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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Gould
Request for Comments: 5910 S. Hollenbeck
Obsoletes: 4310 VeriSign, Inc.
Category: Standards Track May 2010
ISSN: 2070-1721
Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping
for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name
System security (DNSSEC) extensions for domain names stored in a
shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends
the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required
for the provisioning of DNS security extensions. This document
obsoletes RFC 4310.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Migrating from RFC 4310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Delegation Signer Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Public Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Booleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. DS Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . 8
5. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
1. Introduction
This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 5730
[RFC5730]. This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping
described in RFC 5731 [RFC5731], is specified using the Extensible
Markup Language (XML) 1.0 [W3C.REC-xml-20001006] and XML Schema
notation ([W3C.REC-xmlschema-1-20010502]
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]).
The EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730] provides a complete
description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough
understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to
understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with
the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [RFC1034] and
RFC 1035 [RFC1035] and with DNS security extensions described in
RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034 [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] is
required to understand the DNS security concepts described in this
document.
The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for
the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a
shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping
can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC
Delegation Signer (DS) resource records (RRs) as described in
RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
This document obsoletes RFC 4310 [RFC4310]; thus, secDNS-1.1 as
defined in this document deprecates secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310]. The
motivation behind obsoleting RFC 4310 [RFC4310] includes:
- Addressing the issue with removing DS data based on the non-unique
<secDNS:keyTag> element. The client should explicitly specify the
DS data to be removed, by using all four <secDNS:dsData> elements
that are guaranteed to be unique.
- Adding the ability to add and remove <secDNS:dsData> elements in a
single command. This makes it consistent with RFC 5731 [RFC5731].
- Clarifying and correcting the usage of the <secDNS:chg> element.
RFC 4310 [RFC4310] defined the <secDNS:chg> element as a
replacement for the DS data. This is inconsistent with RFC 5731
[RFC5731], where a <domain:chg> element is used to change the
values of the domain attributes.
- Adding support for the Key Data Interface described in Section 4.2
for "thick" DNSSEC servers that accept only key data and generate
the associated DS data.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used
to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page
boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only
to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of
this protocol.
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented in order to develop a conforming
implementation.
secDNS-1.0 is used as an abbreviation for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0, and secDNS-1.1 is used as an
abbreviation for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1.
2. Migrating from RFC 4310
This section includes implementation recommendations for clients and
servers to use in migrating from secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1.
As this document deprecates RFC 4310 [RFC4310], if a server announces
support for both secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] and secDNS-1.1 in the EPP
greeting, clients supporting both versions SHOULD prefer secDNS-1.1.
A server SHOULD do the following to help clients migrate from
secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1 as defined in this document.
1. A server migrating from secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1 SHOULD
support both versions (i.e., secDNS-1.0 and secDNS-1.1) for a
reasonable migration period.
2. The version of the <secDNS:infData> element to be returned by the
server in the response to a <domain:info> response SHOULD depend
on the <extURI> elements (indicating the secDNS extension) the
client included in the EPP <login> command using the following
mapping:
- Return version secDNS-1.1 of the <secDNS:infData> element if
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
element in the EPP <login> command, independent of whether
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 is also included as an
<extURI> element in the EPP <login> command.
- Return version secDNS-1.0 of the <secDNS:infData> element if
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 but not
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
element in the EPP <login> command.
- Don't return the <secDNS:infData> element if neither
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 nor
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
element in the EPP <login> command.
3. Object Attributes
This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name
mapping [RFC5731]. Only those new elements are described here.
3.1. Delegation Signer Information
Delegation Signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to
indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent
zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child
zone. A DS resource record (RR) contains four fields: a key tag
field, a key algorithm number octet, an octet identifying a digest
algorithm, and a digest field. See RFC 4034 [RFC4034] for specific
field formats.
3.1.1. Public Key Information
Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR
presentation field formats described in Section 2.2 of RFC 4034
[RFC4034]. A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol
octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key.
3.2. Booleans
Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described
in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].
3.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime
Maximum signature lifetime (maxSigLife) is an OPTIONAL child
preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when
the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child
will expire. The maxSigLife value applies to the RRSIG resource
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
record (RR) over the DS RRset. See Section 3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034]
for information on the RRSIG resource record (RR).
The maximum signature lifetime is represented using the <secDNS:
maxSigLife> element. The maxSigLife value MUST be represented in
seconds, using an extended XML Schema "int" format. The base "int"
format, which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the
W3C XML Schema recommendation [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]. This
format is further restricted to enforce a minimum value of 1.
