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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
Request for Comments: 6484 D. Kong
BCP: 173 K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice R. Watro
ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN Technologies
February 2012
Certificate Policy (CP) for
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Abstract
This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
Number Resource (INR) holdings. Each organization that distributes
IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the
resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
the current, unique holder of these resources.
Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 1]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................6
1.1. Overview ...................................................7
1.2. Document Name and Identification ...........................7
1.3. PKI Participants ...........................................7
1.3.1. Certification Authorities ...........................8
1.3.2. Registration Authorities ............................8
1.3.3. Subscribers .........................................8
1.3.4. Relying Parties .....................................8
1.3.5. Other Participants ..................................8
1.4. Certificate Usage ..........................................9
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses ........................9
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses .........................9
1.5. Policy Administration ......................................9
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document .............9
1.5.2. Contact Person ......................................9
1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures ..............................9
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................10
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................11
2.1. Repositories ..............................................11
2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................11
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................12
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................12
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................12
3.1. Naming ....................................................12
3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................12
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................12
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........13
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........13
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................13
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................13
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key ......13
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............13
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............14
3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information ................14
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................14
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................14
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....14
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
Routine Re-Key .....................................14
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
Re-Key after Revocation ............................15
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..15
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 2]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements ................16
4.1. Certificate Application ...................................16
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........16
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............16
4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................16
4.2.1. Performing Identification and
Authentication Functions ...........................16
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..16
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........17
4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................17
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............17
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
Issuance of Certificate ............................17
4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................17
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........17
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........17
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................17
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................18
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......18
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....18
4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................18
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............19
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................19
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............19
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................19
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Renewal Certificate ................................19
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...20
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.7. Certificate Re-Key ........................................20
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key ................20
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..20
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ..........21
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................21
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Re-Keyed Certificate ...............................21
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ..21
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................21
4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................21
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........21
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........21
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......22
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 3]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................22
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
Certificate ........................................22
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..22
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................22
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................22
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................22
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................22
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................23
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................23
4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the
Revocation Request .................................23
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
Parties ............................................23
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................23
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................23
4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................24
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................24
5.1. Physical Controls .........................................24
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................24
5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................24
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................24
5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................24
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................24
5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................24
5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................24
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................24
5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................24
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................25
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................25
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....25
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............25
5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................25
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................25
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................25
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................25
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................26
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................26
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................26
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................26
5.6. Key Changeover ............................................26
5.7. CA or RA Termination ......................................26
6. Technical Security Controls ....................................26
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................27
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................27
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................27
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 4]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........27
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........27
6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................27
6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and
Quality Checking ...................................28
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
Usage Field) .......................................28
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls ......................................28
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........28
6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control ......28
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................28
6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................28
6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................28
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
Cryptographic Module ...............................29
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........29
6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key .................29
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key ...............29
6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key ................29
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................29
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................29
6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................29
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
Pair Usage Periods .................................29
6.4. Activation Data ...........................................30
6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................30
6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls .............................30
6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................30
6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................30
6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls .......................30
6.7. Network Security Controls .................................30
6.8. Timestamping ..............................................30
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................31
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................31
9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................31
9.12. Amendments ..............................................31
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................31
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................31
9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed .....32
10. Security Considerations .......................................32
11. Acknowledgments ...............................................33
12. References ....................................................33
12.1. Normative References .....................................33
12.2. Informative References ...................................33
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 5]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
1. Introduction
This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet Number Resource (INR)
holdings (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers). An
organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the
resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
the current holder of these resources.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that
it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records of
the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
certificate in the context of this PKI.
This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of
claims related to current INR holdings. This includes any
certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure,
e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system
described in Section 2.4. Such transitive uses of certificates also
are permitted under this policy. Use of the certificates and
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any
other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs)
SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.
Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647
[RFC3647], a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
stream. In the interest of keeping the document as short as
reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template have been
omitted from this policy because they do not apply to this PKI.
However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
RFC 3647 to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
RFC 3647. Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
stipulation" in Certificate Policy (CP) / Certification Practice
Statement (CPS) parlance.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 6]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
1.1. Overview
This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI. The ability
to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
distribution of these resources [RFC6480].
The structure of the RPKI is congruent with the number resource
allocation framework of the Internet. The IANA allocates number
resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to others, and for
special purposes [RFC5736]. The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation
of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and
others.
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6487] for
more details):
o CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
INR holders
o End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
signatures on RPKI signed objects
1.2. Document Name and Identification
The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI)".
This policy has been assigned the following OID:
id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }
1.3. PKI Participants
Note that in a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
some of them are individuals.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 7]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
1.3.1. Certification Authorities
The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.
Organizations that do not distribute INRs but hold such resources
also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.
1.3.2. Registration Authorities
This PKI does not require establishment or use of a registration
authority (RA) function separate from the one provided inherently in
conjunction with the CA function. The RA function MUST be provided
by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in
Section 1.3.1. An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a
formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes
INRs. These entities (the CAs) already perform the RA function
implicitly since they already assume responsibility for distributing
INRs.
