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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones
Request for Comments: 8747 Microsoft
Category: Standards Track L. Seitz
ISSN: 2070-1721 Combitech
G. Selander
Ericsson AB
S. Erdtman
Spotify
H. Tschofenig
Arm Ltd.
March 2020
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
Abstract
This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
(which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT
possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove
possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-
of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to
"Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC
7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs
rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens
(JWTs).
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
3.1. Confirmation Claim
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric
Proof-of-Possession Key
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
4. Security Considerations
5. Privacy Considerations
6. Operational Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
7.1.1. Registry Contents
7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry
7.2.1. Registration Template
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] can
declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-
of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also
sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800] but using Concise
Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] and CWTs [RFC8392]
rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259] and JSON Web
Tokens (JWTs) [JWT].
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
[RFC8392], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.
These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer
Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject
to the proof-of-possession key.
Presenter
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
recipient of a CWT.
In the context of OAuth, this party is also called the OAuth
Client.
Recipient
Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key
information from the presenter.
In the context of OAuth, this party is also called the OAuth
Resource Server.
This specification provides examples in CBOR extended diagnostic
notation, as defined in Appendix G of [RFC8610]. The examples
include line breaks for readability.
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the
CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that
the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has
possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map
(which is defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC7049]) and the members of
that map identify the proof-of-possession key.
The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT,
depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some
applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [RFC8392] to
identify the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss"
(issuer) claim [RFC8392] to identify the presenter. In some
applications, the subject identifier might be relative to the issuer
identified by the "iss" claim. The actual mechanism used is
dependent upon the application. The case in which the presenter is
the subject of the CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation
usage.
3.1. Confirmation Claim
The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods.
Some of them use proof-of-possession keys, while others do not. This
design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject
confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession
key information).
The set of confirmation members that a CWT must contain to be
considered valid is context dependent and is outside the scope of
this specification. Specific applications of CWTs will require
implementations to understand and process some confirmation members
in particular ways. However, in the absence of such requirements,
all confirmation members that are not understood by implementations
MUST be ignored.
Section 7.2 establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry
for CWT "cnf" member values and registers the members defined by this
specification. Other specifications can register other members used
for confirmation, including other members for conveying proof-of-
possession keys using different key representations.
The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of-
possession key. At most one of the "COSE_Key" and
"Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined in Table 1 may be
present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple
proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve
this is to use other claim names (in addition to "cnf") to hold the
additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could
use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims
would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be
registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry
[IANA.CWT.Claims].
+--------------------+-----+-------------------------------+
| Name | Key | Value type |
+====================+=====+===============================+
| COSE_Key | 1 | COSE_Key |
+--------------------+-----+-------------------------------+
| Encrypted_COSE_Key | 2 | COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0 |
+--------------------+-----+-------------------------------+
| kid | 3 | binary string |
+--------------------+-----+-------------------------------+
Table 1: Summary of the "cnf" Names, Keys, and Value Types
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
"COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [RFC8152] representing the
corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT:
{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
/aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org",
/exp/ 4 : 1879067471,
/cnf/ 8 :{
/COSE_Key/ 1 :{
/kty/ 1 : /EC2/ 2,
/crv/ -1 : /P-256/ 1,
/x/ -2 : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa27c9
e354089bbe13',
/y/ -3 : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22afb725d535e515d020731e
79a3b4e47120'
}
}
}
The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of
that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the
"kid" (Key ID) member.
The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a
symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is
not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is
explained in [RFC8392]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric
key MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3. This procedure is
equivalent to the one defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC7800].
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the
"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]
representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the
recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:
{
/kty/ 1 : /Symmetric/ 4,
/alg/ 3 : /HMAC 256-256/ 5,
/k/ -1 : h'6684523ab17337f173500e5728c628547cb37df
e68449c65f885d1b73b49eae1'
}
The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting
the key.
