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Network Working Group B. Weis
Request for Comments: 5374 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track G. Gross
Secure Multicast Networks LLC
D. Ignjatic
Polycom
November 2008
Multicast Extensions to the
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2008 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
The Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol describes
security services for traffic at the IP layer. That architecture
primarily defines services for Internet Protocol (IP) unicast
packets. This document describes how the IPsec security services are
applied to IP multicast packets. These extensions are relevant only
for an IPsec implementation that supports multicast.
Weis, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Scope ......................................................3
1.2. Terminology ................................................4
2. Overview of IP Multicast Operation ..............................6
3. Security Association Modes ......................................7
3.1. Tunnel Mode with Address Preservation ......................7
4. Security Association ............................................8
4.1. Major IPsec Databases ......................................8
4.1.1. Group Security Policy Database (GSPD) ...............8
4.1.2. Security Association Database (SAD) ................12
4.1.3. Group Peer Authorization Database (GPAD) ...........12
4.2. Group Security Association (GSA) ..........................14
4.2.1. Concurrent IPsec SA Life Spans and Re-key Rollover .15
4.3. Data Origin Authentication ................................17
4.4. Group SA and Key Management ...............................18
4.4.1. Co-Existence of Multiple Key Management Protocols ..18
5. IP Traffic Processing ..........................................18
5.1. Outbound IP Traffic Processing ............................18
5.2. Inbound IP Traffic Processing .............................19
6. Security Considerations ........................................22
6.1. Security Issues Solved by IPsec Multicast Extensions ......22
6.2. Security Issues Not Solved by IPsec Multicast Extensions ..23
6.2.1. Outsider Attacks ...................................23
6.2.2. Insider Attacks ....................................23
6.3. Implementation or Deployment Issues that Impact Security ..24
6.3.1. Homogeneous Group Cryptographic Algorithm
Capabilities .......................................24
6.3.2. Groups that Span Two or More Security
Policy Domains .....................................24
6.3.3. Source-Specific Multicast Group Sender
Transient Locators .................................25
7. Acknowledgements ...............................................25
8. References .....................................................25
8.1. Normative References ......................................25
8.2. Informative References ....................................26
Appendix A - Multicast Application Service Models .................28
A.1 Unidirectional Multicast Applications ......................28
A.2 Bi-directional Reliable Multicast Applications .............28
A.3 Any-To-Any Multicast Applications ..........................30
Appendix B - ASN.1 for a GSPD Entry ...............................30
B.1 Fields Specific to a GSPD Entry ............................30
B.2 SPDModule ..................................................31
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1. Introduction
The Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC4301]
provides security services for traffic at the IP layer. It describes
an architecture for IPsec-compliant systems and a set of security
services for the IP layer. These security services primarily
describe services and semantics for IPsec Security Associations (SAs)
shared between two IPsec devices. Typically, this includes SAs with
traffic selectors that include a unicast address in the IP
destination field, and results in an IPsec packet with a unicast
address in the IP destination field. The security services defined
in RFC 4301 can also be used to tunnel IP multicast packets, where
the tunnel is a pairwise association between two IPsec devices. RFC
4301 defined manually keyed transport mode IPsec SA support for IP
packets with a multicast address in the IP destination address field.
However, RFC 4301 did not define the interaction of an IPsec
subsystem with a Group Key Management protocol or the semantics of a
tunnel mode IPsec SA with an IP multicast address in the outer IP
header.
This document describes OPTIONAL extensions to RFC 4301 that further
define the IPsec security architecture in order for groups of IPsec
devices to share SAs. In particular, it supports SAs with traffic
selectors that include a multicast address in the IP destination
field and that result in an IPsec packet with an IP multicast address
in the IP destination field. It also describes additional semantics
for IPsec Group Key Management (GKM) subsystems. Note that this
document uses the term "GKM protocol" generically and therefore does
not assume a particular GKM protocol.
An IPsec implementation that does not support multicast is not
required to support these extensions.
Throughout this document, RFC 4301 semantics remain unchanged by the
presence of these multicast extensions unless specifically noted to
the contrary.
1.1. Scope
The IPsec extensions described in this document support IPsec
Security Associations that result in IPsec packets with IPv4 or IPv6
multicast group addresses as the destination address. Both
Any-Source Multicast (ASM) and Source-Specific Multicast (SSM)
[RFC3569] group addresses are supported. These extensions are used
when management policy requires that IP multicast packets protected
by IPsec remain IP multicast packets. When management policy
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requires that the IP multicast packets be encapsulated as IP unicast
packets (e.g., because the network connected to the unprotected
interface does not support IP multicast), the extensions in this
document are not used.
These extensions also support Security Associations with IPv4
Broadcast addresses that result in an IPv4 link-level Broadcast
packet, and IPv6 Anycast addresses [RFC2526] that result in an IPv6
Anycast packet. These destination address types share many of the
same characteristics of multicast addresses because there may be
multiple candidate receivers of a packet protected by IPsec.
The IPsec architecture does not make requirements upon entities not
participating in IPsec (e.g., network devices between IPsec
endpoints). As such, these multicast extensions do not require
intermediate systems in a multicast-enabled network to participate in
IPsec. In particular, no requirements are placed on the use of
multicast routing protocols (e.g., Protocol Independent Multicast -
Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) [RFC4601]) or multicast admission protocols
(e.g., Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [RFC3376]).
All implementation models of IPsec (e.g., "bump-in-the-stack",
"bump-in-the-wire") are supported.
This version of the multicast IPsec extension specification requires
that all IPsec devices participating in a Security Association be
homogeneous. They MUST share a common set of cryptographic transform
and protocol-handling capabilities. The semantics of an "IPsec
composite group" [COMPGRP], a heterogeneous IPsec cryptographic group
formed from the union of two or more sub-groups, is an area for
future standardization.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
The following key terms are used throughout this document.
Any-Source Multicast (ASM)
The Internet Protocol (IP) multicast service model as defined in
RFC 1112 [RFC1112]. In this model, one or more senders source
packets to a single IP multicast address. When receivers join the
group, they receive all packets sent to that IP multicast address.
This is known as a (*,G) group.
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Group
A set of devices that work together to protect group
communications.
Group Controller Key Server (GCKS)
A Group Key Management (GKM) protocol server that manages IPsec
state for a group. A GCKS authenticates and provides the IPsec SA
policy and keying material to GKM Group Members.
Group Key Management (GKM) Protocol
A key management protocol used by a GCKS to distribute IPsec
Security Association policy and keying material. A GKM protocol
is used when a group of IPsec devices require the same SAs. For
example, when an IPsec SA describes an IP multicast destination,
the sender and all receivers need to have the group SA.
Group Key Management Subsystem
A subsystem in an IPsec device implementing a Group Key Management
protocol. The GKM subsystem provides IPsec SAs to the IPsec
subsystem on the IPsec device. Refer to RFC 3547 [RFC3547] and
RFC 4535 [RFC4535] for additional information.
Group Member
An IPsec device that belongs to a group. A Group Member is
authorized to be a Group Sender and/or a Group Receiver.
Group Owner
An administrative entity that chooses the policy for a group.
Group Security Association (GSA)
A collection of IPsec Security Associations (SAs) and GKM
subsystem SAs necessary for a Group Member to receive key updates.
A GSA describes the working policy for a group. Refer to RFC 4046
[RFC4046] for additional information.
Group Security Policy Database (GSPD)
The GSPD is a multicast-capable security policy database, as
mentioned in RFC 3740 and Section 4.4.1.1. of RFC 4301. Its
semantics are a superset of the unicast Security Policy Database
(SPD) defined by Section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301. Unlike a unicast
SPD-S, in which point-to-point traffic selectors are inherently
bi-directional, multicast security traffic selectors in the GSPD-S
include a "sender only", "receiver only", or "symmetric"
directional attribute. Refer to Section 4.1.1 for more details.
