💾 Archived View for gemini.bortzmeyer.org › rfc-mirror › rfc6218.txt captured on 2023-05-24 at 19:51:21.
⬅️ Previous capture (2021-11-30)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Independent Submission G. Zorn
Request for Comments: 6218 Network Zen
Category: Informational T. Zhang
ISSN: 2070-1721 Advista Technologies
J. Walker
Intel Corporation
J. Salowey
Cisco Systems
April 2011
Cisco Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attributes for
the Delivery of Keying Material
Abstract
This document defines a set of vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes
designed to allow both the secure transmission of cryptographic
keying material and strong authentication of any RADIUS message.
These attributes have been allocated from the Cisco vendor-specific
space and have been implemented by multiple vendors.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6218.
IESG Note
The IESG has concluded that this work is related to IETF work done in
the RADEXT WG, but this relationship does not prevent publishing.
The IESG recommends that the RADEXT WG proceed with the work for an
interoperable modern key wrap solution using attributes from the
standard space as part of its charter.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Specification of Requirements ...................................3
3. Attributes ......................................................3
3.1. Keying-Material ............................................4
3.2. MAC-Randomizer .............................................9
3.3. Message-Authentication-Code ...............................11
4. Security Considerations ........................................16
5. Contributors ...................................................16
6. Acknowledgements ...............................................16
7. References .....................................................16
7.1. Normative References ......................................16
7.2. Informative References ....................................17
1. Introduction
This document defines a set of vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes,
allocated from the Cisco vendor space, that can be used to securely
transfer cryptographic keying material using standard techniques with
well-understood security properties. In addition, the Message-
Authentication-Code Attribute may be used to provide strong
authentication for any RADIUS message, including those used for
accounting and dynamic authorization.
These attributes were designed to provide stronger protection and
more flexibility than the currently defined Vendor-Specific
MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key Attributes in [RFC2548] and the
Message-Authenticator Attribute in [RFC3579].
Many remote access deployments (for example, deployments utilizing
wireless LAN technology) require the secure transmission of
cryptographic keying material from a RADIUS [RFC2865] server to a
network access point. This material is usually produced as a
by-product of an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748]
authentication and returned in the Access-Accept message following a
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
successful authentication process. The keying material is of a form
that may be used in virtually any cryptographic algorithm after
appropriate processing. These attributes may also be used in other
cases where an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
server needs to deliver keying material to a network access point.
Discussion of this document may be directed to the authors.
2. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Attributes
The following subsections describe sub-attributes that are
transmitted in RADIUS Attributes of type Vendor-Specific [RFC2865].
The Vendor ID field of the Vendor-Specific Attribute(s) MUST be set
to decimal 9 (Cisco). The general format of the attributes is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (26) | Length | Vendor ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor ID (cont'd) | Sub-type (1)| Sub-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
26 for Vendor-Specific
Length
Length of entire attribute including type and length fields
Vendor ID
4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9
Sub-type
Attribute sub-type of 1
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Sub-length
Length of the sub-attribute including the sub-type and sub-length
fields
Value
Value of the sub-attribute
This specification concerns the following sub-attributes:
o Keying-Material
o MAC-Randomizer
o Message-Authentication-Code
3.1. Keying-Material
Description
This Attribute MAY be used to transfer cryptographic keying
material from a RADIUS server to a client.
It MAY be sent in request messages (e.g., Access-Request, etc.),
as well; if the Keying-Material (KM) Attribute is present in a
request, it SHOULD be taken as a hint by the server that the
client prefers this method of key delivery over others. The
server is not obligated to honor the hint, however. When the
Keying-Material Attribute is included in a request message, the KM
ID, key-encrypting-key (KEK) ID, Lifetime, Initialization Vector
(IV), and Key Material Data fields MAY be omitted.
