💾 Archived View for gemini.bortzmeyer.org › rfc-mirror › rfc3871.txt captured on 2023-07-22 at 20:21:26.
⬅️ Previous capture (2021-11-30)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Network Working Group G. Jones, Ed.
Request for Comments: 3871 The MITRE Corporation
Category: Informational September 2004
Operational Security Requirements for Large
Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
This document defines a list of operational security requirements for
the infrastructure of large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP
networks (routers and switches). A framework is defined for
specifying "profiles", which are collections of requirements
applicable to certain network topology contexts (all, core-only,
edge-only...). The goal is to provide network operators a clear,
concise way of communicating their security requirements to vendors.
Jones Informational [Page 1]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Definition of a Secure Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Intended Audience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.8. Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1. Device Management Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1. Support Secure Channels For Management. . . . . 11
2.2. In-Band Management Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1. Use Cryptographic Algorithms Subject To
Open Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2. Use Strong Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.3. Use Protocols Subject To Open Review For
Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.4. Allow Selection of Cryptographic Parameters . . 15
2.2.5. Management Functions Should Have Increased
Priority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3. Out-of-Band (OoB) Management Requirements . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1. Support a 'Console' Interface . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2. 'Console' Communication Profile Must Support
Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.3. 'Console' Requires Minimal Functionality of
Attached Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.4. 'Console' Supports Fall-back Authentication . . 20
2.3.5. Support Separate Management Plane IP
Interfaces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.6. No Forwarding Between Management Plane And Other
Interfaces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4. Configuration and Management Interface Requirements. . . 22
2.4.1. 'CLI' Provides Access to All Configuration and
Management Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.2. 'CLI' Supports Scripting of Configuration . . . 23
2.4.3. 'CLI' Supports Management Over 'Slow' Links . . 24
2.4.4. 'CLI' Supports Idle Session Timeout . . . . . . 25
2.4.5. Support Software Installation . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.6. Support Remote Configuration Backup . . . . . . 27
2.4.7. Support Remote Configuration Restore. . . . . . 27
2.4.8. Support Text Configuration Files. . . . . . . . 28
2.5. IP Stack Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1. Ability to Identify All Listening Services. . . 29
2.5.2. Ability to Disable Any and All Services . . . . 30
Jones Informational [Page 2]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.5.3. Ability to Control Service Bindings for
Listening Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.4. Ability to Control Service Source Addresses . . 31
2.5.5. Support Automatic Anti-spoofing for
Single-Homed Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.6. Support Automatic Discarding Of Bogons and
Martians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.7. Support Counters For Dropped Packets. . . . . . 34
2.6. Rate Limiting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.1. Support Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.2. Support Directional Application Of Rate
Limiting Per Interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.3. Support Rate Limiting Based on State. . . . . . 36
2.7. Basic Filtering Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7.1. Ability to Filter Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7.2. Ability to Filter Traffic TO the Device . . . . 37
2.7.3. Ability to Filter Traffic THROUGH the Device. . 38
2.7.4. Ability to Filter Without Significant
Performance Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7.5. Support Route Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7.6. Ability to Specify Filter Actions . . . . . . . 40
2.7.7. Ability to Log Filter Actions . . . . . . . . . 40
2.8. Packet Filtering Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.1. Ability to Filter on Protocols. . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.2. Ability to Filter on Addresses. . . . . . . . . 42
2.8.3. Ability to Filter on Protocol Header Fields . . 42
2.8.4. Ability to Filter Inbound and Outbound. . . . . 43
2.9. Packet Filtering Counter Requirements. . . . . . . . . . 43
2.9.1. Ability to Accurately Count Filter Hits . . . . 43
2.9.2. Ability to Display Filter Counters. . . . . . . 44
2.9.3. Ability to Display Filter Counters per Rule . . 45
2.9.4. Ability to Display Filter Counters per Filter
Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.9.5. Ability to Reset Filter Counters. . . . . . . . 46
2.9.6. Filter Counters Must Be Accurate. . . . . . . . 47
2.10. Other Packet Filtering Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.10.1. Ability to Specify Filter Log Granularity . . . 47
2.11. Event Logging Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.11.1. Logging Facility Uses Protocols Subject To
Open Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.11.2. Logs Sent To Remote Servers . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.11.3. Ability to Select Reliable Delivery . . . . . . 49
2.11.4. Ability to Log Locally. . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.11.5. Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time. . . . 50
2.11.6. Display Timezone And UTC Offset . . . . . . . . 51
2.11.7. Default Timezone Should Be UTC. . . . . . . . . 52
2.11.8. Logs Must Be Timestamped. . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.11.9. Logs Contain Untranslated IP Addresses. . . . . 53
Jones Informational [Page 3]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.11.10. Logs Contain Records Of Security Events . . . . 54
2.11.11. Logs Do Not Contain Passwords . . . . . . . . . 55
2.12. Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.12.1. Authenticate All User Access. . . . . . . . . . 55
2.12.2. Support Authentication of Individual Users. . . 56
2.12.3. Support Simultaneous Connections. . . . . . . . 56
2.12.4. Ability to Disable All Local Accounts . . . . . 57
2.12.5. Support Centralized User Authentication
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.12.6. Support Local User Authentication Method. . . . 58
2.12.7. Support Configuration of Order of
Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.12.8. Ability To Authenticate Without Plaintext
Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.12.9. No Default Passwords. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.12.10. Passwords Must Be Explicitly Configured Prior
To Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.12.11. Ability to Define Privilege Levels. . . . . . . 61
2.12.12. Ability to Assign Privilege Levels to Users . . 62
2.12.13. Default Privilege Level Must Be 'None'. . . . . 62
2.12.14. Change in Privilege Levels Requires
Re-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.12.15. Support Recovery Of Privileged Access . . . . . 64
2.13. Layer 2 Devices Must Meet Higher Layer Requirements. . . 65
2.14. Security Features Must Not Cause Operational Problems. . 65
2.15. Security Features Should Have Minimal Performance
Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3. Documentation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.1. Identify Services That May Be Listening. . . . . . . . . 67
3.2. Document Service Defaults. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3. Document Service Activation Process. . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4. Document Command Line Interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5. 'Console' Default Communication Profile Documented . . . 69
4. Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1. Identify Origin of IP Stack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2. Identify Origin of Operating System. . . . . . . . . . . 70
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendices
A. Requirement Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.1. Minimum Requirements Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.2. Layer 3 Network Edge Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Jones Informational [Page 4]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
1. Introduction
1.1. Goals
This document defines a list of operational security requirements for
the infrastructure of large IP networks (routers and switches). The
goal is to provide network operators a clear, concise way of
communicating their security requirements to equipment vendors.
1.2. Motivation
Network operators need tools to ensure that they are able to manage
their networks securely and to insure that they maintain the ability
to provide service to their customers. Some of the threats are
outlined in section 3.2 of [RFC2196]. This document enumerates
features which are required to implement many of the policies and
procedures suggested by [RFC2196] in the context of the
infrastructure of large IP-based networks. Also see [RFC3013].
1.3. Scope
The scope of these requirements is intended to cover the managed
infrastructure of large ISP IP networks (e.g., routers and switches).
Certain groups (or "profiles", see below) apply only in specific
situations (e.g., edge-only).
The following are explicitly out of scope:
o general purpose hosts that do not transit traffic including
infrastructure hosts such as name/time/log/AAA servers, etc.,
o unmanaged devices,
o customer managed devices (e.g., firewalls, Intrusion Detection
System, dedicated VPN devices, etc.),
o SOHO (Small Office, Home Office) devices (e.g., personal
firewalls, Wireless Access Points, Cable Modems, etc.),
o confidentiality of customer data,
o integrity of customer data,
o physical security.
This means that while the requirements in the minimum profile (and
others) may apply, additional requirements have not be added to
account for their unique needs.
Jones Informational [Page 5]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
While the examples given are written with IPv4 in mind, most of the
requirements are general enough to apply to IPv6.
1.4. Definition of a Secure Network
For the purposes of this document, a secure network is one in which:
o The network keeps passing legitimate customer traffic
(availability).
o Traffic goes where it is supposed to go, and only where it is
supposed to go (availability, confidentiality).
o The network elements remain manageable (availability).
o Only authorized users can manage network elements (authorization).
o There is a record of all security related events (accountability).
o The network operator has the necessary tools to detect and respond
to illegitimate traffic.
1.5. Intended Audience
There are two intended audiences: the network operator who selects,
purchases, and operates IP network equipment, and the vendors who
create them.
1.6. Format
The individual requirements are listed in the three sections below.
o Section 2 lists functional requirements.
o Section 3 lists documentation requirements.
o Section 4 lists assurance requirements.
Within these areas, requirements are grouped in major functional
areas (e.g., logging, authentication, filtering, etc.)
Each requirement has the following subsections:
o Requirement (what)
o Justification (why)
o Examples (how)
Jones Informational [Page 6]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o Warnings (if applicable)
The requirement describes a policy to be supported by the device.
The justification tells why and in what context the requirement is
important. The examples section is intended to give examples of
implementations that may meet the requirement. Examples cite
technology and standards current at the time of this writing. See
[RFC3631]. It is expected that the choice of implementations to meet
the requirements will change over time. The warnings list
operational concerns, deviation from standards, caveats, etc.
Security requirements will vary across different device types and
different organizations, depending on policy and other factors. A
desired feature in one environment may be a requirement in another.
Classifications must be made according to local need.
In order to assist in classification, Appendix A defines several
requirement "profiles" for different types of devices. Profiles are
concise lists of requirements that apply to certain classes of
devices. The profiles in this document should be reviewed to
determine if they are appropriate to the local environment.
1.7. Intended Use
It is anticipated that the requirements in this document will be used
for the following purposes:
o as a checklist when evaluating networked products,
o to create profiles of different subsets of the requirements which
describe the needs of different devices, organizations, and
operating environments,
o to assist operators in clearly communicating their security
requirements,
o as high level guidance for the creation of detailed test plans.
1.8. Definitions
RFC 2119 Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Jones Informational [Page 7]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
The use of the RFC 2119 keywords is an attempt, by the editor, to
assign the correct requirement levels ("MUST", "SHOULD",
"MAY"...). It must be noted that different organizations,
operational environments, policies and legal environments will
generate different requirement levels. Operators and vendors
should carefully consider the individual requirements listed here
in their own context. One size does not fit all.
Bogon.
A "Bogon" (plural: "bogons") is a packet with an IP source address
in an address block not yet allocated by IANA or the Regional
Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC...) as well as all
addresses reserved for private or special use by RFCs. See
[RFC3330] and [RFC1918].
CLI.
Several requirements refer to a Command Line Interface (CLI).
While this refers at present to a classic text oriented command
interface, it is not intended to preclude other mechanisms which
may meet all the requirements that reference "CLI".
Console.
Several requirements refer to a "Console". The model for this is
the classic RS232 serial port which has, for the past 30 or more
years, provided a simple, stable, reliable, well-understood and
nearly ubiquitous management interface to network devices. Again,
these requirements are intended primarily to codify the benefits
provided by that venerable interface, not to preclude other
mechanisms that meet all the same requirements.
Filter.
In this document, a "filter" is defined as a group of one or more
rules where each rule specifies one or more match criteria as
specified in Section 2.8.
In-Band management.
"In-Band management" is defined as any management done over the
same channels and interfaces used for user/customer data.
Examples would include using SSH for management via customer or
Internet facing network interfaces.
Jones Informational [Page 8]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
High Resolution Time.
"High resolution time" is defined in this document as "time having
a resolution greater than one second" (e.g., milliseconds).
IP.
Unless otherwise indicated, "IP" refers to IPv4.
Management.
This document uses a broad definition of the term "management".
In this document, "management" refers to any authorized
interaction with the device intended to change its operational
state or configuration. Data/Forwarding plane functions (e.g.,
the transit of customer traffic) are not considered management.
