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From: John Lepingwell <jwrlep@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
I received a few expressions of interest in my KAL article, and I have
received approval from the copyright holders for posting it on the
sci.military newsgroup. I believe it is appropriate for this group,
for while it is not completely technical, it does try to untangle the
story as much as is possible. The second part, on the implications
for theories as to why KAL was in Soviet airspace, is more
controversial. While this may venture slightly out of sci.military's
bounds I hope it does not do so too much.
[I'll go with it since its very thorough and well documented,
and it provides insight into Soviet air defense. --CDR]
NEW SOVIET REVELATIONS ABOUT THE KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN
John W.R. Lepingwell
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
361 Lincoln Hall
702 S. Wright St
Urbana, IL 61801
Copyright 1991 RFE/RL Inc.
[AUTHOR'S NOTE AND DISCLAIMER: This is a preliminary draft of an
article published in "Report on the USSR" by the Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute. Any citations should be made
to the final, published work, which appeared in "Report on the USSR"
Vol. 3, Number 17 (April 26, 1991). This article is provided for the
information of Internet and Usenet users who may not have ready access
to "Report on the USSR." It is copyright 1991 by RFE/RL Inc, and this
posting is not to be considered a repudiation of copyright rights.
"Report on the USSR" is a weekly publication of the RFE/RL Research
Institute that provides timely analysis of current affairs in the
Soviet Union. It is only available by subscription. For information
write to RFE/RL Inc, 1775 Broadway, New York, NY 10019.
My disclaimer: I am an occasional contributer to "Report on the USSR"
and a frequent reader of it. I do not, however, work for Radio
Liberty or the U.S. Government. The opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the views
of RFE/RL Inc. or the U.S. government.
N.B. This article was written in March 1991. There were no major
developments between March and late May 1991 (the date of posting)
that would lead me to reconsider the main arguments in the article.
Unfortunately, Gorbachev did not address the issue in any detail
during his trip to S. Korean in mid-April.]
Despite the recent rollback in glasnost', the Soviet newspaper
Izvestiya has published a remarkable series of articles on the
shootdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983.1 The
revelations in the series shed light on one of the most critical
events in U.S.-Soviet relations of the past decade and resolve a
number of questions concerning the shootdown. In general, the new
Soviet reports tend to strengthen the argument that KAL-007 strayed
accidentally into Soviet airspace, while weakening the claims that it
was a deliberate intrusion.
Background: Events and Interpretations
There is little disagreement about the basic facts of the KAL
tragedy. On September 1, 1983, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 deviated
from its planned flightpath from Anchorage to Seoul by hundreds of
miles, flying over the Kamchatka peninsula and then Sakhalin Island.2
Soviet air defenses tracked KAL-007 over Kamchatka, finally intercepting
it over Sakhalin Island, where it was shot down by a Soviet Su-15
interceptor just before exiting Soviet airspace.
Interpretations of the facts vary widely. The U.S. government
maintained that KAL-007 had inadvertently strayed from its flightpath,
that the Soviets had intercepted and identified the aircraft as a
civilian airliner, and destroyed it nonetheless. According to the U.S.,
the aircraft was not on an intelligence mission, and was not coordinated
with other U.S. operations in the area that night.3 President Reagan
called the shootdown a "barbaric act" and imposed limited sanctions on
the Soviet Union.4 Several years later, however, the Reagan
administration quietly backed away from its initial assertion that the
Soviets had positively identified the aircraft as a civilian airliner,
and admitted that the Soviets might have believed it was a U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft.5
The Soviet interpretation of the shootdown was very different. It
emerged slowly, over a few days, but eventually stabilized into a
detailed theory that laid the blame for the tragedy squarely on the
United States. Soviet officials charged that the airliner was part of a
deliberate "provocation" by the U.S. and South Korea, intended to force
the Soviets to reveal valuable information about their Far Eastern
defenses, and to provoke a new round in the cold war. According to this
view, KAL-007 deliberately left its assigned flightpath, and in
collaboration with a nearby U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft
proceeded to penetrate Soviet airspace. Responding to this intrusion,
the Soviet Air Defense Forces (Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony--VPVO)
activated their entire radar and communications network, allowing the
U.S. to gain valuable intelligence.6
A key component of the Soviet argument was that KAL-007 tried to
evade Soviet air defenses, both by changing its flightpath to avoid
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and by taking evasive action when a
Soviet interceptor tried to force the airliner to land. The standard
Soviet account claimed that the aircraft was flying "blacked out"
without its normal air navigation lights, that it was warned with tracer
fire from the Soviet interceptor, and that it was repeatedly hailed
(with no response) on the international emergency radio frequency. When
the aircraft allegedly ignored the warnings and took evasive action, the
Soviets decided to destroy it. According to the Soviet view, the KAL
incident was provoked by the U.S., and particularly the CIA, and the
U.S. should bear the responsibility for the deaths of the 269 people
on board.
