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Network Working Group G. Zorn
Request for Comments: 2619 B. Aboba
Category: Standards Track Microsoft
June 1999
RADIUS Authentication Server MIB
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo defines a set of extensions which instrument RADIUS
authentication server functions. These extensions represent a portion
of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network
management protocols in the Internet community. Using these
extensions IP-based management stations can manage RADIUS
authentication servers.
1. Introduction
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for use with network management protocols in the Internet community.
In particular, it describes managed objects used for managing RADIUS
authentication servers.
RADIUS authentication servers are today widely deployed by dialup
Internet Service Providers, in order to provide authentication
services. As a result, the effective management of RADIUS
authentication servers is of considerable importance.
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
2. The SNMP Management Framework
The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major
components:
o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 [1].
o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the
purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of
Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in
STD 16, RFC 1155 [2], STD 16, RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4].
The second version, called SMIv2, is described in STD 58, RFC
2578 [5], RFC 2579 [6] and RFC 2580 [7].
o Message protocols for transferring management information. The
first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and
described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the
SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet standards
track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901
[9] and RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message
protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC
2572 [11] and RFC 2574 [12].
o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The
first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is
described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol
operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905
[13].
o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2573 [14] and
the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2575
[15].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are
defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI.
This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A
MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate
translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically
equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no
translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable
information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in
SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine
readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the
MIB.
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
3. Overview
The RADIUS authentication protocol, described in [16], distinguishes
between the client function and the server function. In RADIUS
authentication, clients send Access-Requests, and servers reply with
Access-Accepts, Access-Rejects, and Access-Challenges. Typically NAS
devices implement the client function, and thus would be expected to
implement the RADIUS authentication client MIB, while RADIUS
authentication servers implement the server function, and thus would
be expected to implement the RADIUS authentication server MIB.
However, it is possible for a RADIUS authentication entity to perform
both client and server functions. For example, a RADIUS proxy may act
as a server to one or more RADIUS authentication clients, while
simultaneously acting as an authentication client to one or more
authentication servers. In such situations, it is expected that
RADIUS entities combining client and server functionality will
support both the client and server MIBs.
3.1. Selected objects
This MIB module contains fourteen scalars as well as a single table:
(1) the RADIUS Authentication Client Table contains one row for
each RADIUS authentication client that the server shares a
secret with.
Each entry in the RADIUS Authentication Client Table includes twelve
columns presenting a view of the activity of the RADIUS
authentication server.
4. Definitions
RADIUS-AUTH-SERVER-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-IDENTITY,
Counter32, Integer32,
IpAddress, TimeTicks, mib-2 FROM SNMPv2-SMI
SnmpAdminString FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF;
radiusAuthServMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "9906110000Z"
ORGANIZATION "IETF RADIUS Working Group."
CONTACT-INFO
" Bernard Aboba
Microsoft
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Phone: +1 425 936 6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com"
DESCRIPTION
"The MIB module for entities implementing the server
side of the Remote Access Dialin User Service (RADIUS)
authentication protocol."
REVISION "9906110000Z" -- 11 Jun 1999
DESCRIPTION "Initial version as published in RFC 2619"
::= { radiusAuthentication 1 }
radiusMIB OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OID assigned to RADIUS MIB work by the IANA."
::= { mib-2 67 }
radiusAuthentication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {radiusMIB 1}
radiusAuthServMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ radiusAuthServMIB 1 }
radiusAuthServ OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBObjects 1 }
radiusAuthServIdent OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The implementation identification string for the
RADIUS authentication server software in use on the
system, for example; `FNS-2.1'"
::= {radiusAuthServ 1}
radiusAuthServUpTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"If the server has a persistent state (e.g., a process),
this value will be the time elapsed (in hundredths of a
seco) since the server process was started.
For software without persistent state, this value will
be zero."
