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Subject:      File: "V101 1" being sent to you
To: "Gary F. Tom" <sun!portal!cup.portal.com!garyt>

Subject: Virus 101 - Chapter 1
From: woodside@ttidca.TTI.COM (George Woodside)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.atari.st,comp.sys.apple,comp.sys.mac,comp.sys.ibm.pc
Date: 1 Mar 89 14:39:58 GMT
Organization: Citicorp/TTI, Santa Monica

Preface: The program VKILLER is specific to the ATARI ST. My apologies for
not making this clear in the previous posting, which went to several
newsgroups. I have recieved far too many requests for the program from users
of other systems to reply to each one individually, and the mailer has
bounced some of the replies I tried to send. If you have an Atari, VKILLER
was posted here a few weeks ago, and is available in the archives, on GEnie,
Compuserve, and from most public domain disk distributors and User Group
libraries. The current version is 2.01.

Initial postings will cover virus fundamentals, as they apply to the area of
the Atari ST and, similarly, to MS-DOS systems. The file systems of the two
machines are nearly identical. These general information articles will be
cross-posted to the newsgroups in which this topic is now active. Future
postings will be made only to the Atari newsgroup, since they will deal with
viruses (the plural, according to Webster's, is viruses) known to exist in
the ST world.  They would automatically be different than an IBM virus,
since they are in the 68000 instruction set, or from a Mac or Amiga virus,
since the file systems differ. Since all the viruses I have located are the
"BOOT SECTOR" type (far and away the most common), that's what I will dwell
upon. If and when the proposed newsgroup comp.virus becomes active, it will
be added to the list for all postings.

Your generic disclaimer: I just an old-school computer hacker, with 20 years
in the software business. I built my first IMSAI many years ago, and have
had several different computers. That qualifies me to have spent a lot of
time on computers, but nothing further. I may be wrong about some things,
may have a different opinion than you or anybody else, or most anything else
you'd care to have disclaimed. What I think is my own opinion, and in no way
represents the opinion or position of my employer or anyone else. I've
written several articles for magazines as well as software related to virus
detection and killing, but I have been known to be wrong (so they tell me
:^)).

While posting any kind of information about viruses may trigger someone to
attempt creating one, I believe that the benefit of the knowledge to
potential victims outweighs that risk. I don't believe that you can stop
someone (who wishes to) from creating a virus by withholding information -
it is already available from many sources.  Since not all viruses act the
same, or attempt to attack in the same manner, it may help potential (or
current) victims to learn about the symptoms of the viruses known to exist,
and how to protect themselves.

While the concept of viruses can be complex, I'll try to keep things at a
level that should be understandable by most anyone past the casual user
genre. However, since I've been at this sort of thing for some time, what I
consider basic knowledge may not be familiar to everyone. Advance apologies
are offered here for any invalid assumptions, typos, smart alec remarks,
grammatic errors, or whatever offends you.

Some basic terms, as they have come to be used in this area:

A VIRUS is any program which spreads itself secretly. It may be destructive,
a prank, or even intended to be helpful, but it spreads.

A TROJAN HORSE is a program which executes one function secretly while
appearing to be accomplishing some other task, or appearing to be some other
program entirely. One task a Trojan Horse may accomplish is to install a
virus, which would then spread itself.

A WORM is a program or function which imbeds itself inside another program,
be it an application, part of a system, a library or whatever. It may or may
not spread itself by some means, and may or may not have destructive
intents.

Now, to the basics of a disk (specifically floppies, but true of most hard
disks as well):

A DIRECTORY is a list of files and sub-directories. There is one primary
directory (called the root directory) on a disk. It contains the entries for
files, and other directories (called sub-directories, or folders on the
Atari). Sub-directories (folders) may contain entries of other
sub-directories, files, or both. Every file has one entry in the disk
directory (or in some sub-directory). That entry contains, among other
things, the file name, date and time of creation, length, and the address of
the first entry in the File Allocation Table (FAT) for the file.

A FAT is a File Allocation Table. It is a road map of how the operating
system will locate data on a disk. Essentially, it is a series of pointers.
The directory entry of a file points to the first FAT entry of that file.
That entry points to the next, and so on, until the last entry, which
contains a special value indicating end of file. There are two copies of the
FAT on the disk, since it is absolutely critical. Lose the FAT, and the data
on the disk becomes un-accessable.

A BOOT SECTOR is the first sector on a floppy disk. With the Atari (and
MS-DOS) system, it contains configuration information about the disk. That
information includes how many tracks are on the disk, how many sectors per
track, how many sides on the disk, how big the FATs and directories are,
where the data begins, etc. On the MS-DOS systems, the boot sector contains
the ID of the operating system under which it was formatted. On the Atari,
that value is not used, but replaced (in part) by a number. That number
should be different on every disk, and is used as part of the mechanism by
which disk changes are detected. The boot sector may or may not contain
executable code.  If it does contain executable code, it is normally
executed only at system powerup or system reset time.

On all such disks, the boot sector is number 0, the first sector on the
first side of the first track. On a standard format Atari disk, the next
five sectors are the first copy of the FAT, the next five sectors are the
second copy of the FAT, the next seven sectors are the root directory, and
the remainder of the disk is available for data.