In environments where the Keying-Material Attribute is known to be
supported or in cases where the client wants to avoid roll-back
attacks, the client MAY be configured to require the use of the
Keying-Material Attribute. If the client requires the use of the
Keying-Material Attribute for keying material delivery and it is
not present in the Access-Accept or Access-Challenge message, the
client MAY ignore the message in question and end the user
session.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Any packet that contains a Keying-Material Attribute MUST also
include the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.
Any packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
Attribute MUST NOT contain an instance of any other attribute
(e.g., MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys [RFC2548], Tunnel-Password [RFC2868],
etc.) encapsulating identical keying material.
The Keying-Material Attribute MUST NOT be used to transfer long-
lived keys (i.e., passwords) between RADIUS servers and clients.
A summary of the Keying-Material Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (26) | Length | Vendor ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor ID (cont'd) | Sub-type (1)| Sub-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String ID ("radius:app-key=")
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd) | Enc Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| App ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KEK ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KM ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
IV (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Keying Material Data
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Type
26 for Vendor-Specific
Length
Length of entire attribute including type and length fields
Vendor ID
4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9
Sub-type
Attribute sub-type of 1
Sub-length
Length of the sub-attribute including the sub-type and sub-length
fields
String-ID
The ASCII characters "radius:app-key=" without quotes or null
termination
Enc Type
The Enc Type field indicates the method used to encrypt the
contents of the Data field. This document defines only one value
(decimal) for this field:
0 AES Key Wrap with 128-bit KEK [RFC3394]
Implementations MUST support Enc Type 0 (AES Key Wrap with 128-bit
KEK).
Implementation Note
A shared secret is used as the key-encrypting-key (KEK) for the
AES key wrap algorithm. Implementations SHOULD provide a means
to provision a key (cryptographically separate from the normal
RADIUS shared secret) to be used exclusively as a KEK.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
App ID
The App ID field is 4 octets in length and identifies the type of
application for which the key material is to be used. This allows
for multiple keys for different purposes to be present in the same
message. This document defines two values for the App ID:
0 Reserved
1 EAP MSK
KEK ID
The KEK ID field is 16 octets in length. The combination of the
KEK ID and the client and server IP addresses together uniquely
identify a key shared between the RADIUS client and server. As a
result, the KEK ID need not be globally unique. The KEK ID MUST
refer to an encryption key of a type and length appropriate for
use with the algorithm specified by the Enc Type field (see
above). This key is used to protect the contents of the Data
field (below). The KEK ID is a constant that is configured
through an out-of-band mechanism. The same value is configured on
both the RADIUS client and server. If no KEK ID is configured,
then the field is set to 0. If only a single KEK is configured
for use between a given RADIUS client and server, then 0 can be
used as the default value.
KM ID
The KM ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an identifier
for the contents of the Data field. The KM ID MAY be used by
communicating parties to identify the material being transmitted.
The combination of App ID and KM ID MUST uniquely identify the
keying material between the parties utilizing it. The KM ID is
assumed to be known to the parties that derived the keying
material. If the KM ID is not used, it is set to 0. The KM ID
for the EAP Master Session Key (MSK) application is set to 0.
Another application that uses the KM ID field can be defined in
the future.
Lifetime
The Lifetime field is an integer [RFC2865] representing the period
of time (in seconds) for which the keying material is valid.
Note: Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning
of the lifetime to be the point in time when the keying material
is first used.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
IV
The length of the IV field depends upon the value of the Enc Type
field, but is fixed for any given value thereof. When the value
of the Enc Type field is 0 (decimal), the IV field MUST be 8
octets in length (as illustrated above), and the value of the IV
field MUST be as specified in [RFC3394]. If the IV for Enc Type 0
does not match [RFC3394], then the receiver MUST NOT use the key
material from this attribute.
Keying Material Data
The Keying Material Data field is of variable length and contains
the actual encrypted keying material.
3.2. MAC-Randomizer
Description
The MAC-Randomizer Attribute MUST be present in any message that
includes an instance of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.
