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Mail-From: ARPAnet host SRI-CSL rcvd at Wed Sep 28 15:58-PDT
Date: 26 Sep 1983 20:08-PDT
Sender: GEOFF@SRI-CSL
Subject: Telecommunications Security and Privacy.
From: the tty of Geoffrey S. Goodfellow
Reply-To: Geoff@SRI-CSL
To: Human-nets:,
To: Telecom:,
To: Security-Forum:,
To: Info-Micro:
Cc: csl:,
Cc: others:
Message-ID: <[SRI-CSL]26-Sep-83 20:08:20.GEOFF>
Redistributed-To: dist:
Redistributed-By: GEOFF at SRI-CSL
Redistributed-Date: 28 Sep 1983
On Monday, September 26th, I appeared before and presented invited
testimony at the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Transportation, Aviation and Materials on the subject of Telecommunications
Security and Privacy.
Due to the activities of the Milwaukee 414s and the subsequent hoopla that
has been generated in the media, HACKING has been getting a bad name. I
therefore decided to address my testimony to the TRUE nature of computer
hackers and hacking (in an attempt to put the entire situation in some type
of perspective). I also addressed what can and should be done to help
abate the 'unsavory' hacking problem. And lastly, how low tech the current
hackings have been and what we might be seeing more of in the future.
I'm told the hearings went out live over CNN -- there were at least 16
video cameras that I could count and the rest of the room was jammed to
standing room only with reporters and other media.
Individuals who presented testimony were: Neal Patrick (of the 414s); Jimmy
McClary (Los Alamos Division leader for Security); Donn Parker and myself
(from SRI); and Steve Walker (formerly of DARPA/Pentagon).
Those interested in what I had to say about hacking and such are invited to
FTP a copy of my prepared testimony from [SRI-CSL]<GEOFF>HOUSE.DOC; There
is also a .LPT version with line-printer overstriking, should you want
that. If you cannot FTP a copy for whatever reason, I'll be able to send
one by netmail if you mail a request to Geoff@SRI-CSL.
Geoff
...............................................................................
...............................................................................
TESTIMONY BY GEOFFREY S. GOODFELLOW
Before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials
on the subject of Telecommunications Security and Privacy.
26 September 1983
1. Introduction
My name is Geoffrey S. Goodfellow. I am primarily employed by the
Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International, Menlo Park, California.
For the past 10 years at SRI, I have been involved in research efforts
related with packet switched computer network communication systems,
protocols and security technologies. I have also been involved in
various operating and sub-system development projects. Currently, my
responsibilities include a position as Principle Investigator of SRI's
involvement in a Department of Defense program aimed at developing and
proving secure computer systems, that operate at different security
levels and communicate via networks. A detailed biography of my career
from 7th grade school where I discovered computers (which
eventually lead to my permanent abandonment of the formal educational
system during high school) to how I got to where I am today with no
degrees or any type of equivalency to my name is included at the end of
my testimony.
I am a coauthor of the Hacker's Dictionary -- A Guide to the World of
Computer Wizards, a new book being published this fall.
THE STATEMENTS INCLUDED HEREIN ARE MY OWN AND DO NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT THOSE OF SRI INTERNATIONAL OR ANY CLIENTS OF SRI.
2. The Nature of Computer Hackers and Hacking.
The primary nature of a computer hacker can be defined as follows:
- A person who enjoys learning or knowing the details of computer
systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most
users of computers, who prefer to learn or know only the minimum
amount necessary in order to get their job done.
- One who programs computers enthusiastically, for the sheer fun of it,
and gets a non professional amount of enjoyment out of using them.
- A person capable of appreciating the irony and beauty (i.e. `hack
value') of a program.
- A person who is good at programming quickly or is an expert on a
particular program. (This definition and the proceeding ones are
correlated, and people who fit them congregate).
Unfortunately, though, hacking has an unsavory faction to it:
- A malicious or inquisitive meddler (i.e. `poacher') who tries to
discover information by poking around. For example, a "password
hacker" is one who tries, possibly by deceptive or illegal means, to
discover other people's computer passwords. A "network hacker" is
one who tries to learn about the computer network (possibly because
he wants to interfere--one can tell the difference only by context,
tone of voice and manner of approach).
Hackers of all factions, whether benign or of the unsavory flavor,
consider themselves somewhat of an elite, though one to which new members
are gladly welcome. Hacking is meritocracy based on ability.
There is a certain self-satisfaction in identifying yourself as a hacker
(but if you claim to be one and are not, you'll quickly be labelled
`bogus').
