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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
Request for Comments: 8608 sn3rd
Obsoletes: 8208 O. Borchert
Updates: 7935 NIST
Category: Standards Track June 2019
ISSN: 2070-1721
BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats
used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document
updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure") and obsoletes RFC 8208
("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats") by adding
Documentation and Experimentation Algorithm IDs, correcting the range
of unassigned algorithms IDs to fill the complete range, and
restructuring the document for better reading.
This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as
the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
necessary to validate those signatures.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8608.
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Algorithm ID Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256) . . . . . . . . 6
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA
P-256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Signature Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1. Topology and Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
1. Introduction
This document specifies the following:
o the digital signature algorithm and parameters,
o the hash algorithm and parameters,
o the algorithm identifier assignment and classification,
o the public and private key formats, and
o the signature formats
used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification
Authorities (CAs) and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security)
speakers (i.e., routers). CAs use these algorithms when processing
requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [RFC8209]. Examples of when
BGPsec routers use these algorithms include requesting BGPsec
certificates [RFC8209], signing BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205], and
verifying signatures on BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205].
This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec
signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature
algorithm. The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other
RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as
defined in [RFC8209]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]
[DSS] from the rest of the RPKI to provide similar security with
smaller keys, making the certificates smaller; these algorithms also
result in smaller signatures, which make the PDUs smaller.
Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as
well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the
certificates necessary to validate the signatures.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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1.2. Changes from RFC 8208
This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and
this document.
o Added Section 2.1 containing Algorithm ID types. Also, the
interpretation of these IDs is described.
o Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding
algorithm suite identifier value.
o Corrected the range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier
values.
o Added Documentation algorithm suite identifier values.
o Added Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values.
o Changed the next-hop IP in Appendix A's IPv6 example to use a
private usage IPv6 address.
2. Algorithms
The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as
specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935]. This section addresses
algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these
algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec
UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec
UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each
Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message.
2.1. Algorithm ID Types
Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm
Suite Identifier field (algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see
Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]).
This document specifies five types of Algorithm IDs:
o Reserved Algorithm ID
Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255).
These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block, and if
encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as
malformed [RFC4271].
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o Signature Algorithm ID
Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document.
Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature
algorithms is described at length in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 of
[RFC8205].
o Unassigned Algorithm ID
This type of Algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST
NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see
Section 7). In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm
ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the
router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as an unsupported
algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
o Experimentation Algorithm ID
Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250).
To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment
examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is
inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm
IDs is required. This ensures that experimentation does not clash
with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the
risks to operational integrity of the network through
inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal
configuration of routing elements on production systems. A router
that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an
experimental network SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported
algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
o Documentation Algorithm ID
Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254).
To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples,
the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a
reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required. This
ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm
IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the risks to operational
integrity of the network through inappropriate use of
documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements
on production systems. A router that encounters an algorithm ID
of this type SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported algorithm
as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
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2.2. Signature Algorithms
2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].
o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
BGPsec UPDATE messages. They are represented by an OID that combines
the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:
o The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the Public-Key
Cryptography Standards #10 (PKCS #10) signatureAlgorithm field
[RFC2986] or in the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211]; where the OID is placed
depends on the certificate request format generated.
o In BGPsec UPDATE messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 algorithm suite
identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the
Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
[RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.
3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256
elliptic curve domain parameters [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST
use the uncompressed form.
3.1.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1
of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be
secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].
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o subjectPublicKey: ECPoint MUST be used to encode the certificate's
subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480].
3.1.2. Private Key Format
Local policy determines private key format.
4. Signature Formats
The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935]; this is the same format used
by other RPKI certificates. The structure for the certification
request's and BGPsec UPDATE message's signature field MUST be as
specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].
5. Additional Requirements
It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security. This profile should be updated to specify such future
requirements, when appropriate.
The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key
sizes and algorithms are specified in [RFC6916].
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
[RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates. The security
considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]
apply to certification requests. The security considerations of
[RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.
No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this
specification.
7. IANA Considerations
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the
"BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet algorithm suite
identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm and
signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's
Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
Per [RFC8208], IANA registered a single algorithm suite identifier
for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the signature
algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS]. This identifier
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RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
is still valid, and IANA has updated the registration to refer to
this document.
IANA has modified the range of the "Unassigned" address space from
"0x2-0xEF" to "0x02-0xF6":
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
In addition, IANA has registered the following address spaces for
"Experimentation" and "Documentation":
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
The "BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the RPKI group now contains
the following values:
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] |
| | | | [RFC6090] |
| | | | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
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RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,
December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
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Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Topology and Experiment Description
Topology:
AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)
Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32
The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256, using
the algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7
of this document.
