💾 Archived View for spam.works › mirrors › textfiles › politics › gorecrpt.rec captured on 2024-02-05 at 13:48:46.
⬅️ Previous capture (2023-06-16)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
FLASH: Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy
Date: 10 Feb 1994 23:40:13 GMT
National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in
Washington at the Old Executive Office Building. In comments made after
a question and answer period, Vice President Al Gore said that key
escrow policy announced last Friday (2/4/94) had serious flaws and that
he hope the issue of who holds the keys and under what terms would be
given more serious, careful consideration.
Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography technology
was necessary for national security. However, the key escrow policies
announced by the Departments of Justice, Commerce & State, and the NSA,
were "low level decisions" that got out before thorough analysis. In a
conversation with Mitchell Kapor, Esther Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the
White House Staff), Gore said that he would prefer that the keys be held
by some part of the Judiciary branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private
escrow agents. He made it clear that he believed that the escrow agents
named in last Friday's announcement (National Institute of Standards &
Technology and the Treasure Department) were no appropriate key holders.
Mike Nelson also indicated that there was real interest in a
software-based escrow system instead of the hardware-based SKIPJACK
standard
Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised. His remarks suggest
that the key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the
White House.
Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of encryption
technology is essential to national security. "Encryption and
codebreaking have determined the outcome of world wars. He stated
(incorrectly) that most our industrialized allies place must stricter
controls in encryption that the US does. In fact, almost all COCOM
countries allow the export of DES-based products, though some do not
allow DES to be imported.
The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told the
Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had serious
reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies. Gore and Kapor
agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have a serious
dialogue about encryption policy. Given Gore's departure from the
current Clipper proposals, there might actually be something to talk
about.
==========
NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away. Part of stopping
Clipper is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US companies
to start producing products that enable all of us to protect our privacy
with strong encryption.
I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
Subject header.*
P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
For introductory info about EFF, send any message to info@eff.org.
The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the any of
the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
Danny Weitzner Senior Staff Counsel, EFF
+1 202 347-5400