Prompted by the apparent inconsistencies and unresolved questions
in official versions of the event, several authors have published
lengthy studies of the KAL-007 tragedy. Some of these studies have
expounded theories suggesting that the KAL flight was the result of a
conspiracy, rather than an accident or error.7 The evidence uncovered
by the Izvestiya investigation undermines a number of previous Soviet
assertions, and weakens the conspiracy theories. Among the revelations
are the following:
1) KAL-007's air navigation lights were on throughout the
interception.
2) The interceptor pilot did not fire tracer rounds to alert the
KAL airliner, because his aircraft was armed with only armor-piercing
rounds.
3) The Soviets did locate the wreckage of the airliner, and
mounted a campaign to keep U.S. forces away from the area.
4) The "black boxes" containing cockpit voice recordings and
flight data were found, and reportedly sent to Moscow for analysis.
This information tends to confirm the argument that the KAL-007
crew was unaware of the interception attempt. The implications of these
revelations for a more complete and accurate understanding of the KAL
tragedy are examined below.
The Intercept and Shootdown
It is often forgotten that the KAL-007 incident was the tragic
culmination of a number of interceptions of unidentified aircraft in
Soviet airspace. In earlier interceptions the standard rules of
engagement were clear: intruders must be forced to land, or destroyed.
In some instances these rules led to attacks on civilian aircraft as
well as military aircraft that strayed into Soviet airspace.8 That this
policy was a reaction to U.S. U-2 overflights in the 1950s is likely,
but the fact that the policy remained in force until the late 1970s or
early 1980s signals a preoccupation with security and defense of Soviet
borders that seems far out of proportion to the threat posed by one
aircraft.
The background to the shootdown, then, is one of Soviet
determination to prevent any incursion into Soviet airspace, combined
with longstanding U.S. and NATO attempts to probe Soviet air defenses in
an attempt to gain intelligence information.9
Most of the revelations come from an Izvestiya interview with
Gennadiy Nikolayevich Osipovich, the pilot of the Su-15 that shot down
KAL-007.10 Osipovich confirms Hersh's assertion that VPVO forces in the
Far East Military District were on high alert during the summer of 1983
due to an April 1983 overflight of Zelenyy Island by U.S. aircraft.11
After the intrusion, VPVO units were criticized for their laxity,
further increasing tension. But despite this criticism, and the
possibility of further air activity near the Kuriles, Soviet interceptor
pilots were not provided with sufficient fuel to allow them to conduct
air combat in the region, and return home. Their commanders were
reportedly concerned that a full fuel load would allow pilots to reach
Japan, raising the possibility of defection.12 Soviet pilots were
warned that after air combat, they would be directed to a land area over
which they could eject. This high alert level continued through the
summer, but by late August the tension had diminished. Nevertheless,
the pressure on the VPVO to react decisively against any intruder was
very great.
The restriction on aircraft range severely hampered Soviet
interceptor operations against the KAL-007 flight. The initial Soviet
interception of KAL-007 over the Kamchatka peninsula was broken off
because the interceptor did not have sufficient fuel to follow the
aircraft.13 But Soviet air defenses in the area were put on high alert
levels, and remained on alert as KAL-007 left Soviet airspace over
Kamchatka, and continued on a course for Sakhalin Island.
Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich was the most experienced pilot on
alert duty that night, and was ordered to his aircraft at 4:30 am local
time, although he did not take off until approximately 6:00 am.14 This
long time lag implies that Osipovich was alerted while KAL-007 was still
over Kamchatka.15 In his interview, Osipovich noted that he was
surprised to be alerted at that time of day, since RC-135 missions
usually occurred after 11:00 am. Osipovich was presumably referring to
the Rivet Joint RC-135 electronic intelligence missions, which were
normally, but not always, conducted during daytime.16 The timing of the
alert would therefore have been unusual, but not unprecedented.
Nevertheless, it might have raised some questions not only amongst the
pilots but the ground controllers and commanders as well.
Osipovich's account of what happened that morning differs
significantly from the Soviet reports of the time. Indeed, Osipovich
was shown the transcript made by the U.S. of Soviet air to ground
communications during the interception, and he confirmed their general
accuracy.17 Soviet transcripts were reportedly "doctored" to conform
with the official story, even though they were never released.18 In
interviews immediately after the shootdown, Osipovich was told what to
say, in order to bolster the Soviet case.19 In his interview with
Izvestiya, Osipovich confirms that when he sighted the aircraft its air
navigation lights were on, as alleged by the U.S. in its interpretation
of the transcript. At Osipovich's range from KAL-007, the aircraft only
appeared 2-3 centimeters across. In the dark this would have made
visual identification extremely difficult.
After making the intercept, KAL-007 and the interceptor entered a
region where there was no ground-based radar coverage.20 This blind
spot may have delayed the intercept, and perhaps forced the endgame to
proceed at a more rapid pace.
As KAL-007 crossed into Soviet airspace, and before any serious
attempt to identify it had been made, Osipovich was ordered to destroy
it. But before he could carry out the order, it was rescinded.21
Instead, Osipovich was ordered to force the aircraft to land. Here, the
divergence from the old Soviet story are striking. According to
previous Soviet accounts, the Su-15 interceptor fired tracer rounds and
tried to contact KAL-007 on the international emergency frequency.22 As
Osipovich admits in his interview, he did neither. His aircraft was not
armed with tracer rounds, but only armor-piercing shells that could not
be observed. Nor did he try radio contact on the emergency frequency,
because there was no time to do so, and he would have had to break off
contact with his ground controller in order to tune to the emergency
frequency.23
Osipovich maintains that the KAL-007 crew saw his "flashing" but it
is unclear from the interview whether Osipovich flashed his landing
lights or simply was referring to his standard strobe and navigation
lights. To see the Su-15's lights would have been difficult, since the
interceptor was apparently below the aircraft at the time.24
Osipovich's reason for asserting that the KAL crew saw his
interceptor is that KAL-007 allegedly took evasive action, gaining
altitude and slowing as it did so. This is a weak argument. First, it
is unlikely that a 747 pilot would consider it possible to evade a
highly maneuverable interceptor. Second, if the KAL pilot was
attempting evasive action, his actions were quite mild. Osipovich makes
no suggestion that the pilot engaged in more extreme maneuvers, other
than a gradual climb of a few thousand feet. Presumably, a pilot
concerned that he was under attack would "jink" and change course and
altitude more dramatically. Third, the ascent to higher altitude
appears to have been a fuel economy maneuver, and the copilot calmly
reported the altitude change to Japanese air traffic control.25 In
retrospect, it appears that Osipovich may have been "rationalizing" the
aircraft's actions, reading intentionality into an action that may have
been completely unrelated to the attempts at interception.
Nevertheless, Osipovich became convinced, and remains convinced, that
the KAL crew was trying to escape him.
At no time during the interception did Osipovich identify the
aircraft as a civilian airliner. He apparently was never closer than 2
kilometers to KAL-007, and claims not to have been familiar with the
silouhette of the 747. Osipovich recalls that only after firing two air
to air missiles did he begin to wonder what kind of aircraft it was, for
it seemed larger than an Ilyushin-76 (a large Soviet transport
aircraft), and roughly resembled a Soviet Tu-16 bomber. An indicator of
Osipovich's concern (if not confusion) is that his first question for
his commander upon returning to base was whether he had downed a Soviet
aircraft.26
Osipovich confirms that the two missiles hit the aircraft on the
left wing and rear fuselage. KAL-007 immediately began to lose
altitude, and there seems to have been some confusion amongst the
decisionmakers on the ground as to what was happening. Soviet ground
controllers apparently ordered the MiG following Osipovich's aircraft to
try and track KAL-007 on the way down, but the MiG pilot was unable to
make visual contact.27
The account of the interception thus matches that provided by the
U.S. in many ways. The interception was clearly hurried, with the
ground controllers uncertain as to what they were trying to intercept.
