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November 1990
SELECTED SUPREME COURT CASES:
1989-1990 TERM
By
William U. McCormack
Special Agent & Legal Instructor
FBI Academy
During its 1989-1990 term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on
several cases that are of particular interest to law
enforcement. Specifically, the Court decided cases involving
the fourth amendment that clarified the scope of a protective
sweep, ruled that inadvertence is not a requirement of a plain
view seizure, and upheld the validity of a highway checkpoint
designed to deter drunk driving. In other fourth amendment
cases, the Court found that a search based on a police officer's
reasonable belief in the apparent authority of a person to
consent to the search is valid, ruled that an overnight guest in
a residence has an expectation of privacy in that residence, and
held that the fourth amendment does not apply to a search in a
foreign country of the home of a foreign national being tried in
the United States.
In the fifth amendment area, the Court ruled that an
incarcerated inmate's incriminating statements to an undercover
police officer were admissible at trial, despite the lack of
Miranda warnings, and that an illegal warrantless arrest of a
suspect in his home does not require the suppression of an
incriminating statement given by the suspect outside his home.
The Court also decided cases involving first and sixth amendment
issues, which upheld the criminal prosecution of child
pornographers and the admission into evidence of child abuse
victim-witness testimony in child abuse trials using a one-way,
closed-circuit television system.
These and other cases of particular interest to law
enforcement officers are summarized below.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990)
In Buie the Court ruled that police may conduct a
protective sweep of closets and adjoining spaces of a home after
an arrest in the home without any reason or suspicion to believe
others are present who pose a threat. Also, according to this
decision, police may conduct a protective sweep of other rooms
or spaces in the home if they have reasonable suspicion someone
is present who poses a threat.
In the case, two men committed an armed robbery, one of
whom was wearing a red running suit. Police obtained an arrest
warrant for the defendant charging him with the robbery and went
to his house to arrest him. Once inside the house, the police
fanned out through the first and second floors, while one
officer covered the basement. The officer covering the basement
twice shouted into the basement ordering anyone down there to
come up. After the defendant eventually answered, he emerged
from the basement and was arrested. Thereafter, another officer
went down into the basement to see if there was anyone else
there. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running
suit in plain view, which he seized. The Maryland trial court
admitted the running suit into evidence, but the Court of
Appeals of Maryland overturned that ruling, concluding that the
police needed probable cause to believe there was someone posing
a danger before they could lawfully enter the basement. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
The Court ruled first that incident to an in-home arrest,
the police may look in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that anyone is in those spaces. Beyond the
adjoining spaces, however, the Court ruled that there must be
articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent police
officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. In
addition, the Court noted that the sweep may only be a cursory
inspection and may last no longer than it takes to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger.
Horton v. California, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990)
In Horton the Court ruled that the fourth amendment does
not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view,
even though the discovery of the evidence is not inadvertent.
In the case, the defendant became a suspect in an armed
robbery of a coin dealer. The police obtained a warrant to
search only for the proceeds of the robbery, despite also having
probable cause to search for weapons used during the robbery.
During the course of the search, the police seized weapons
located in plain view, which they believed were used during the
robbery. The trial court refused to suppress the weapons seized
in plain view, even though their discovery was not inadvertent.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision.
The Court stated that a plain view seizure of evidence only
serves to supplement a prior legitimate reason for being in a
particular location, and police have little or no reason to
intentionally omit items from a search warrant when they have
probable cause to believe the items are in a particular
location. Thus, inadvertence is not a requirement of a plain
view seizure.
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481
(1990)
In Sitz the Court ruled that the fourth amendment does not
forbid the initial stop and brief detention of all motorists
passing through a highway checkpoint established to detect and
deter drunk driving.
In the case, the Michigan State Police established a
sobriety checkpoint program in which all vehicles passing
through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly
examined for signs of intoxication. Sitz and others filed a
lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential
subjection to the checkpoints, and the Michigan courts held that
the program violated the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court
reversed.
The Court stated that the balancing analysis appropriate
for determining the legality of highway checkpoints should
consider the magnitude of the drunk driving problem and the
slight intrusion on motorists caused by such checkpoints.
