đŸ Archived View for nytpu.com âș gemlog âș 2022-08-04.gmi captured on 2023-03-20 at 17:55:11. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
âŹ ïž Previous capture (2023-01-29)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
I've found I rarely have the motivation to write really long and in-depth posts recently, and yet I have a strong motivation to write medium-length posts such as this one. This is my gemlog so I don't know why I keep holding myself to writing standards instead of just writing what I feel like, so I'm at least going to try writing more stuff like this rather than just not writing anything as I've been doing.
â
For those who don't know, most modern ARM processors have a feature called TrustZone. It's sorta similar in concept to but not execution to crap such as Intel Management Engine (or more aptly, Intel SGX?) or AMD Secure Technology. Unlike Intel Malware Engine, the owner of the device theoretically has access to it to run what they want; it's essentially a second processor core that runs processes in the âsecure worldâ, and it has full access to the hardware and currently running system. The secure world can take ownership of resources such as memory segments, DMA transfers, interrupts, and even external perephrial access. The other cores run in the ânon-secure worldâ and do not have any direct access to resources owned by the secure world, they can only access said resources by getting them transferred via a secure world process.
I think it's a really nifty idea; ssh-agent and other key storage stuff could run their processes in the secure world, you could decrypt secure data in there, lots of potentially nice things. Especially if you had a microkernel instead of a monolithic kernel, you could have some kernel processes in the secure world and the rest in the untrusted world.
However, in its current state, it's bad in the same way Secure Boot is bad (it's generally a good idea but there's awful, awful vendor lock-in). AFAIK the only current use for it is locking it so only the vendor can access it and doing DRM, copy protection, cryptographic verification of boot payloads (without the user being able to change it, Ă la Secure Boot), bullshit like that. While you can access the trusted world on ARM development kits, I don't know if you can access it on any current consumer hardware, even âopen hardwareâá” stuff like the MNT Reform.
I'd say it's possibly even irreconcilably bad; as I personally believe Secure Boot is. Even if the ideas behind them are good, they're both so entrenched as anti-consumer functionality with literally no benefit to the user that the only way they could be made better is by entirely throwing them out and starting again from first principles.
â