Control plane functions such as routing, signaling and link
management protocols and management plane functions such as remote
access, configuration and authentication are considered to be
management.
Martian.
Per [RFC1208] "Martian: Humorous term applied to packets that turn
up unexpectedly on the wrong network because of bogus routing
entries. Also used as a name for a packet which has an altogether
bogus (non-registered or ill-formed) Internet address." For the
purposes of this document Martians are defined as "packets having
a source address that, by application of the current forwarding
tables, would not have its return traffic routed back to the
sender." "Spoofed packets" are a common source of martians.
Note that in some cases, the traffic may be asymmetric, and a
simple forwarding table check might produce false positives. See
[RFC3704]
Out-of-Band (OoB) management.
"Out-of-Band management" is defined as any management done over
channels and interfaces that are separate from those used for
user/customer data. Examples would include a serial console
interface or a network interface connected to a dedicated
management network that is not used to carry customer traffic.
Jones Informational [Page 9]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Open Review.
"Open review" refers to processes designed to generate public
discussion and review of proposed technical solutions such as data
communications protocols and cryptographic algorithms with the
goals of improving and building confidence in the final solutions.
For the purposes of this document "open review" is defined by
[RFC2026]. All standards track documents are considered to have
been through an open review process.
It should be noted that organizations may have local requirements
that define what they view as acceptable "open review". For
example, they may be required to adhere to certain national or
international standards. Such modifications of the definition of
the term "open review", while important, are considered local
issues that should be discussed between the organization and the
vendor.
It should also be noted that section 7 of [RFC2026] permits
standards track documents to incorporate other "external standards
and specifications".
Service.
A number of requirements refer to "services". For the purposes of
this document a "service" is defined as "any process or protocol
running in the control or management planes to which non-transit
packets may be delivered". Examples might include an SSH server,
a BGP process or an NTP server. It would also include the
transport, network and link layer protocols since, for example, a
TCP packet addressed to a port on which no service is listening
will be "delivered" to the IP stack, and possibly result in an
ICMP message being sent back.
Secure Channel.
A "secure channel" is a mechanism that ensures end-to-end
integrity and confidentiality of communications. Examples include
TLS [RFC2246] and IPsec [RFC2401]. Connecting a terminal to a
console port using physically secure, shielded cable would provide
confidentiality but possibly not integrity.
Single-Homed Network.
A "single-homed network" is defined as one for which
* There is only one upstream connection
Jones Informational [Page 10]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
* Routing is symmetric.
See [RFC3704] for a discussion of related issues and mechanisms
for multihomed networks.
Spoofed Packet.
A "spoofed packet" is defined as a packet that has a source
address that does not correspond to any address assigned to the
system which sent the packet. Spoofed packets are often "bogons"
or "martians".
2. Functional Requirements
The requirements in this section are intended to list testable,
functional requirements that are needed to operate devices securely.
2.1. Device Management Requirements
2.1.1. Support Secure Channels For Management
Requirement.
The device MUST provide mechanisms to ensure end-to-end integrity
and confidentiality for all network traffic and protocols used to
support management functions. This MUST include at least
protocols used for configuration, monitoring, configuration backup
and restore, logging, time synchronization, authentication, and
routing.
Justification.
Integrity protection is required to ensure that unauthorized users
cannot manage the device or alter log data or the results of
management commands. Confidentiality is required so that
unauthorized users cannot view sensitive information, such as
keys, passwords, or the identity of users.
Examples.
See [RFC3631] for a current list of mechanisms that can be used to
support secure management.
Later sections list requirements for supporting in-band management
(Section 2.2) and out-of-band management (Section 2.3) as well as
trade-offs that must be weighed in considering which is
appropriate to a given situation.
Jones Informational [Page 11]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
None.
2.2. In-Band Management Requirements
This section lists security requirements that support secure in-band
management. In-band management has the advantage of lower cost (no
extra interfaces or lines), but has significant security
disadvantages:
o Saturation of customer lines or interfaces can make the device
unmanageable unless out-of-band management resources have been
reserved.
o Since public interfaces/channels are used, it is possible for
attackers to directly address and reach the device and to attempt
management functions.
o In-band management traffic on public interfaces may be
intercepted, however this would typically require a significant
compromise in the routing system.
o Public interfaces used for in-band management may become
unavailable due to bugs (e.g., buffer overflows being exploited)
while out-of-band interfaces (such as a serial console device)
remain available.
There are many situations where in-band management makes sense, is
used, and/or is the only option. The following requirements are
meant to provide means of securing in-band management traffic.
2.2.1. Use Cryptographic Algorithms Subject To Open Review
Requirement.
If cryptography is used to provide secure management functions,
then there MUST be an option to use algorithms that are subject to
"open review" as defined in Section 1.8 to provide these
functions. These SHOULD be used by default. The device MAY
optionally support algorithms that are not open to review.
Justification.
Cryptographic algorithms that have not been subjected to
widespread, extended public/peer review are more likely to have
undiscovered weaknesses or flaws than open standards and publicly
reviewed algorithms. Network operators may have need or desire to
Jones Informational [Page 12]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
use non-open cryptographic algorithms. They should be allowed to
evaluate the trade-offs and make an informed choice between open
and non-open cryptography. See [Schneier] for further discussion.
Examples.
The following are some algorithms that satisfy the requirement at
the time of writing: AES [FIPS.197], and 3DES [ANSI.X9-52.1998]
for applications requiring symmetric encryption; RSA [RFC3447] and
Diffie-Hellman [PKCS.3.1993], [RFC2631] for applications requiring
key exchange; HMAC [RFC2401] with SHA-1 [RFC3174] for applications
requiring message verification.
Warnings.
This list is not exhaustive. Other strong, well-reviewed
algorithms may meet the requirement. The dynamic nature of the
field means that what is good enough today may not be in the
future.
Open review is necessary but not sufficient. The strength of the
algorithm and key length must also be considered. For example,
56-bit DES meets the open review requirement, but is today
considered too weak and is therefore not recommended.
2.2.2. Use Strong Cryptography
Requirement.
If cryptography is used to meet the secure management channel
requirements, then the key lengths and algorithms SHOULD be
"strong".
Justification.
Short keys and weak algorithms threaten the confidentiality and
integrity of communications.
Examples.
The following algorithms satisfy the requirement at the time of
writing: AES [FIPS.197], and 3DES [ANSI.X9-52.1998] for
applications requiring symmetric encryption; RSA [RFC3447] and
Diffie-Hellman [PKCS.3.1993], [RFC2631] for applications requiring
key exchange; HMAC [RFC2401] with SHA-1 [RFC3174] for applications
requiring message verification.
Jones Informational [Page 13]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Note that for *new protocols* [RFC3631] says the following:
"Simple keyed hashes based on MD5 [RFC1321], such as that used in
the BGP session security mechanism [RFC2385], are especially to be
avoided in new protocols, given the hints of weakness in MD5."
While use of such hashes in deployed products and protocols is
preferable to a complete lack of integrity and authentication
checks, this document concurs with the recommendation that new
products and protocols strongly consider alternatives.
Warnings.
This list is not exhaustive. Other strong, well-reviewed
algorithms may meet the requirement. The dynamic nature of the
field means that what is good enough today may not be in the
future.
Strength is relative. Long keys and strong algorithms are
intended to increase the work factor required to compromise the
security of the data protected. Over time, as processing power
increases, the security provided by a given algorithm and key
length will degrade. The definition of "Strong" must be
constantly reevaluated.
There may be legal issues governing the use of cryptography and
the strength of cryptography used.
This document explicitly does not attempt to make any
authoritative statement about what key lengths constitute "strong"
cryptography. See [RFC3562] and [RFC3766] for help in
determining appropriate key lengths. Also see [Schneier] chapter
7 for a discussion of key lengths.
2.2.3. Use Protocols Subject To Open Review For Management
Requirement.
If cryptography is used to provide secure management channels,
then its use MUST be supported in protocols that are subject to
"open review" as defined in Section 1.8. These SHOULD be used by
default. The device MAY optionally support the use of
cryptography in protocols that are not open to review.
Jones Informational [Page 14]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Protocols that have not been subjected to widespread, extended
public/peer review are more likely to have undiscovered weaknesses
or flaws than open standards and publicly reviewed protocols
Network operators may have need or desire to use non-open
protocols They should be allowed to evaluate the trade-offs and
make an informed choice between open and non-open protocols.
Examples.
See TLS [RFC2246] and IPsec [RFC2401].
Warnings.
Note that open review is necessary but may not be sufficient. It
is perfectly possible for an openly reviewed protocol to misuse
(or not use) cryptography.
2.2.4. Allow Selection of Cryptographic Parameters
Requirement.
The device SHOULD allow the operator to select cryptographic
parameters. This SHOULD include key lengths and algorithms.
Justification.
Cryptography using certain algorithms and key lengths may be
considered "strong" at one point in time, but "weak" at another.
The constant increase in compute power continually reduces the
time needed to break cryptography of a certain strength.
Weaknesses may be discovered in algorithms. The ability to select
a different algorithm is a useful tool for maintaining security in
the face of such discoveries.
Examples.
56-bit DES was once considered secure. In 1998 it was cracked by
custom built machine in under 3 days. The ability to select
algorithms and key lengths would give the operator options
(different algorithms, longer keys) in the face of such
developments.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 15]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.2.5. Management Functions Should Have Increased Priority
Requirement.
Management functions SHOULD be processed at higher priority than
non-management traffic. This SHOULD include ingress, egress,
internal transmission, and processing. This SHOULD include at
least protocols used for configuration, monitoring, configuration
backup, logging, time synchronization, authentication, and
routing.
Justification.
Certain attacks (and normal operation) can cause resource
saturation such as link congestion, memory exhaustion or CPU
overload. In these cases it is important that management
functions be prioritized to ensure that operators have the tools
needed to recover from the attack.
Examples.
Imagine a service provider with 1,000,000 DSL subscribers, most of
whom have no firewall protection. Imagine that a large portion of
these subscribers machines were infected with a new worm that
enabled them to be used in coordinated fashion as part of large
denial of service attack that involved flooding. It is entirely
possible that without prioritization such an attack would cause
link congestion resulting in routing adjacencies being lost. A
DoS attack against hosts has just become a DoS attack against the
network.
Warnings.
Prioritization is not a panacea. Routing update packets may not
make it across a saturated link. This requirement simply says
that the device should prioritize management functions within its
scope of control (e.g., ingress, egress, internal transit,
processing). To the extent that this is done across an entire
network, the overall effect will be to ensure that the network
remains manageable.
2.3. Out-of-Band (OoB) Management Requirements
See Section 2.2 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of In-band vs. Out-of-Band management.
Jones Informational [Page 16]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
These requirements assume two different possible Out-of-Band
topologies:
o serial line (or equivalent) console connections using a CLI,
o network interfaces connected to a separate network dedicated to
management.
The following assumptions are made about out-of-band management:
o The out-of-band management network is secure.
o Communications beyond the management interface (e.g., console
port, management network interface) is secure.
o There is no need for encryption of communication on out-of-band
management interfaces, (e.g., on a serial connection between a
terminal server and a device's console port).
o Security measures are in place to prevent unauthorized physical
access.
Even if these assumptions hold it would be wise, as an application of
defense-in-depth, to apply the in-band requirements (e.g.,
encryption) to out-of-band interfaces.
2.3.1. Support a 'Console' Interface
Requirement.
The device MUST support complete configuration and management via
a 'console' interface that functions independently from the
forwarding and IP control planes.
Justification.
