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Network Working Group P. Nikander
Request for Comments: 4843 Ericsson Research Nomadic Lab
Category: Experimental J. Laganier
DoCoMo Euro-Labs
F. Dupont
CELAR
April 2007
An IPv6 Prefix for
Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers (ORCHID)
Status of This Memo
This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This document introduces Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash
Identifiers (ORCHID) as a new, experimental class of IPv6-address-
like identifiers. These identifiers are intended to be used as
endpoint identifiers at applications and Application Programming
Interfaces (API) and not as identifiers for network location at the
IP layer, i.e., locators. They are designed to appear as application
layer entities and at the existing IPv6 APIs, but they should not
appear in actual IPv6 headers. To make them more like vanilla IPv6
addresses, they are expected to be routable at an overlay level.
Consequently, while they are considered non-routable addresses from
the IPv6 layer point-of-view, all existing IPv6 applications are
expected to be able to use them in a manner compatible with current
IPv6 addresses.
This document requests IANA to allocate a temporary prefix out of the
IPv6 addressing space for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash
Identifiers. By default, the prefix will be returned to IANA in
2014, with continued use requiring IETF consensus.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Rationale and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. ORCHID Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Expected use of ORCHIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Cryptographic Hash Identifier Construction . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Routing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Overlay Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Collision Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Design Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
This document introduces Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash
Identifiers (ORCHID), a new class of IP address-like identifiers.
These identifiers are intended to be globally unique in a statistical
sense (see Section 4), non-routable at the IP layer, and routable at
some overlay layer. The identifiers are securely bound, via a secure
hash function, to the concatenation of an input bitstring and a
context tag. Typically, but not necessarily, the input bitstring
will include a suitably encoded public cryptographic key.
1.1. Rationale and Intent
These identifiers are expected to be used at the existing IPv6
Application Programming Interfaces (API) and application protocols
between consenting hosts. They may be defined and used in different
contexts, suitable for different overlay protocols. Examples of
these include Host Identity Tags (HIT) in the Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) [HIP-BASE] and Temporary Mobile Identifiers (TMI) for Mobile
IPv6 Privacy Extension [PRIVACYTEXT].
As these identifiers are expected to be used along with IPv6
addresses at both applications and APIs, co-ordination is desired to
make sure that an ORCHID is not inappropriately taken for a vanilla
IPv6 address and vice versa. In practice, allocation of a separate
prefix for ORCHIDs seems to suffice, making them compatible with IPv6
addresses at the upper layers while simultaneously making it trivial
to prevent their usage at the IP layer.
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While being technically possible to use ORCHIDs between consenting
hosts without any co-ordination with the IETF and the IANA, the
authors would consider such practice potentially dangerous. A
specific danger would be realised if the IETF community later decided
to use the ORCHID prefix for some different purpose. In that case,
hosts using the ORCHID prefix would be, for practical purposes,
unable to use the prefix for the other new purpose. That would lead
to partial balkanisation of the Internet, similar to what has
happened as a result of historical hijackings of non-RFC 1918
[RFC1918] IPv4 addresses for private use.
The whole need for the proposed allocation grows from the desire to
be able to use ORCHIDs with existing applications and APIs. This
desire leads to the potential conflict, mentioned above. Resolving
the conflict requires the proposed allocation.
One can argue that the desire to use these kinds of identifiers via
existing APIs is architecturally wrong, and there is some truth in
that argument. Indeed, it would be more desirable to introduce a new
API and update all applications to use identifiers, rather than
locators, via that new API. That is exactly what we expect to happen
in the long run.
However, given the current state of the Internet, we do not consider
it viable to introduce any changes that, at once, require
applications to be rewritten and host stacks to be updated. Rather
than that, we believe in piece-wise architectural changes that
require only one of the existing assets to be touched. ORCHIDs are
designed to address this situation: to allow people to experiment
with protocol stack extensions, such as secure overlay routing, HIP,
or Mobile IP privacy extensions, without requiring them to update
their applications. The goal is to facilitate large-scale
experiments with minimum user effort.