GSPD-S, GSPD-I, GSPD-O
Group Security Policy Database (secure traffic), (inbound), and
(outbound), respectively. See Section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301.
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Group Receiver
A Group Member that is authorized to receive packets sent to a
group by a Group Sender.
Group Sender
A Group Member that is authorized to send packets to a group.
Source-Specific Multicast (SSM)
The Internet Protocol (IP) multicast service model as defined in
RFC 3569 [RFC3569]. In this model, each combination of a sender
and an IP multicast address is considered a group. This is known
as an (S,G) group.
Tunnel Mode with Address Preservation
A type of IPsec tunnel mode used by security gateway
implementations when encapsulating IP multicast packets such that
they remain IP multicast packets. This mode is necessary for IP
multicast routing to correctly route IP multicast packets
protected by IPsec.
2. Overview of IP Multicast Operation
IP multicasting is a means of sending a single packet to a "host
group", a set of zero or more hosts identified by a single IP
destination address. IP multicast packets are delivered to all
members of the group either with "best-efforts" reliability [RFC1112]
or as part of a reliable stream (e.g., NACK-Oriented Reliable
Multicast (NORM) [RFC3940]).
A sender to an IP multicast group sets the destination of the packet
to an IP address that has been allocated for IP multicast. Allocated
IP multicast addresses are defined in [RFC3171], [RFC3306], and
[RFC3307]. Potential receivers of the packet "join" the IP multicast
group by registering with a network routing device ([RFC3376],
[RFC3810]), signaling its intent to receive packets sent to a
particular IP multicast group.
Network routing devices configured to pass IP multicast packets
participate in multicast routing protocols (e.g., PIM-SM) [RFC4601].
Multicast routing protocols maintain state regarding which devices
have registered to receive packets for a particular IP multicast
group. When a router receives an IP multicast packet, it forwards a
copy of the packet out of each interface for which there are known
receivers.
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3. Security Association Modes
IPsec supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel mode. In
transport mode, IP Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] provide protection
primarily for next layer protocols; in tunnel mode, AH and ESP are
applied to tunneled IP packets.
A host implementation of IPsec using the multicast extensions MAY use
either transport mode or tunnel mode to encapsulate an IP multicast
packet. These processing rules are identical to the rules described
in Section 4.1 of [RFC4301]. However, the destination address for
the IPsec packet is an IP multicast address, rather than a unicast
host address.
A security gateway implementation of IPsec MUST use a tunnel mode SA,
for the reasons described in Section 4.1 of [RFC4301]. In
particular, the security gateway needs to use tunnel mode to
encapsulate incoming fragments, since IPsec cannot directly operate
on fragments.
3.1. Tunnel Mode with Address Preservation
New (tunnel) header construction semantics are required when tunnel
mode is used to encapsulate IP multicast packets that are to remain
IP multicast packets. These semantics are due to the following
unique requirements of IP multicast routing protocols (e.g., PIM-SM
[RFC4601]). This document describes these new header construction
semantics as "tunnel mode with address preservation", which is
described as follows.
- When an IP multicast packet is received by a host or router, the
destination address of the packet is compared to the local IP
multicast state. If the (outer) destination IP address of an IP
multicast packet is set to another IP address, the host or router
receiving the IP multicast packet will not process it properly.
Therefore, an IPsec security gateway needs to populate the
multicast IP destination address in the outer header using the
destination address from the inner header after IPsec tunnel
encapsulation.
- IP multicast routing protocols typically create multicast
distribution trees based on the source address as well as the group
address. If an IPsec security gateway populates the (outer) source
address of an IP multicast packet (with its own IP address, as
called for in RFC 4301), the resulting IPsec-protected packet may
fail Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) checks performed by other
routers. A failed RPF check may result in the packet being
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dropped. To accommodate routing protocol RPF checks, the security
gateway implementing the IPsec multicast extensions SHOULD populate
the outer IP address from the original packet IP source address.
However, it should be noted that a security gateway performing
source address preservation will not receive ICMP Path MTU (PMTU)
or other messages intended for the security gateway (triggered by
packets that have had the outer IP source address set to that of
the inner header). Security gateway applications not requiring
source address preservation will be able to receive ICMP PMTU
messages and process them as described in Section 6.1 of RFC 4301.
Because some applications of address preservation may require that
only the destination address be preserved, specification of
destination address preservation and source address preservation are
separated in the above description. Destination address preservation
and source address preservation attributes are described in the Group
Security Policy Database (GSPD) (defined later in this document), and
are copied into corresponding Security Association Database (SAD)
entries.
Address preservation is applicable only for tunnel mode IPsec SAs
that specify the IP version of the encapsulating header to be the
same version as that of the inner header. When the IP versions are
different, IP multicast packets can be encapsulated using a tunnel
interface, for example as described in [RFC4891], where the tunnel is
also treated as an interface by IP multicast routing protocols.
In summary, propagating both the IP source and destination addresses
of the inner IP header into the outer (tunnel) header allows IP
multicast routing protocols to route a packet properly when the
packet is protected by IPsec. This result is necessary in order for
the multicast extensions to allow a host or security gateway to
provide IPsec services for IP multicast packets. This method of RFC
4301 tunnel mode is known as "tunnel mode with address preservation".
4. Security Association
4.1. Major IPsec Databases
The following sections describe the GKM subsystem and IPsec extension
interactions with the IPsec databases. The major IPsec databases
need expanded semantics to fully support multicast.
4.1.1. Group Security Policy Database (GSPD)
The Group Security Policy Database is a security policy database
capable of supporting both unicast Security Associations as defined
by RFC 4301 and the multicast extensions defined by this
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specification. The GSPD is considered to be the SPD, with the
addition of the semantics relating to the multicast extensions
described in this section. Appendix B provides an example of an
ASN.1 definition of a GSPD entry.
This document describes a new "address preservation" (AP) flag
indicating that tunnel mode with address preservation is to be
applied to a GSPD entry. The AP flag has two attributes: AP-L, used
in the processing of the local tunnel address, and AP-R, used in the
processing of the remote tunnel process. This flag is added to the
GSPD "Processing info" field of the GSPD. The following text
reproduced from Section 4.4.1.2 of RFC 4301 is amended to include
this additional processing. (Note: for brevity, only the "Processing
info" text related to tunnel processing has been reproduced.)
o Processing info -- which action is required -- PROTECT,
BYPASS, or DISCARD. There is just one action that goes with
all the selector sets, not a separate action for each set.
If the required processing is PROTECT, the entry contains the
following information.
- IPsec mode -- tunnel or transport
- (if tunnel mode) local tunnel address -- For a non-mobile
host, if there is just one interface, this is
straightforward; if there are multiple interfaces, this
must be statically configured. For a mobile host, the
specification of the local address is handled externally to
IPsec. If tunnel mode with address preservation is
specified for the local tunnel address, the AP-L attribute
is set to TRUE for the local tunnel address and the local
tunnel address is unspecified. The presence of the AP-L
attribute indicates that the inner IP header source address
will be copied to the outer IP header source address during
IP header construction for tunnel mode.
- (if tunnel mode) remote tunnel address -- There is no
standard way to determine this. See Section 4.5.3 of RFC
4301, "Locating a Security Gateway". If tunnel mode with
address preservation is specified for the remote tunnel
address, the AP-R attribute is set to TRUE for the remote
tunnel address and the remote tunnel address is
unspecified. The presence of the AP-R attribute indicates
that the inner IP header destination address will be copied
to the outer IP header destination address during IP header
construction for tunnel mode.