The attempts to contact the crew of KAL-007 were performed hastily, and
without much concern for their effectiveness. There is no evidence that
Osipovich identified the "target" as a civilian aircraft. Hersh
maintains that in 1983 the Soviets violated their own rules of
engagement, requiring a positive identification of the aircraft before
attack.28 Indeed, even had Osipovich identified the aircraft as
civilian it is not certain that the Soviet response would have been any
different. In 1978 a KAL airliner had been clearly identified as
civilian, yet the pilot was ordered to destroy the aircraft.29
Similarly, in the aftermath of the Rust affair, the tone of the articles
implied that the VPVO's main error had been in not stopping the
intrusion.30
After the Shootdown: The Search for the Black Boxes
In the wake of the tragedy, both the U.S. and Soviet Union mounted
massive search operations in the Sea of Japan. The Izvestiya series
discusses Soviet efforts to find the wreckage in some detail. The
account states that the Soviet Navy did not have sufficient equipment
and trained personnel, and had to rely on a ship, divers, and diving
equipment assigned to the task by the Ministry of the Gas Industry.31
Soviet forces did their best to hamper U.S. and Japanese efforts to
locate and retrieve the black boxes. According to the account, the
Soviet Navy placed a false black box with a "pinger" in a deep part of
the sea (620 meters), to divert the U.S. search effort. This may have
triggered a mistaken U.S. assertion that the black boxes had been
located, an assertion that was later dropped.32
Soviet forces did finally locate the wreckage 11 miles off Moneron
Island at a depth of 160 meters, sometime in late September or early
October.33 A special drilling ship, able to stabilize its position
above the wreckage, was brought in to support the diving and retrieval
operations. For almost a month divers searched the area for parts of
the aircraft and the black boxes.34
According to Izvestiya's interviews with the diving team, little
was left of the aircraft, which apparently broke up upon hitting the
water's surface. The largest pieces found were only about a meter in
size. The divers were also surprised to find few human remains,
discovering instead primarily clothes and personal effects. As the
articles speculate, the decomposition of the bodies apparently was very
rapid, leaving little for the divers to find.35 No evidence of
espionage equipment was found amongst the wreckage.
In addition to the diving team borrowed from the Ministry of the
Gas Industry, a submersible from the Academy of Sciences was brought to
the scene. It was this submersible that allegedly recovered one of the
two black boxes found by the Soviets.36 The black boxes were reportedly
sent to the mainland, and thence to Moscow for analysis.37 The
retrieval of the black boxes was a closely held secret and the results
of the analysis have never been revealed.
The reluctance of the Soviets to announce their retrieval of the
black boxes raises questions as to their contents. The black boxes
would contain cockpit voice recordings and other data that are
critically important to understanding the last moments of KAL-007 and
how it came to be over Sakhalin.
Implications and Explanations
The case of KAL-007 has been debated in a highly charged
atmosphere. The string of errors and coincidences that might have led
the aircraft to its destruction appears incredible, and many authors
have therefore concluded that KAL-007's flight was not accidental. But
evidence for the KAL-007 flight being a planned intrusion into Soviet
airspace is dubious at best, and many of the arguments that it was
intentional are based on weak suppositions.38
How do the new Soviet revelations affect the balance of evidence
between accident and premeditation? While there is little new material
on the origins of KAL-007, the account of the interception and the
recovery operation contradicts some portions of the conspiracy theories.
Both Pearson and Johnson find fault with U.S. reports of the
interception, reinterpreting the transcripts and arguing that the Soviet
pilot had indeed attempted to communicate with KAL-007 by the emergency
radio channel, firing tracers, and possibly blinking his lights.