Balancing these factors with the fact the checkpoints reasonably
advanced Michigan's interest in preventing drunk driving, the
Court held that the checkpoints were consistent with the fourth
amendment.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990)
In Rodriguez the Court ruled that a warrantless entry into
a residence based upon the consent of a third party is legal if
police, at the time of entry, reasonably believe that the third
party possesses common authority over the premises, even if the
third party in fact does not.
In the case, a woman advised police that she was severely
beaten by the defendant earlier that day in an apartment where
the defendant was then sleeping. During her conversation with
police, she referred to the apartment as "our" apartment and
said that she had clothes and furniture there. She consented to
travel to the apartment with police and unlock the door with her
key so the defendant could be arrested. Based on her consent,
police entered the apartment without an arrest or search warrant
and observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view and
arrested the defendant. The trial court concluded that this
woman did not have common authority over the apartment and
suppressed the drug evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and ruled that for consent
searches to be reasonable, the authority of a person to consent
to a search must be judged against an objective standard; that
is, would the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the consent cause someone of reasonable caution to believe that
the consenting party had authority over the premises. The Court
remanded the case to determine if, at the time of the entry, the
officers had established facts supporting a reasonable belief
that the woman had authority to consent.
Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990)
In Olson the Court ruled that overnight guests in a
residence have an expectation of privacy and are protected by
the fourth amendment against warrantless police intrusions into
that residence.
In the case, police had identified the defendant as a
suspect in an armed robbery and received a telephone call from a
woman who stated that he had been involved in the robbery and
was planning to leave town. The woman called again and told
police that the defendant had told two other women who resided
at a particular address about his participation in the armed
robbery. The police went to that residence and determined that
the two women lived in the upper unit. Another woman who
resided in the lower unit told police the defendant had been
staying in the upper unit, and she promised to call police when
he returned. The defendant was arrested in the residence
without a warrant. An hour later, at police headquarters, he
provided an inculpatory statement that the Minnesota courts
ruled inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court found that the defendant's status as an overnight
guest in another's home was, standing alone, enough to show he
had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable. Moreover, the warrantless
entry to arrest was not justified by exigent circumstances
because, as the State court correctly noted, even though the
crime was serious, the residence was surrounded by police, there
was no suggestion that others in the dwelling were in danger,
and it was evident that the defendant was going nowhere.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990)
In Verdugo-Urquidez the Court ruled that the fourth
amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by U. S.
agents of property owned by a nonresident alien which is located
in a foreign country.
In the case, the defendant, a resident and citizen of
Mexico, was arrested on drug charges by U.S. Marshals, after
which DEA agents and Mexican police conducted searches of his
residences in Mexico. Certain documents that were seized in
those searches were suppressed at the defendant's trial in U.S.
district court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first looked at the text of the fourth amendment
and concluded that its reach extends only to "the people."
The Court then determined that "the people" is a term of art
employed in the Constitution to mean persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with the United States to be considered part of that
community. The Court found that the defendant did not have any
substantial connection with this country when the search of his
residences in Mexico took place, such that he would be
considered part of "the people" as used in the fourth
amendment. The Court concluded that the fourth amendment does
not apply in a situation such as this, where at the time of the
searches in Mexico, the defendant was a resident and citizen of
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States.
Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990)
In White the Court ruled that an anonymous tip, which is
corroborated by independent police work, can in some cases
exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop.
In the case, a police officer received an anonymous call
that the defendant would be leaving a certain apartment at a
particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right
taillight lens broken and that she would be going to a
particular motel with cocaine inside a brown attache case. The
police observed the defendant leave that apartment without an
attache case and enter a brown Plymouth station wagon with a
broken right taillight. The police followed that car as it
travelled the most direct route to the motel. Just before the
defendant arrived at the motel, police stopped the car, obtained
consent to search, and found in the car a brown attache case
containing marijuana and also cocaine in the defendant's purse.
The Alabama courts suppressed this drug evidence holding that
the officers did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court stated that reasonable suspicion to temporarily
detain a person must be established based on the totality of the
circumstances and held that sufficient indicia of reliability
were established by the police verifying the information
provided by the anonymous caller. The Court stated that because
only a small number of people are generally privy to an
individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe
that a person with access to such information is likely to also
have access to reliable information about the individual's
illegal activities.