A.2. Keys
For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to
make the result deterministic.
The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],
Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".
Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, they are still
useful within the constraint of this document.
k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60
Keys of AS64496:
================
ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
private key:
x = D8AA4DFBE2478F86E88A7451BF075565
709C575AC1C136D081C540254CA440B9
public key:
Ux = 7391BABB92A0CB3BE10E59B19EBFFB21
4E04A91E0CBA1B139A7D38D90F77E55A
Uy = A05B8E695678E0FA16904B55D9D4F5C0
DFC58895EE50BC4F75D205A25BD36FF5
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RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 38655612 (0x24dd67c)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
Validity
Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:73:91:ba:bb:92:a0:cb:3b:e1:0e:59:b1:9e:bf:
fb:21:4e:04:a9:1e:0c:ba:1b:13:9a:7d:38:d9:0f:
77:e5:5a:a0:5b:8e:69:56:78:e0:fa:16:90:4b:55:
d9:d4:f5:c0:df:c5:88:95:ee:50:bc:4f:75:d2:05:
a2:5b:d3:6f:f5
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
AB:4D:91:0F:55:CA:E7:1A:21:5E:
F3:CA:FE:3A:CC:45:B5:EE:C1:54
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
Autonomous System Numbers:
64496
Routing Domain Identifiers:
inherit
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:07:b7:b4:6a:5f:a4:f1:cc:68:36:39:03:a4:83:
ec:7c:80:02:d2:f6:08:9d:46:b2:ec:2a:7b:e6:92:b3:6f:b1:
02:20:00:91:05:4a:a1:f5:b0:18:9d:27:24:e8:b4:22:fd:d1:
1c:f0:3d:b1:38:24:5d:64:29:35:28:8d:ee:0c:38:29
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Keys of AS(65536):
==================
ski: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
private key:
x = 6CB2E931B112F24554BCDCAAFD9553A9
519A9AF33C023B60846A21FC95583172
public key:
Ux = 28FC5FE9AFCF5F4CAB3F5F85CB212FC1
E9D0E0DBEAEE425BD2F0D3175AA0E989
Uy = EA9B603E38F35FB329DF495641F2BA04
0F1C3AC6138307F257CBA6B8B588F41F
Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 3752143940 (0xdfa52c44)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=ROUTER-00010000
Validity
Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
Subject: CN=ROUTER-00010000
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:28:fc:5f:e9:af:cf:5f:4c:ab:3f:5f:85:cb:21:
2f:c1:e9:d0:e0:db:ea:ee:42:5b:d2:f0:d3:17:5a:
a0:e9:89:ea:9b:60:3e:38:f3:5f:b3:29:df:49:56:
41:f2:ba:04:0f:1c:3a:c6:13:83:07:f2:57:cb:a6:
b8:b5:88:f4:1f
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
47:F2:3B:F1:AB:2F:8A:9D:26:86:
4E:BB:D8:DF:27:11:C7:44:06:EC
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
Autonomous System Numbers:
65536
Routing Domain Identifiers:
inherit
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:21:00:8c:d9:f8:12:96:88:82:74:03:a1:82:82:18:
c5:31:00:ee:35:38:e8:fa:ae:72:09:fe:98:67:01:78:69:77:
8c:02:20:5f:ee:3a:bf:10:66:be:28:d3:b3:16:a1:6b:db:66:
21:99:ed:a6:e4:ad:64:3c:ba:bf:44:fb:cb:b7:50:91:74
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
A.3. BGPsec IPv4
BGPsec IPv4 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
===============================================
Binary Form of BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
01 03 02 00 00 00 EC 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
00 00 80 0E 0D 00 01 01 04 C6 33 64 64 00 18 C0
00 02 90 1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00
00 00 FB F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26
86 4E BB D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02
21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E
81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF
37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B 6A 07 96
3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66 8F D8 61
8C 83 FA C3 F1 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3
CA FE 3A CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00
EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6
9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16
02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C 8B 8A 95 A3 C0
9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD 07 A1 7E D7 AA
05 5E CA
Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 21 33 E5 CA A0 26 BE 07 3D 9C 1B 4E FE B9 B9 77
9F 20 F8 F5 DE 29 FA 98 40 00 9F 60 47 D0 81 54
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C
8B 8A 95 A3 C0 9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD
07 A1 7E D7 AA 05 5E CA
Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 01 4F 24 DA E2 A5 21 90 B0 80 5C 60 5D B0 63 54
22 3E 93 BA 41 1D 3D 82 A3 EC 26 36 52 0C 5F 84
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B
6A 07 96 3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66
8F D8 61 8C 83 FA C3 F1
The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a BGPsec
traffic generator that uses a Wireshark-like printout.