Furthermore, they question the U.S. assertion that KAL-007's navigation
lights were on.39 According to the conspiracy theories, the failure of
the KAL-007 crew to respond to Soviet attempts to communicate strongly
supports the hypothesis that they were on a spy mission, and tried to
evade the Su-15.40 Indeed, they suggest that Soviet radars were being
jammed by U.S. electronic warfare assets, with Johnson explicitly
pointing to the "blind zone" that the Su-15 entered, and that this
jamming caused one of the two missiles launched (a radar-guided missile)
to miss KAL-007.41
These assertions are falsified by the new Soviet information. KAL-
007's lights were on, the Su-15 fired cannon shells that could not have
been seen by the crew of KAL-007, and the pilot made no attempt to
contact the aircraft on the emergency radio frequency. There is no
evidence in the interview with Osipovich of jamming or interference with
the Soviet intercept operation. The "blind spot" in radar coverage was
apparently a previously existing weak link in the Soviet air defenses
about which the pilots had never been informed. Osipovich also confirms
that both missiles hit the aircraft, causing extensive damage.
The new account of the recovery operation also punctures some of
the assumptions of the conspiracy theorists. Early reports indicated
that the U.S. may have detected a black box "pinger" in mid-September,
but the reports soon disappeared. These reports have led to allegations
that the U.S. found the black boxes and covered up the retrieval
operation in order to suppress evidence implicating U.S. intelligence
services.42 The information that the wreckage and black boxes were
found in Soviet waters explains the failure of U.S. recovery efforts,
and the decoy black box planted by the Soviets apparently triggered the
mistaken U.S. claims. Furthermore, it is quite likely that U.S.
intelligence was aware of the arrival and positioning of the Soviet
drilling ship, and may have recognized that the Soviets had located the
wreckage and black boxes. This, in turn, may have led to the U.S.
decision to call off further searches in November 1983.
These new revelations, and confirmations of old data, seriously
weaken some of the conspiracy theory arguments, even if they do not
constitute a complete refutation.43 The key question, how KAL-007 went
off course, cannot be satisfactorily resolved without access to the
black box information that the Soviet Ministry of Defense may hold.44
The evidence does clearly show that the Soviets were confused about
the intrusion, and that they reacted without making a positive
identification of the aircraft. But there is no indication that the
crew of KAL-007 was ever, or even could have been, aware of the Su-15
interceptor, let alone that KAL-007 took evasive action. On balance the
evidence makes it seem far less likely that KAL-007 was serving any
intelligence agency.
Current Soviet Defense Debates and KAL-007
While the KAL-007 tragedy is now history, its reexamination is
taking place during a period of debate concerning the role and fate of
the Soviet air defense forces (the VPVO), and against a backdrop of
improving Soviet--South Korean relations.
Questions have already been raised in the Soviet press over the
need for maintaining a separate air defense service, and the Izvestiya
revelations do little to boost the image of the VPVO.45 Current
military reform plans call for 18-20 percent cuts in VPVO personnel
levels--the largest cut being planned for any of the military
services.46 The new information on VPVO performance in 1983 may
therefore play a role in the upcoming debate on military reform, perhaps
significantly weakening the VPVO's claim to remain a separate service.
The KAL-007 affair also has direct implications for the current
Commander in Chief of the VPVO, General Ivan Tret'yak, a relatively
conservative military officer. Tret'yak was commander of the Far East
military district in 1983, and almost certainly played a role in the
decision to shoot down KAL-007. His rise in the military, culminating
in his appointment to the VPVO after the Rust incident, indicates that
the KAL-007 affair did not harm his career. The new questions being
raised might therefore reflect badly not only on the VPVO, but also
directly on its Commander in Chief.