The hacker is intensely interested in technology and is a very
inquisitive person. Many are social outcasts who don't enjoy the same
things as most other kids their age. Hackers of the unsavory flavor are a
very curious breed of individual -- many can best be described as
loners looking for someone to appreciate their talents. They know full
well that what they're doing errs on the `dark side (of the force)' --
to coin a phrase. Unsavory hackers want to get caught so they can be given
the appreciation they desire -- and the process of getting caught adds an
essence of thrill to their endeavor.
I would like to state for the record, that benign hackers, such as I,
deplore the unsanctioned entry and subsequent rummaging of mainframe
computer systems and networks. These types of activities are tarnishing
the profession of hacking and giving it a bad name.
In the Real World, computer system organizations are generally run
like totalitarian police states. This unfortunate reality fosters
resentment in hackers and a desire to challenge the reverence of
authority develops. As a result, the way hackers bring themselves to a
system managers attention is via the medium they know and relate to best:
a terminal and modem and your computer system. In most cases, the hacker
wouldn't personally think of or know how to go about calling up the
director of a computer system and offering his services to you as a bright
young guy for the fear of reprisals or not being taken seriously.
Instead, they choose to `introduce' you to them by meddling with your
computer system, cavalierly circumventing security and protection
mechanisms, in order to satiate their hunger for knowledge and
develop an understanding of how things work.
The organization will respond in kind by trying to `plug the leak' of
an intrusion into their system by erecting barriers. This type of
reaction is precisely the wrong approach to take, because the hacker
will notice the beefed-up defenses and see them as a further
challenge of his prowess and ingenuity and legitimate users are subjected
to greater inconvenience.
Instead, what an organization should do is try to befriend hackers which
have penetrated their inner sanctums. The perspective that should be
taken is one of "Is it helpful or useful for you to do this?" rather
than "Are you authorized to do this?". You must in effect come down to
the hackers level and circulate among them. Show them that you appreciate
their talents. If you ask them nonforeboding questions and take a genuine
interest in what they're doing, most of the time you'll find they're more
than happy to tell you exactly what it is they're looking for or
interested in. The hacker wants to learn and you can be their
guide/teacher. This is how I was dealt with by the firm that caught
me during my unsavory hacking days in 1973 when I breached security on a
large commercial timesharing network and many of its host computer
systems. I was very much inspired by this method of catching and steering
unsavory hackers towards more constructive use of their talents.
There is, however, a more virulent strain of the unsavory faction, namely
the electronic vandals or joy-riders (N.B. NOT HACKERS). This strain
includes, for example, kids whose parents are of an affluent nature. As a
result, these kids have an inflated world picture and little or no true
sense of reality, due to the nature of their care-free life styles and
upbringing. These kids plague computer systems and networks as they
would spray paint on school walls, t-p someone's house, or engage in the
use of so called 'recreational' drugs. In other words, these illicit
activities are engaged in with absolute reckless abandon and disregard for
the rights or sovereignty of other people's property. As with regular
vandalism, the primary motivators seems to be simply doing it because
they can get away with it, and because of the respect it brings them
among their equally disrespectful peers. This differs from the unsavory
hacker in that there is no constructive purpose or motive involved, such
as learning or acquiring knowledge. This problem is further
exacerbated by the juvenile age of the perpetrators and the unlikelihood of
prosecution, even if caught. The perpetrators are smugly aware of their
immunity in most cases!
3. What Can and Should Be Done to Help Abate The Unsavory Hacking Problem?
From my own observations and inspections of systems and from what I have
been reading in the press, I have come to the conclusion that
computer site administrators are not taking reasonable and prudent
measures to protect their computer systems from even the most casual
methods of circumvention. A rather egregious example of this would be the
installation of which the 414s allegedly logged into with username "test"
and password "test". Usernames and passwords of this sort are not uncommon
and sites which set up logins like this are just asking for a break in
-- just as someone who would leave a key in the lock on the front door of
their house, complete with the WELCOME! mat out for all to see, invites
the casual burglar.
The way I view `reasonable and prudent' measures of protection from the
casual penetration is by drawing a paradigm with the way DoD classified
information is handled.
With respect to the handling and use of classified information, it is
the responsibility of the organization to which you belong, in conformance
with DoD guidelines, to provide you with rules and regulations in
the handling of classified information. It is also the responsibility of
your organization to provide you with a safe place (i.e. a vault) to
store said information and to provide adequate safeguards (such as alarm
systems, security personnel and patrols) to prevent unauthorized access.
The same methodology should be taken to heart by administrators of
computer systems. It's their responsibility to provide reasonable and
prudent measures to prevent unauthorized access attempts from gaining
access to the system. This means a few very basic things like:
- Forcing users to choose reasonable passwords - not their spouse's
name or their dog's name.