There are times when it is operationally necessary to be able to
immediately and easily access a device for management or
configuration, even when the network is unavailable, routing and
network interfaces are incorrectly configured, the IP stack and/or
operating system may not be working (or may be vulnerable to
recently discovered exploits that make their use impossible/
inadvisable), or when high bandwidth paths to the device are
unavailable. In such situations, a console interface can provide
a way to manage and configure the device.
Jones Informational [Page 17]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
An RS232 (EIA232) interface that provides the capability to load
new versions of the system software and to perform configuration
via a command line interface. RS232 interfaces are ubiquitous and
well understood.
A simple embedded device that provides management and
configuration access via an Ethernet or USB interface.
As of this writing, RS232 is still strongly recommended as it
provides the following benefits:
* Simplicity. RS232 is far simpler than the alternatives. It is
simply a hardware specification. By contrast an Ethernet based
solution might require an ethernet interface, an operating
system, an IP stack and an HTTP server all to be functioning
and properly configured.
* Proven. RS232 has more than 30 years of use.
* Well-Understood. Operators have a great deal of experience
with RS232.
* Availability. It works even in the presence of network
failure.
* Ubiquity. It is very widely deployed in mid to high end
network infrastructure.
* Low-Cost. The cost of adding a RS232 port to a device is
small.
* CLI-Friendly. An RS232 interface and a CLI are sufficient in
most cases to manage a device. No additional software is
required.
* Integrated. Operators have many solutions (terminal servers,
etc.) currently deployed to support management via RS232.
While other interfaces may be supplied, the properties listed
above should be considered. Interfaces not having these
properties may present challenges in terms of ease of use,
integration or adoption. Problems in any of these areas could
have negative security impacts, particularly in situations
where the console must be used to quickly respond to incidents.
Jones Informational [Page 18]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
It is common practice is to connect RS232 ports to terminal
servers that permit networked access for convenience. This
increases the potential security exposure of mechanisms available
only via RS232 ports. For example, a password recovery mechanism
that is available only via RS232 might give a remote hacker to
completely reconfigure a router. While operational procedures are
beyond the scope of this document, it is important to note here
that strong attention should be given to policies, procedures,
access mechanisms and physical security governing access to
console ports.
2.3.2. 'Console' Communication Profile Must Support Reset
Requirement.
There MUST be a method defined and published for returning the
console communication parameters to their default settings. This
method must not require the current settings to be known.
Justification.
Having to guess at communications settings can waste time. In a
crisis situation, the operator may need to get on the console of a
device quickly.
Examples.
One method might be to send a break on a serial line.
Warnings.
None.
2.3.3. 'Console' Requires Minimal Functionality of Attached Devices
Requirement.
The use of the 'console' interface MUST NOT require proprietary
devices, protocol extensions or specific client software.
Jones Informational [Page 19]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
The purpose of having the console interface is to have a
management interface that can be made to work quickly at all
times. Requiring complex or nonstandard behavior on the part of
attached devices reduces the likelihood that the console will work
without hassles.
Examples.
If the console is supplied via an RS232 interface, then it should
function with an attached device that only implements a "dumb"
terminal. Support of "advanced" terminal features/types should be
optional.
Warnings.
None.
2.3.4. 'Console' Supports Fall-back Authentication
Requirement.
The 'console' SHOULD support an authentication mechanism which
does not require functional IP or depend on external services.
This authentication mechanism MAY be disabled until a failure of
other preferred mechanisms is detected.
Justification.
It does little good to have a console interface on a device if you
cannot get into the device with it when the network is not
working.
Examples.
Some devices which use TACACS or RADIUS for authentication will
fall back to a local account if the TACACS or RADIUS server does
not reply to an authentication request.
Warnings.
This requirement represents a trade-off between being able to
manage the device (functionality) and security. There are many
ways to implement this which would provide reduced security for
the device, (e.g., a back door for unauthorized access). Local
policy should be consulted to determine if "fail open" or "fail
Jones Informational [Page 20]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
closed" is the correct stance. The implications of "fail closed"
(e.g., not being able to manage a device) should be fully
considered.
If the fall-back mechanism is disabled, it is important that the
failure of IP based authentication mechanism be reliably detected
and the fall-back mechanism automatically enabled...otherwise the
operator may be left with no means to authenticate.
2.3.5. Support Separate Management Plane IP Interfaces
Requirement.
The device MAY provide designated network interface(s) that are
used for management plane traffic.
Justification.
A separate management plane interface allows management traffic to
be segregated from other traffic (data/forwarding plane, control
plane). This reduces the risk that unauthorized individuals will
be able to observe management traffic and/or compromise the
device.
This requirement applies in situations where a separate OoB
management network exists.
Examples.
Ethernet port dedicated to management and isolated from customer
traffic satisfies this requirement.
Warnings.
The use of this type of interface depends on proper functioning of
both the operating system and the IP stack, as well as good, known
configuration at least on the portions of the device dedicated to
management.
2.3.6. No Forwarding Between Management Plane And Other Interfaces
Requirement.
If the device implements separate network interface(s) for the
management plane per Section 2.3.5 then the device MUST NOT
forward traffic between the management plane and non-management
plane interfaces.
Jones Informational [Page 21]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
This prevents the flow, intentional or unintentional, of
management traffic to/from places that it should not be
originating/terminating (e.g., anything beyond the customer-facing
interfaces).
Examples.
Implementing separate forwarding tables for management plane and
non-management plane interfaces that do not propagate routes to
each other satisfies this requirement.
Warnings.
None.
2.4. Configuration and Management Interface Requirements
This section lists requirements that support secure device
configuration and management methods. In most cases, this currently
involves some sort of command line interface (CLI) and configuration
files. It may be possible to meet these requirements with other
mechanisms, for instance SNMP or a script-able HTML interface that
provides full access to management and configuration functions. In
the future, there may be others (e.g., XML based configuration).
2.4.1. 'CLI' Provides Access to All Configuration and Management
Functions
Requirement.
The Command Line Interface (CLI) or equivalent MUST allow complete
access to all configuration and management functions. The CLI
MUST be supported on the console (see Section 2.3.1) and SHOULD be
supported on all other interfaces used for management.
Justification.
The CLI (or equivalent) is needed to provide the ability to do
reliable, fast, direct, local management and monitoring of a
device. It is particularly useful in situations where it is not
possible to manage and monitor the device in-band via "normal"
means (e.g., SSH or SNMP [RFC3410], [RFC3411]) that depend on
functional networking. Such situations often occur during
security incidents such as bandwidth-based denial of service
attacks.
Jones Informational [Page 22]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
Examples of configuration include setting interface addresses,
defining and applying filters, configuring logging and
authentication, etc. Examples of management functions include
displaying dynamic state information such as CPU load, memory
utilization, packet processing statistics, etc.
Warnings.
None.
2.4.2. 'CLI' Supports Scripting of Configuration
Requirement.
The CLI or equivalent MUST support external scripting of
configuration functions. This CLI SHOULD support the same command
set and syntax as that in Section 2.4.1.
Justification.
During the handling of security incidents, it is often necessary
to quickly make configuration changes on large numbers of devices.
Doing so manually is error prone and slow. Vendor supplied
management solutions do not always foresee or address the type or
scale of solutions that are required. The ability to script
provides a solution to these problems.
Examples.
Example uses of scripting include: tracking an attack across a
large network, updating authentication parameters, updating
logging parameters, updating filters, configuration fetching/
auditing, etc. Some languages that are currently used for
scripting include expect, Perl and TCL.
Warnings.
Some properties of the command language that enhance the ability
to script are: simplicity, regularity and consistency. Some
implementations that would make scripting difficult or impossible
include: "text menu" style interfaces (e.g., "curses" on UNIX) or
a hard-coded GUI interfaces (e.g., a native Windows or Macintosh
GUI application) that communicate using a proprietary or
undocumented protocol not based on a CLI.
Jones Informational [Page 23]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.4.3. 'CLI' Supports Management Over 'Slow' Links
Requirement.
The device MUST support a command line interface (CLI) or
equivalent mechanism that works over low bandwidth connections.
Justification.
There are situations where high bandwidth for management is not
available, for example when in-band connections are overloaded during
an attack or when low-bandwidth, out-of-band connections such as
modems must be used. It is often under these conditions that it is
most crucial to be able to perform management and configuration
functions.
Examples.
The network is down. The network engineer just disabled routing
by mistake on the sole gateway router in a remote unmanned data
center. The only access to the device is over a modem connected
to a console port. The data center customers are starting to call
the support line. The GUI management interface is redrawing the
screen multiple times...slowly... at 9600bps.
One mechanism that supports operation over slow links is the
ability to apply filters to the output of CLI commands which have
potentially large output. This may be implemented with something
similar to the UNIX pipe facility and "grep" command.
For example,
cat largefile.txt | grep interesting-string
Another is the ability to "page" through large command output,
e.g., the UNIX "more" command:
For example,
cat largefile.txt | more
Warnings.
One consequence of this requirement may be that requiring a GUI
interface for management is unacceptable unless it can be shown to
work acceptably over slow links.
Jones Informational [Page 24]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.4.4. 'CLI' Supports Idle Session Timeout
Requirement.
The command line interface (CLI) or equivalent mechanism MUST
support a configurable idle timeout value.
Justification.
Network administrators go to lunch. They leave themselves logged
in with administrative privileges. They forget to use screen-
savers with password protection. They do this while at
conferences and in other public places. This behavior presents
opportunity for unauthorized access. Idle timeouts reduce the
window of exposure.
Examples.
The CLI may provide a configuration command that allows an idle
timeout to be set. If the operator does not enter commands for
that amount of time, the login session will be automatically
terminated.
Warnings.
None.
2.4.5. Support Software Installation
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to install new software versions.
It MUST be possible to install new software while the device is
disconnected from all public IP networks. This MUST NOT rely on
previous installation and/or configuration. While new software
MAY be loaded from writable media (disk, flash, etc.), the
capability to load new software MUST depend only on non-writable
media (ROM, etc.). The installation procedures SHOULD support
mechanisms to ensure reliability and integrity of data transfers.
Justification.
* Vulnerabilities are often discovered in the base software
(operating systems, etc.) shipped by vendors. Often mitigation of
the risk presented by these vulnerabilities can only be
accomplished by updates to the vendor supplied software (e.g., bug
Jones Informational [Page 25]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
fixes, new versions of code, etc.). Without a mechanism to load
new vendor supplied code, it may not be possible to mitigate the
risk posed by these vulnerabilities.
* It is also conceivable that malicious behavior on the part of
hackers or unintentional behaviors on the part of operators could
cause software on devices to be corrupted or erased. In these
situations, it is necessary to have a means to (re)load software
onto the device to restore correct functioning.
* It is important to be able to load new software while disconnected
from all public IP networks because the device may be vulnerable
to old attacks before the update is complete.
* One has to assume that hackers, operators, etc. may erase or
corrupt all writable media (disks, flash, etc.). In such
situations, it is necessary to be able to recover starting with
only non-writable media (e.g., CD-ROM, a true ROM-based monitor).
* System images may be corrupted in transit (from vendor to
customer, or during the loading process) or in storage (bit rot,
defective media, etc.). Failure to reliably load a new image, for
example after a hacker deletes or corrupts the installed image,
could result in extended loss of availability.
Examples.
The device could support booting into a simple ROM-based monitor
that supported a set of commands sufficient to load new operating
system code and configuration data from other devices. The
operating system and configuration might be loaded from:
RS232. The device could support uploading new code via an RS232
console port.
CD-ROM. The device could support installing new code from a
locally attached CD-ROM drive.
NETWORK. The device could support installing new code via a
network interface, assuming that (a) it is disconnected from all
public networks and (b) the device can boot an OS and IP stack
from some read-only media with sufficient capabilities to load new
code from the network.
Jones Informational [Page 26]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
FLASH. The device could support booting from flash memory cards.