The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT illustrates the use of
an encrypted symmetric key as the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value:
{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
/sub/ 2 : "24400320",
/aud/ 3: "s6BhdRkqt3",
/exp/ 4 : 1311281970,
/iat/ 5 : 1311280970,
/cnf/ 8 : {
/Encrypted_COSE_Key/ 2 : [
/protected header/ h'A1010A' /{ \alg\ 1:10 \AES-CCM-16-64-128\}/,
/unprotected header/ { / iv / 5: h'636898994FF0EC7BFCF6D3F95B'},
/ciphertext/ h'0573318A3573EB983E55A7C2F06CADD0796C9E584F1D0E3E
A8C5B052592A8B2694BE9654F0431F38D5BBC8049FA7F13F'
]
}
}
The example above was generated with the key:
h'6162630405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10'
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified using a Key ID
instead of communicating the actual key, provided the recipient is
able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In this case,
the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses a
particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
the presenter's proof of possession of the key by including a "cnf"
claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map containing a "kid" member
identifying the key.
The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT
Claims Set of a CWT:
{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://as.example.com",
/aud/ 3 : "coaps://resource.example.org",
/exp/ 4 : 1361398824,
/cnf/ 8 : {
/kid/ 3 : h'dfd1aa976d8d4575a0fe34b96de2bfad'
}
}
The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For
instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of
the public key value as the "kid" value.
Note that the use of a Key ID to identify a proof-of-possession key
needs to be carefully circumscribed, as described below and in
Section 6. In cases where the Key ID is not a cryptographic value
derived from the key or where not all of the parties involved are
validating the cryptographic derivation, implementers should expect
collisions where different keys are assigned the same Key ID.
Recipients of a CWT with a PoP key linked through only a Key ID
should be prepared to handle such situations.
In the world of constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there
is frequently a restriction on the size of Key IDs, either because of
table constraints or a desire to keep message sizes small.
Note that the value of a Key ID for a specific key is not necessarily
the same for different parties. When sending a COSE encrypted
message with a shared key, the Key ID may be different on both sides
of the conversation, with the appropriate one being included in the
message based on the recipient of the message.
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
"challenge". There are, however, also other means to demonstrate
freshness of the exchange and to link the proof-of-possession key to
the participating parties, as demonstrated by various authentication
and key exchange protocols.
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
protocols will communicate this information in different ways.
Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not
specified, as this is also protocol specific.
Note that other means of proving possession of the key exist, which
could be used in conjunction with a CWT's confirmation key.
Applications making use of such alternate means are encouraged to
register them in the IANA "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Confirmation Methods"
registry established in Section 7.2.
4. Security Considerations
All the security considerations that are discussed in [RFC8392] also
apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own
unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is
kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that
unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
audience restriction, as described in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8392],
because it provides additional protections. Audience restriction can
be used by recipients to reject messages intended for different
recipients. (Of course, applications not using proof of possession
can also benefit from using audience restriction to reject messages
intended for different recipients.)
CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of
an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework [ACE-OAUTH], in
which protocols are used by a presenter to request these tokens and
to subsequently use them with recipients. Proof of possession only
provides the intended security gains when the proof is known to be
current and not subject to replay attacks; security protocols using
mechanisms such as nonces and timestamps can be used to avoid the
risk of replay when performing proof of possession for a token. Note
that a discussion of the architecture or specific protocols that CWTs
with proof-of-possession keys are used with is beyond the scope of
this specification.
As is the case with other information included in a CWT, it is
necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity
protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data
origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns
about the entity that created the CWT, since this will be important
for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary
from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special
care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT
since those not only require integrity protection but also
confidentiality protection.
As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes
on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust
decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with
keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied
upon.
5. Privacy Considerations
A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
same key is used on multiple occasions. Thus, for privacy reasons,
it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used
when interacting with different parties.
6. Operational Considerations
The use of CWTs with proof-of-possession keys requires additional
information to be shared between the involved parties in order to
ensure correct processing. The recipient needs to be able to use
credentials to verify the authenticity and integrity of the CWT.
Furthermore, the recipient may need to be able to decrypt either the
whole CWT or the encrypted parts thereof (see Section 3.3). This
requires the recipient to know information about the issuer.
Likewise, there needs to be agreement between the issuer and the
recipient about the claims being used (which is also true of CWTs in
general).