- Setting up proper modem controls on dial-up/remote access ports so
that disconnection causes any jobs (or trojan horses left on the
port) to be flushed and results in resetting the port to not-logged
in status.
- Reporting incorrect password attempts to the system console or log
file.
- Causing line disconnection after a few successively repeated
incorrect password attempts.
- Using encrypted passwords, so it is not possible to compromise an
entire systems password list when circumvention of a systems
protection mechanisms is attained. This is analogous to the DoD's
compartmentalization of information -- so a breach in one area does
not sacrifice security in all areas.
The second facet of the paradigm is the users' responsibility. I don't go
out to lunch and leave my secrets sitting on my desk. I put them in a
vault. And I don't go throwing them over the embassy walls. So it is
the same for the computer system user. It is the users
responsibility to choose reasonable passwords and not leave them written
down anywhere, such as on their desk blotter or white board or to
pass them out to others.
The third matter is a paradigm of a different nature. This has to do
with socially acceptable values. Namely, when I was brought up, I was
taught about trespassing. If I went to someone's house and found the front
door wide open, I don't really know of anyone who would walk right in
and look around. They would instead stand at the door, ring the doorbell
or knock or call out. This type of responsibility or sense of morals
has to be applied to the computer technology field.
Research into methods of improving the safeguarding of information flow
through technology should be pursued. One such project is the one of which
I am the Principle Investigator of at SRI, which has to do with this type
of technology. Our involvement has to do with developing and proving
technologies that will absolutely assure that I will only have access to
information in a computer system database of which my clearance and
my `need to know' entitles me too, while prohibiting me from information I
am not cleared or permitted to access. However, one must carefully weigh
the value of increased security with the cost in user convenience and
flexibility.
Explicit federal and state criminal statutes should be enacted to
allow a vehicle for vigorous prosecution, should it be warranted or
desired, by injured parties. These explicit laws would also hopefully
act as a method of deterrence.
4. Let Us Not Lull Ourselves into a False Sense of Security.
In general unsanctioned computer system penetrations can be
performed by individuals who possess three basic aspects of computer
knowledge: access, skill and information.
Access can be defined as a terminal and modem. Skill can be
defined as ingenuity or familiarity with computer systems, especially
with the given system type that the penetration is directed
towards. Information can be defined as dial-up phone numbers, network
address or means of accessing a given computer system -- perhaps even
physical. Information can also include various methods, most likely in the
form of 'bugs' (i.e. shortcomings) or 'features' (i.e. an aspect
inherent to the hardware or software design of the system) which will
permit the holder to circumvent the operating system security and
protection mechanisms, and in effect gain carte blanche access to the
computer. Carte blanche can be defined as allowing the holder to override
file security and protection considerations, in that you can read or alter
any data and even change the nature of the computer operating system
software itself.
In the good ol' days such skill and information was not widely known.
However, with the ever increasing number of computer systems, both
personal and mainframe alike, information and skill is spreading to an
ever increasing number of individuals and institutions.
Unfortunately, not all of the individuals are as scrupulous as they
should be. Such instruments as `Pirate Bulletin Board' systems are
being used to disseminate this information on a nationwide, on-call, as
needed basis.
What does this mean?
Up until now most unsanctioned computer system penetrations have not been
the high technological acts of chicanery the media has made them out to
be. They were primarily performed by individuals who were as familiar
with computer technology as, say, an auto enthusiast is with what goes
on under the hood of your car. The 'auto whiz' has the breadth of
knowledge necessary to 'hot wire' a motor vehicle, just as your computer
literate individual has the breadth necessary to perform a
technological 'hot wire' inside a computer system.
However, the current low to medium technological approaches to
system penetrations are likely to change.
I define the technological levels as follows: high tech is defined as a
new method of circumvention. High tech methods are primarily
invented by individuals or a group of individuals who have an in depth
understanding of the desired technology the caper is directed against.
Medium tech can be defined as an individual who has the same basic level
of understanding as the high tech guy, but uses the knowledge and
perhaps fine tunes or refines it a bit (i.e. the medium tech individual is
a knowledgeable user). The low tech individual is just a user of
the knowledge with little or no understanding of what is involved in making
the technology perform its desired function.
In the not to distant future with higher stakes, increased levels of
knowledge and other aspects better understood, I believe we will see a
trend towards a more 'higher tech' level of system penetrations and
circumventions. These capers will be harder to detect and deter.
The further development of formal specification and verification techniques
and associated technologies will permit the system developers,
reviewers or specifier himself to verify that a given system
specification is consistent with a given model of desired operation.