If maxSigLife is not provided by the client, or if the server does
not support the client-specified maxSigLife value, the default
signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined
using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.
4. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can
create, add, and remove Delegation Signer (DS) information or key
data information for a domain name. There are two different forms of
interfaces that a server can support. The first is called the "DS
Data Interface", where the client is responsible for the creation of
the DS information and is required to pass DS information when
performing adds and removes. The server is required to pass DS
information for <domain:info> responses. The second is the "Key Data
Interface," where the client is responsible for passing the key data
information when performing adds and removes. The server is
responsible for passing key data information for <domain:info>
responses.
The server MUST support one form of interface within a single command
or response, where <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:keyData> MUST NOT be
mixed, except for when <secDNS:keyData> is a child element of
<secDNS:dsData> for server validation. The server MUST support the
use of only one form of interface across all <secDNS:create>,
<secDNS:update>, and <secDNS:infData> elements, except during a
transition period, during which the server MAY support both. For
instance, during a transition period, the server MAY support either
the DS Data Interface or the Key Data Interface on a per-domain basis
and allow the client to migrate to the target interface. The client
can replace the interface used by utilizing the <secDNS:rem><secDNS:
all>true</secDNS:all></secDNS:rem> element to remove all data of the
old interface, and by utilizing the <secDNS:add> to add data using
the new interface (<secDNS:dsData> for the DS Data Interface and
<secDNS:keyData> for the Key Data Interface). The server MUST return
an EPP error result code of 2306 if the server receives a command
using an unsupported interface.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
4.1. DS Data Interface
The DS Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:dsData>
element for creates, adds, removes, and <domain:info> responses. The
key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by the
client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data. The
server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve
the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate
the received DS information. It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone
operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the
parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary. The key
data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in
RFC 3757 [RFC3757] and RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
The <secDNS:dsData> element contains the following child elements:
- A <secDNS:keyTag> element that contains a key tag value as
described in Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. The <secDNS:
keyTag> element is represented as an unsignedShort
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].
- A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm value as
described in Section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
- A <secDNS:digestType> element that contains a digest type value as
described in Section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
- A <secDNS:digest> element that contains a digest value as
described in Section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. The <secDNS:
digest> element is represented as a hexBinary
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:keyData> element that describes the key data
used as input in the DS hash calculation for use in server
validation. The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the child
elements defined in Section 4.2.
4.2. Key Data Interface
The Key Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:keyData>
element for creates, adds, removes, and <domain:info> responses. The
DS information is not provided by the client but is generated by the
server. The attributes used for DS generation are based on server
policy, where only key data is passed between the client and the
server.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following child elements:
- A <secDNS:flags> element that contains a flags field value as
described in Section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
- A <secDNS:protocol> element that contains a protocol field value
as described in Section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
- A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm number field
value as described in Section 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
- A <secDNS:pubKey> element that contains an encoded public key
field value as described in Section 2.1.4 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
The <secDNS:pubKey> element is represented as a base64Binary
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502] with a minimum length of 1.
4.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
Example use of the secDNS-1.1 DS Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:dsData>
<secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
<secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
<secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
</secDNS:dsData>
Example use of secDNS-1.1 DS Data Interface with option key data for
a create:
<secDNS:dsData>
<secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
<secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
<secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
<secDNS:keyData>
<secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
<secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
<secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
</secDNS:keyData>
</secDNS:dsData>
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example use of the secDNS-1.1 Key Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:keyData>
<secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
<secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
<secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
</secDNS:keyData>
5. EPP Command Mapping
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command
mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and
managing DNS security extensions via EPP.
5.1. EPP Query Commands
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
retrieve object transfer status information.
5.1.1. EPP <check> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <check> command
or <check> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].
5.1.2. EPP <info> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <info> command
described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731]. However, additional
elements are defined for the <info> response.
When an <info> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
<resData> element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP
domain mapping [RFC5731]. In addition, the EPP <extension> element
SHOULD contain a child <secDNS:infData> element that identifies the
extension namespace if the domain object has data associated with
this extension and based on server policy. The <secDNS:infData>
element contains the following child elements:
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
child will expire. maxSigLife is described in Section 3.3.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
- One or more <secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData> elements,
but not both, as defined in Section 4. The <secDNS:dsData>
elements describe the Delegation Signer (DS) data provided by the
client for the domain. The <secDNS:keyData> elements describe the
key data provided by the client for the domain. Child elements of
the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 4.1. Child
elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are described in
Section 4.2.