For example, there already exists, at the time of this writing, HIP
implementations that run fully in user space, using the operating
system to divert a certain part of the IPv6 address space to a user
level daemon for HIP processing. In practical terms, these
implementations are already using a certain IPv6 prefix for
differentiating HIP identifiers from IPv6 addresses, allowing them
both to be used by the existing applications via the existing APIs.
This document argues for allocating an experimental prefix for such
purposes, thereby paving the way for large-scale experiments with
cryptographic identifiers without the dangers caused by address-space
hijacking.
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1.2. ORCHID Properties
ORCHIDs are designed to have the following properties:
o Statistical uniqueness; also see Section 4
o Secure binding to the input parameters used in their generation
(i.e., the context identifier and a bitstring).
o Aggregation under a single IPv6 prefix. Note that this is only
needed due to the co-ordination need as indicated above. Without
such co-ordination need, the ORCHID namespace could potentially be
completely flat.
o Non-routability at the IP layer, by design.
o Routability at some overlay layer, making them, from an
application point of view, semantically similar to IPv6 addresses.
As mentioned above, ORCHIDs are intended to be generated and used in
different contexts, as suitable for different mechanisms and
protocols. The context identifier is meant to be used to
differentiate between the different contexts; see Section 4 for a
discussion of the related API and kernel level implementation issues,
and Section 5 for the design choices explaining why the context
identifiers are used.
1.3. Expected use of ORCHIDs
Examples of identifiers and protocols that are expected to adopt the
ORCHID format include Host Identity Tags (HIT) in the Host Identity
Protocol [HIP-BASE] and the Temporary Mobile Identifiers (TMI) in the
Simple Privacy Extension for Mobile IPv6 [PRIVACYTEXT]. The format
is designed to be extensible to allow other experimental proposals to
share the same namespace.
1.4. Action Plan
This document requests IANA to allocate an experimental prefix out of
the IPv6 addressing space for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash
Identifiers.
1.5. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Cryptographic Hash Identifier Construction
An ORCHID is generated using the algorithm below. The algorithm
takes a bitstring and a context identifier as input and produces an
ORCHID as output.
Input := any bitstring
Hash Input := Context ID | Input
Hash := Hash_function( Hash Input )
ORCHID := Prefix | Encode_100( Hash )
where:
| : Denotes concatenation of bitstrings
Input : A bitstring that is unique or statistically unique
within a given context. The bitstring is intended
to be associated with the to-be-created ORCHID in
the given context.
Context ID : A randomly generated value defining the expected
usage context for the particular ORCHID and the
hash function to be used for generation of ORCHIDs
in this context. These values are allocated out of
the namespace introduced for CGA Type Tags; see RFC
3972 and
http://www.iana.org/assignments/cga-message-types.
Hash_function : The one-way hash function (i.e., hash function with
pre-image resistance and second pre-image
resistance) to be used according to the document
defining the context usage identified by the
Context ID. For example, the current version of
the HIP specification defines SHA1 [RFC3174] as
the hash function to be used to generate ORCHIDs
used in the HIP protocol [HIP-BASE].
Encode_100( ) : An extraction function in which output is obtained
by extracting the middle 100-bit-long bitstring
from the argument bitstring.
Prefix : A constant 28-bit-long bitstring value
(2001:10::/28).
To form an ORCHID, two pieces of input data are needed. The first
piece can be any bitstring, but is typically expected to contain a
public cryptographic key and some other data. The second piece is a
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context identifier, which is a 128-bit-long datum, allocated as
specified in Section 7. Each specific experiment (such as HIP HITs
or MIP6 TMIs) is expected to allocate their own, specific context
identifier.
The input bitstring and context identifier are concatenated to form
an input datum, which is then fed to the cryptographic hash function
to be used according to the document defining the context usage
identified by the Context ID. The result of the hash function is
processed by an encoding function, resulting in a 100-bit-long value.