The Random field MUST contain a 32-octet random number that SHOULD
satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].
Implementation Note
The Random field MUST be filled in before the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) is computed. The MAC-Randomizer
Attribute SHOULD be placed at the beginning of the RADIUS
message if possible.
A summary of the MAC-Randomizer Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (26) | Length | Vendor ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor ID (cont'd) | Sub-type (1)| Sub-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String ID ("radius:random-nonce=")
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
26 for Vendor-Specific
Length
Length of entire attribute including type and length fields
Vendor ID
4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9
Sub-type
Attribute sub-type of 1
Sub-length
Length of the sub-attribute including the sub-type and
sub-length fields
String-ID
The ASCII characters "radius:random-nonce=" without quotes or
null termination
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Random
This field MUST contain a 32 octet random number that SHOULD
satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].
3.3. Message-Authentication-Code
Description
This Attribute MAY be used to "sign" messages to prevent spoofing.
If it is present in a request, the receiver should take this as a
hint that the sender prefers the use of this Attribute for message
authentication; the receiver is not obligated to do so, however.
The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be included in any
message that contains a Keying-Material Attribute.
If both the Message-Authentication-Code and Message-Authenticator
Attributes are to be included in a message (e.g., for backward
compatibility in a network containing both old and new clients),
the value of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be
computed first.
If any message is received containing an instance of the Message-
Authentication-Code Attribute, the receiver MUST calculate the
correct value of the Message-Authentication-Code and silently
discard the packet if the computed value does not match the value
received.
If a received message contains an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute (Section 3.2), the received MAC-Randomizer Attribute
SHOULD be included in the computation of the Message-
Authentication-Code Attribute sent in the response, as described
below.
A summary of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute format is
shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (26) | Length | Vendor ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor ID (cont'd) | Sub-type (1)| Sub-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String ID ("radius:message-authenticator-code=")
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String ID (cont'd) | MAC Type | MAC Key ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Key ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd) | MAC
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC (cont'd) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
26 for Vendor-Specific
Length
Length of entire attribute including type and length fields
Vendor ID
4 octets encoding the Cisco Vendor ID of 9
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Sub-type
Attribute sub-type of 1
Sub-length
Length of the sub-attribute including the sub-type and
sub-length fields
String-ID
The ASCII characters "radius:message-authenticator-code="
without quotes or null termination
MAC Type
The MAC Type field specifies the algorithm used to create the
value in the MAC field. This document defines six values for
the MAC Type field:
0 HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS] [RFC2104]
1 HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS] [RFC4231]
2 HMAC-SHA-512 [FIPS] [RFC4231]
3 CMAC-AES-128 [NIST]
4 CMAC-AES-192 [NIST]
5 CMAC-AES-256 [NIST]
Implementations MUST support MAC Type 0 (HMAC-SHA-1).
MAC Key ID
The MAC Key ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
identifier for the key. The combination of the MAC Key ID and
the client and server IP addresses together uniquely identify a
key shared between the RADIUS client and server. As a result,
the MAC Key ID need not be globally unique. The MAC Key ID
MUST refer to a key of a type and length appropriate for use
with the algorithm specified by the MAC Type field (see above).
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
The MAC Key ID is a constant that is configured through an out-
of-band mechanism. The same value is configured on both the
RADIUS client and server. If no MAC Key ID is configured, then
the field is set to 0. If only a single MAC Key ID is
configured for use between a given RADIUS client and server,
then 0 can be used as the default value.
MAC
Both the length and value of the MAC field depend upon the
algorithm specified by the value of the MAC Type field. If the
algorithm specified is HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, or
HMAC-SHA-512, the MAC field MUST be 20, 32, or 64 octets in
length, respectively. If the algorithm specified is
CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, or CMAC-AES-256, the MAC field
SHOULD be 64 octets in length. The derivation of the MAC field
value for all the algorithms specified in this document is
identical, except for the algorithm used. There are
differences, however, depending upon whether the MAC is being
computed for a request message or a response. These
differences are detailed below, with the free variable HASH-ALG
representing the actual algorithm used.