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
Using the DS Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
Using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
S: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
Using the Key Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
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S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
An EPP error response MUST be returned if an <info> command cannot be
processed for any reason.
5.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
[RFC5731].
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
5.2. EPP Transform Commands
EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
change information associated with an object.
5.2.1. EPP <create> Command
This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <create>
command described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731]. No additional
elements are defined for the EPP <create> response.
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to create a domain object. In addition to the EPP command
elements described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731], the command
MUST contain an <extension> element, and the <extension> element MUST
contain a child <secDNS:create> element that identifies the extension
namespace if the client wants to associate data defined in this
extension to the domain object. The <secDNS:create> element contains
the following child elements:
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
child will expire. maxSigLife is described in Section 3.3. If the
server does not support the <secDNS:maxSigLife> element, a 2102
error MUST be returned.
- Zero or more <secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData>
elements, but not both, as defined in Section 4. Child elements
of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 4.1.
Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are described in
Section 4.2.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
Using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
Using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
Using the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When a <create> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].
5.2.2. EPP <delete> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <delete> command
or <delete> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
5.2.3. EPP <renew> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <renew> command
or <renew> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].
5.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
[RFC5731].
5.2.5. EPP <update> Command
This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <update>
command described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731]. No additional
elements are defined for the EPP <update> response.
The EPP <update> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to
the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the
command MUST contain an <extension> element, and the <extension>
element MUST contain a child <secDNS:update> element that identifies
the extension namespace if the client wants to update the domain
object with data defined in this extension. The <secDNS:update>
element contains a <secDNS:add> element to add security information
to a delegation, a <secDNS:rem> element to remove security
information from a delegation, or a <secDNS:chg> element to change
existing security information. At least one <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:
rem>, or <secDNS:chg> element MUST be provided. The order of the
<secDNS:rem> and <secDNS:add> elements is significant, where the
server MUST first remove the existing elements prior to adding the
new elements.
The <secDNS:update> element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent"
attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to
complete and implement the update request with high priority. This
attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 3.2; the
default value is boolean false. "High priority" is relative to
standard server operator policies that are determined using an out-
of-band mechanism. A server MUST return an EPP error result code of
2102 if the "urgent" attribute is specified with a value of boolean
true and the server does not support it. A server MUST return an EPP
error result code of 2306 if the server supports the "urgent"
attribute and an urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute
value of boolean true) cannot be completed with high priority.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
The <secDNS:update> element contains the following child elements:
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:rem> element that contains a <secDNS:all>
element, or one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData>
elements that are used to remove security data from a delegation.
The <secDNS:all> element is used to remove all DS and key data
with a value of boolean true. A value of boolean false will do
nothing. Removing all DS information can remove the ability of
the parent to secure the delegation to the child zone.
The <secDNS:dsData> element is part of the DS Data Interface and
is used to uniquely define the DS record to be removed, by using
all four elements -- <secDNS:keyTag>, <secDNS:alg>, <secDNS:
digestType>, and <secDNS:digest> -- that are guaranteed to be
unique.
The <secDNS:keyData> element is part of the Key Data Interface and
is used to uniquely define the key data to be removed, by using
all four elements -- <secDNS:flags>, <secDNS:protocol>, <secDNS:
alg>, and <secDNS:pubKey> -- that are guaranteed to be unique.
There can be more than one DS record created for each key, so
removing a key could remove more than one DS record.
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:add> element that is used to add security
information to an existing set. The <secDNS:add> element MUST
contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData> elements.
Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in
Section 4.1. Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are
described in Section 4.2.
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:chg> element that contains security
information to be changed. A <secDNS:chg> element contains the
following child elements:
- An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a
child's preference for the number of seconds after signature
generation when the parent's signature on the DS information
provided by the child will expire. maxSigLife is described in
Section 3.3. If the server does not support the <secDNS:
maxSigLife> element, a 2102 error MUST be returned.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing DS
Data Using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B33C99B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <update> Command,
Updating the maxSigLife:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>605900</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <update> Command, Adding and
Removing Key Data Using the Key Data Interface, and
Setting maxSigLife:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4QQQ</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>605900</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 22]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
<secDNS:dsData> Using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 23]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example <update> Command,
Removing all DS and Key Data Using <secDNS:rem>
with <secDNS:all>:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update urgent="true"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:all>true</secDNS:all>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Example Urgent <update> Command,
Replacing all DS Data Using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update urgent="true"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:all>true</secDNS:all>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When an extended <update> command has been processed successfully,
the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].