Simple mechanisms currently in use to protect the integrity of
system images and data transfer include image checksums and simple
serial file transfer protocols such as XMODEM and Kermit.
Warnings.
None.
2.4.6. Support Remote Configuration Backup
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to store the system configuration
to a remote server. The stored configuration MUST have sufficient
information to restore the device to its operational state at the
time the configuration is saved. Stored versions of the
configuration MAY be compressed using an algorithm which is
subject to open review, as long as the fact is clearly identified
and the compression can be disabled. Sensitive information such
as passwords that could be used to compromise the security of the
device MAY be excluded from the saved configuration.
Justification.
Archived configurations are essential to enable auditing and
recovery.
Examples.
Possible implementations include SCP, SFTP or FTP over a secure
channel. See Section 2.1.1 for requirements related to secure
communication channels for management protocols and data.
Warnings.
The security of the remote server is assumed, with appropriate
measures being outside the scope of this document.
2.4.7. Support Remote Configuration Restore
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to restore a configuration that
was saved as described in Section 2.4.6. The system MUST be
restored to its operational state at the time the configuration
was saved.
Jones Informational [Page 27]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Restoration of archived configurations allows quick restoration of
service following an outage (security related as well as from
other causes).
Examples.
Configurations may be restored using SCP, SFTP or FTP over a
secure channel. See Section 2.1.1 for requirements related to
secure communication channels for management protocols and data.
Warnings.
The security of the remote server is assumed, with appropriate
measures being outside the scope of this document.
Note that if passwords or other sensitive information are excluded
from the saved copy of the configuration, as allowed by Section
2.4.6, then the restore may not be complete. The operator may
have to set new passwords or supply other information that was not
saved.
2.4.8. Support Text Configuration Files
Requirement.
The device MUST support display, backup and restore of system
configuration in a simple well defined textual format. The
configuration MUST also be viewable as text on the device itself.
It MUST NOT be necessary to use a proprietary program to view the
configuration.
Justification.
Simple, well-defined textual configurations facilitate human
understanding of the operational state of the device, enable off-
line audits, and facilitate automation. Requiring the use of a
proprietary program to access the configuration inhibits these
goals.
Examples.
A 7-bit ASCII configuration file that shows the current settings
of the various configuration options would satisfy the
requirement, as would a Unicode configuration or any other
"textual" representation. A structured binary format intended
only for consumption by programs would not be acceptable.
Jones Informational [Page 28]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
Offline copies of configurations should be well protected as they
often contain sensitive information such as SNMP community
strings, passwords, network blocks, customer information, etc.
"Well defined" and "textual" are open to interpretation. Clearly
an ASCII configuration file with a regular, documented command
oriented-syntax would meet the definition. These are currently in
wide use. Future options, such as XML based configuration may
meet the requirement. Determining this will require evaluation
against the justifications listed above.
2.5. IP Stack Requirements
2.5.1. Ability to Identify All Listening Services
Requirement.
The vendor MUST:
* Provide a means to display all services that are listening for
network traffic directed at the device from any external
source.
* Display the addresses to which each service is bound.
* Display the addresses assigned to each interface.
* Display any and all port(s) on which the service is listing.
* Include both open standard and vendor proprietary services.
Justification.
This information is necessary to enable a thorough assessment of
the security risks associated with the operation of the device
(e.g., "does this protocol allow complete management of the device
without also requiring authentication, authorization, or
accounting?"). The information also assists in determining what
steps should be taken to mitigate risk (e.g., "should I turn this
service off ?")
Jones Informational [Page 29]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
If the device is listening for SNMP traffic from any source
directed to the IP addresses of any of its local interfaces, then
this requirement could be met by the provision of a command which
displays that fact.
Warnings.
None.
2.5.2. Ability to Disable Any and All Services
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to turn off any "services" (see
Section 1.8).
Justification.
The ability to disable services for which there is no operational
need will allow administrators to reduce the overall risk posed to
the device.
Examples.
Processes that listen on TCP and UDP ports would be prime examples
of services that it must be possible to disable.
Warnings.
None.
2.5.3. Ability to Control Service Bindings for Listening Services
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means for the user to specify the
bindings used for all listening services. It MUST support binding
to any address or net-block associated with any interface local to
the device. This must include addresses bound to physical or
non-physical (e.g., loopback) interfaces.
Justification.
It is a common practice among operators to configure "loopback"
pseudo-interfaces to use as the source and destination of
management traffic. These are preferred to physical interfaces
Jones Informational [Page 30]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
because they provide a stable, routable address. Services bound
to the addresses of physical interface addresses might become
unreachable if the associated hardware goes down, is removed, etc.
This requirement makes it possible to restrict access to
management services using routing. Management services may be
bound only to the addresses of loopback interfaces. The loopback
interfaces may be addressed out of net-blocks that are only routed
between the managed devices and the authorized management
networks/hosts. This has the effect of making it impossible for
anyone to connect to (or attempt to DoS) management services from
anywhere but the authorized management networks/hosts.
It also greatly reduces the need for complex filters. It reduces
the number of ports listening, and thus the number of potential
avenues of attack. It ensures that only traffic arriving from
legitimate addresses and/or on designated interfaces can access
services on the device.
Examples.
If the device listens for inbound SSH connections, this
requirement means that it should be possible to specify that the
device will only listen to connections destined to specific
addresses (e.g., the address of the loopback interface) or
received on certain interfaces (e.g., an Ethernet interface
designated as the "management" interface). It should be possible
in this example to configure the device such that the SSH is NOT
listening to every address configured on the device. Similar
effects may be achieved with the use of global filters, sometimes
called "receive" or "loopback" ACLs, that filter traffic destined
for the device itself on all interfaces.
Warnings.
None.
2.5.4. Ability to Control Service Source Addresses
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means that allows the user to specify
the source addresses used for all outbound connections or
transmissions originating from the device. It SHOULD be possible
to specify source addresses independently for each type of
outbound connection or transmission. Source addresses MUST be
limited to addresses that are assigned to interfaces (including
loopbacks) local to the device.
Jones Informational [Page 31]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
This allows remote devices receiving connections or transmissions
to use source filtering as one means of authentication. For
example, if SNMP traps were configured to use a known loopback
address as their source, the SNMP workstation receiving the traps
(or a firewall in front of it) could be configured to receive SNMP
packets only from that address.
Examples.
The operator may allocate a distinct block of addresses from which
all loopbacks are numbered. NTP and syslog can be configured to
use those loopback addresses as source, while SNMP and BGP may be
configured to use specific physical interface addresses. This
would facilitate filtering based on source address as one way of
rejecting unauthorized attempts to connect to peers/servers.
Warnings.
Care should be taken to assure that the addresses chosen are
routable between the sending and receiving devices, (e.g., setting
SSH to use a loopback address of 10.1.1.1 which is not routed
between a router and all intended destinations could cause
problems).
Note that some protocols, such as SCTP [RFC3309], can use more
than one IP address as the endpoint of a single connection.
Also note that [RFC3631] lists address-based authentication as an
"insecurity mechanism". Address based authentication should be
replaced or augmented by other mechanisms wherever possible.
2.5.5. Support Automatic Anti-spoofing for Single-Homed Networks
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to designate particular interfaces
as servicing "single-homed networks" (see Section 1.8) and MUST
provide an option to automatically drop "spoofed packets" (Section
1.8) received on such interfaces where application of the current
forwarding table would not route return traffic back through the
same interface. This option MUST work in the presence of dynamic
routing and dynamically assigned addresses.
Jones Informational [Page 32]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
See sections 3 of [RFC1918], sections 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 of
[RFC1812], and [RFC2827].
Examples.
This requirement could be satisfied in several ways. It could be
satisfied by the provision of a single command that automatically
generates and applies filters to an interface that implements
anti-spoofing. It could be satisfied by the provision of a
command that causes the return path for packets received to be
checked against the current forwarding tables and dropped if they
would not be forwarded back through the interface on which they
were received.
See [RFC3704].
Warnings.
This requirement only holds for single-homed networks. Note that
a simple forwarding table check is not sufficient in the more
complex scenarios of multi-homed or multi-attached networks, i.e.,
where the traffic may be asymmetric. In these cases, a more
extensive check such as Feasible Path RPF could be very useful.
2.5.6. Support Automatic Discarding Of Bogons and Martians
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to automatically drop all "bogons"
(Section 1.8) and "martians" (Section 1.8). This option MUST work
in the presence of dynamic routing and dynamically assigned
addresses.
Justification.
These sorts of packets have little (no?) legitimate use and are
used primarily to allow individuals and organization to avoid
identification (and thus accountability) and appear to be most
often used for DoS attacks, email abuse, hacking, etc. In
addition, transiting these packets needlessly consumes resources
and may lead to capacity and performance problems for customers.
See sections 3 of [RFC1918], sections 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 of
[RFC1812], and [RFC2827].
Jones Informational [Page 33]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
This requirement could be satisfied by the provision of a command
that causes the return path for packets received to be checked
against the current forwarding tables and dropped if no viable
return path exists. This assumes that steps are taken to assure
that no bogon entries are present in the forwarding tables (for
example filtering routing updates per Section 2.7.5 to reject
advertisements of unassigned addresses).
See [RFC3704].
Warnings.
This requirement only holds for single-homed networks. Note that
a simple forwarding table check is not sufficient in the more
complex scenarios of multi-homed or multi-attached networks, i.e.,
where the traffic may be asymmetric. In these cases, a more
extensive check such as Feasible Path RPF could be very useful.
2.5.7. Support Counters For Dropped Packets
Requirement.
The device MUST provide accurate, per-interface counts of spoofed
packets dropped in accordance with Section 2.5.5 and Section
2.5.6.
Justification.
Counters can help in identifying the source of spoofed traffic.
Examples.
An edge router may have several single-homed customers attached.
When an attack using spoofed packets is detected, a quick check of
counters may be able to identify which customer is attempting to
send spoofed traffic.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 34]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.6. Rate Limiting Requirements
2.6.1. Support Rate Limiting
Requirement.
The device MUST provide the capability to limit the rate at which
it will pass traffic based on protocol, source and destination IP
address or CIDR block, source and destination port, and interface.
Protocols MUST include at least IP, ICMP, UDP, and TCP and SHOULD
include any protocol.
Justification.
This requirement provides a means of reducing or eliminating the
impact of certain types of attacks. Also, rate limiting has the
advantage that in some cases it can be turned on a priori, thereby
offering some ability to mitigate the effect of future attacks
prior to any explicit operator reaction to the attacks.
Examples.
Assume that a web hosting company provides space in its data-
center to a company that becomes unpopular with a certain element
of network users, who then decide to flood the web server with
inbound ICMP traffic. It would be useful in such a situation to
be able to rate-filter inbound ICMP traffic at the data-center's
border routers. On the other side, assume that a new worm is
released that infects vulnerable database servers such that they
then start spewing traffic on TCP port 1433 aimed at random
destination addresses as fast as the system and network interface
of the infected server is capable. Further assume that a data
center has many vulnerable servers that are infected and
simultaneously sending large amounts of traffic with the result
that all outbound links are saturated. Implementation of this
requirement, would allow the network operator to rate limit
inbound and/or outbound TCP 1433 traffic (possibly to a rate of 0
packets/bytes per second) to respond to the attack and maintain
service levels for other legitimate customers/traffic.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 35]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.6.2. Support Directional Application Of Rate Limiting Per Interface
Requirement.
The device MUST provide support to rate-limit input and/or output
separately on each interface.
Justification.
This level of granular control allows appropriately targeted
controls that minimize the impact on third parties.
Examples.
If an ICMP flood is directed a single customer on an edge router,
it may be appropriate to rate-limit outbound ICMP only on that
customers interface.