That the Izvestiya revelations were unwelcome news for the military
is also clear. The reports indicate a substantial disinformation
campaign on the part of the senior Soviet military leadership of the
time. This revelation may serve to further inflame tensions between
the media and the military. In fact, the General Staff attempted to
dissuade the reporters from publishing the series on KAL-007, and
refused access to documents concerning the case.47
Finally, the series appears when Soviet--South Korean relations are
warming rapidly, with the possibility of a visit by President Gorbachev
to South Korea some time in the near future. A move
to release more information about KAL-007, and perhaps even to accept
blame and issue a formal apology, might play a significant role in
improving relations between the two countries. Indeed, during South
Korean President Roh's recent visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze reportedly expressed his "regret" over the
shootdown. The South South Korean Foreign Minister reportedly accepted
the comment as an apology.48
Given the sensitivity of the issue, and the ongoing debate over
the future of Soviet strategic air defenses, it is unlikely that the
last word on KAL-007 has been said.49 Izvestiya is also publishing a
series based on research in the U.S., and other publications may try
to get their own "scoops." In addition to the mystery of the black
boxes there remain a number of unanswered questions on the Soviet
side, particularly concerning the decisionmaking process within the
VPVO. Answering these questions may finally clear up the aura of
mystery surrounding the tragedy.
NOTES
1 The ten part series is the result of investigative reporting
by Izvestiya correspondent Andrey Illesh, published under the
title "Tayna Koreyskogo "Boinga-747" in January 1991. Not all
of the original Russian language articles were available to the
author. Where possible, citations are to the Russian originals
published in the Izvestiya Moscow evening edition. Other
citations are based on the collected translation published in
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report FBIS-SOV-
91-025 (February 6, 1991), pp. 3-27. An update to the series,
based on new evidence, was published in FBIS-SOV-91-031-S, pp.
1-4. A later series written by Izvestiya's New York
correspondent, investigating the U.S. side of the tragedy, is
not covered in this report.
2 The most detailed, and plausible, account of the KAL-007
tragedy is "The Target is Destroyed" What Really Happened to
Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random
House, 1986) by Seymour M. Hersh, a well-known investigative
reporter. An earlier analysis that concentrates more on the
internal Soviet decisionmaking process and background is
Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
3 For the official U.S. view see U.S. Information Agency, The
Shootdown of KAL 007: Moscow's Charges--and the Record
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1983), and
U.S. Department of State, KAL Flight #007: Compilation of
Statements and Documents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
State, 1983).
4 Reagan's remarks on the shootdown are reported in Kal Flight
#007 p. 3.
5 The intelligence assessment indicating that the Soviets had
not identified the aircraft wasn't released until January 1988,
after action by Congressman Lee H. Hamilton. See Young and
Launer, Flights of Fancy, p. 202.
6 The development of the Soviet version of events is critically
examined in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy, pp. 137-167.
7 The best-known conspiracy theories are those of R.W. Johnson,
Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection (New York:
Viking, 1986) and David Pearson, KAL 007: The Cover-Up (New
York: Summit, 1987). These conspiracy theories and the
propaganda wars surrounding the KAL shootdown are incisively
critiqued in Marilyn J. Young, Michael K. Launer, Flights of
Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and Soviet-American Rhetoric
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988). In adddition
to analyzing the rhetoric, the Young and Launer introduce some
new evidence and carefully dissect previously existing evidence.
8 Of particular note is the 1978 Soviet interception and attack
on a KAL flight that strayed far off course and over the Kola
peninsula. After much effort the target was intercepted, and
despite clear identification of its civilian nature, was fired
upon. The pilot managed to land the crippled aircraft, and even
though the Soviets had the opportunity to inspect the aircraft,
no evidence of espionage equipment was ever reported. See
Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 3-15. Other incidents are
described in James E. Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (New
York: Random House, 1988), pp. 32-49. There have also been
claims that Soviet civilian airliners have also been shot down
by Soviet air defenses in cases of mistaken identity. For a
Soviet account of an intercept and near attack on a Soviet
civilian transport aircraft see V. Lavrinenkov, Bez voyny (Kiev:
Politizdat, 1982) pp. 215-217. In the wake of the Rust flight,
the VPVO revealed more information on attacks on intruding
aircraft, see "Bditel'nost i reshitel'nost'--Chest' i doblest'
voyna PVO," Vestnik PVO No. 8, 1987, pp. 3-6.
9 The Su-15 pilot reports that he flew more than 1000
intercepts over a ten year period, see Izvestiya January 23,
1991 p. 5. VPVO concerns over near incursions are reported in
A. Galunov, "V zone--strategicheskiy razvedchik," Krasnaya
zvezda September 10, 1988, p. 1; M. Lukyanin, A. Smolyanko, V.