6. Formal Syntax
An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The
formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of
the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML
instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they
are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI
registration purposes.
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
of the code. All rights reserved.
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 25]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
- Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
- Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor the
names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or promote
products derived from this software without specific prior written
permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
domain name extension schema
for provisioning DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<!--
Child elements found in EPP commands.
-->
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
<element name="create" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
<element name="update" type="secDNS:updateType"/>
<!--
Child elements supporting either the
dsData or the keyData interface.
-->
<complexType name="dsOrKeyType">
<sequence>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<choice>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!--
Definition for the maximum signature lifetime (maxSigLife)
-->
<simpleType name="maxSigLifeType">
<restriction base="int">
<minInclusive value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!--
Child elements of dsData used for dsData interface
-->
<complexType name="dsDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digestType" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digest" type="hexBinary"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!--
Child elements of keyData used for keyData interface
and optionally with dsData interface
-->
<complexType name="keyDataType">
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
<sequence>
<element name="flags" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="protocol" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="pubKey" type="secDNS:keyType"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!--
Definition for the public key
-->
<simpleType name="keyType">
<restriction base="base64Binary">
<minLength value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!--
Child elements of the <update> element.
-->
<complexType name="updateType">
<sequence>
<element name="rem" type="secDNS:remType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="add" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="chg" type="secDNS:chgType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="urgent" type="boolean" default="false"/>
</complexType>
<!--
Child elements of the <rem> command.
-->
<complexType name="remType">
<choice>
<element name="all" type="boolean"/>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<!--
Child elements supporting the <chg> element.
-->
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
<complexType name="chgType">
<sequence>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!--
Child response elements.
-->
<element name="infData" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
</schema>
END
7. Internationalization Considerations
EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding
information using the Unicode character set and its more compact
representations including UTF-8 [RFC3629]. Conformant XML processors
recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [RFC2781]. Though XML includes
provisions to identify and use other character encodings through use
of an "encoding" attribute in an <?xml?> declaration, use of UTF-8 is
RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support
incompatibility exists.
As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731], the
internationalization requirements in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731]
are followed by this extension. This extension does not override any
of the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731] internationalization features.
8. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [RFC3688].
Two URI assignments have been completed by the IANA.
Registration request for the extension namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the extension XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.1
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 29]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
9. Security Considerations
The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any
security services beyond those described by EPP [RFC5730], the EPP
domain name mapping [RFC5731], and protocol layers used by EPP. The
security considerations described in these other specifications apply
to this specification as well.
As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations
described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring
client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in
Sections 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 5730 [RFC5730]. Any attempt to perform
a transform operation on a domain object by any client other than the
sponsoring client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP
authorization error.
The provisioning service described in this document involves the
exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the
DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and
server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done
after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a
strong authentication mechanism.
An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator
who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published
by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible
as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data
manipulation.
Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce
significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones
MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly. In the absence
of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the
secure namespace, yielding untrustworthy query responses. If a key
is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised
information or update the delegation information via EPP commands
using the "urgent" attribute.
Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain
delegation can be implemented using a two-step process. First,
security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just
described. The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by
changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold"
or "serverHold" domain status values. The domain can also be removed
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 30]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
from the zone using the EPP <delete> command, but this is a more
drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use.
Data validity checking and Delegation Signer record creation at the
server require computational resources. A purposeful or inadvertent
denial-of-service attack is possible if a client requests some number
of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities.
Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command
processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service
attack.
The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that
can be rejected. Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an
adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities. Server
operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to
limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter
potential adverse situations.
10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people who have
provided significant contributions to the development of this
document:
David Blacka, Howard Eland, Patrik Faltstrom, Olafur Gudmundsson,
Bernie Hoeneisen, Ed Lewis, Klaus Malorny, Alexander Mayrhofer,
Patrick Mevzek, David Smith, Andrew Sullivan, and
Srikanth Veeramachaneni.
This document replaces RFC 4310 [RFC4310]. Please see the
Acknowledgements section in that RFC for additional acknowledgements.
This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the
PROVREG mailing list and users.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC3757] Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, "Domain Name
System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry
Point (SEP) Flag", RFC 3757, April 2004.
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 31]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.
[W3C.REC-xml-20001006]
Maler, E., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Bray, T., and J. Paoli,
"Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)",
World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006,
October 2000,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006>.
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-1-20010502]
Beech, D., Thompson, H., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney,
"XML Schema Part 1: Structures", World Wide Web Consortium
FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-1-20010502, May 2001,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-1-20010502>.