Warnings.
None.
2.6.3. Support Rate Limiting Based on State
Requirement.
The device MUST be able to rate limit based on all TCP control
flag bits. The device SHOULD support rate limiting of other
stateful protocols where the normal processing of the protocol
gives the device access to protocol state.
Justification.
This allows appropriate response to certain classes of attack.
Examples.
For example, for TCP sessions, it should be possible to rate limit
based on the SYN, SYN-ACK, RST, or other bit state.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 36]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.7. Basic Filtering Capabilities
2.7.1. Ability to Filter Traffic
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to filter IP packets on any
interface implementing IP.
Justification.
Packet filtering is important because it provides a basic means of
implementing policies that specify which traffic is allowed and
which is not. It also provides a basic tool for responding to
malicious traffic.
Examples.
Access control lists that allow filtering based on protocol and/or
source/destination address and or source/destination port would be
one example.
Warnings.
None.
2.7.2. Ability to Filter Traffic TO the Device
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to apply the filtering mechanism to traffic
that is addressed directly to the device via any of its interfaces
- including loopback interfaces.
Justification.
This allows the operator to apply filters that protect the device
itself from attacks and unauthorized access.
Examples.
Examples of this might include filters that permit only BGP from
peers and SNMP and SSH from an authorized management segment and
directed to the device itself, while dropping all other traffic
addressed to the device.
Jones Informational [Page 37]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
None.
2.7.3. Ability to Filter Traffic THROUGH the Device
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to apply the filtering mechanism to traffic
that is being routed (switched) through the device.
Justification.
This permits implementation of basic policies on devices that
carry transit traffic (routers, switches, etc.).
Examples.
One simple and common way to meet this requirement is to provide
the ability to filter traffic inbound to each interface and/or
outbound from each interface. Ingress filtering as described in
[RFC2827] provides one example of the use of this capability.
Warnings.
None.
2.7.4. Ability to Filter Without Significant Performance Degradation
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to filter packets without
significant performance degradation. This specifically applies to
stateless packet filtering operating on layer 3 (IP) and layer 4
(TCP or UDP) headers, as well as normal packet forwarding
information such as incoming and outgoing interfaces.
The device MUST be able to apply stateless packet filters on ALL
interfaces (up to the maximum number possible) simultaneously and
with multiple filters per interface (e.g., inbound and outbound).
Justification.
This enables the implementation of filtering wherever and whenever
needed. To the extent that filtering causes degradation, it may
not be possible to apply filters that implement the appropriate
policies.
Jones Informational [Page 38]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
Another way of stating the requirement is that filter performance
should not be the limiting factor in device throughput. If a
device is capable of forwarding 30Mb/sec without filtering, then
it should be able to forward the same amount with filtering in
place.
Warnings.
The definition of "significant" is subjective. At one end of the
spectrum it might mean "the application of filters may cause the
box to crash". At the other end would be a throughput loss of
less than one percent with tens of thousands of filters applied.
The level of performance degradation that is acceptable will have
to be determined by the operator.
Repeatable test data showing filter performance impact would be
very useful in evaluating conformance with this requirement.
Tests should include such information as packet size, packet rate,
number of interfaces tested (source/destination), types of
interfaces, routing table size, routing protocols in use,
frequency of routing updates, etc. See [bmwg-acc-bench].
This requirement does not address stateful filtering, filtering
above layer 4 headers or other more advanced types of filtering
that may be important in certain operational environments.
2.7.5. Support Route Filtering
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to filter routing updates for all
protocols used to exchange external routing information.
Justification.
See [RFC3013] and section 3.2 of [RFC2196].
Examples.
Operators may wish to ignore advertisements for routes to
addresses allocated for private internets. See eBGP.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 39]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.7.6. Ability to Specify Filter Actions
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a mechanism to allow the specification of
the action to be taken when a filter rule matches. Actions MUST
include "permit" (allow the traffic), "reject" (drop with
appropriate notification to sender), and "drop" (drop with no
notification to sender). Also see Section 2.7.7 and Section 2.9
Justification.
This capability is essential to the use of filters to enforce
policy.
Examples.
Assume that you have a small DMZ network connected to the
Internet. You want to allow management using SSH coming from your
corporate office. In this case, you might "permit" all traffic to
port 22 in the DMZ from your corporate network, "rejecting" all
others. Port 22 traffic from the corporate network is allowed
through. Port 22 traffic from all other addresses results in an
ICMP message to the sender. For those who are slightly more
paranoid, you might choose to "drop" instead of "reject" traffic
from unauthorized addresses, with the result being that *nothing*
is sent back to the source.
Warnings.
While silently dropping traffic without sending notification may
be the correct action in security terms, consideration should be
given to operational implications. See [RFC3360] for
consideration of potential problems caused by sending
inappropriate TCP Resets.
2.7.7. Ability to Log Filter Actions
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to log all filter actions. The logging
capability MUST be able to capture at least the following data:
* permit/deny/drop status,
* source and destination IP address,
* source and destination ports (if applicable to the protocol),
Jones Informational [Page 40]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
* which network element received the packet (interface, MAC
address or other layer 2 information that identifies the
previous hop source of the packet).
Logging of filter actions is subject to the requirements of
Section 2.11.
Justification.
Logging is essential for auditing, incident response, and
operations.
Examples.
A desktop network may not provide any services that should be
accessible from "outside." In such cases, all inbound connection
attempts should be logged as possible intrusion attempts.
Warnings.
None.
2.8. Packet Filtering Criteria
2.8.1. Ability to Filter on Protocols
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means to filter traffic based on the
value of the protocol field in the IP header.
Justification.
Being able to filter on protocol is necessary to allow
implementation of policy, secure operations and for support of
incident response.
Examples.
Some denial of service attacks are based on the ability to flood
the victim with ICMP traffic. One quick way (admittedly with some
negative side effects) to mitigate the effects of such attacks is
to drop all ICMP traffic headed toward the victim.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 41]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.8.2. Ability to Filter on Addresses
Requirement.
The function MUST be able to control the flow of traffic based on
source and/or destination IP address or blocks of addresses such
as Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) blocks.
Justification.
The capability to filter on addresses and address blocks is a
fundamental tool for establishing boundaries between different
networks.
Examples.
One example of the use of address based filtering is to implement
ingress filtering per [RFC2827].
Warnings.
None.
2.8.3. Ability to Filter on Protocol Header Fields
Requirement.
The filtering mechanism MUST support filtering based on the
value(s) of any portion of the protocol headers for IP, ICMP, UDP
and TCP. It SHOULD support filtering of all other protocols
supported at layer 3 and 4. It MAY support filtering based on the
headers of higher level protocols. It SHOULD be possible to
specify fields by name (e.g., "protocol = ICMP") rather than bit-
offset/length/numeric value (e.g., 72:8 = 1).
Justification.
Being able to filter on portions of the header is necessary to
allow implementation of policy, secure operations, and support
incident response.
Examples.
This requirement implies that it is possible to filter based on
TCP or UDP port numbers, TCP flags such as SYN, ACK and RST bits,
and ICMP type and code fields. One common example is to reject
"inbound" TCP connection attempts (TCP, SYN bit set+ACK bit clear
or SYN bit set+ACK,FIN and RST bits clear). Another common
Jones Informational [Page 42]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
example is the ability to control what services are allowed in/out
of a network. It may be desirable to only allow inbound
connections on port 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS) to a network hosting
web servers.
Warnings.
None.
2.8.4. Ability to Filter Inbound and Outbound
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to filter both incoming and outgoing traffic
on any interface.
Justification.
This requirement allows flexibility in applying filters at the
place that makes the most sense. It allows invalid or malicious
traffic to be dropped as close to the source as possible.
Examples.
It might be desirable on a border router, for example, to apply an
egress filter outbound on the interface that connects a site to
its external ISP to drop outbound traffic that does not have a
valid internal source address. Inbound, it might be desirable to
apply a filter that blocks all traffic from a site that is known
to forward or originate lots of junk mail.
Warnings.
None.
2.9. Packet Filtering Counter Requirements
2.9.1. Ability to Accurately Count Filter Hits
Requirement.
The device MUST supply a facility for accurately counting all
filter hits.
Jones Informational [Page 43]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Accurate counting of filter rule matches is important because it
shows the frequency of attempts to violate policy. This enables
resources to be focused on areas of greatest need.
Examples.
Assume, for example, that a ISP network implements anti-spoofing
egress filters (see [RFC2827]) on interfaces of its edge routers
that support single-homed stub networks. Counters could enable
the ISP to detect cases where large numbers of spoofed packets are
being sent. This may indicate that the customer is performing
potentially malicious actions (possibly in violation of the ISPs
Acceptable Use Policy), or that system(s) on the customers network
have been "owned" by hackers and are being (mis)used to launch
attacks.
Warnings.
None.
2.9.2. Ability to Display Filter Counters
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a mechanism to display filter counters.
Justification.
Information that is collected is not useful unless it can be
displayed in a useful manner.
Examples.
Assume there is a router with four interfaces. One is an up-link
to an ISP providing routes to the Internet. The other three
connect to separate internal networks. Assume that a host on one
of the internal networks has been compromised by a hacker and is
sending traffic with bogus source addresses. In such a situation,
it might be desirable to apply ingress filters to each of the
internal interfaces. Once the filters are in place, the counters
can be examined to determine the source (inbound interface) of the
bogus packets.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 44]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.9.3. Ability to Display Filter Counters per Rule
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a mechanism to display filter counters per
rule.
Justification.
This makes it possible to see which rules are matching and how
frequently.
Examples.
Assume that a filter has been defined that has two rules, one
permitting all SSH traffic (tcp/22) and the second dropping all
remaining traffic. If three packets are directed toward/through
the point at which the filter is applied, one to port 22, the
others to different ports, then the counter display should show 1
packet matching the permit tcp/22 rule and 2 packets matching the
deny all others rule.
Warnings.
None.
2.9.4. Ability to Display Filter Counters per Filter Application
Requirement.
If it is possible for a filter to be applied more than once at the
same time, then the device MUST provide a mechanism to display
filter counters per filter application.
Justification.
It may make sense to apply the same filter definition
simultaneously more than one time (to different interfaces, etc.).
If so, it would be much more useful to know which instance of a
filter is matching than to know that some instance was matching
somewhere.
Examples.
One way to implement this requirement would be to have the counter
display mechanism show the interface (or other entity) to which
the filter has been applied, along with the name (or other
designator) for the filter. For example if a filter named
Jones Informational [Page 45]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
"desktop_outbound" applied two different interfaces, say,
"ethernet0" and "ethernet1", the display should indicate something
like "matches of filter 'desktop_outbound' on ethernet0 ..." and
"matches of filter 'desktop_outbound' on ethernet1 ..."
Warnings.
None.
2.9.5. Ability to Reset Filter Counters
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to reset counters to zero on a per filter
basis.
For the purposes of this requirement it would be acceptable for
the system to maintain two counters: an "absolute counter",
C[now], and a "reset" counter, C[reset]. The absolute counter
would maintain counts that increase monotonically until they wrap
or overflow the counter. The reset counter would receive a copy
of the current value of the absolute counter when the reset
function was issued for that counter. Functions that display or
retrieve the counter could then display the delta (C[now] -
C[reset]).
Justification.
This allows operators to get a current picture of the traffic
matching particular rules/filters.
Examples.
Assume that filter counters are being used to detect internal
hosts that are infected with a new worm. Once it is believed that
all infected hosts have been cleaned up and the worm removed, the
next step would be to verify that. One way of doing so would be
to reset the filter counters to zero and see if traffic indicative
of the worm has ceased.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 46]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.9.6. Filter Counters Must Be Accurate
Requirement.