Strel'tsov, A. Ladin, V. Khabarov, "Lyudi i nebo," Krasnaya
zvezda April 9, 1989, p. 1-2. For detailed information on U.S.
reconnaissance flights in the Far East see Hersh, The Target is
Destroyed pp. 35-43, 222-223.
10 Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff in 1983, ordered
Izvestiya to misidentify the pilot responsible for shooting down
KAL-007, and consequently most Western accounts refer to him as
Major Vassiliy Kasmin. See Johnson, Shootdown p. 20 for an
example. It does appear that a pilot by that name intercepted
the KAL aircraft over Kamchatka, however, see FBIS-SOV-91-025,
p. 6.
11 Izvestiya Jan. 23, 1991, p. 5; Hersh, The Target is
Destroyed pp. 18-22. Zelenyy Island is part of the disputed
Kurile chain (or Japanese Northern Territories). Hersh notes
that it remains uncertain whether the overflight was intentional
or not.
12 Soviet authorities were concerned over a possible repetition
of the incident in which Viktor Belenko, a Soviet pilot,
defected to Japan in his modern MiG-25 interceptor. Izvestiya
January 23, 1991, p. 5.
13 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 6.
14 Izvestiya January 23, 1991, p. 5. The local time on
Sakhalin is 9 hours different from Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and
3 hours different from Japanese Summer Time (i.e. 3:00 am in
Japan is the same as 6:00 am on Sakhalin). Hersh uses Japan
time, while other sources use GMT. For a convenient summary see
Dallin, Black Box p. 1.
15 This contradicts some accounts of VPVO operations that night.
For example, Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 218, suggests
that the VPVO forces on Kamchatka may have kept information
concerning the overflight quiet, perhaps to prevent criticism
for not stopping it.
16 Izvestiya January 23, p. 5. Rivet Joint missions were RC-
135 missions flown over the Sea of Okhotsk and other areas in
order to monitor Soviet communications and air defense radars.
See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 8-11, 220.
17 One difference between the transcript compiled by the U.S.
and that published in Izvestiya is significant. In the U.S.
transcript, Osipovich is reported as commenting at 1819:08
(6:19:08 local time) after the initial intercept that "They
[KAL-007] do not see me." Dallin Black Box p. 24. The Izvestiya
report (January 23, 1991, p. 5) gives this as "vremya ne vyydet"
or "time is short." No explanation is given for this change, or
mistranslation, from the English. This statement comes before
Osipovich made his attempt to signal the aircraft, so it would
be wrong to construe it as indicating that Osipovich believed he
wasn't observed at any time during the intercept. The
transcript is reproduced in Dallin, Black Box pp. 22-25.
18 Izvestiya January 23, 1991, p. 5.
19 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7.
20 This seems to be the period from 1815 GMT to perhaps 1820.
Dallin, Black Box pp. 23-24.
21 This seems to be around 1820 GMT, judging from the
transcript. Dallin, Black Box p. 24. This account seems to
confirm that given in Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 233.
22 See the summary in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy pp.
152-164.
23 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7.
24 On Osipovich's claim see Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7.
It is possible that the crew might have been preoccupied with
work inside the cockpit. On the difficulty involved in getting
a pilot's attention, even with tracers, see Hersh, The Target is
Destroyed p. 233-234. Hersh also notes that the pilot (or co-
pilot) may well have been absent from the cockpit at the time
the Su-15 tried to signal the aircraft. See Ibid, pp. 205-208.
25 See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 234.
26 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. Osipovich's claim that
Soviet pilots were not familiar with foreign civilian aircraft
is amazing. The Boeing 747 is a distinctive design, and had
been prominent in the aviation industry for over a decade. That
Soviet pilots were ignorant of the Boeing 747 indicates very
tight constraints on their training. The comparison to a Tu-16
bomber is also puzzling, for the Tu-16 is much smaller than
either an Ilyushin 76 or a Boeing 747, and has quite a different
configuration. Clearly, there was some confusion as to what
kind of aircraft was being intercepted. Dallin, Black Box pp.