This document describes unique directionality processing for GSPD
entries with a remote IP multicast address. Since an IP multicast
address must not be sent as the source address of an IP packet
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[RFC1112], directionality of Local and Remote addresses and ports is
maintained during incoming SPD-S and SPD-I checks rather than being
swapped. Section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301 is amended as follows:
Representing Directionality in an SPD Entry
For traffic protected by IPsec, the Local and Remote address
and ports in an SPD entry are swapped to represent
directionality, consistent with IKE conventions. In general,
the protocols that IPsec deals with have the property of
requiring symmetric SAs with flipped Local/Remote IP
addresses. However, SPD entries with a remote IP multicast
address do not have their Local and Remote addresses and
ports in an SPD entry swapped during incoming SPD-S and SPD-I
checks.
A new Group Security Policy Database (GSPD) attribute is introduced:
GSPD entry directionality. The following text is added to the bullet
list of SPD fields described in Section 4.4.1.2 of RFC 4301.
o Directionality -- can be one of three types: "symmetric",
"sender only", or "receiver only". "Symmetric" indicates
that a pair of SAs are to be created (one in each direction,
as specified by RFC 4301). GSPD entries marked as "sender
only" indicate that one SA is to be created in the outbound
direction. GSPD entries marked as "receiver only" indicate
that one SA is to be created in the inbound direction. GSPD
entries marked as "sender only" or "receiver only" SHOULD
support multicast IP addresses in their destination address
selectors. If the processing requested is BYPASS or DISCARD
and a "sender only" type is configured, the entry MUST be put
in GSPD-O only. Reciprocally, if the type is "receiver
only", the entry MUST go to GSPD-I only.
GSPD entries created by a GCKS may be assigned identical Security
Parameter Indexes (SPIs) to SAD entries created by IKEv2 [RFC4306].
This is not a problem for the inbound traffic as the appropriate SAs
can be matched using the algorithm described in Section 4.1 of RFC
4301. However, the outbound traffic needs to be matched against the
GSPD selectors so that the appropriate SA can be created.
To facilitate dynamic group keying, the outbound GSPD MUST implement
a policy action capability that triggers a GKM protocol registration
exchange (as per Section 5.1 of [RFC4301]). For example, the Group
Sender GSPD policy might trigger on a match with a specified
multicast application packet that is entering the implementation via
the protected interface or that is emitted by the implementation on
the protected side of the boundary and directed toward the
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unprotected interface. The ensuing Group Sender registration
exchange would set up the Group Sender's outbound SAD entry that
encrypts the multicast application's data stream. In the inverse
direction, group policy may also set up an inbound IPsec SA.
At the Group Receiver endpoint(s), the IPsec subsystem MAY use GSPD
policy mechanisms that initiate a GKM protocol registration exchange.
One such policy mechanism might be on the detection of a device in
the protected network joining a multicast group matching GSPD policy
(e.g., by receiving a IGMP/MLD (Multicast Listener Discovery) join
group message on a protected interface). The ensuing Group Receiver
registration exchange would set up the Group Receiver's inbound SAD
entry that decrypts the multicast application's data stream. In the
inverse direction, the group policy may also set up an outbound IPsec
SA (e.g., when supporting an ASM service model).
Note: A security gateway triggering on the receipt of unauthenticated
messages arriving on a protected interface may result in early Group
Receiver registration if the message is not the result of a device on
the protected network actually wishing to join a multicast group.
The unauthenticated messages will only cause the Group Receiver to
register once; subsequent messages will have no effect on the Group
Receiver.
The IPsec subsystem MAY provide GSPD policy mechanisms that
automatically initiate a GKM protocol de-registration exchange.
De-registration allows a GCKS to minimize exposure of the group's
secret key by re-keying a group on a group membership change event.
It also minimizes cost on a GCKS for those groups that maintain
member state. One such policy mechanism could be the detection of
IGMP/MLD leave group exchange. However, a security gateway Group
Member would not initiate a GKM protocol de-registration exchange
until it detects that there are no more receivers behind a protected
interface.
Additionally, the GKM subsystem MAY set up the GSPD/SAD state
information independent of the multicast application's state. In
this scenario, the Group Owner issues management directives that tell
the GKM subsystem when it should start GKM registration and
de-registration protocol exchanges. Typically, the registration
policy strives to make sure that the group's IPsec subsystem state is
"always ready" in anticipation of the multicast application starting
its execution.
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4.1.2. Security Association Database (SAD)
The SAD contains an item describing whether tunnel or transport mode
is applied to traffic on this SA. The text in RFC 4301 Section
4.4.2.1 is amended to describe address preservation.
o IPsec protocol mode: tunnel or transport. Indicates which
mode of AH or ESP is applied to traffic on this SA. When
tunnel mode is specified, the data item also indicates
whether or not address preservation is applied to the outer
IP header. Address preservation MUST NOT be specified when
the IP version of the encapsulating header and IP version of
the inner header do not match. The local address, remote
address, or both addresses MAY be marked as being preserved
during tunnel encapsulation.
4.1.3. Group Peer Authorization Database (GPAD)
The multicast IPsec extensions introduce a new data structure called
the Group Peer Authorization Database (GPAD). The GPAD is analogous
to the PAD defined in RFC 4301. It provides a link between the GSPD
and a Group Key Management (GKM) Subsystem. The GPAD embodies the
following critical functions:
o identifies a GCKS (or group of GCKS devices) that is
authorized to communicate with this IPsec entity
o specifies the protocol and method used to authenticate each
GCKS
o provides the authentication data for each GKCS
o constrains the traffic selectors that can be asserted by a
GCKS with regard to SA creation
o constrains the types and values of Group Identifiers for
which a GCKS is authorized to provide group policy
The GPAD provides these functions for a Group Key Management
subsystem. The GPAD is not consulted by IKE or other authentication
protocols that do not act as GKM protocols.
To provide these functions, the GPAD contains an entry for each GCKS
that the IPsec entity is configured to contact. An entry contains
one or more GCKS Identifiers, the authentication protocol (e.g.,
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) or Group Secure Association Key
Management Protocol (GSAKMP)), the authentication method used (e.g.,
certificates or pre-shared secrets), and the authentication data
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(e.g., the pre-shared secret or trust anchor relative to which the
peer's certificate will be validated). For certificate-based
authentication, the entry also may provide information to assist in
verifying the revocation status of the peer, e.g., a pointer to a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) repository or the name of an Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server associated with either the
peer or the trust anchor associated with the peer. The entry also
contains constraints a Group Member applies to the policy received
from the GKCS.
4.1.3.1. GCKS Identifiers
GCKS Identifiers are used to identify one or more devices that are
authorized to act as a GCKS for this group. GCKS Identifiers are
specified as PAD entry IDs in Section 4.4.3.1 of RFC 4301 and follow
the matching rules described therein.
4.1.3.2. GCKS Peer Authentication Data
Once a GPAD entry is located, it is necessary to verify the asserted
identity, i.e., to authenticate the asserted GCKS Identifier. PAD
authentication data types and semantics specified in Section 4.4.3.2
of RFC 4301 are used to authenticate a GCKS.
See GDOI [RFC3547] and GSAKMP [RFC4535] for details of how a GKM
protocol performs peer authentication using certificates and
pre-shared secrets.
4.1.3.3. Group Identifier Authorization Data
A Group Identifier is used by a GKM protocol to identify a particular
group to a GCKS. A GPAD entry includes a Group Identifier to
indicate that the GKCS Identifiers in the GPAD entry are authorized
to act as a GCKS for the group.