1.3.3. Subscribers
These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs: RIRs,
NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
from more than one source over time. This is true even for RIRs,
which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This
PKI accommodates such relationships.
1.3.4. Relying Parties
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI
signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying
parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See Section
1.6 for the definition of an RPKI signed object.)
1.3.5. Other Participants
Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects that it issues.
The organization MAY operate its own publication point, or it MAY
outsource this function (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 8]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
1.4. Certificate Usage
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, also are permitted under this policy. For example,
certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access control
for the repository system described in Section 2.4. Such transitive
uses are permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
under this policy.
1.5. Policy Administration
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document
This CP is administered by
Internet Engineering Steering Group
c/o Internet Society
1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
Reston, VA 20190-5108
U.S.A.
1.5.2. Contact Person
The contact information is
EMail: iesg@ietf.org
Phone: +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)
1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures
If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current
BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following
the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in RFC 2026
[RFC2026].
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 9]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority (CA)
employs in issuing certificates in this PKI.
Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along
the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of
IP addresses and AS numbers to the five Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and
AS numbers to organizations within their service regions, who
in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the IP addressing system and AS numbers
used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).
INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:
o IP version 4 addresses,
o IP version 6 addresses, and
o Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing
and providing Internet services to other organizations.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. In some regions, this term is used
to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form
an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage
INRs.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 10]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
RPKI signed object - An RPKI signed object is a digitally signed data
object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to
be such by a Standards Track RFC, and that can be validated
using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and
format of these data constructs depend on the context in which
validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486]
and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects (intended for public
consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
parties, to enable them to validate this data. This motivates use of
a robust, distributed repository system. Each CA MUST maintain a
publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate
Repository Structure" [RFC6481]. (This function MAY be outsourced,
as noted in Section 2.2 below.) The collection of repositories forms
the RPKI distributed repository system.
2.2. Publication of Certification Information
Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
consumption) that it issues via the repository system.
Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
it issues via the repository system.
Each CA MUST publish its RPKI signed objects (intended for public
consumption) via the repository system.
Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its
administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the
requirements set forth in this CP. Publication means that the
entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire
a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS
changes. (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does
not need to create or publish a CPS.)
An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data --
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.
The CP will be published as an IETF-stream RFC and will be available
from the RFC repository.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 11]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:
The period of time within which a certificate will be published after
the CA issues the certificate.
The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry
for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.
Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories
Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying, or deleting
repository entries. A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS,
certificates, CRLs, or RPKI signed objects. This data is intended to
be accessible to the public.
3. Identification and Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of Names
The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
single CommonName (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer
of the certificate. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be
included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative
distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of
certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful
The subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful",
i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the subject
to relying parties. The rationale here is that certificates issued
under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are not used to
identify subjects.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 12]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers
Although subject (and issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no
explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms
None.
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names
There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
PKI. Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the
certificates it issues. Although it is desirable that these subject
names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI
cannot be guaranteed.
However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way
that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
assigned the same name. The RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in
a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.
3.2. Initial Identity Validation
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
subject to demonstrate proof of possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate. The specific
procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for
each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in
the management of the INRs. This authentication is solely for use by
each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this
CA-subscriber relationship.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 13]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of
each organization that is an INR holder. The specific means by which
each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying
parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
those it already employs as a registry or ISP in authenticating
individuals as representatives for INR holders.
3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information
A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject
Information Access (SIA) extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of Authority
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
organization to which a certificate is issued is authorized to
represent that organization in this context. The procedures MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA
to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for
INR holders.
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation
This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI.
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and the
associated INRs, and MUST require PoP of the private key
corresponding to the new public key. The procedures employed for
these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA. With respect
to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can
expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.
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Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA.
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR. The CA
MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
described by the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of
the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
or ISP, in the management of INRs. Note that there MAY be different
procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has
access to that key.
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request
Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
procedures to ensure that:
o an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of
the certificate to be revoked.
o each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with
regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the
INRs identified in the certificate.
o an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a
certificate is to be revoked is authorized to represent that
organization in this context.
The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described
by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
or ISP, in the management of INRs.
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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application
Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate. This
includes Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that
hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
acquire a certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued
to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
Identifiers", as appropriate.
The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities
The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
for each CA. An entity that desires one or more certificates should
contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.
4.2. Certificate Application Processing
CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application
processing. Section 6 of the Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be
supported.
Each CA MUST define via its CPS, the certificate request/response
standards that it employs.
4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions
Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to
note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the
identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
INRs they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for by this
PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
organization names, etc.
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications
Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
records of INR holders. Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified
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in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester. The details of how certificate
applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in
question.
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications
No stipulation. As part of its CPS, each CA MUST declare its
expected time frame to process (approve, issue, and publish) a
certificate application.
4.3. Certificate Issuance
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance
If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
repository publication point.
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate
The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
The means by which a subscriber is notified MUST be defined by each
CA in its CPS.
4.4. Certificate Acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance
Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber. This MAY be
done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA MUST state in
its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate
and notification to the subscriber.