This value is prepended with the 28-bit ORCHID prefix. The result is
the ORCHID, a 128-bit-long bitstring that can be used at the IPv6
APIs in hosts participating to the particular experiment.
The ORCHID prefix is allocated under the IPv6 global unicast address
block. Hence, ORCHIDs are indistinguishable from IPv6 global unicast
addresses. However, it should be noted that ORCHIDs do not conform
with the IPv6 global unicast address format defined in Section 2.5.4
of [RFC4291] since they do not have a 64-bit Interface ID formatted
as described in Section 2.5.1. of [RFC4291].
3. Routing Considerations
ORCHIDs are designed to serve as location independent endpoint-
identifiers rather than IP-layer locators. Therefore, routers MAY be
configured not to forward any packets containing an ORCHID as a
source or a destination address. If the destination address is an
ORCHID but the source address is a valid unicast source address,
routers MAY be configured to generate an ICMP Destination
Unreachable, Administratively Prohibited message.
Due to the experimental nature of ORCHIDs, router software MUST NOT
include any special handling code for ORCHIDs. In other words, the
non-routability property of ORCHIDs, if implemented, MUST be
implemented via configuration and NOT by hardwired software code. At
this time, it is RECOMMENDED that the default router configuration
not handle ORCHIDs in any special way. In other words, there is no
need to touch existing or new routers due to this experiment. If
such a reason should later appear, for example, due to a faulty
implementation leaking ORCHIDs to the IP layer, the prefix can be and
should be blocked by a simple configuration rule.
3.1. Overlay Routing
As mentioned multiple times, ORCHIDs are designed to be non-routable
at the IP layer. However, there are multiple ongoing research
efforts for creating various overlay routing and resolution
mechanisms for flat identifiers. For example, the Host Identity
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Indirection Infrastructure (Hi3) [Hi3] and Node Identity
Internetworking Architecture (NodeID) [NodeID] proposals, outline
ways for using a Distributed Hash Table to forward HIP packets based
on the Host Identity Tag.
What is common to the various research proposals is that they create
a new kind of resolution or routing infrastructure on top of the
existing Internet routing structure. In practical terms, they allow
delivery of packets based on flat, non-routable identifiers,
utilising information stored in a distributed database. Usually, the
database used is based on Distributed Hash Tables. This effectively
creates a new routing network on top of the existing IP-based routing
network, capable of routing packets that are not addressed by IP
addresses but some other kind of identifiers.
Typical benefits from overlay routing include location independence,
more scalable multicast, anycast, and multihoming support than in IP,
and better DoS resistance than in the vanilla Internet. The main
drawback is typically an order of magnitude of slower performance,
caused by an easily largish number of extra look-up or forwarding
steps needed. Consequently, in most practical cases, the overlay
routing system is used only during initial protocol state set-up (cf.
TCP handshake), after which the communicating endpoints exchange
packets directly with IP, bypassing the overlay network.
The net result of the typical overlay routing approaches is a
communication service whose basic functionality is comparable to that
provided by classical IP but provides considerably better resilience
that vanilla IP in dynamic networking environments. Some experiments
also introduce additional functionality, such as enhanced security or
ability to effectively route through several IP addressing domains.
The authors expect ORCHIDs to become fully routable, via one or more
overlay systems, before the end of the experiment.
4. Collision Considerations
As noted above, the aim is that ORCHIDs are globally unique in a
statistical sense. That is, given the ORCHID referring to a given
entity, the probability of the same ORCHID being used to refer to
another entity elsewhere in the Internet must be sufficiently low so
that it can be ignored for most practical purposes. We believe that
the presented design meets this goal; see Section 5.
Consider next the very rare case that some ORCHID happens to refer to
two different entities at the same time, at two different locations
in the Internet. Even in this case, the probability of this fact
becoming visible (and therefore a matter of consideration) at any
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single location in the Internet is negligible. For the vast majority
of cases, the two simultaneous uses of the ORCHID will never cross
each other. However, while rare, such collisions are still possible.
This section gives reasonable guidelines on how to mitigate the
consequences in the case that such a collision happens.
