallagatti, S., and G. Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 9314,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9314, September 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9314>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5883] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Multihop Paths", RFC 5883, DOI 10.17487/RFC5883,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5883>.
[RFC7880] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S.
Pallagatti, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10.17487/RFC7880, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7880>.
[RFC7911] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
"Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7911>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Alvaro Retana, Dan
Romascanu, Derek Atkins, Greg Mirsky, Gyan Mishra, Henning Rogge,
Jeffrey Haas, John Scudder, Lars Eggert, Magnus Westerlund, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Murray Kucherawy, Raj Chetan, Robert Wilton, Roman
Danyliw, Tom Petch, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker for their reviews and
valuable input.
Authors' Addresses
Enke Chen
Palo Alto Networks
3000 Tannery Way
Santa Clara, CA 95054
United States of America
Email: enchen@paloaltonetworks.com
Naiming Shen
Zededa
160 W Santa Clara Street
San Jose, CA 95113
United States of America
Email: naiming@zededa.com
Robert Raszuk
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place
San Jose, CA 95110
United States of America
Email: robert@raszuk.net
Reshad Rahman
Equinix
Canada
Email: reshad@yahoo.com