The Group Identifier is an opaque byte string of IKE ID type Key ID
that identifies a secure multicast group. The Group Identifier byte
string MUST be at least four bytes long and less than 256 bytes long.
IKE ID types other than Key ID MAY be supported.
4.1.3.4. IPsec SA Traffic Selector Authorization Data
Once a GCKS is authenticated, the GCKS delivers IPsec SA policy to
the Group Member. Before the Group Member accepts the IPsec SA
Policy, the source and destination traffic selectors of the SA are
compared to a set of authorized data flows. Each data flow includes
a set of authorized source traffic selectors and a set of authorized
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destination traffic selectors. Traffic selectors are represented as
a set of IPv4 and/or IPv6 address ranges. (A peer may be authorized
for both address types, so there MUST be provision for both v4 and v6
address ranges.)
4.1.3.5. How the GPAD Is Used
When a GKM protocol registration exchange is triggered, the Group
Member and GCKS each assert their identity as a part of the exchange.
Each GKM protocol registration exchange MUST use the asserted ID to
locate an identity in the GPAD. The GPAD entry specifies the
authentication method to be employed for the identified GCKS. The
entry also specifies the authentication data that will be used to
verify the asserted identity. This data is employed in conjunction
with the specified method to authenticate the GCKS before accepting
any group policy from the GCKS.
During the GKM protocol registration, a Group Member includes a Group
Identifier. Before presenting that Group Identifier to the GCKS, a
Group Member verifies that the GPAD entry for authenticated GCKS GPAD
entry includes the Group Identifier. This ensures that the GCKS is
authorized to provide policy for the Group.
When IPsec SA policy is received, each data flow is compared to the
data flows in the GPAD entry. The Group Member accepts policy
matching a data flow. Policy not matching a data flow is discarded,
and the reason SHOULD be recorded in the audit log.
A GKM protocol may distribute IPsec SA policy to IPsec devices that
have previously registered with it. The method of distribution is
part of the GKM protocol and is outside the scope of this memo. When
the IPsec device receives this new policy, it compares the policy to
the data flows in the GPAD entry as described above.
4.2. Group Security Association (GSA)
An IPsec implementation supporting these extensions will support a
number of Security Associations: one or more IPsec SAs plus one or
more GKM SAs used to download the parameters that are used to create
IPsec SAs. These SAs are collectively referred to as a Group
Security Association (GSA) [RFC3740].
4.2.1. Concurrent IPsec SA Life Spans and Re-key Rollover
During a secure multicast group's lifetime, multiple IPsec Group
Security Associations can exist concurrently. This occurs
principally due to two reasons:
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- There are multiple Group Senders authorized in the group, each with
its own IPsec SA, which maintains anti-replay state. A group that
does not rely on IP security anti-replay services can share one
IPsec SA for all of its Group Senders.
- The life spans of a Group Sender's two (or more) IPsec SAs are
allowed to overlap in time so that there is continuity in the
multicast data stream across group re-key events. This capability
is referred to as "re-key rollover continuity".
The re-key continuity rollover algorithm depends on an IPsec SA
management interface between the GKM subsystem and the IPsec
subsystem. The IPsec subsystem MUST provide management interface
mechanisms for the GKM subsystem to add IPsec SAs and to delete IPsec
SAs. For illustrative purposes, this text defines the re-key
rollover continuity algorithm in terms of two timer parameters that
govern IPsec SA life spans relative to the start of a group re-key
event. However, it should be emphasized that the GKM subsystem
interprets the group's security policy to direct the correct timing
of IPsec SA activation and deactivation. A given group policy may
choose timer values that differ from those recommended by this text.
The two re-key rollover continuity timer parameters are:
1. Activation Time Delay (ATD) - The ATD defines how long after the
start of a re-key event to activate new IPsec SAs. The ATD
parameter is expressed in units of seconds. Typically, the ATD
parameter is set to the maximum time it takes to deliver a
multicast message from the GCKS to all of the group's members.
For a GCKS that relies on a Reliable Multicast Transport Protocol
(RMTP), the ATD parameter could be set equal to the RTMP's maximum
error recovery time. When an RMTP is not present, the ATD
parameter might be set equal to the network's maximum multicast
message delivery latency across all of the group's endpoints. The
ATD is a GKM group policy parameter. This value SHOULD be
configurable at the Group Owner management interface on a per
group basis.
2. Deactivation Time Delay (DTD) - The DTD defines how long after the
start of a re-key event to deactivate those IPsec SAs that are
destroyed by the re-key event. The purpose of the DTD parameter
is to minimize the residual exposure of a group's keying material
after a re-key event has retired that keying material. The DTD is
independent of, and should not to be confused with, the IPsec SA
soft lifetime attribute. The DTD parameter is expressed in units
of seconds. Typically, the DTD parameter would be set to the ADT
plus the maximum time it takes to deliver a multicast message from
the Group Sender to all of the group's members. For a Group
Sender that relies on an RMTP, the DTD parameter could be set
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equal to ADT plus the RMTP's maximum error recovery time. When an
RMTP is not present, the DTD parameter might be set equal to ADT
plus the network's maximum multicast message delivery latency
across all of the group's endpoints. A GKM subsystem MAY
implement the DTD as a group security policy parameter. If a GKM
subsystem does not implement the DTD parameter, then other group
security policy mechanisms MUST determine when to deactivate an
IPsec SA.
Each group re-key multicast message sent by a GCKS signals the start
of a new Group Sender IPsec SA time epoch, with each such epoch
having an associated set of two IPsec SAs. Note that this document
refers to re-key mechanisms as being multicast because of the
inherent scalability of IP multicast distribution. However, there is
no particular reason that re-keying mechanisms must be multicast.
For example, [ZLLY03] describes a method of re-key employing both
unicast and multicast messages.
The group membership interacts with these IPsec SAs as follows:
- As a precursor to the Group Sender beginning its re-key rollover
continuity processing, the GCKS periodically multicasts a Re-Key
Event (RKE) message to the group. The RKE multicast MAY contain
group policy directives, new IPsec SA policy, and group keying
material. In the absence of an RMTP, the GCKS may re-transmit the
RKE a policy-defined number of times to improve the availability of
re-key information. The GKM subsystem starts the ATD and DTD
timers after it receives the last RKE re-transmission.
- The GKM subsystem interprets the RKE multicast to configure the
group's GSPD/SAD with the new IPsec SAs. Each IPsec SA that
replaces an existing SA is called a "leading edge" IPsec SA. The
leading edge IPsec SA has a new Security Parameter Index (SPI) and
its associated keying material, which keys it. For a time period
of ATD seconds after the GCKS multicasts the RKE, a Group Sender
does not yet transmit data using the leading edge IPsec SA.
Meanwhile, other Group Members prepare to use this IPsec SA by
installing the leading edge IPsec SAs to their respective GSPD/SAD.
- After waiting for the ATD period, such that all of the Group
Members have received and processed the RKE message, the GKM
subsystem directs the Group Sender to begin to transmit using the
leading edge IPsec SA with its data encrypted by the new keying
material. Only authorized Group Members can decrypt these IPsec SA
multicast transmissions.
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- The Group Sender's "trailing edge" SA is the oldest Security
Association in use by the group for that sender. All authorized
Group Members can receive and decrypt data for this SA, but the
Group Sender does not transmit new data using the trailing edge
IPsec SA after it has transitioned to the leading edge IPsec SA.
The trailing edge IPsec SA is deleted by the group's GKM subsystems
after the DTD time period has elapsed since the RKE transmission.
This re-key rollover strategy allows the group to drain its
in-transit datagrams from the network while transitioning to the
leading edge IPsec SA. Staggering the roles of each respective IPsec
SA as described above improves the group's synchronization even when
there are high network propagation delays. Note that due to group
membership joins and leaves, each Group Sender IPsec SA time epoch
may have a different group membership set.