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]
Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes",
World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-2-
20010502, May 2001,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-2-20010502>.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2781] Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO
10646", RFC 2781, February 2000.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 32]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4310] Hollenbeck, S., "Domain Name System (DNS) Security
Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
Protocol (EPP)", RFC 4310, December 2005.
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 33]
RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310
1. Added the motivation in obsoleting RFC 4310 [RFC4310] to
Section 1.
2. Updated Section 1 to add an explicit statement about deprecation
of RFC 4310.
3. Added secDNS-1.0 and secDNS-1.1 abbreviation definitions in
Section 1.1.
4. Updated "Data validity checking at the server..." to "Data
validity checking and Delegation Signer record creation at the
server..." in Section 9.
5. Added Section 2.
6. Updated the second paragraph of Section 7 to clarify that the
internationalization features of [RFC5731] are followed.
7. Moved <secDNS:rem> prior to <secDNS:add> to conform to the EPP
order semantics for supporting <secDNS:all> with <secDNS:rem> to
remove all data, and for supporting the replace semantics
previously supported by <secDNS:chg>.
8. Added support for the use of the <secDNS:all> boolean element
under <secDNS:rem> to remove all DS or key data in place of
using <secDNS:chg/>.
9. Updated <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:rem>, and <secDNS:chg> to function
in a consistent way to the other EPP RFCs.
10. Removed support for <secDNS:rem> using just <secDNS:keyTag>.
11. Moved the <secDNS:maxSigLife> element out of the <secDNS:dsData>
and <secDNS:keyData> elements and directly under the <secDNS:
create> element, under the <secDNS:chg> element of the <secDNS:
update> element, and under the <secDNS:infData> element.
Section 3.3 element was updated to better describe the <secDNS:
maxSigLife> element, and references to the <secDNS:maxSigLife>
element were updated throughout the document.
12. Replaced references to urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0
with urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.1, and replaced "Two
URI assignments have been completed by the IANA" with "Two URI
assignments have been completed by the IANA" in Section 8.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
13. Added "The <secDNS:keyTag> element is represented as an
unsignedShort [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]" in Section 4.1.
14. Added "The <secDNS:digest> element is represented as a hexBinary
[W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]" in Section 4.1.
15. Added "The <secDNS:pubKey> element is represented as a
base64Binary [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502] with a minimum
length of 1" in Section 4.2.
16. Combined "the command MUST contain an <extension> element" with
the following sentence in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.5.
17. Added sentence "If the server does not support the <secDNS:
maxSigLife> element, a 2102 error MUST be returned" to
Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.5.
18. Added sentence "This document replaces RFC 4310. Please see the
Acknowledgements section in that RFC for additional
acknowledgements" in Section 10.
19. Added "This document incorporates feedback from implementers on
the PROVREG mail list and users" as well as "This document
obsoletes RFC 4310" in the Abstract.
20. Removed all references to xsi:schemaLocation to be consistent
with the other EPP RFCs.
21. Added the "DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface" section.
22. Moved the "create, add, remove, and replace Delegation Signer
(DS) information" paragraph from the "Object Attributes" section
to the "DS Data Interface" section.
23. Replaced the element descriptions in the "EPP <info> Command"
section with a reference to the <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:
keyData> elements described in the "DS Data Interface" and "Key
Data Interface" sections, respectively.
24. Updated the "EPP <info> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.
25. Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section to refer to both the
use of <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:keyData> described in the "DS
Data Interface" and "Key Data Interface" sections, respectively.
26. Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.
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RFC 5910 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping May 2010
27. Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section to describe the use
of <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:rem>, and <secDNS:chg> together.
28. Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface. Also
included additional examples of adding and removing DS data or
key data.
29. Updated the "Formal Syntax" section with the updated XML schema.
30. Updated the Acknowledgements section with a new list of
contributors.
31. Replaced references to RFC 3730 with references to RFC 5730.
32. Replaced references to RFC 3731 with references to RFC 5731.
33. Added clarification on when the extension MUST be included for
each of the commands and responses (<secDNS:create>, <secDNS:
update>, <secDNS:infData>).
34. Changed "In addition, the EPP <extension> element MUST contain a
child <secDNS:infData> element" to "In addition, the EPP
<extension> element SHOULD contain a child <secDNS:infData>
element" and added "and based on server policy".
Authors' Addresses
James Gould
VeriSign, Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
US
EMail: jgould@verisign.com
Scott Hollenbeck
VeriSign, Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
US
EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com
Gould & Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 36]