62-63, notes the difficulty in distinguishing between aircraft
in the darkness at that range.
27 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. After the missiles hit
the air navigation lights went out, presumably because of a
power failure. This confirms Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p.
235.
28 Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 232.
29 Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 12-14.
30 Other articles have hinted at VPVO authority to open fire
with surface-to-air missiles without any attempt to intercept
intruders first. A. Galunov, "V zone--strategicheskiy
razvedchik," Krasnaya zvezda September 10, 1988, p. 1.
31 Izvestiya January 25, 1991, p. 6.
32 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 26. The initial Izvestiya account was
later confirmed by a naval officer in a follow-up article. see
FBIS-SOV-91-031-S (February 14, 1991) p. 3-4.
33 Izvestiya January 25,p. 6; FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 15, 18.
34 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 19.
35 Izvestiya January 29, 1991, p. 8; January 30, 1991, p. 5.
36 Izvestiya January 30, 1991, p. 5. The Izvestiya series
claims that 3 black boxes were found, even though only 2 were on
board the aircraft. See Izvestiya January 31, 1991, p. 7.
37 Izvestiya January 30, p. 5.
38 Peason's book is examined and critiqued in Young and Launer,
Flights of Fancy, while Johnson's Shootdown is reviewed in
Marilyn J. Young and Michael K. Launer, "007--Conspiracy or
Accident?" Commonweal pp. September 12 1986, pp. 472-473. One
example of a clear error by Johnson is his assertion that the
fuselage of KAL-007 could not have been hit by a Soviet air to
air missile because it would have caused a large hole and "all
the passengers and crew would have been irresistably sucked out
and flung into the freezing blackness." (pp. 27-28) There have
been recent cases of substantial damage to fuselages resulting
in rapid decompression, without having "all" the passengers and
crew sucked out. Furthermore, this groundless assertion is
belied by Osipovich's account.
39 Pearson's attempts at reinterpreting the transcript of the
shootdown are demolished in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy,
pp. 83-96.
40 See Johnson, Shootdown pp. 19-28; David Pearson "K.A.L. 007
What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It," The Nation August 18-
25, 1984, pp. 118-119.
41 Johnson, Shootdown p. 21, 27-28.
42 See, for example, Johnson, Shootdown pp. 200-207.
43 Refuting such an argument is extremely difficult, for new
layers of conspiracy may always be added. Furthermore, it is
easier to raise doubts about the facts than to answer them.
44 Hersh, in The Target is Destroyed gives perhaps the most
convincing scenario for accidental deviation from the
flightpath.
45 This debate was triggered by Aleksey Arbatov, "Skol'ko
oborony dostatochno?" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' No. 3, 1989, pp.
41-43. The initial VPVO response is Yu. Lyubimov, "O
dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti," Kommunist
vooruzhenykh sil No. 16, 1990, pp. 21-26.
46 "Kontseptsiya voyennoy reformy," Pravitel'stvenniy Vestnik
p. 7.
47 Izvestiya January 31, 1990, p. 7.
48 Far Eastern Economic Review December 27, 1990, p. 6.
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev repeated this comment
during a visit to South Korea in January. See Report on the
USSR January 18, 1991, p. 34. For a review of improving
Soviet--South Korean relations see The Economist December 22,
1990, pp. 39-41.
49 As this article was being prepared for publication
the Air Defense Forces replied to the Izvestiya series with four
articles covering the KAL 1978 incident, KAL-007, and the Rust affair,
along with some lesser known intrusions into Soviet airspace. These
cases are compared to the destruction of an Iranian airbus by the
U.S.S. Vincennes. (See A. Dokuchayev, "O 'Boingakh', 'Tsessne', i
drugikh," Krasnaya zvezda March 13, 1991, p. 2; March 14, 1991, p. 2;
March 15, 1991, p. 2; March 20, 1991, p. .), The series sheds little
new light on the KAL- 007 incident, although it emphasizes that U.S.
air activity in the Far East in 1983 was "terrorizing" the Air Defense
Forces and raising tensions. The series plays up the Air Defense
Force's professionalism and expertise in the very difficult task of
intercepting and identifying intruding aircraft.