It is a group policy decision whether the re-key event transition
between epochs provides forward and backward secrecy. The group's
re-key protocol keying material and algorithm (e.g., Logical Key
Hierarchy; refer to [RFC2627] and Appendix A of [RFC4535]) enforces
this policy. Implementations MAY offer a Group Owner management
interface option to enable/disable re-key rollover continuity for a
particular group. This specification requires that a GKM/IPsec
implementation MUST support at least two concurrent IPsec SAs per
Group Sender as well as this re-key rollover continuity algorithm.
4.3. Data Origin Authentication
As defined in [RFC4301], data origin authentication is a security
service that verifies the identity of the claimed source of data. A
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is often used to achieve data
origin authentication for connections shared between two parties.
However, typical MAC authentication methods using a single shared
secret are not sufficient to provide data origin authentication for
groups with more than two parties. With a MAC algorithm, every Group
Member can use the MAC key to create a valid MAC tag, whether or not
they are the authentic originator of the group application's data.
When the property of data origin authentication is required for an
IPsec SA shared by more than two parties, an authentication transform
where the receiver is assured that the sender generated that message
should be used. Two possible algorithms are Timed Efficient Stream
Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [RFC4082] or RSA digital
signature [RFC4359].
In some cases (e.g., digital signature authentication transforms),
the processing cost of the algorithm is significantly greater than a
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) authentication method. To
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protect against denial-of-service attacks from a device that is not
authorized to join the group, the IPsec SA using this algorithm may
be encapsulated with an IPsec SA using a MAC authentication
algorithm. However, doing so requires the packet to be sent across
the IPsec boundary a second time for additional outbound processing
on the Group Sender (see Section 5.1 of [RFC4301]) and a second time
for inbound processing on Group Receivers (see Section 5.2 of
[RFC4301]). This use of AH or ESP encapsulated within AH or ESP
accommodates the constraint that AH and ESP define an Integrity Check
Value (ICV) for only a single authenticator transform.
4.4. Group SA and Key Management
4.4.1. Co-Existence of Multiple Key Management Protocols
Often, the GKM subsystem will be introduced to an existent IPsec
subsystem as a companion key management protocol to IKEv2 [RFC4306].
A fundamental GKM protocol IP security subsystem requirement is that
both the GKM protocol and IKEv2 can simultaneously share access to a
common Group Security Policy Database and Security Association
Database. The mechanisms that provide mutually exclusive access to
the common GSPD/SAD data structures are a local matter. This
includes the GSPD-O cache and the GSPD-I cache. However,
implementers should note that IKEv2 SPI allocation is entirely
independent from GKM SPI allocation because Group Security
Associations are qualified by a destination multicast IP address and
may optionally have a source IP address qualifier. See Section 2.1
of [RFC4303] for further explanation.
The Peer Authorization Database does require explicit coordination
between the GKM protocol and IKEv2. Section 4.1.3 describes these
interactions.
5. IP Traffic Processing
Processing of traffic follows Section 5 of [RFC4301], with the
additions described below when these IP multicast extensions are
supported.
5.1. Outbound IP Traffic Processing
If an IPsec SA is marked as supporting tunnel mode with address
preservation (as described in Section 3.1), either or both of the
outer header source or destination addresses are marked as being
preserved.
Header construction for tunnel mode is described in Section 5.1.2 of
RFC 4301. The first bullet of that section is amended as follows:
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o If address preservation is not marked in the SAD entry for
either the outer IP header Source Address or Destination
Address, the outer IP header Source Address and Destination
Address identify the "endpoints" of the tunnel (the
encapsulator and decapsulator). If address preservation is
marked for the IP header Source Address, it is copied from
the inner IP header Source Address. If address preservation
is marked for the IP header Destination Address, it is copied
from the inner IP header Destination Address. The inner IP
header Source Address and Destination Addresses identify the
original sender and recipient of the datagram (from the
perspective of this tunnel), respectively. Address
preservation MUST NOT be marked when the IP version of the
encapsulating header and IP version of the inner header do
not match.
Note (3), regarding construction of tunnel addresses in Section
5.1.2.1 of RFC 4301, is amended as follows. (Note: for brevity, Note
(3) of RFC 4301 is not reproduced in its entirety.)
(3) Unless marked for address preservation, Local and Remote
addresses depend on the SA, which is used to determine the
Remote address, which in turn determines which Local
address (net interface) is used to forward the packet. If
address preservation is marked for the Local address, it is
copied from the inner IP header. If address preservation
is marked for the Remote address, that address is copied
from the inner IP header.
5.2. Inbound IP Traffic Processing
IPsec-protected packets generated by an IPsec device supporting these
multicast extensions may (depending on its GSPD policy) populate an
outer tunnel header with a destination address such that it is not
addressed to an IPsec device. This requires an IPsec device
supporting these multicast extensions to accept and process IP
traffic that is not addressed to the IPsec device itself. The
following additions to IPsec inbound IP traffic processing are
necessary.
For compatibility with RFC 4301, the phrase "addressed to this
device" is taken to mean packets with a unicast destination address
belonging to the system itself, and also multicast packets that are
received by the system itself. However, multicast packets not
received by the IPsec device are not considered addressed to this
device.
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The discussion of processing inbound IP Traffic described in Section
5.2 of RFC 4301 is amended as follows.
The first dash in item 2 is amended as follows:
- If the packet appears to be IPsec protected and it is
addressed to this device, or appears to be IPsec protected
and is addressed to a multicast group, an attempt is made to
map it to an active SA via the SAD. Note that the device may
have multiple IP addresses that may be used in the SAD
lookup, e.g., in the case of protocols such as SCTP.
A new item is added to the list between items 3a and 3b to describe
processing of IPsec packets with destination address preservation
applied:
3aa. If the packet is addressed to a multicast group and AH or
ESP is specified as the protocol, the packet is looked up
in the SAD. Use the SPI plus the destination or SPI plus
destination and source addresses, as specified in Section
4.1. If there is no match, the packet is directed to
SPD-I lookup. Note that if the IPsec device is a security
gateway, and the SPD-I policy is to BYPASS the packet, a
subsequent security gateway along the routed path of the
multicast packet may decrypt the packet.
Figure 3 in RFC 4301 is updated to show the new processing path
defined in item 3aa.
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Unprotected Interface
|
V
+-----+ IPsec protected
------------------->|Demux|--------------------+
| +-----+ |
| | |
| Not IPsec | |
| | IPsec protected, not |
| V addressed to device, |
| +-------+ +---------+ and not in SAD |
| |DISCARD|<---|SPD-I (*)|<------------+ |
| +-------+ +---------+ | |
| | | |
| |-----+ | |
| | | | |
| | V | |
| | +------+ | |
| | | ICMP | | |
| | +------+ | |
| | | V
+---------+ | +-----------+
....|SPD-O (*)|............|...................|PROCESS(**)|...IPsec
+---------+ | | (AH/ESP) | Boundary
^ | +-----------+
| | +---+ |
| BYPASS | +-->|IKE| |
| | | +---+ |
| V | V
| +----------+ +---------+ +----+
|--------<------|Forwarding|<---------|SAD Check|-->|ICMP|
nested SAs +----------+ | (***) | +----+
| +---------+
V
Protected Interface
Figure 1. Processing Model for Inbound Traffic
(amending Figure 3 of RFC 4301)
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The discussion of processing inbound IP traffic in Section 5.2 of RFC
4301 is amended to insert a new item 6 as follows.