5. Recommendations
In conclusion, I would like to say that I believe the scale of the
hacking problem is going to escalate dramatically as more of the technology
makes its way into the mass market. There is no one easy solution to
these problems. The directions that need to be taken are technological,
ethical/moral and social. Hopefully an increased awareness of the
vulnerability of our systems to penetration and circumvention will allow us
to see the light, in the form of solutions, at the end of the tunnel. And
hopefully that light, is not a train.
6. Biography (The Making of a Hacker)
My first experience with computers (and the world of `hacking')
manifested itself during my 7th grade school when I discovered a room
full of teletypes connected to a computer system at Stanford University
which offered Computer Assisted Instruction/drill programs.
Having discovered `The Computer Room', I started arriving at school early
each day to be able to play with them. I would also spend the lunch
hour, recess and as long as I could after school in the computer room, as
well.
Luckily, that summer I was permitted to hang-out at the Stanford facility
which had the computer system that served our school and others. This
allowed me the opportunity to interact with the system designers and
learn how everything worked. At the facility, I quickly began to
develop a keen interest in system-level software, such as the
operating system and privileged type programs which only `the wizards'
could run or know the inner workings of. However, I did not let this
fact keep me from learning about the system.
During the 8th grade, my parents wishing to contribute to their son's
apparent avid absorption of computer technology, procured a used teletype
machine and modem from a large time-sharing computer firm. I don't
know how, but in the process, they managed to talk the firm out of `free'
account for after hours and weekend use. The firm then promptly
forgot about me. After running the usual course of computer games, which
quickly became quite boring, my attention turned towards the operating
system and its protection mechanism, which I took delight in finding
ways around. This of course, was noticed by the time-sharing
company and one summer evening, after they were sure it was me inside
their system, their vice president and district manager came knocking at
our door, and in effect said, "gotcha!". The result of being caught was
that I was hired for the summer to help them make their system more
secure and plug the holes that I had uncovered in my wanderings.
While employed for the summer, 1973, I chanced to meet up with another
summer hire who had done some work at NASA-AMES and had knowledge of a
Department of Defense computer network, called the ARPANET, which linked
together computers all over the country at various research
establishments, universities and military bases. My new-found friend
passed me a dial-up number, and on a scrap of paper, wrote a few commands
that would allow me to connect up to various systems on the network.
In these early days of the ARPANET (which pioneered packet
switching technology, a method for allowing computers of different flavors
and types to `talk' to one-another), the majority of the computers had
`guest' accounts on them with purposefully obvious and published passwords.
This was done in order to promote the free use of resources at other host
systems and to let users of the network have a chance to explore, learn and
use said systems.
Needless to say, this was a gold mine that no hacker, such as myself,
could pass up. So I spent the better part of the summer learning and
using as many different computer systems as possible, all over the country.
One of my favorite systems to use was the guest login account on a host
called SRI-AI, a PDP-10 running the Tenex operating system, which
belonged to the Stanford Research Institute's Artificial Intelligence
Center. I thought it nice to have a system right in my very own home
town. I made it a point to get to know the operations of this system as
well as I could in hopes that perhaps someday I might have a login account
of my own to use and it would be nice to be familiar with it in such an
event.
Well, that day came when, as usual, I logged into the public guest account,
and out popped a message of the form "Welcome to the SRI-AI computer
public guest account. If you think you have a need for your own account,
send a note (with the on-line electronic mail program, of course) to
the system administrator, explaining your need."
Such an invitation was just to good to pass up and having my very own
login account is something I had dreamed about. So, I took it upon myself
to send a message saying I was a hacker who had been spending time on the
public guest account learning about their system and wanted to have an
increased level of access and login area of my own to store files. In
return, I would freely help improve the systems capabilities thru my
hacking.
After some initial trepidation on the part of the systems administrator
was overcome, my account was granted. This allowed me to make SRI-AI my
home base of network operations. I immediately proceeded to hack
away to my heart's content, now that, in effect, I had become a legitimate
network user.
After demonstrating my competence and some semblance of responsibility, I
was granted system privileges (i.e. carte blanche access to all system
resources). This permitted me to learn and develop a further understanding
of the system.
So, I hung around SRI for about 9 months. I was given a building pass, so
as to have physical as well as electronic (remote) access to the computer
systems. This allowed me to come and go at odd hours, which are the
hours hackers are best known to keep.
Then, there was an opening for a part-time weekend computer operator's job,
and since I had demonstrated my competence, I was immediately hired
for the position. I was now in my senior year of high school, and as a
result of my increased access to computers, my grade average followed the
typical hacker curve, i.e. down. until, two weeks into the final quarter
of my senior year in high school, I dropped out, and became full-time at
SRI. I have never returned to a classroom since the day I left school in
1974.
I dropped out, and became full-time at
SRI. I have never re