When an issuer creates a CWT containing a Key ID claim, it needs to
make sure that it does not issue another CWT with different claims
containing the same Key ID within the lifetime of the CWTs, unless
intentionally desired. Failure to do so may allow one party to
impersonate another party, with the potential to gain additional
privileges. A case where such reuse of a Key ID would be intentional
is when a presenter obtains a CWT with different claims (e.g.,
extended scope) for the same recipient but wants to continue using an
existing security association (e.g., a DTLS session) bound to the key
identified by the Key ID. Likewise, if PoP keys are used for
multiple different kinds of CWTs in an application and the PoP keys
are identified by Key IDs, care must be taken to keep the keys for
the different kinds of CWTs segregated so that an attacker cannot
cause the wrong PoP key to be used by using a valid Key ID for the
wrong kind of CWT. Using an audience restriction for the CWT would
be one strategy to mitigate this risk.
7. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC8126] basis
after a three-week review period on the <cwt-reg-review@ietf.org>
mailing list, on the advice of one or more designated experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the designated experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to Register CWT Confirmation
Method: example"). Registration requests that are undetermined for a
period longer than 21 days can be brought directly to IANA's
attention (using the iana@iana.org mailing list) for resolution.
Designated experts should determine whether a registration request
contains enough information for the registry to be populated with the
new values and whether the proposed new functionality already exists.
In the case of an incomplete registration or an attempt to register
already existing functionality, the designated experts should ask for
corrections or reject the registration.
It is suggested that multiple designated experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
expert, that expert should defer to the judgment of the other
experts.
7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web
Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims], established by
[RFC8392].
7.1.1. Registry Contents
* Claim Name: "cnf"
* Claim Description: Confirmation
* JWT Claim Name: "cnf"
* Claim Key: 8
* Claim Value Type(s): map
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of RFC 8747
7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for CWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
defines it.
7.2.1. Registration Template
Confirmation Method Name:
The human-readable name requested (e.g., "kid").
Confirmation Method Description:
Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key
Identifier").
JWT Confirmation Method Name:
Claim Name of the equivalent JWT confirmation method value, as
registered in the "JSON Web Token Claims" subregistry in the "JSON
Web Token (JWT)" registry [IANA.JWT]. CWT claims should normally
have a corresponding JWT claim. If a corresponding JWT claim
would not make sense, the designated experts can choose to accept
registrations for which the JWT Claim Name is listed as "N/A".
Confirmation Key:
CBOR map key value for the confirmation method.
Confirmation Value Type(s):
CBOR types that can be used for the confirmation method value.
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required. Note that the designated experts
and IANA must be able to obtain copies of the specification
document(s) to perform their work.
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
* Confirmation Method Name: "COSE_Key"
* Confirmation Method Description: COSE_Key Representing Public Key
* JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwk"
* Confirmation Key: 1
* Confirmation Value Type(s): COSE_Key structure
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFC 8747
* Confirmation Method Name: "Encrypted_COSE_Key"
* Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted COSE_Key
* JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwe"
* Confirmation Key: 2
* Confirmation Value Type(s): COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0
structure (with an optional corresponding COSE_Encrypt or
COSE_Encrypt0 tag)
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of RFC 8747
* Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
* Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
* JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
* Confirmation Key: 3
* Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of RFC 8747
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[IANA.CWT.Claims]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
8.2. Informative References
[ACE-OAUTH]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21, 14 February 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
21>.
[IANA.JWT] IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT)",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005, <https://docs.oasis-
open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the
specification: Roman Danyliw, Christer Holmberg, Benjamin Kaduk,
Mirja Kühlewind, Yoav Nir, Michael Richardson, Adam Roach, Éric
Vyncke, and Jim Schaad.
Ludwig Seitz and Göran Selander worked on this document as part of
the CelticPlus projects CyberWI and CRITISEC, with funding from
Vinnova.
Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Ludwig Seitz
Combitech
Djaeknegatan 31
SE-211 35 Malmö
Sweden
Email: ludwig.seitz@combitech.se
Göran Selander
Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Kista
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
Samuel Erdtman
Spotify
Email: erdtman@spotify.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd.
6060 Hall in Tirol
Austria
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com