6. If an IPsec SA is marked as supporting tunnel mode with
address preservation (as described in Section 3.1), the
marked address(es) (i.e., source and/or destination
address(es)) in the outer IP header MUST be verified to be
the same value(s) as in the inner IP header. If the
addresses are not consistent, the IPsec system MUST discard
the packet and treat the inconsistency as an auditable
event.
6. Security Considerations
The IP security multicast extensions defined by this specification
build on the unicast-oriented IP security architecture [RFC4301].
Consequently, this specification inherits many of RFC 4301's security
considerations, and the reader is advised to review it as companion
guidance.
6.1. Security Issues Solved by IPsec Multicast Extensions
The IP security multicast extension service provides the following
network layer mechanisms for secure group communications:
- Confidentiality using a group shared encryption key.
- Group source authentication and integrity protection using a group
shared authentication key.
- Group Sender data origin authentication using a digital signature,
TESLA, or other mechanism.
- Anti-replay protection for a limited number of Group Senders using
the ESP (or AH) sequence number facility.
- Filtering of multicast transmissions identified with a source
address of systems that are not authorized by group policy to be
Group Senders. This feature leverages the IPsec stateless firewall
service (i.e., SPD-I and/or SDP-O entries with a packet disposition
specified as DISCARD).
In support of the above services, this specification enhances the
definition of the SPD, PAD, and SAD databases to facilitate the
automated group key management of large-scale cryptographic groups.
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6.2. Security Issues Not Solved by IPsec Multicast Extensions
As noted in Section 2.2. of RFC 4301, it is out of the scope of this
architecture to defend the group's keys or its application data
against attacks targeting vulnerabilities of the operating
environment in which the IPsec implementation executes. However, it
should be noted that the risk of attacks originating by an adversary
in the network is magnified to the extent that the group keys are
shared across a large number of systems.
The security issues that are left unsolved by the IPsec multicast
extension service divide into two broad categories: outsider attacks
and insider attacks.
6.2.1. Outsider Attacks
The IPsec multicast extension service does not defend against an
adversary outside of the group who has:
- the capability to launch a multicast, flooding denial-of-service
attack against the group, originating from a system whose IPsec
subsystem does not filter the unauthorized multicast transmissions.
- compromised a multicast router, allowing the adversary to corrupt
or delete all multicast packets destined for the group endpoints
downstream from that router.
- captured a copy of an earlier multicast packet transmission and
then replayed it to a group that does not have the anti-replay
service enabled. Note that for a large-scale, any-source multicast
group, it is impractical for the Group Receivers to maintain an
anti-replay state for every potential Group Sender. Group policies
that require anti-replay protection for a large-scale, any-source
multicast group should consider an application layer multicast
protocol that can detect and reject replays.
6.2.2. Insider Attacks
For large-scale groups, the IP security multicast extensions are
dependent on an automated Group Key Management protocol to correctly
authenticate and authorize trustworthy members in compliance to the
group's policies. Inherent in the concept of a cryptographic group
is a set of one or more shared secrets entrusted to all of the Group
Members. Consequently, the service's security guarantees are no
stronger than the weakest member admitted to the group by the GKM
system. The GKM system is responsible for responding to compromised
Group Member detection by executing a re-key procedure. The GKM
re-keying protocol will expel the compromised Group Members and
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distribute new group keying material to the trusted members.
Alternatively, the group policy may require the GKM system to
terminate the group.
In the event that an adversary has been admitted into the group by
the GKM system, the following attacks are possible and can not be
solved by the IPsec multicast extension service:
- The adversary can disclose the secret group key or group data to an
unauthorized party outside of the group. After a group key or data
compromise, cryptographic methods such as traitor tracing or
watermarking can assist in the forensics process. However, these
methods are outside the scope of this specification.
- The insider adversary can forge packet transmissions that appear to
be from a peer Group Member. To defend against this attack, for
those Group Sender transmissions that merit the overhead, the group
policy can require the Group Sender to multicast packets using the
data origin authentication service.
- If the group's data origin authentication service uses digital
signatures, then the insider adversary can launch a computational
resource denial-of-service attack by multicasting bogus signed
packets.
6.3. Implementation or Deployment Issues that Impact Security
6.3.1. Homogeneous Group Cryptographic Algorithm Capabilities
The IP security multicast extensions service can not defend against a
poorly considered group security policy that allows a weaker
cryptographic algorithm simply because all of the group's endpoints
are known to support it. Unfortunately, large-scale groups can be
difficult to upgrade to the current best-in-class cryptographic
algorithms. One possible approach to solving many of these problems
is the deployment of composite groups that can straddle heterogeneous
groups [COMPGRP]. A standard solution for heterogeneous groups is an
activity for future standardization. In the interim, synchronization
of a group's cryptographic capabilities could be achieved using a
secure and scalable software distribution management tool.
6.3.2. Groups that Span Two or More Security Policy Domains
Large-scale groups may span multiple legal jurisdictions (e.g.,
countries) that enforce limits on cryptographic algorithms or key
strengths. As currently defined, the IPsec multicast extension
service requires a single group policy per group. As noted above,
this problem remains an area for future standardization.
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6.3.3. Source-Specific Multicast Group Sender Transient Locators
A Source Specific Multicast (SSM) Group Sender's source IP address
can dynamically change during a secure multicast group's lifetime.
Examples of the events that can cause the Group Sender's source
address to change include but are not limited to NAT, a mobility-
induced change in the care-of-address, and a multi-homed host using a
new IP interface. The change in the Group Sender's source IP address
will cause GSPD entries related to that multicast group to become out
of date with respect to the group's multicast routing state. In the
worst case, there is a risk that the Group Sender's data originating
from a new source address will be BYPASS processed by a security
gateway. If this scenario was not anticipated, then it could leak
the group's data. Consequently, it is recommended that SSM secure
multicast groups have a default DISCARD policy for all unauthorized
Group Sender source IP addresses for the SSM group's destination IP
address.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Steven Kent, Russ Housley, Pasi Eronen, and
Tero Kivinen for their helpful comments.
The "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations"
[RFC3552] was consulted to develop the Security Considerations
section of this memo.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5,
RFC 1112, August 1989.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December
2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
4303, December 2005.
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8.2. Informative References
[COMPGRP] Gross G. and H. Cruickshank, "Multicast IP Security
Composite Cryptographic Groups", Work in Progress, February
2007.
[RFC2526] Johnson, D. and S. Deering, "Reserved IPv6 Subnet Anycast
Addresses", RFC 2526, March 1999.
[RFC2627] Wallner, D., Harder, E., and R. Agee, "Key Management for
Multicast: Issues and Architectures", RFC 2627, June 1999.
[RFC2914] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41, RFC
2914, September 2000.
[RFC3171] Albanna, Z., Almeroth, K., Meyer, D., and M. Schipper,
"IANA Guidelines for IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments",
BCP 51, RFC 3171, August 2001.
[RFC3306] Haberman, B. and D. Thaler, "Unicast-Prefix-based IPv6
Multicast Addresses", RFC 3306, August 2002.
[RFC3307] Haberman, B., "Allocation Guidelines for IPv6 Multicast
Addresses", RFC 3307, August 2002.
[RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A.
Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version
3", RFC 3376, October 2002.
[RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
[RFC3569] Bhattacharyya, S., Ed., "An Overview of Source-Specific
Multicast (SSM)", RFC 3569, July 2003.
[RFC3740] Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004.
[RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed., and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.
[RFC3940] Adamson, B., Bormann, C., Handley, M., and J. Macker,
"Negative-acknowledgment (NACK)-Oriented Reliable Multicast
(NORM) Protocol", RFC 3940, November 2004.
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[RFC4046] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
"Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.