Filter counters MUST be accurate. They MUST reflect the actual
number of matching packets since the last counter reset. Filter
counters MUST be capable of holding up to 2^32 - 1 values without
overflowing and SHOULD be capable of holding up to 2^64 - 1
values.
Justification.
Inaccurate data can not be relied on as the basis for action.
Underreported data can conceal the magnitude of a problem.
Examples.
If N packets matching a filter are sent to/through a device, then
the counter should show N matches.
Warnings.
None.
2.10. Other Packet Filtering Requirements
2.10.1. Ability to Specify Filter Log Granularity
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to enable/disable logging on a per rule basis.
Justification.
The ability to tune the granularity of logging allows the operator
to log only the information that is desired. Without this
capability, it is possible that extra data (or none at all) would
be logged, making it more difficult to find relevant information.
Examples.
If a filter is defined that has several rules, and one of the
rules denies telnet (tcp/23) connections, then it should be
possible to specify that only matches on the rule that denies
telnet should generate a log message.
Jones Informational [Page 47]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
None.
2.11. Event Logging Requirements
2.11.1. Logging Facility Uses Protocols Subject To Open Review
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a logging facility that is based on
protocols subject to open review. See Section 1.8. Custom or
proprietary logging protocols MAY be implemented provided the same
information is made available.
Justification.
The use of logging based on protocols subject to open review
permits the operator to perform archival and analysis of logs
without relying on vendor-supplied software and servers.
Examples.
This requirement may be satisfied by the use of one or more of
syslog [RFC3164], syslog with reliable delivery [RFC3195], TACACS+
[RFC1492] or RADIUS [RFC2865].
Warnings.
While [RFC3164] meets this requirement, it has many security
issues and by itself does not meet the requirements of Section
2.1.1. See the security considerations section of [RFC3164] for
a list of issues. [RFC3195] provides solutions to most/all of
these issues....however at the time of this writing there are few
implementations. Other possible solutions might be to tunnel
syslog over a secure transport...but this often raises difficult
key management and scalability issues.
The current best solution seems to be the following:
* Implement [RFC3164].
* Consider implementing [RFC3195].
Jones Informational [Page 48]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.11.2. Logs Sent To Remote Servers
Requirement.
The device MUST support transmission of records of security
related events to one or more remote devices. There MUST be
configuration settings on the device that allow selection of
servers.
Justification.
This is important because it supports individual accountability.
It is important to store them on a separate server to preserve
them in case of failure or compromise of the managed device.
Examples.
This requirement may be satisfied by the use of one or more of:
syslog [RFC3164], syslog with reliable delivery [RFC3195], TACACS+
[RFC1492] or RADIUS [RFC2865].
Warnings.
Note that there may be privacy or legal considerations when
logging/monitoring user activity.
High volumes of logging may generate excessive network traffic
and/or compete for scarce memory and CPU resources on the device.
2.11.3. Ability to Select Reliable Delivery
Requirement.
It SHOULD be possible to select reliable delivery of log messages.
Justification.
Reliable delivery is important to the extent that log data is
depended upon to make operational decisions and forensic analysis.
Without reliable delivery, log data becomes a collection of hints.
Examples.
One example of reliable syslog delivery is defined in [RFC3195].
Syslog-ng provides another example, although the protocol has not
been standardized.
Jones Informational [Page 49]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
None.
2.11.4. Ability to Log Locally
Requirement.
It SHOULD be possible to log locally on the device itself. Local
logging SHOULD be written to non-volatile storage.
Justification.
Local logging of failed authentication attempts to non-volatile
storage is critical. It provides a means of detecting attacks
where the device is isolated from its authentication interfaces
and attacked at the console.
Local logging is important for viewing information when connected
to the device. It provides some backup of log data in case remote
logging fails. It provides a way to view logs relevant to one
device without having to sort through a possibly large set of logs
from other devices.
Examples.
One example of local logging would be a memory buffer that
receives copies of messages sent to the remote log server.
Another example might be a local syslog server (assuming the
device is capable of running syslog and has some local storage).
Warnings.
Storage on the device may be limited. High volumes of logging may
quickly fill available storage, in which case there are two
options: new logs overwrite old logs (possibly via the use of a
circular memory buffer or log file rotation), or logging stops.
2.11.5. Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time
Requirement.
The device MUST maintain accurate, "high resolution" (see
definition in Section 1.8) system time.
Jones Informational [Page 50]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Accurate time is important to the generation of reliable log data.
Accurate time is also important to the correct operation of some
authentication mechanisms.
Examples.
This requirement may be satisfied by supporting Network Time
Protocol (NTP), Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP), or via direct
connection to an accurate time source.
Warnings.
System clock chips are inaccurate to varying degrees. System time
should not be relied upon unless it is regularly checked and
synchronized with a known, accurate external time source (such as
an NTP stratum-1 server). Also note that if network time
synchronization is used, an attacker may be able to manipulate the
clock unless cryptographic authentication is used.
2.11.6. Display Timezone And UTC Offset
Requirement.
All displays and logs of system time MUST include a timezone or
offset from UTC.
Justification.
Knowing the timezone or UTC offset makes correlation of data and
coordination with data in other timezones possible.
Examples.
Bob is in Newfoundland, Canada which is UTC -3:30. Alice is
somewhere in Indiana, USA. Some parts of Indiana switch to
daylight savings time while others do not. A user on Bob's
network attacks a user on Alice's network. Both are using logs
with local timezones and no indication of UTC offset. Correlating
these logs will be difficult and error prone. Including timezone,
or better, UTC offset, eliminates these difficulties.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 51]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.11.7. Default Timezone Should Be UTC
Requirement.
The default timezone for display and logging SHOULD be UTC. The
device MAY support a mechanism to allow the operator to specify
the display and logging of times in a timezone other than UTC.
Justification.
Knowing the timezone or UTC offset makes correlation of data and
coordination with data in other timezones possible.
Examples.
Bob in Newfoundland (UTC -3:30) and Alice in Indiana (UTC -5 or
UTC -6 depending on the time of year and exact county in Indiana)
are working an incident together using their logs. Both left the
default settings, which was UTC, so there was no translation of
time necessary to correlate the logs.
Warnings.
None.
2.11.8. Logs Must Be Timestamped
Requirement.
By default, the device MUST timestamp all log messages. The
timestamp MUST be accurate to within a second or less. The
timestamp MUST include a timezone. There MAY be a mechanism to
disable the generation of timestamps.
Justification.
Accurate timestamps are necessary for correlating events,
particularly across multiple devices or with other organizations.
This applies when it is necessary to analyze logs.
Examples.
This requirement MAY be satisfied by writing timestamps into
syslog messages.
Jones Informational [Page 52]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
It is difficult to correlate logs from different time zones.
Security events on the Internet often involve machines and logs
from a variety of physical locations. For that reason, UTC is
preferred, all other things being equal.
2.11.9. Logs Contain Untranslated IP Addresses
Requirement.
Log messages MUST NOT list translated addresses (DNS names)
associated with the address without listing the untranslated IP
address where the IP address is available to the device generating
the log message.
Justification.
Including IP address of access list violations authentication
attempts, address lease assignments and similar events in logs
enables a level of individual and organizational accountability
and is necessary to enable analysis of network events, incidents,
policy violations, etc.
DNS entries tend to change more quickly than IP block assignments.
This makes the address more reliable for data forensics.
DNS lookups can be slow and consume resources.
Examples.
A failed network login should generate a record with the source
address of the login attempt.
Warnings.
* Source addresses may be spoofed. Network-based attacks often
use spoofed source addresses. Source addresses should not be
completely trusted unless verified by other means.
* Addresses may be reassigned to different individual, for
example, in a desktop environment using DHCP. In such cases
the individual accountability afforded by this requirement is
weak. Having accurate time in the logs increases the chances
that the use of an address can be correlated to an individual.
Jones Informational [Page 53]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
* Network topologies may change. Even in the absence of dynamic
address assignment, network topologies and address block
assignments do change. Logs of an attack one month ago may not
give an accurate indication of which host, network or
organization owned the system(s) in question at the time.
2.11.10. Logs Contain Records Of Security Events
Requirement.
The device MUST be able to send a record of at least the following
events:
* authentication successes,
* authentication failures,
* session Termination,
* authorization changes,
* configuration changes,
* device status changes.
The device SHOULD be able to send a record of all other security
related events.
Justification.
This is important because it supports individual accountability.
See section 4.5.4.4 of [RFC2196].
Examples.
Examples of events for which there must be a record include: user
logins, bad login attempts, logouts, user privilege level changes,
individual configuration commands issued by users and system
startup/shutdown events.
Warnings.
This list is far from complete.
Note that there may be privacy or legal considerations when
logging/monitoring user activity.
Jones Informational [Page 54]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.11.11. Logs Do Not Contain Passwords
Requirement.
Passwords SHOULD be excluded from all audit records, including
records of successful or failed authentication attempts.
Justification.
Access control and authorization requirements differ for
accounting records (logs) and authorization databases (passwords).
Logging passwords may grant unauthorized access to individuals
with access to the logs. Logging failed passwords may give hints
about actual passwords. See section 4.5.4.4 of [RFC2196].
Examples.
A user may make small mistakes in entering a password such as
using incorrect capitalization ("my password" vs. "My Password").
Warnings.
There may be situations where it is appropriate/required to log
passwords.
2.12. Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Requirements
2.12.1. Authenticate All User Access
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a facility to perform authentication of
all user access to the system.
Justification.
This functionality is required so that access to the system can be
restricted to authorized personnel.
Examples.
This requirement MAY be satisfied by implementing a centralized
authentication system. See Section 2.12.5. It MAY also be
satisfied using local authentication. See Section 2.12.6.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 55]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.12.2. Support Authentication of Individual Users
Requirement.
Mechanisms used to authenticate interactive access for
configuration and management MUST support the authentication of
distinct, individual users. This requirement MAY be relaxed to
support system installation Section 2.4.5 or recovery of
authorized access Section 2.12.15.
Justification.
The use of individual accounts, in conjunction with logging,
promotes accountability. The use of group or default accounts
undermines individual accountability.
Examples.
A user may need to log in to the device to access CLI functions
for management. Individual user authentication could be provided
by a centralized authentication server or a username/password
database stored on the device. It would be a violation of this
rule for the device to only support a single "account" (with or
without a username) and a single password shared by all users to
gain administrative access.
Warnings.
This simply requires that the mechanism to support individual
users be present. Policy (e.g., forbidding shared group accounts)
and enforcement are also needed but beyond the scope of this
document.
2.12.3. Support Simultaneous Connections
Requirement.
The device MUST support multiple simultaneous connections by
distinct users, possibly at different authorization levels.
Justification.
This allows multiple people to perform authorized management
functions simultaneously. This also means that attempted
connections by unauthorized users do not automatically lock out
authorized users.
Jones Informational [Page 56]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Examples.
None.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.4. Ability to Disable All Local Accounts
Requirement.
The device MUST provide a means of disabling all local accounts
including:
* local users,
* default accounts (vendor, maintenance, guest, etc.),
* privileged and unprivileged accounts.
A local account defined as one where all information necessary for
user authentication is stored on the device.
Justification.
Default accounts, well-known accounts, and old accounts provide
easy targets for someone attempting to gain access to a device.
It must be possible to disable them to reduce the potential
vulnerability.
Examples.
The implementation depends on the types of authentication
supported by the device.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.5. Support Centralized User Authentication Methods
Requirement.
The device MUST support a method of centralized authentication of
all user access via standard authentication protocols.
Jones Informational [Page 57]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Support for centralized authentication is particularly important
in large environments where the network devices are widely
distributed and where many people have access to them. This
reduces the effort needed to effectively restrict and track access
to the system by authorized personnel.
Examples.