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Send UPDATE Message
+--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+--length: 259
+--type: 2 (UPDATE)
+--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
+--total_path_attr_length: 236
+--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
| +--Length: 1 byte
| +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
+--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
| +--Length: 4 bytes
| +--data: 00 00 00 00
+--MP_REACH_NLRI (16 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
| +--Length: 13 bytes
| +--Address family: IPv4 (1)
| +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
| +--Next hop network address: (4 bytes)
| | +--Next hop: 198.51.100.100
| +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
| +--Network layer reachability information: (4 bytes)
| +--192.0.2.0/24
| +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 24
| +--MP Reach NLRI IPv4 prefix: 192.0.2.0
+--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
+--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
+--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
+--Length: 205 bytes
+--Secure Path (14 bytes)
| +--Length: 14 bytes
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| | +--pCount: 1
| | +--Flags: 0
| | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| +--pCount: 1
| +--Flags: 0
| +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
+--Signature Block (191 bytes)
+--Length: 191 bytes
+--Algo ID: 1
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
| +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
| +--Length: 72 bytes
| +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
| 9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
| A84EAF3716022100 90F2C129ABB2F39B
| 6A07963BD555A87A B2B7333B7B91F166
| 8FD8618C83FAC3F1
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
+--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
+--Length: 72 bytes
+--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
A84EAF3716022100 8E21F60E44C6066C
8B8A95A3C09D3AD4 379585A2D728EEAD
07A17ED7AA055ECA
A.4. BGPsec IPv6
BGPsec IPv6 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
===============================================
Binary Form of BGP/BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
01 10 02 00 00 00 F9 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00
00 00 80 0E 1A 00 02 01 10 FD 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 C6 33 64 64 00 20 20 01 0D B8 90
1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 FB
F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26 86 4E BB
D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF
D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D
2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02
21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21 36 A1 05 B0 F4 72
7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B 8F 43 BD DE 91 C3
06 26 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 3A
CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B
2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87
7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00
E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96 93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97
19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8 55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 8A 0C D3 E9 8E 55 10 45 82 1D 80 46 01 D6 55 FC
52 11 89 DF 4D B0 28 7D 84 AC FC 77 55 6D 06 C7
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96
93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97 19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8
55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3
Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
--------------------------------------
Digest: 44 49 EC 70 8D EC 5C 85 00 C2 17 8C 72 FE 4C 79
FF A9 3C 95 31 61 01 2D EE 7E EE 05 46 AF 5F D0
Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD
9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E
A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21
36 A1 05 B0 F4 72 7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B
8F 43 BD DE 91 C3 06 26
The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a BGPsec
traffic generator that uses a Wireshark-like printout.
Send UPDATE Message
+--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+--length: 272
+--type: 2 (UPDATE)
+--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
+--total_path_attr_length: 249
+--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
| +--Length: 1 byte
| +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
+--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
| +--Length: 4 bytes
| +--data: 00 00 00 00
+--MP_REACH_NLRI (29 bytes)
| +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
| +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
| +--Length: 26 bytes
| +--Address family: IPv6 (2)
| +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
| +--Next hop network address: (16 bytes)
| | +--Next hop: fd00:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:c633:6464
| +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
| +--Network layer reachability information: (5 bytes)
| +--2001:db8::/32
| +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 32
| +--MP Reach NLRI IPv6 prefix: 2001:db8::
+--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
+--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
+--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
+--Length: 205 bytes
+--Secure Path (14 bytes)
| +--Length: 14 bytes
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| | +--pCount: 1
| | +--Flags: 0
| | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
| +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
| +--pCount: 1
| +--Flags: 0
| +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
+--Signature Block (191 bytes)
+--Length: 191 bytes
+--Algo ID: 1
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
| +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
| +--Length: 72 bytes
| +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
| 9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
| A84EAF3716022100 D1B94F6251046D21
| 36A105B0F4727CC5 BCD674D97D28E61B
| 8F43BDDE91C30626
+--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
+--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
+--Length: 72 bytes
+--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B 2AACB6A8FD1140DD
9CD45E81D69D2C87 7B56AAF991C34D0E
A84EAF3716022100 E2A02C68FE53CB96
934C781F5A14A297 1979200C9156EDF8
55058E8053F4ACD3
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 20]
RFC 8608 BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats June 2019
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. The
authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg,
Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and
comments. Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery
were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.
Additionally, we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from
which we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document.
Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com
Oliver Borchert
NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov
Turner & Borchert Standards Track [Page 21]