[RFC4082] Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, June 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4359] Weis, B., "The Use of RSA/SHA-1 Signatures within
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication
Header (AH)", RFC 4359, January 2006.
[RFC4535] Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross, "GSAKMP:
Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol", RFC
4535, June 2006.
[RFC4601] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas,
"Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):
Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 4601, August 2006.
[RFC4891] Graveman, R., Parthasarathy, M., Savola, P., and H.
Tschofenig, "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnels",
RFC 4891, May 2007.
[ZLLY03] Zhang, X., et al., "Protocol Design for Scalable and
Reliable Group Rekeying", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking (TON), Volume 11, Issue 6, December 2003.
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Appendix A. Multicast Application Service Models
The vast majority of secure multicast applications can be catalogued
by their service model and accompanying intra-group communication
patterns. Both the Group Key Management (GKM) subsystem and the
IPsec subsystem MUST be able to configure the GSPD/SAD security
policies to match these dominant usage scenarios. The GSPD/SAD
policies MUST include the ability to configure both Any-Source
Multicast groups and Source-Specific Multicast groups for each of
these service models. The GKM subsystem management interface MAY
include mechanisms to configure the security policies for service
models not identified by this standard.
A.1. Unidirectional Multicast Applications
Multimedia content-delivery multicast applications that do not have
congestion notification or re-transmission error-recovery mechanisms
are inherently unidirectional. RFC 4301 only defines bi-directional
unicast traffic selectors (as per RFC 4301, Sections 4.4.1 and 5.1
with respect to traffic selector directionality). The GKM subsystem
requires that the IPsec subsystem MUST support unidirectional SPD
entries, which cause a Group Security Association (GSA) to be
installed in only one direction. Multicast applications that have
only one Group Member authorized to transmit can use this type of
Group Security Association to enforce that group policy. In the
inverse direction, the GSA does not have an SAD entry, and the GSPD
configuration is optionally set up to discard unauthorized attempts
to transmit unicast or multicast packets to the group.
The GKM subsystem's management interface MUST have the ability to set
up a GKM subsystem group having a unidirectional GSA security policy.
A.2. Bi-Directional Reliable Multicast Applications
Some secure multicast applications are characterized as one Group
Sender to many receivers but have inverse data flows required by a
reliable multicast transport protocol (e.g., NORM). In such
applications, the data flow from the sender is multicast and the
inverse flow from the Group's Receivers is unicast to the sender.
Typically, the inverse data flows carry error repair requests and
congestion control status.
For such applications, it is advantageous to use the same IPsec SA
for protection of both unicast and multicast data flows. This does
introduce one risk: the IKEv2 application may choose the same SPI for
receiving unicast traffic as the GCKS chooses for a group IPsec SA
covering unicast traffic. If both SAs are installed in the SAD, the
SA lookup may return the wrong SPI as the result of an SA lookup. To
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avoid this problem, IPsec SAs installed by the GKM SHOULD use the 2-
tuple {destination IP address, SPI} to identify each IPsec SA. In
addition, the GKM SHOULD use a unicast destination IP address that
does not match any destination IP address in use by an IKEv2 unicast
IPsec SA. For example, suppose a Group Member is using both IKEv2
and a GKM protocol, and the group security policy requires protecting
the NORM inverse data flows as described above. In this case, group
policy SHOULD allocate and use a unique unicast destination IP
address representing the NORM Group Sender. This address would be
configured in parallel to the Group Sender's existing IP addresses.
The GKM subsystems at both the NORM Group Sender and Group Receiver
endpoints would install the IPsec SA, protecting the NORM unicast
messages such that the SA lookup uses the unicast destination address
as well as the SPI.
The GSA SHOULD use IPsec anti-replay protection service for the
sender's multicast data flow to the group's Receivers. Because of
the scalability problem described in the next section, it is not
practical to use the IPsec anti-replay service for the unicast
inverse flows. Consequently, in the inverse direction, the IPsec
anti-replay protection MUST be disabled. However, the unicast
inverse flows can use the group's IPsec group authentication
mechanism. The Group Receiver's GSPD entry for this GSA SHOULD be
configured to only allow a unicast transmission to the sender node
rather than a multicast transmission to the whole group.
If an ESP digital signature authentication is available (e.g., RFC
4359), source authentication MAY be used to authenticate a receiver
node's transmission to the sender. The GKM protocol MUST define a
key management mechanism for the Group Sender to validate the
asserted signature public key of any receiver node without requiring
that the sender maintain state about every Group Receiver.
This multicast application service model is RECOMMENDED because it
includes congestion control feedback capabilities. Refer to
[RFC2914] for additional background information.
The GKM subsystem's Group Owner management interface MUST have the
ability to set up a symmetric GSPD entry and one Group Sender. The
management interface SHOULD be able to configure a group to have at
least 16 concurrent authorized senders, each with their own GSA
anti-replay state.
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A.3. Any-To-Many Multicast Applications
Another family of secure multicast applications exhibits an "any-to-
many" communications pattern. A representative example of such an
application is a videoconference combined with an electronic
whiteboard.
For such applications, all (or a large subset) of the Group Members
are authorized multicast senders. In such service models, creating a
distinct IPsec SA with anti-replay state for every potential sender
does not scale to large groups. The group SHOULD share one IPsec SA
for all of its senders. The IPsec SA SHOULD NOT use the IPsec anti-
replay protection service for the sender's multicast data flow to the
Group Receivers.
The GKM subsystem's management interface MUST have the ability to set
up a group having an Any-To-Many Multicast GSA security policy.
Appendix B. ASN.1 for a GSPD Entry
This appendix describes an additional way to describe GSPD entries,
as defined in Section 4.1.1. It uses ASN.1 syntax that has been
successfully compiled. This syntax is merely illustrative and need
not be employed in an implementation to achieve compliance. The GSPD
description in Section 4.1.1 is normative. As shown in Section
4.1.1, the GSPD updates the SPD and thus this appendix updates the
SPD object identifier.
B.1. Fields Specific to a GSPD Entry
The following fields summarize the fields of the GSPD that are not
present in the SPD.