As mentioned above, ORCHIDs are expected to be used at the legacy
IPv6 APIs between consenting hosts. The context ID is intended to
differentiate between the various experiments, or contexts, sharing
the ORCHID namespace. However, the context ID is not present in the
ORCHID itself, but only in front of the input bitstring as an input
to the hash function. While this may lead to certain implementation-
related complications, we believe that the trade-off of allowing the
hash result part of an ORCHID being longer more than pays off the
cost.
Because ORCHIDs are not routable at the IP layer, in order to send
packets using ORCHIDs at the API level, the sending host must have
additional overlay state within the stack to determine which
parameters (e.g., what locators) to use in the outgoing packet. An
underlying assumption here, and a matter of fact in the proposals
that the authors are aware of, is that there is an overlay protocol
for setting up and maintaining this additional state. It is assumed
that the state-set-up protocol carries the input bitstring, and that
the resulting ORCHID-related state in the stack can be associated
back with the appropriate context and state-set-up protocol.
Even though ORCHID collisions are expected to be extremely rare, two
kinds of collisions may still happen. First, it is possible that two
different input bitstrings within the same context may map to the
same ORCHID. In this case, the state-set-up mechanism is expected to
resolve the conflict, for example, by indicating to the peer that the
ORCHID in question is already in use.
A second type of collision may happen if two input bitstrings, used
in different usage contexts, map to the same ORCHID. In this case,
the main confusion is about which context to use. In order to
prevent these types of collisions, it is RECOMMENDED that
implementations that simultaneously support multiple different
contexts maintain a node-wide unified database of known ORCHIDs, and
indicate a conflict if any of the mechanisms attempt to register an
ORCHID that is already in use. For example, if a given ORCHID is
already being used as a HIT in HIP, it cannot simultaneously be used
as a TMI in Mobile IP. Instead, if Mobile IP attempts to use the
ORCHID, it will be notified (by the kernel) that the ORCHID in
question is already in use.
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5. Design Choices
The design of this namespace faces two competing forces:
o As many bits as possible should be preserved for the hash result.
o It should be possible to share the namespace between multiple
mechanisms.
The desire to have a long hash result requires that the prefix be as
short as possible, and use few (if any) bits for additional encoding.
The present design takes this desire to the maxim: all the bits
beyond the prefix are used as hash output. This leaves no bits in
the ORCHID itself available for identifying the context.
Additionally, due to security considerations, the present design
REQUIRES that the hash function used in constructing ORCHIDs be
constant; see Section 6.
The authors explicitly considered including a hash-extension
mechanism, similar to the one in CGA [RFC3972], but decided to leave
it out. There were two reasons: desire for simplicity, and the
somewhat unclear IPR situation around the hash-extension mechanism.
If there is a future revision of this document, we strongly advise
the future authors to reconsider the decision.
The desire to allow multiple mechanisms to share the namespace has
been resolved by including the context identifier in the hash-
function input. While this does not allow the mechanism to be
directly inferred from a ORCHID, it allows one to verify that a given
input bitstring and ORCHID belong to a given context, with high-
probability; but also see Section 6.
6. Security Considerations
ORCHIDs are designed to be securely bound to the Context ID and the
bitstring used as the input parameters during their generation. To
provide this property, the ORCHID generation algorithm relies on the
second-preimage resistance (a.k.a. one-way) property of the hash
function used in the generation [RFC4270]. To have this property and
to avoid collisions, it is important that the allocated prefix is as
short as possible, leaving as many bits as possible for the hash
output.
For a given Context ID, all mechanisms using ORCHIDs MUST use exactly
the same mechanism for generating an ORCHID from the input bitstring.
Allowing different mechanisms, without explicitly encoding the
mechanism in the Context ID or the ORCHID itself, would allow so-
called bidding-down attacks. That is, if multiple different hash
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functions were allowed to construct ORCHIDs valid for the same
Context ID, and if one of the hash functions became insecure, that
would allow attacks against even those ORCHIDs valid for the same
Context ID that had been constructed using the other, still secure
hash functions.