::= {radiusAuthServ 2}
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
radiusAuthServResetTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"If the server has a persistent state (e.g., a process)
and supports a `reset' operation (e.g., can be told to
re-read configuration files), this value will be the
time elapsed (in hundredths of a second) since the
server was `reset.' For software that does not
have persistence or does not support a `reset' operation,
this value will be zero."
::= {radiusAuthServ 3}
radiusAuthServConfigReset OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER { other(1),
reset(2),
initializing(3),
running(4)}
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Status/action object to reinitialize any persistent
server state. When set to reset(2), any persistent
server state (such as a process) is reinitialized as if
the server had just been started. This value will
never be returned by a read operation. When read, one of
the following values will be returned:
other(1) - server in some unknown state;
initializing(3) - server (re)initializing;
running(4) - server currently running."
::= {radiusAuthServ 4}
-- New Stats proposed by Dale E. Reed Jr (daler@iea-software.com)
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packets received on the
authentication port."
::= { radiusAuthServ 5}
radiusAuthServTotalInvalidRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Request packets
received from unknown addresses."
::= { radiusAuthServ 6 }
radiusAuthServTotalDupAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of duplicate RADIUS Access-Request
packets received."
::= { radiusAuthServ 7 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets sent."
::= { radiusAuthServ 8 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets sent."
::= { radiusAuthServ 9 }
radiusAuthServTotalAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets sent."
::= { radiusAuthServ 10 }
radiusAuthServTotalMalformedAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of malformed RADIUS Access-Request
packets received. Bad authenticators
and unknown types are not included as
malformed Access-Requests."
::= { radiusAuthServ 11 }
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
radiusAuthServTotalBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Authentication-Request packets
which contained invalid Signature attributes received."
::= { radiusAuthServ 12 }
radiusAuthServTotalPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of incoming packets
silently discarded for some reason other
than malformed, bad authenticators or
unknown types."
::= { radiusAuthServ 13 }
radiusAuthServTotalUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which
were received."
::= { radiusAuthServ 14 }
-- End of new
radiusAuthClientTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RadiusAuthClientEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table listing the RADIUS authentication
clients with which the server shares a secret."
::= { radiusAuthServ 15 }
radiusAuthClientEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RadiusAuthClientEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry (conceptual row) representing a RADIUS
authentication client with which the server shares a
secret."
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
INDEX { radiusAuthClientIndex }
::= { radiusAuthClientTable 1 }
RadiusAuthClientEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
radiusAuthClientIndex Integer32,
radiusAuthClientAddress IpAddress,
radiusAuthClientID SnmpAdminString,
radiusAuthServAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessRejects Counter32,
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges Counter32,
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators Counter32,
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped Counter32,
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes Counter32
}
radiusAuthClientIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A number uniquely identifying each RADIUS
authentication client with which this server
communicates."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 1 }
radiusAuthClientAddress OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX IpAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The NAS-IP-Address of the RADIUS authentication client
referred to in this table entry."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 2 }
radiusAuthClientID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The NAS-Identifier of the RADIUS authentication client
referred to in this table entry. This is not necessarily
the same as sysName in MIB II."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 3 }
-- Server Counters
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
--
-- Responses = AccessAccepts + AccessRejects + AccessChallenges
--
-- Requests - DupRequests - BadAuthenticators - MalformedRequests -
-- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped - Responses = Pending
--
-- Requests - DupRequests - BadAuthenticators - MalformedRequests -
-- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped = entries logged
radiusAuthServAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of packets received on the authentication
port from this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 4 }
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of duplicate RADIUS Access-Request
packets received from this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 5 }
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets
sent to this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 6 }
radiusAuthServAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets
sent to this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 7 }
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets
sent to this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 8 }
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of malformed RADIUS Access-Request
packets received from this client.
Bad authenticators and unknown types are not included as
malformed Access-Requests."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 9 }
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS Authentication-Request packets
which contained invalid Signature attributes received
from this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 10 }
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of incoming packets from this
client silently discarded for some reason other
than malformed, bad authenticators or
unknown types."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 11 }
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which
were received from this client."