This requirement can be satisfied through the use of DIAMETER
[RFC3588], TACACS+ [RFC1492], RADIUS [RFC2865], or Kerberos
[RFC1510].
The secure management requirements (Section 2.1.1) apply to AAA.
See [RFC3579] for a discussion security issues related to RADIUS.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.6. Support Local User Authentication Method
Requirement.
The device SHOULD support a local authentication method. If
implemented, the method MUST NOT require interaction with anything
external to the device (such as remote AAA servers), and MUST
work in conjunction with Section 2.3.1 (Support a 'Console'
Interface) and Section 2.12.7 (Support Configuration of Order of
Authentication Methods).
Justification.
Support for local authentication may be required in smaller
environments where there may be only a few devices and a limited
number of people with access. The overhead of maintaining
centralized authentication servers may not be justified.
Examples.
The use of local, per-device usernames and passwords provides one
way to implement this requirement.
Jones Informational [Page 58]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Warnings.
Authentication information must be protected wherever it resides.
Having, for instance, local usernames and passwords stored on 100
network devices means that there are 100 potential points of
failure where the information could be compromised vs. storing
authentication data centralized server(s), which would reduce the
potential points of failure to the number of servers and allow
protection efforts (system hardening, audits, etc.) to be focused
on, at most, a few servers.
2.12.7. Support Configuration of Order of Authentication Methods
Requirement.
The device MUST support the ability to configure the order in
which supported authentication methods are attempted.
Authentication SHOULD "fail closed", i.e., access should be denied
if none of the listed authentication methods succeeds.
Justification.
This allows the operator flexibility in implementing appropriate
security policies that balance operational and security needs.
Examples.
If, for example, a device supports RADIUS authentication and local
usernames and passwords, it should be possible to specify that
RADIUS authentication should be attempted if the servers are
available, and that local usernames and passwords should be used
for authentication only if the RADIUS servers are not available.
Similarly, it should be possible to specify that only RADIUS or
only local authentication be used.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.8. Ability To Authenticate Without Plaintext Passwords
Requirement.
The device MUST support mechanisms that do not require the
transmission of plaintext passwords in all cases that require the
transmission of authentication information across networks.
Jones Informational [Page 59]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Plaintext passwords can be easily observed using packet sniffers
on shared networks. See [RFC1704] and [RFC3631] for a through
discussion.
Examples.
Remote login requires the transmission of authentication
information across networks. Telnet transmits plaintext
passwords. SSH does not. Telnet fails this requirement. SSH
passes.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.9. No Default Passwords
Requirement.
The initial configuration of the device MUST NOT contain any
default passwords or other authentication tokens.
Justification.
Default passwords provide an easy way for attackers to gain
unauthorized access to the device.
Examples.
Passwords such as the name of the vendor, device, "default", etc.
are easily guessed. The SNMP community strings "public" and
"private" are well known defaults that provide read and write
access to devices.
Warnings.
Lists of default passwords for various devices are readily
available at numerous websites.
2.12.10. Passwords Must Be Explicitly Configured Prior To Use
Requirement.
The device MUST require the operator to explicitly configure
"passwords" prior to use.
Jones Informational [Page 60]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
This requirement is intended to prevent unauthorized management
access. Requiring the operator to explicitly configure passwords
will tend to have the effect of ensuring a diversity of passwords.
It also shifts the responsibility for password selection to the
user.
Examples.
Assume that a device comes with console port for management and a
default administrative account. This requirement together with No
Default Passwords says that the administrative account should come
with no password configured. One way of meeting this requirement
would be to have the device require the operator to choose a
password for the administrative account as part of a dialog the
first time the device is configured.
Warnings.
While this device requires operators to set passwords, it does not
prevent them from doing things such as using scripts to configure
hundreds of devices with the same easily guessed passwords.
2.12.11. Ability to Define Privilege Levels
Requirement.
It MUST be possible to define arbitrary subsets of all management
and configuration functions and assign them to groups or
"privilege levels", which can be assigned to users per Section
2.12.12. There MUST be at least three possible privilege levels.
Justification.
This requirement supports the implementation of the principal of
"least privilege", which states that an individual should only
have the privileges necessary to execute the operations he/she is
required to perform.
Examples.
Examples of privilege levels might include "user" which only
allows the initiation of a PPP or telnet session, "read only",
which allows read-only access to device configuration and
operational statistics, "root/superuser/administrator" which
allows update access to all configurable parameters, and
"operator" which allows updates to a limited, user defined set of
Jones Informational [Page 61]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
parameters. Note that privilege levels may be defined locally on
the device or on centralized authentication servers.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.12. Ability to Assign Privilege Levels to Users
Requirement.
The device MUST be able to assign a defined set of authorized
functions, or "privilege level", to each user once they have
authenticated themselves to the device. Privilege level
determines which functions a user is allowed to execute. Also see
Section 2.12.11.
Justification.
This requirement supports the implementation of the principal of
"least privilege", which states that an individual should only
have the privileges necessary to execute the operations he/she is
required to perform.
Examples.
The implementation of this requirement will obviously be closely
coupled with the authentication mechanism. If RADIUS is used, an
attribute could be set in the user's RADIUS profile that can be
used to map the ID to a certain privilege level.
Warnings.
None.
2.12.13. Default Privilege Level Must Be 'None'
Requirement.
The default privilege level SHOULD NOT allow any access to
management or configuration functions. It MAY allow access to
user-level functions (e.g., starting PPP or telnet). It SHOULD be
possible to assign a different privilege level as the default.
This requirement MAY be relaxed to support system installation per
Section 2.4.5 or recovery of authorized access per Section
2.12.15.
Jones Informational [Page 62]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
This requirement supports the implementation of the principal of
"least privilege", which states that an individual should only
have the privileges necessary to execute the operations he/she is
required to perform.
Examples.
Examples of privilege levels might include "user" which only
allows the initiation of a PPP or telnet session, "read-only",
which allows read-only access to device configuration and
operational statistics, "root/superuser/administrator" which
allows update access to all configurable parameters, and
"operator" which allows updates to a limited, user defined set of
parameters. Note that privilege levels may be defined locally on
the device or on centralized authentication servers.
Warnings.
It may be required to provide exceptions to support the
requirements to support recovery of privileged access (Section
2.12.15) and to support OS installation and configuration (Section
2.4.5). For example, if the OS and/or configuration has somehow
become corrupt an authorized individual with physical access may
need to have "root" level access to perform an install.
2.12.14. Change in Privilege Levels Requires Re-Authentication
Requirement.
The device MUST re-authenticate a user prior to granting any
change in user authorizations.
Justification.
This requirement ensures that users are able to perform only
authorized actions.
Examples.
This requirement might be implemented by assigning base privilege
levels to all users and allowing the user to request additional
privileges, with the requests validated by the AAA server.
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 63]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.12.15. Support Recovery Of Privileged Access
Requirement.
The device MUST support a mechanism to allow authorized
individuals to recover full privileged administrative access in
the event that access is lost. Use of the mechanism MUST require
physical access to the device. There MAY be a mechanism for
disabling the recovery feature.
Justification.
There are times when local administrative passwords are forgotten,
when the only person who knows them leaves the company, or when
hackers set or change the password. In all these cases,
legitimate administrative access to the device is lost. There
should be a way to recover access. Requiring physical access to
invoke the procedure makes it less likely that it will be abused.
Some organizations may want an even higher level of security and
be willing to risk total loss of authorized access by disabling
the recovery feature, even for those with physical access.
Examples.
Some examples of ways to satisfy this requirement are to have the
device give the user the chance to set a new administrative
password when:
* The user sets a jumper on the system board to a particular
position.
* The user sends a special sequence to the RS232 console port
during the initial boot sequence.
* The user sets a "boot register" to a particular value.
Warnings.
This mechanism, by design, provides a "back door" to complete
administrative control of the device and may not be appropriate
for environments where those with physical access to the device
can not be trusted.
Also see the warnings in Section 2.3.1 (Support a 'Console'
Interface).
Jones Informational [Page 64]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
2.13. Layer 2 Devices Must Meet Higher Layer Requirements
Requirement.
If a device provides layer 2 services that are dependent on layer
3 or greater services, then the portions that operate at or above
layer 3 MUST conform to the requirements listed in this document.
Justification.
All layer 3 devices have similar security needs and should be
subject to similar requirements.
Examples.
Signaling protocols required for layer 2 switching may exchange
information with other devices using layer 3 communications. In
such cases, the device must provide a secure layer 3 facility.
Also, if higher layer capabilities (say, SSH or SNMP) are used to
manage a layer 2 device, then the rest of the requirements in this
document apply to those capabilities.
Warnings.
None.
2.14. Security Features Must Not Cause Operational Problems
Requirement.
The use of security features specified by the requirements in this
document SHOULD NOT cause severe operational problems.
Justification.
Security features which cause operational problems are not useful
and may leave the operator with no mechanism for enforcing
appropriate policy.
Examples.
Some examples of severe operational problems include:
* The device crashes.
* The device becomes unmanageable.
* Data is lost.
Jones Informational [Page 65]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
* Use of the security feature consumes excessive resources (CPU,
memory, bandwidth).
Warnings.
Determination of compliance with this requirement involves a level
of judgement. What is "severe"? Certainly crashing is severe,
but what about a %5 loss in throughput when logging is enabled?
It should also be noted that there may be unavoidable physical
limitations such as the total capacity of a link.
2.15. Security Features Should Have Minimal Performance Impact
Requirement.
Security features specified by the requirements in this document
SHOULD be implemented with minimal impact on performance. Other
sections of this document may specify different performance
requirements (e.g., "MUST"s).
Justification.
Security features which significantly impact performance may leave
the operator with no mechanism for enforcing appropriate policy.
Examples.
If the application of filters is known to have the potential to
significantly reduce throughput for non-filtered traffic, there
will be a tendency, or in some cases a policy, not to use filters.
Assume, for example, that a new worm is released that scans random
IP addresses looking for services listening on TCP port 1433. An
operator might want to investigate to see if any of the hosts on
their networks were infected and trying to spread the worm. One
way to do this would be to put up non-blocking filters counting
and logging the number of outbound connection 1433, and then to
block the requests that are determined to be from infected hosts.
If any of these capabilities (filtering, counting, logging) have
the potential to impose severe performance penalties, then this
otherwise rational course of action might not be possible.
Warnings.
Requirements for which performance is a particular concern
include: filtering, rate-limiting, counters, logging and anti-
spoofing.
Jones Informational [Page 66]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
3. Documentation Requirements
The requirements in this section are intended to list information
that will assist operators in evaluating and securely operating a
device.
3.1. Identify Services That May Be Listening
Requirement.
The vendor MUST provide a list of all services that may be active
on the device. The list MUST identify the protocols and default
ports (if applicable) on which the services listen. It SHOULD
provide references to complete documentation describing the
service.
Justification.
This information is necessary to enable a thorough assessment of
the potential security risks associated with the operation of each
service.
Examples.
The list will likely contain network and transport protocols such
as IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP, routing protocols such as BGP and OSPF,
application protocols such as SSH and SNMP along with references
to the RFCs or other documentation describing the versions of the
protocols implemented.
Web servers "usually" listen on port 80. In the default
configuration of the device, it may have a web server listening on
port 8080. In the context of this requirement "identify ...
default port" would mean "port 8080".
Warnings.
There may be valid, non-technical reasons for not disclosing the
specifications of proprietary protocols. In such cases, all that
needs to be disclosed is the existence of the service and the
default ports (if applicable).
3.2. Document Service Defaults
Requirement.
The vendor MUST provide a list of the default state of all
services.
Jones Informational [Page 67]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Understanding risk requires understanding exposure. Each service
that is enabled presents a certain level of exposure. Having a
list of the services that is enabled by default makes it possible
to perform meaningful risk analysis.