Florida v. Wells, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990)
In Wells the Court held that the opening of a closed
container by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper for inventory
purposes was illegal, because the Florida Highway Patrol had no
policy concerning the opening of closed containers encountered
during an inventory search.
In the case, a Florida Highway Patrol trooper stopped the
defendant for speeding, and after smelling alcohol on his
breath, arrested him for driving under the influence. The
defendant's car was later impounded, and an inventory turned up
two marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray and a locked suitcase in
the trunk. The locked suitcase was opened, and a garbage bag
with marijuana was found. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that
the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence found in
the locked suitcase. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court ruled that standardized criteria or an
established routine must regulate the opening of containers
found during inventory searches, and because the Florida Highway
Patrol had no policy whatsoever concerning the opening of closed
containers encountered during an inventory search, the search of
the suitcase violated the fourth amendment. The Court added
that it is not necessary for an inventory policy concerning
closed containers to be all or nothing and that a department
policy may allow a police officer sufficient latitude to
determine whether a particular container should be opened in
light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the
container.
FIFTH AMENDMENT
Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 2394 (1990)
In Perkins the Court ruled that an undercover law
enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give
Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking
questions that may elicit an incriminating response.
In the case, the defendant was incarcerated pending trial
on an aggravated assault charge. Police suspected him of a
murder and placed an undercover police officer in his cellblock
who suggested to the defendant that they escape, promised to be
responsible for any murder that occurred during that escape, and
then asked the defendant if he had ever "done" anybody. The
defendant replied that he had and then proceeded to describe at
length the events of the murder for which he was a suspect. The
Illinois courts suppressed this confession given to the
undercover officer. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court concluded that Miranda warnings were designed to
preserve an individual's fifth amendment right against compelled
self-incrimination during questioning in a "police-dominated
atmosphere" and that the essential ingredients of a
"police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present
when an incarcerated person voluntarily speaks to a fellow
inmate. The Court, therefore, held that the statement given by
the defendant to a person he thought was a fellow inmate was not
in violation of Miranda and should be admissible at trial.
New York v. Harris, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (1990)
In Harris the Court ruled that an illegal warrantless
arrest of a suspect in his home does not require the suppression
of an incriminating statement given by the suspect outside his
home.
In the case, police developed probable cause to arrest the
defendant for murder, but then arrested him in his apartment
without an arrest warrant. After officers read him his Miranda
rights, he admitted to the murder and was taken to the station
house where he was again informed of his Miranda rights, which
he waived, and then signed an inculpatory statement. The New
York Court of Appeals ruled that this second statement was a
fruit of the illegal entry into the defendant's apartment, and
therefore, should have been suppressed. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.
The Court ruled that even if the warrantless arrest of the
defendant in his home was illegal, his continued custody at the
station house was lawful, and the second statement was not the
fruit of the fact the defendant was arrested in his house rather
than someplace else. The Court noted that any evidence seized
or statements obtained from a defendant in his home after an
illegal arrest will be inadmissible.
James v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 648 (1990)
In James the Court held that the impeachment exception to
the exclusionary rule, which allows the prosecution to introduce
illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defendant's
testimony, should not be extended to allow impeachment of all
defense witnesses.
In the case, police arrested the defendant for murder and
questioned him about a suspected change in his hair color, and
he admitted to changing it to a different color from the color
the previous evening when the murder was committed. These
statements about his hair color were later ruled inadmissible as
the fruit of a fourth amendment violation because the detectives
lacked probable cause to arrest. However, the trial court
permitted the prosecution to use these illegally obtained
statements to impeach the credibility of a defense witness,
which the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court concluded that expanding the impeachment
exception to the exclusionary rule to include all defense
witnesses would chill some defendants from presenting their best
defense through the testimony of others and would significantly
weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police
misconduct. The Court determined that the current exception,
which allows impeachment of the defendant's own testimony with
illegally obtained evidence, should remain unchanged.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (1990)
In Muniz the Court ruled that videotaped evidence of an
arrestee's slurred speech in response to routine booking
questions and of his performance of sobriety tests is
nontestimonial and not within the scope of the fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
In the case, the defendant was arrested for driving while
intoxicated, and while at the police station, his actions and
words were recorded by videotape, including his slurred speech
in response to routine booking questions and his performance of
various sobriety tests. During the course of taking the
sobriety tests, he made several unsolicited incriminating
statements, but was not advised of his Miranda rights until
after he answered the routine booking questions and took the
sobriety tests.