Now, on with the show:

Floppy disks are changed on a regular basis while the computer is being
used. More so on systems with no hard disks, but periodically on most all
systems. This event, referred to as a "Media Change", is detected by the
computer's disk drive. The disk door is opened, the status of the write
protection changes as one disk is removed and another is inserted, etc. When
that happens, the operating system must recognize that the disk has been
changed before attempting to read or write to the new disk. The operating
system reads the disk's boot sector to learn about the newly inserted disk.
That instant, when the operating system checks the new disk, is when nearly
all the boot sector viruses spread. We'll get to that in the next chapter,
but first, a more primary question:

How did the virus get in there?

When a computer is booted up from a power off state, or reset (in most
cases), it starts executing code from internal ROMs. Those ROMs set up
primary vectors, minimal configuration information, and perform some
fundamental tests. Then they start moving into uncharted waters. They have
to find out what devices are attached, and get them into operating status.
They also have to provide a means of expanding their own capabilities to
support new devices, functions, and whatever else which may not have existed
when the ROMs were created. One of the means by which this is accomplished
is by checking various addresses for special codes, magic numbers, or any
kind of response to a read or write. Another function which may be enabled
is checking the boot sector on an inserted floppy disk for executable
status. If that boot sector has executable status, the code contained in the
boot sector is executed. That code may cause other portions of the disk to
be loaded and executed, set variables or vectors, or nearly anything
imaginable.  That includes infecting the system with a virus, if that's what
the boot sector code contains. Executable status may be via a special flag
value in a reserved address, but it is normally determined by adding up the
value of all the data bytes in the boot sector. If the total derived (called
a checksum) is a specific value (a "magic" number), then the boot sector is
deemed executable. The code is usually executed at that time. The code is
not normally garanteed to be loaded at any specific address in memory, so it
must be "position independant", or capable of executing no matter where it
exists in memory.

The boot sector is of limited size, normally 512 bytes. While that is enough
for a small program, it may not be enough for whatever task it is designed
to accomplish. So, part of what the code in the boot sector accomplishes
must be to load the rest of the code it needs to get the job done.  This may
be a normal data file, or hard coded to some other part of the disk.

If the code from the boot sector is designed only to accomplish some task,
it will normally take the steps to do so, then return to the operating
system. This may be setting the screen resolution or colors, issuing an
initialization command to some device, or setting up some option or feature.
If the code is designed to remain available after the initial execution
(such as part of a device driver), it must inform the operating system that
it wishes to remain resident. The operating system then alters the amount of
RAM available to protect the space occupied by the loaded code, so that
subsequent programs do not tamper with the loaded routine. Such a routine is
referred to as a "Terminate and Stay Resident" routine, or a TSR. Viruses
must be TSR type programs. They have to remain in the system, and active, to
be able to accomplish their spread, and eventually, their true goal. If the
boot sector program was designed to attack immediately, it may accomplish
its destruction, but it would never get the opportunity to spread, and the
disk which caused the attack would be easily identifiable.

Most viruses accomplish system infection by taking over a "vector". A vector
is a specific address in system memory which contains the address of a
routine or function. When an interrupt (such as pressing a key, the clock
ticking, or so on) occurs, processing is suspended, and the system loads the
address in some vector associated with that event. It executes the routine
at the address which was stored in the vector, then resumes whatever it was
up to when the interrupt occurred. Other vectors are not associated with
interrupts, but with specific functions, such as display a character on the
screen, read a sector from the disk, write to the printer, and so on.

To take over a vector, the steps are fairly simple. A RAMdisk, for example,
will usually take over a disk read/write vector. When it installs itself, it
removes the current address from the vector assigned to the disk read/write
function. It saves that address in it's own code, and places the address of
it's own code in the vector.  When a disk read/write call is made by the
operating system, the operating system loads the address found in the proper
vector, and starts executing the code found at that address. That address now
points to the executable code of the RAMdisk. The first thing the RAMdisk
does is check the function call's parameters to see if the read/write is for
the RAMdisk. If it is, the RAMdisk accomplishes the read or write, and
returns to the operating system. If the read/write is for some other disk
drive, the RAMdisk code passes the call on to the address it removed from
the vector, allowing the assigned device to accomplish the task.

There may be more than one alteratiion of the vector. Each new routine which
is installed will save the old vector, and insert itself. That means that
the routine installed last will get the first access to any call which uses
that vector. If it does not want the call, it passes the call on to the
address it found in the vector, and so on. The significance of this
sequencing is that a boot sector virus, if present, will be one of the first
"vector snatchers" to get installed.  Conversely, it will be one of the last
routines in the sequence to get executed when a vector is accessed.

If the vector in question happens to be for floppy disk I/O, the virus will
be one of the last vectors before the real physical read/write routine. So,
if a program designed to detect a virus's floppy disk I/O calls is executed
as part of a startup procedure, it can easily be fooled. The detect program
will see only normal system I/O calls passing through the vector. The virus
resides in the vector list after the anti-virus program, so the anti-virus
will never see any activity generated by the virus. The anti-virus thinks
that things are progressing well, while, in reality, the virus is either
spreading or doing damage behind the anti-virus's back.

If the anti-virus gets installed first (say, by being in a boot sector
itself), it has a better chance of offering protection, but not an absolute
one. Some viruses check things like ROM version numbers, and know the
absolute addresses in the ROMs of the functions they want. By using those
addresses, they can bypass subsequent links in the vector list, and still do
their dirty work. They can also refuse to install themselves if the
addresses or version numbers do not correspond to the environment they want.

End of Chapter 1.
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