Examples.
The list may be no more than the output of a command that
implements Section 2.5.1.
Warnings.
None.
3.3. Document Service Activation Process
Requirement.
The vendor MUST concisely document which features enable and
disable services.
Justification.
Once risk has been assessed, this list provides the operator a
quick means of understanding how to disable (or enable) undesired
(or desired) services.
Examples.
This may be a list of commands to enable/disable services one by
one or a single command which enables/disables "standard" groups
of commands.
Warnings.
None.
3.4. Document Command Line Interface
Requirement.
The vendor MUST provide complete documentation of the command line
interface with each software release. The documentation SHOULD
include highlights of changes from previous versions. The
documentation SHOULD list potential output for each command.
Jones Informational [Page 68]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Justification.
Understanding of inputs and outputs is necessary to support
scripting. See Section 2.4.2.
Examples.
Separate documentation should be provided for each command listing
the syntax, parameters, options, etc. as well as expected output
(status, tables, etc.).
Warnings.
None.
3.5. 'Console' Default Communication Profile Documented
Requirement.
The console default profile of communications parameters MUST be
published in the system documentation.
Justification.
Publication in the system documentation makes the settings
accessible. Failure to publish them could leave the operator
having to guess.
Examples.
None.
Warnings.
None.
4. Assurance Requirements
The requirements in this section are intended to
o identify behaviors and information that will increase confidence
that the device will meet the security functional requirements.
o Provide information that will assist in the performance of
security evaluations.
Jones Informational [Page 69]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
4.1. Identify Origin of IP Stack
Requirement.
The vendor SHOULD disclose the origin or basis of the IP stack
used on the system.
Justification.
This information is required to better understand the possible
security vulnerabilities that may be inherent in the IP stack.
Examples.
"The IP stack was derived from BSD 4.4", or "The IP stack was
implemented from scratch."
Warnings.
Many IP stacks make simplifying assumptions about how an IP packet
should be formed. A malformed packet can cause unexpected
behavior in the device, such as a system crash or buffer overflow
which could result in unauthorized access to the system.
4.2. Identify Origin of Operating System
Requirement.
The vendor SHOULD disclose the origin or basis of the operating
system (OS).
Justification.
This information is required to better understand the security
vulnerabilities that may be inherent to the OS based on its
origin.
Examples.
"The operating system is based on Linux kernel 2.4.18."
Warnings.
None.
Jones Informational [Page 70]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
5. Security Considerations
General
Security is the subject matter of this entire memo. The
justification section of each individual requirement lists the
security implications of meeting or not meeting the requirement.
SNMP
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the
objects in the MIB.
It is recommended that implementors consider the security features
as provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410], section 8),
including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms
(for authentication and privacy).
Furthermore, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to MIB
objects is properly configured to give access to the objects only
to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to indeed
GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[ANSI.X9-52.1998] American National Standards Institute, "Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", ANSI
X9.52, 1998.
[FIPS.197] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Advanced Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 197,
November 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
fips-197.ps>.
[PKCS.3.1993] RSA Laboratories, "Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement
Standard, Version 1.4", PKCS 3, November 1993.
[RFC1208] Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "Glossary of networking
terms", RFC 1208, March 1991.
Jones Informational [Page 71]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC
1321, April 1992.
[RFC1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes
Called TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993.
[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September
1993.
[RFC1704] Haller, N. and R. Atkinson, "On Internet
Authentication", RFC 1704, October 1994.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4
Routers", RFC 1812, June 1995.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de
Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for
Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process --
Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC
2196, September 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the
TCP MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture
for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November
1998.
[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Method", RFC 2631, June 1999.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress
Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks
which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38,
RFC 2827, May 2000.
Jones Informational [Page 72]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W.
Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC3013] Killalea, T., "Recommended Internet Service
Provider Security Services and Procedures", BCP 46,
RFC 3013, November 2000.
[RFC3164] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", RFC 3164,
August 2001.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash
Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC3195] New, D. and M. Rose, "Reliable Delivery for
syslog", RFC 3195, November 2001.
[RFC3309] Stone, J., Stewart, R. and D. Otis, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", RFC
3309, September 2002.
[RFC3330] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330,
September 2002.
[RFC3360] Floyd, S., "Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered
Harmful", BCP 60, RFC 3360, August 2002.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D. and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for
Internet-Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
December 2002.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks",
STD 62, RFC 3411, December 2002.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February
2003.
[RFC3562] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the
TCP MD5 Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.
Jones Informational [Page 73]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3579, September 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G.,
and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3631] Bellovin, S., Schiller, J., and C. Kaufman, Eds.,
"Security Mechanisms for the Internet", RFC 3631,
December 2003.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths
For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric
Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766, April 2004.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for
Multihomed Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
[bmwg-acc-bench] Poretsky, S., "Framework for Accelerated Stress
Benchmarking", Work in Progress, October 2003.
[Schneier] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Ed.,
Publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc.", 1996.
Jones Informational [Page 74]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Appendix A. Requirement Profiles
This Appendix lists different profiles. A profile is a list of list
of requirements that apply to a particular class of devices. The
minimum requirements profile applies to all devices.
A.1. Minimum Requirements Profile
The functionality listed here represents a minimum set of
requirements to which managed infrastructure of large IP networks
should adhere.
The minimal requirements profile addresses functionality which will
provide reasonable capabilities to manage the devices in the event of
attacks, simplify troubleshooting, keep track of events which affect
system integrity, help analyze causes of attacks, as well as provide
administrators control over IP addresses and protocols to help
mitigate the most common attacks and exploits.
o Support Secure Channels For Management
o Use Protocols Subject To Open Review For Management
o Use Cryptographic Algorithms Subject To Open Review
o Use Strong Cryptography
o Allow Selection of Cryptographic Parameters
o Management Functions Should Have Increased Priority
o Support a 'Console' Interface
o 'Console' Communication Profile Must Support Reset
o 'Console' Default Communication Profile Documented
o 'Console' Requires Minimal Functionality of Attached Devices.
o Support Separate Management Plane IP Interfaces
o No Forwarding Between Management Plane And Other Interfaces
o 'CLI' Provides Access to All Configuration and Management
Functions
o 'CLI' Supports Scripting of Configuration
Jones Informational [Page 75]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o 'CLI' Supports Management Over 'Slow' Links
o Document Command Line Interface
o Support Software Installation
o Support Remote Configuration Backup
o Support Remote Configuration Restore
o Support Text Configuration Files
o Ability to Identify All Listening Services
o Ability to Disable Any and All Services
o Ability to Control Service Bindings for Listening Services
o Ability to Control Service Source Addresses
o Ability to Filter Traffic
o Ability to Filter Traffic TO the Device
o Support Route Filtering
o Ability to Specify Filter Actions
o Ability to Log Filter Actions
o Ability to Filter Without Significant Performance Degradation
o Ability to Specify Filter Log Granularity
o Ability to Filter on Protocols
o Ability to Filter on Addresses
o Ability to Filter on Protocol Header Fields
o Ability to Filter Inbound and Outbound
o Packet Filtering Counter Requirements
o Ability to Display Filter Counters
o Ability to Display Filter Counters per Rule
Jones Informational [Page 76]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o Ability to Display Filter Counters per Filter Application
o Ability to Reset Filter Counters
o Filter Counters Must Be Accurate
o Logging Facility Uses Protocols Subject To Open Review
o Logs Sent To Remote Servers
o Ability to Log Locally
o Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time
o Display Timezone And UTC Offset
o Default Timezone Should Be UTC
o Logs Must Be Timestamped
o Logs Contain Untranslated IP Addresses
o Logs Contain Records Of Security Events
o Authenticate All User Access
o Support Authentication of Individual Users
o Support Simultaneous Connections
o Ability to Disable All Local Accounts
o Support Centralized User Authentication Methods
o Support Local User Authentication Method
o Support Configuration of Order of Authentication Methods
o Ability To Authenticate Without Plaintext Passwords
o Passwords Must Be Explicitly Configured Prior To Use
o No Default Passwords
o Ability to Define Privilege Levels
o Ability to Assign Privilege Levels to Users
Jones Informational [Page 77]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o Default Privilege Level Must Be 'None'
o Change in Privilege Levels Requires Re-Authentication
o Support Recovery Of Privileged Access
o Logs Do Not Contain Passwords
o Security Features Must Not Cause Operational Problems
o Security Features Should Have Minimal Performance Impact
o Identify Services That May Be Listening
o Document Service Defaults
o Document Service Activation Process
o Identify Origin of IP Stack
o Identify Origin of Operating System
o Identify Origin of IP Stack
o Identify Origin of Operating System
o Layer 2 Devices Must Meet Higher Layer Requirements
A.2. Layer 3 Network Edge Profile
This section builds on the minimal requirements listed in A.1 and
adds more stringent security functionality specific to layer 3
devices which are part of the network edge. The network edge is
typically where much of the filtering and traffic control policies
are implemented.
An edge device is defined as a device that makes up the network
infrastructure and connects directly to customers or peers. This
would include routers connected to peering points, switches
connecting customer hosts, etc.
o Support Automatic Anti-spoofing for Single-Homed Networks
o Support Automatic Discarding Of Bogons and Martians
o Support Counters For Dropped Packets
o Support Rate Limiting
Jones Informational [Page 78]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o Support Directional Application Of Rate Limiting Per Interface
o Support Rate Limiting Based on State
o Ability to Filter Traffic THROUGH the Device
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
This document grew out of an internal security requirements document
used by UUNET for testing devices that were being proposed for
connection to the backbone.
The editor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of:
o Greg Sayadian, author of a predecessor of this document.
o Eric Brandwine, a major source of ideas/critiques.
o The MITRE Corporation for supporting continued development of this
document. NOTE: The editor's affiliation with The MITRE
Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is
not intended to convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or
support for, the positions, opinions or viewpoints expressed by
the editor.
o The former UUNET network security team: Jared Allison, Eric
Brandwine, Clarissa Cook, Dave Garn, Tae Kim, Kent King, Neil
Kirr, Mark Krause, Michael Lamoureux, Maureen Lee, Todd MacDermid,
Chris Morrow, Alan Pitts, Greg Sayadian, Bruce Snow, Robert Stone,
Anne Williams, Pete White.
o Others who have provided significant feedback at various stages of
the life of this document are: Ran Atkinson, Fred Baker, Steve
Bellovin, David L. Black, Michael H. Behringer, Matt Bishop, Scott
Blake, Randy Bush, Pat Cain, Ross Callon, Steven Christey, Owen
Delong, Sean Donelan, Robert Elmore, Barbara Fraser, Barry Greene,
Jeffrey Haas, David Harrington, Dan Hollis, Jeffrey Hutzelman,
Merike Kaeo, James Ko, John Kristoff, Chris Lonvick, Chris
Liljenstolpe, James W. Laferriere, Jared Mauch, Perry E. Metzger,
Mike O'Connor, Alan Paller, Rob Pickering, Pekka Savola, Gregg
Schudel, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Don Smith, Rodney Thayer, David
Walters, Joel N. Weber II, Russ White, Anthony Williams, Neal
Ziring.
o Madge B. Harrison and Patricia L. Jones, technical writing review.
o This listing is intended to acknowledge contributions, not to
imply that the individual or organizations approve the content of
this document.
Jones Informational [Page 79]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
o Apologies to those who commented on/contributed to the document
and were not listed.
Author's Address
George M. Jones, Editor
The MITRE Corporation
7515 Colshire Drive, M/S WEST
McLean, Virginia 22102-7508
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 703 488 9740
EMail: gmj3871@pobox.com
Jones Informational [Page 80]
RFC 3871 Operational Security Requirements September 2004
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Jones Informational [Page 81]