::= { radiusAuthClientEntry 12 }
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
-- conformance information
radiusAuthServMIBConformance
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIB 2 }
radiusAuthServMIBCompliances
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBConformance 1 }
radiusAuthServMIBGroups
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthServMIBConformance 2 }
-- compliance statements
radiusAuthServMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for authentication servers
implementing the RADIUS Authentication Server MIB."
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { radiusAuthServMIBGroup }
OBJECT radiusAuthServConfigReset
WRITE-SYNTAX INTEGER { reset(2) }
DESCRIPTION "The only SETable value is 'reset' (2)."
::= { radiusAuthServMIBCompliances 1 }
-- units of conformance
radiusAuthServMIBGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {radiusAuthServIdent,
radiusAuthServUpTime,
radiusAuthServResetTime,
radiusAuthServConfigReset,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalInvalidRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalDupAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessAccepts,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessRejects,
radiusAuthServTotalAccessChallenges,
radiusAuthServTotalMalformedAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServTotalBadAuthenticators,
radiusAuthServTotalPacketsDropped,
radiusAuthServTotalUnknownTypes,
radiusAuthClientAddress,
radiusAuthClientID,
radiusAuthServAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServDupAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServAccessAccepts,
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
radiusAuthServAccessRejects,
radiusAuthServAccessChallenges,
radiusAuthServMalformedAccessRequests,
radiusAuthServBadAuthenticators,
radiusAuthServPacketsDropped,
radiusAuthServUnknownTypes
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The collection of objects providing management of
a RADIUS Authentication Server."
::= { radiusAuthServMIBGroups 1 }
END
5. References
[1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for
Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2571, April 1999.
[2] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of
Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", STD 16, RFC
1155, May 1990.
[3] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", STD 16,
RFC 1212, March 1991.
[4] Rose, M., "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the
SNMP", RFC 1215, March 1991.
[5] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose,
M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.
[6] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose,
M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58,
RFC 2579, April 1999.
[7] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose,
M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD
58, RFC 2580, April 1999.
[8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple
Network Management Protocol", STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990.
[9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser,
"Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, January
1996.
Zorn & Aboba Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
[10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser,
"Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, January 1996.
[11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message
Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2572, April 1999.
[12] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model for
Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)",
RFC 2574, April 1999.
[13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol
Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, January 1996.
[14] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMP Applications", RFC
2573, April 1999.
[15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access
Control Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 2575, April 1999.
[16] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson W. and S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April
1997.
6. Security Considerations
There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB that
have a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such
objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure
environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
network operations.
There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that may contain
sensitive information. These are:
radiusAuthClientAddress
This can be used to determine the address of the RADIUS
authentication client with which the server is
communicating. This information could be useful in
impersonating the client.
radiusAuthClientID This can be used to determine the client ID of the
authentication client with which the server is
communicating. This information could be useful in
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
impersonating the client.
It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and
possibly to even encrypt the values of these object when sending them
over the network via SNMP. Not all versions of SNMP provide features
for such a secure environment.
SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment. Even if the network
itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), there is no control as
to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET
(read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
It is recommended that the implementers consider the security
features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use
of the User-based Security Model RFC 2574 [12] and the View-based
Access Control Model RFC 2575 [15] is recommended. Using these
security features, customer/users can give access to the objects only
to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to GET or SET
(change/create/delete) them.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the contributions of the RADIUS Working Group
in the development of this MIB. Thanks to Narendra Gidwani of
Microsoft, Allan C. Rubens of MERIT, Carl Rigney of Livingston and
Peter Heitman of American Internet Corporation for useful discussions
of this problem space.
8. Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-936-6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Glen Zorn
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-703-1559
EMail: glennz@microsoft.com
9. Intellectural Property Statement
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
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obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
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RFC 2619 RADIUS Authentication Server MIB June 1999
10. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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