Due to the desire to keep the hash output value as long as possible,
the hash function is not encoded in the ORCHID itself, but rather in
the Context ID. Therefore, the present design allows only one method
per given Context ID for constructing ORCHIDs from input bitstrings.
If other methods (perhaps using more secure hash functions) are later
needed, they MUST use a different Context ID. Consequently, the
suggested method to react to the hash result becoming too short, due
to increased computational power, or to the used hash function
becoming insecure due to advances in cryptology, is to allocate a new
Context ID and cease to use the present one.
As of today, SHA1 [RFC3174] is considered as satisfying the second-
preimage resistance requirement. The current version of the HIP
specification defines SHA1 [RFC3174] as the hash function to be used
to generate ORCHIDs for the Context ID used by the HIP protocol
[HIP-BASE].
In order to preserve a low enough probability of collisions (see
Section 4), each method MUST utilize a mechanism that makes sure that
the distinct input bitstrings are either unique or statistically
unique within that context. There are several possible methods to
ensure this; for example, one can include into the input bitstring a
globally maintained counter value, a pseudo-random number of
sufficient entropy (minimum 100 bits), or a randomly generated public
cryptographic key. The Context ID makes sure that input bitstrings
from different contexts never overlap. These together make sure that
the probability of collisions is determined only by the probability
of natural collisions in the hash space and is not increased by a
possibility of colliding input bitstrings.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA allocated a temporary non-routable 28-bit prefix from the IPv6
address space. By default, the prefix will be returned to IANA in
2014, continued use requiring IETF consensus. As per [RFC4773], the
28-bit prefix was drawn out of the IANA Special Purpose Address
Block, namely 2001:0000::/23, in support of the experimental usage
described in this document. IANA has updated the IPv6 Special
Purpose Address Registry.
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During the discussions related to this document, it was suggested
that other identifier spaces may be allocated from this block later.
However, this document does not define such a policy or allocations.
The Context Identifier (or Context ID) is a randomly generated value
defining the usage context of an ORCHID and the hash function to be
used for generation of ORCHIDs in this context. This document
defines no specific value.
We propose sharing the name space introduced for CGA Type Tags.
Hence, defining new values would follow the rules of Section 8 of
[RFC3972], i.e., on a First Come First Served basis.
8. Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Geoff Huston for his sharp but constructive
critique during the development of this memo. Tom Henderson helped
to clarify a number of issues. This document has also been improved
by reviews, comments, and discussions originating from the IPv6,
Internet Area, and IETF communities.
Julien Laganier is partly funded by Ambient Networks, a research
project supported by the European Commission under its Sixth
Framework Program. The views and conclusions contained herein are
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed
or implied, of the Ambient Networks project or the European
Commission.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGA)", RFC 3972, March 2005.
9.2. Informative References
[HIP-BASE] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol", Work
in Progress, February 2007.
[Hi3] Nikander, P., Arkko, J., and B. Ohlman, "Host Identity
Indirection Infrastructure (Hi3)", November 2004.
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[NodeID] Ahlgren, B., Arkko, J., Eggert, L., and J. Rajahalme,
"A Node Identity Internetworking Architecture
(NodeID)", April 2006.
[PRIVACYTEXT] Dupont, F., "A Simple Privacy Extension for Mobile
IPv6", Work in Progress, July 2006.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270,
November 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC4773] Huston, G., "Administration of the IANA Special
Purpose IPv6 Address Block", RFC 4773, December 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Pekka Nikander
Ericsson Research Nomadic Lab
JORVAS FI-02420
Finland
Phone: +358 9 299 1
EMail: pekka.nikander@nomadiclab.com
Julien Laganier
DoCoMo Communications Laboratories Europe GmbH
Landsberger Strasse 312
Munich 80687
Germany
Phone: +49 89 56824 231
EMail: julien.ietf@laposte.net
Francis Dupont
CELAR
EMail: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr
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Full Copyright Statement
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