Request Messages
For requests (e.g., CoA-Request [RFC5176], Accounting-
Request [RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a
hash of the entire packet except the Request Authenticator
in the header of the RADIUS packet, using a shared secret as
the key, as follows.
MAC = MAC-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
where '+' represents concatenation
The MAC-Randomizer Attribute (Section 3.2) MUST be included
in any request in which the Message-Authentication-Code
Attribute is used. The Random field of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute MUST be filled in before the value of the MAC
field is computed.
If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
client request, the server SHOULD ignore the contents of the
Request Authenticator.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Implementation Notes
When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute and the String field
of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
considered to be zero-filled.
Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
(cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
Message-Authentication-Code.
Response Messages
For responses (e.g., CoA-ACK [RFC5176], Accounting-Response
[RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a hash of
the entire packet except the Response Authenticator in the
header of the RADIUS packet using a shared secret as the
key, as follows.
MAC = HASH-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
where '+' represents concatenation
If the request contained an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute and the responder wishes to include an instance of
the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute in the
corresponding response, then the MAC-Randomizer Attribute
from the request MUST be included in the response.
If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
server response, the client SHOULD ignore the contents of
the Response Authenticator.
Implementation Notes
When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute and the String field
of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
considered to be zero-filled.
The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be created
and inserted in the packet before the Response
Authenticator is calculated.
Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
(cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
Message-Authentication-Code.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
4. Security Considerations
It is RECOMMENDED in this memo that two new keys, a key encrypting
key and a message authentication key, be shared by the RADIUS client
and server. If implemented, these two keys MUST be different from
each other and SHOULD NOT be based on a password. These two keys
MUST be cryptographically independent of the RADIUS shared secret
used in calculating the Response Authenticator [RFC2865], Request
Authenticator [RFC2866] [RFC5176], and Message-Authenticator
Attribute [RFC3579]; otherwise, if the shared secret is broken, all
is lost.
To avoid the possibility of collisions, the same MAC key SHOULD NOT
be used with more than 2^(n/2) messages, where 'n' is the length of
the MAC value in octets.
If a packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
Attribute also contains an instance of another, weaker key transport
attribute (e.g., MS-MPPE-Recv-Key [RFC2548]) encapsulating identical
keying material, then breaking the weaker attribute might facilitate
a known-plaintext attack against the KEK.
5. Contributors
Hao Zhou, Nancy Cam-Winget, Alex Lam, Paul Funk, and John Fossaceca
all contributed to this document.
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks (in no particular order) to Keith McCloghrie, Kaushik Narayan,
Murtaza Chiba, Bill Burr, Russ Housley, David McGrew, Pat Calhoun,
Joel Halpern, Jim Schaad, Greg Weber, and Bernard Aboba for useful
feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008.
[NIST] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", NIST SP800-
38B, May 2005.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
June 2005.
[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for
HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and
HMAC-SHA-512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
[RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
January 2008.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 6218 RADIUS Keying Material Transfer VSA April 2011
Authors' Addresses
Glen Zorn
Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand
Phone: +66 (0) 87 040 4617
EMail: gwz@net-zen.net
Tiebing Zhang
Advista Technologies
5252 Orange Ave., Suite 106
Cypress, CA 90630
US
Phone: +1 (949) 242 0391
EMail: tzhang@advistatech.com
Jesse Walker
Intel Corporation
JF2-55
2111 N.E. 25th Ave.
Hillsboro, OR 97214-5961
US
Phone: +1 (503) 712-1849
EMail: jesse.walker@intel.com
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
2901 Third Avenue
SEA1/6/
Seattle, WA 98121
US
Phone: +1 (206) 256-3380
EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com
Zorn, et al. Informational [Page 18]