- direction (in IPsecEntry)
- DirectionFlags
- noswap (in SelectorList)
- ap-l, ap-r (in TunnelOptions)
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B.2. SPDModule
SPDModule
{iso(1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) mechanisms (5)
ipsec (8) asn1-modules (3) spd-module (1) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
RDNSequence FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
-- An SPD is a list of policies in decreasing order of preference
SPD ::= SEQUENCE OF SPDEntry
SPDEntry ::= CHOICE {
iPsecEntry IPsecEntry, -- PROTECT traffic
bypassOrDiscard [0] BypassOrDiscardEntry } -- DISCARD/BYPASS
IPsecEntry ::= SEQUENCE { -- Each entry consists of
name NameSets OPTIONAL,
pFPs PacketFlags, -- Populate from packet flags
-- Applies to ALL of the corresponding
-- traffic selectors in the SelectorLists
direction DirectionFlags, -- SA directionality
condition SelectorLists, -- Policy "condition"
processing Processing -- Policy "action"
}
BypassOrDiscardEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
bypass BOOLEAN, -- TRUE BYPASS, FALSE DISCARD
condition InOutBound }
InOutBound ::= CHOICE {
outbound [0] SelectorLists,
inbound [1] SelectorLists,
bothways [2] BothWays }
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BothWays ::= SEQUENCE {
inbound SelectorLists,
outbound SelectorLists }
NameSets ::= SEQUENCE {
passed SET OF Names-R, -- Matched to IKE ID by
-- responder
local SET OF Names-I } -- Used internally by IKE
-- initiator
Names-R ::= CHOICE { -- IKEv2 IDs
dName RDNSequence, -- ID_DER_ASN1_DN
fqdn FQDN, -- ID_FQDN
rfc822 [0] RFC822Name, -- ID_RFC822_ADDR
keyID OCTET STRING } -- KEY_ID
Names-I ::= OCTET STRING -- Used internally by IKE
-- initiator
FQDN ::= IA5String
RFC822Name ::= IA5String
PacketFlags ::= BIT STRING {
-- if set, take selector value from packet
-- establishing SA
-- else use value in SPD entry
localAddr (0),
remoteAddr (1),
protocol (2),
localPort (3),
remotePort (4) }
DirectionFlags ::= BIT STRING {
-- if set, install SA in the specified
-- direction. symmetric policy is
-- represented by setting both bits
inbound (0),
outbound (1) }
SelectorLists ::= SET OF SelectorList
SelectorList ::= SEQUENCE {
localAddr AddrList,
remoteAddr AddrList,
protocol ProtocolChoice,
noswap BOOLEAN } -- Do not swap local and remote
-- addresses and ports on incoming
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-- SPD-S and SPD-I checks
Processing ::= SEQUENCE {
extSeqNum BOOLEAN, -- TRUE 64 bit counter, FALSE 32 bit
seqOverflow BOOLEAN, -- TRUE rekey, FALSE terminate & audit
fragCheck BOOLEAN, -- TRUE stateful fragment checking,
-- FALSE no stateful fragment checking
lifetime SALifetime,
spi ManualSPI,
algorithms ProcessingAlgs,
tunnel TunnelOptions OPTIONAL } -- if absent, use
-- transport mode
SALifetime ::= SEQUENCE {
seconds [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
bytes [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL }
ManualSPI ::= SEQUENCE {
spi INTEGER,
keys KeyIDs }
KeyIDs ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
ProcessingAlgs ::= CHOICE {
ah [0] IntegrityAlgs, -- AH
esp [1] ESPAlgs} -- ESP
ESPAlgs ::= CHOICE {
integrity [0] IntegrityAlgs, -- integrity only
confidentiality [1] ConfidentialityAlgs, -- confidentiality
-- only
both [2] IntegrityConfidentialityAlgs,
combined [3] CombinedModeAlgs }
IntegrityConfidentialityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE {
integrity IntegrityAlgs,
confidentiality ConfidentialityAlgs }
-- Integrity Algorithms, ordered by decreasing preference
IntegrityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF IntegrityAlg
-- Confidentiality Algorithms, ordered by decreasing preference
ConfidentialityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfidentialityAlg
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-- Integrity Algorithms
IntegrityAlg ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm IntegrityAlgType,
parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- OPTIONAL }
IntegrityAlgType ::= INTEGER {
none (0),
auth-HMAC-MD5-96 (1),
auth-HMAC-SHA1-96 (2),
auth-DES-MAC (3),
auth-KPDK-MD5 (4),
auth-AES-XCBC-96 (5)
-- tbd (6..65535)
}
-- Confidentiality Algorithms
ConfidentialityAlg ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm ConfidentialityAlgType,
parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- OPTIONAL }
ConfidentialityAlgType ::= INTEGER {
encr-DES-IV64 (1),
encr-DES (2),
encr-3DES (3),
encr-RC5 (4),
encr-IDEA (5),
encr-CAST (6),
encr-BLOWFISH (7),
encr-3IDEA (8),
encr-DES-IV32 (9),
encr-RC4 (10),
encr-NULL (11),
encr-AES-CBC (12),
encr-AES-CTR (13)
-- tbd (14..65535)
}
CombinedModeAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF CombinedModeAlg
CombinedModeAlg ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm CombinedModeType,
parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- }
-- defined outside
-- of this document for AES modes.
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CombinedModeType ::= INTEGER {
comb-AES-CCM (1),
comb-AES-GCM (2)
-- tbd (3..65535)
}
TunnelOptions ::= SEQUENCE {
dscp DSCP,
ecn BOOLEAN, -- TRUE Copy CE to inner header
ap-l BOOLEAN, -- TRUE Copy inner IP header
-- source address to outer
-- IP header source address
ap-r BOOLEAN, -- TRUE Copy inner IP header
-- destination address to outer
-- IP header destination address
df DF,
addresses TunnelAddresses }
TunnelAddresses ::= CHOICE {
ipv4 IPv4Pair,
ipv6 [0] IPv6Pair }
IPv4Pair ::= SEQUENCE {
local OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)),
remote OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)) }
IPv6Pair ::= SEQUENCE {
local OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
remote OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) }
DSCP ::= SEQUENCE {
copy BOOLEAN, -- TRUE copy from inner header
-- FALSE do not copy
mapping OCTET STRING OPTIONAL} -- points to table
-- if no copy
DF ::= INTEGER {
clear (0),
set (1),
copy (2) }
ProtocolChoice::= CHOICE {
anyProt AnyProtocol, -- for ANY protocol
noNext [0] NoNextLayerProtocol, -- has no next layer
-- items
oneNext [1] OneNextLayerProtocol, -- has one next layer
-- item
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twoNext [2] TwoNextLayerProtocol, -- has two next layer
-- items
fragment FragmentNoNext } -- has no next layer
-- info
AnyProtocol ::= SEQUENCE {
id INTEGER (0), -- ANY protocol
nextLayer AnyNextLayers }
AnyNextLayers ::= SEQUENCE { -- with either
first AnyNextLayer, -- ANY next layer selector
second AnyNextLayer } -- ANY next layer selector
NoNextLayerProtocol ::= INTEGER (2..254)
FragmentNoNext ::= INTEGER (44) -- Fragment identifier
OneNextLayerProtocol ::= SEQUENCE {
id INTEGER (1..254), -- ICMP, MH, ICMPv6
nextLayer NextLayerChoice } -- ICMP Type*256+Code
-- MH Type*256
TwoNextLayerProtocol ::= SEQUENCE {
id INTEGER (2..254), -- Protocol
local NextLayerChoice, -- Local and
remote NextLayerChoice } -- Remote ports
NextLayerChoice ::= CHOICE {
any AnyNextLayer,
opaque [0] OpaqueNextLayer,
range [1] NextLayerRange }
-- Representation of ANY in next layer field
AnyNextLayer ::= SEQUENCE {
start INTEGER (0),
end INTEGER (65535) }
-- Representation of OPAQUE in next layer field.
-- Matches IKE convention
OpaqueNextLayer ::= SEQUENCE {
start INTEGER (65535),
end INTEGER (0) }
-- Range for a next layer field
NextLayerRange ::= SEQUENCE {
start INTEGER (0..65535),
end INTEGER (0..65535) }
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-- List of IP addresses
AddrList ::= SEQUENCE {
v4List IPv4List OPTIONAL,
v6List [0] IPv6List OPTIONAL }
-- IPv4 address representations
IPv4List ::= SEQUENCE OF IPv4Range
IPv4Range ::= SEQUENCE { -- close, but not quite right ...
ipv4Start OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)),
ipv4End OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) }
-- IPv6 address representations
IPv6List ::= SEQUENCE OF IPv6Range
IPv6Range ::= SEQUENCE { -- close, but not quite right ...
ipv6Start OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
ipv6End OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)) }
END
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Authors' Addresses
Brian Weis
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive,
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
USA
Phone: +1-408-526-4796
EMail: bew@cisco.com
George Gross
Secure Multicast Networks LLC
977 Bates Road
Shoreham, VT 05770
USA
Phone: +1-802-897-5339
EMail: gmgross@securemulticast.net
Dragan Ignjatic
Polycom
Suite 200
3605 Gilmore Way
Burnaby, BC V5G 4X5
Canada
Phone: +1-604-453-9424
EMail: dignjatic@polycom.com
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