The Supreme Court held that all of the defendant's
videotaped words and actions at the police station were
admissible at trial, except his response to a question during
booking concerning the date of his sixth birthday. The Court
stated that while his inability to articulate words in a clear
manner in response to routine booking questions was not
testimonial, his response to the sixth birthday question was
testimonial because from the content of the response, it could
be inferred that his mental state was confused. The Court also
found that his performance of the sobriety tests was
nontestimonial and that the incriminating statements he made
while performing the tests were not elicited in response to
interrogation.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S.Ct. 1176 (1990)
In Harvey the Court held that the prosecution may use a
defendant's statement to impeach the defendant's testimony at
trial, even when the statement is taken in violation of the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
In the case, the defendant was arrested for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct in connection with a rape. On the day
of his arrest, he made a statement to police and was later
arraigned and had counsel appointed for him. More than 2 months
later, he told a police officer he wanted to make a statement,
but did not know whether he should talk to his lawyer. The
officer told him that he did not need to speak with his
attorney, because his attorney would get a copy of the statement
anyway. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he gave a
statement concerning his version of the alleged rape. The trial
court allowed this statement to be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony, but the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of
Appeals.
The Court concluded that there was no reason to treat a
sixth amendment violation of the right to counsel differently
than a fifth amendment Miranda violation. The Court ruled that
if a statement is taken voluntarily, it may be used for
impeachment purposes.
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990)
In Craig the Court ruled that the sixth amendment does not
invariably require face-to-face confrontation between a
defendant and a child abuse victim-witness at trial, if the
child abuse victim-witness will suffer emotional trauma by
testifying in the presence of the defendant. The case involved
child sexual abuse offenses in which the trial court permitted
testimony of child abuse victims outside the presence of the
defendant through the use of a one-way, closed-circuit
television.
The Supreme Court held that the right to face-to-face
confrontation with witnesses who testify against an accused is
not absolute and may be denied when necessary to further an
important public policy and where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured. The Court held that if a State
makes an adequate showing of necessity, the State's interest in
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a
child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of
a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases
to testify at trial against the defendant in the absence of a
face-to-face confrontation with defendant.
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990)
In Wright the Court held that an out-of-court statement by
an alleged victim of child sexual abuse did not possess
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted at
trial, but ruled that an out-of-court statement may be admitted
if it is determined that the child making the statement was
particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement
was made.
In the case, a 2 1/2-year-old girl was interviewed by a
pediatrician after it was alleged that the girl was being
sexually abused. Incriminating statements made by the victim
about the defendants were introduced at trial through the
testimony of the pediatrician. The Supreme Court of Idaho held
that the admission of the hearsay testimony of the pediatrician
at trial violated the defendants' sixth amendment right to
confront the witnesses against them. The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Court held that for hearsay testimony of this nature to
be admitted, "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
must be shown from the totality of circumstances. The Court
ruled that hearsay statements by a child witness in a child
abuse case may be admitted at trial if the child was
particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement
was made. The Court concluded that because the pediatrician in
this case conducted the interview of the 2 1/2-year-old child
abuse victim in a suggestive and unreliable manner, the hearsay
testimony should not be admitted.
FIRST AMENDMENT
Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S.Ct. 1691 (1990)
In Osborne the Court held that an Ohio statute prohibiting
the possession and viewing of child pornography does not violate
the first amendment.
In the case, the defendant was convicted of violating an
Ohio statute designed to combat child pornography. The
conviction was based on photographs depicting a nude male
adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position, which were
seized from the defendant's home.
The Court distinguished this case from its earlier decision
in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), which struck down a
law outlawing the private possession of obscene material. The
Court ruled that States' interests in prohibiting the possession
of child pornography are compelling and that States may
constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child
pornography without violating the first amendment.