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA
Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
publication point as per the conduct described in Section 4.4.1. The
procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
notified when a certificate is issued.
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4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage
Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 [X.509] CA
certificate containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions. Holders of
CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves
to enable verification of RPKI signed objects that they generate.
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage
Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances.
If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the
relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance
to be deemed reasonable.
Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
Section 1.4), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
the certificates in the chain (terminating at a trust anchor (TA)
accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the
certificate in question. If any of the certificates in the
certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, the relying
party is solely responsible for determining whether reliance on a
digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is
acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the
relying party.
If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover, the relying party
MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
Certificate Profile [RFC6487], which specifies the extended
validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.
4.6. Certificate Renewal
This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
an old one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the
serial number (the field in the certificate, not the DN attribute)
are changed. The public key and all other information remain the
same.
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4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal
A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
date or a renewal request from the subscriber. Prior to the
expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to maintain
continuity of certificate usage. If the issuing CA initiates the
renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that
CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process. The
validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap
that of the previous certificate to ensure continuity of certificate
usage. It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and
published at least 1 week prior to the expiration of the certificate
it replaces.
Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 apply.
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal
Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
renewal process. The certificate holder MAY request an early
renewal, for example, if it expects to be unavailable to support the
renewal process during the normal expiration period. An issuing CA
MAY initiate the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
date.
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests
Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate. Renewal
processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
revoked.
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.
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4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.
4.7. Certificate Re-Key
This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an
old one because the key needs to be replaced. Unlike with
certificate renewal, the public key is changed.
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key
Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required, based
on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair
A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the
reissuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity. So it
should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
validation path includes the re-keyed entity. CA key rollover MUST
follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI"
[RFC6489].
Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
public key rather than a new key. This applies when one is adding
INRs (revocation not required) and when one is removing INRs
(revocation required (see Section 4.8.1)).
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate MUST be revoked.
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, the
CA that issued the certificate MAY choose to initiate a re-key based
on a verified compromise report.
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4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests
The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
generation as defined in Section 4.3.
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.
4.8. Certificate Modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification
Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected
attribute values in a certificate. In the context of the RPKI, the
only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are
changes to the INR holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension(s)
and changes to the SIA extension.
When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
issued. If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new
certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration
date as the original certificate, but with the SIA extension and/or
the INR set expanded. In this case, revocation of the previous
certificate is not required.
When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then
the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST be
issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings. (The SIA extension in
the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder
supplies a new SIA value.)
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification
Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
certificate modification process.
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4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests
The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
followed (see Section 4.3).
4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation
A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
private key. A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
specified in a CA's CPS.
Note: If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a
new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources
and the old key. If INRs are being removed or if there has been a
key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a
re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation
This MUST be defined in the CPS of the organization that issued the
certificate.
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4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request
A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
revocation. This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
and MUST be authenticated. The procedures for making the request
MUST be described in the CPS for each CA. The RPKI provisioning
document [RFC6492] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
revocation requests.
A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
certificate. The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
publication. The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period
A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace
period for the subscriber in this process.
4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request
No stipulation. Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
processing time in its CPS.
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties
A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL
from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency
The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value, and a new
CRL MUST be published at or before that time. A CA MUST set the
nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next
scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs
The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
posting its CRL to the repository system.
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4.10. Certificate Status Services
This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] or Server-Based Certificate
Validation Protocol (SCVP) [RFC5055]. This is because it is
anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols
are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
checking. RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is
RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no
more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
accesses).
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical Controls
Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The physical controls employed for
CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be
covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from
[RFC3647].)
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction
5.1.2. Physical Access
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning
5.1.4. Water Exposures
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection
5.1.6. Media Storage
5.1.7. Waste Disposal
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup
5.2. Procedural Controls
Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The procedural security controls
employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible
topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are
taken from [RFC3647].)
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5.2.1. Trusted Roles
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties
5.3. Personnel Controls
Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be
specified in its CPS.
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures
Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in
Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.8 MUST be addressed in its CPS.
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded
Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records MUST
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
o Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
o Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
o Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
o Posting of any material to a repository
o Any attempts to change or delete audit data
o Key generation
o Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
o Clock adjustments
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log
Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.
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5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log
Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log
The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
standards.
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures
The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
standards.
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments
The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
their normal business practice.
5.6. Key Changeover
When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
containing its new public key. See [RFC6489] for a description of
how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.
5.7. CA or RA Termination
In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA for the specified INRs that
were distributed to that entity. Procedures associated with the
termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA. These
procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued
a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is
terminating.
Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
as the CA (see Section 1.3.2), there are no separate stipulations for
RAs.
6. Technical Security Controls
The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
authoritative for these distributions. This PKI is designed to
enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them. Accordingly,
the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
administering the distribution of INR data by the extant
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organizations. Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation
In most instances, public key pairs will be generated by the subject,
i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However,
some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects
at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who
do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure
fashion. (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it
generates them; see Section 6.1.6.) Since the keys used in this PKI
are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA MUST
describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber
If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
subscribers in a secure fashion.
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer
When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key
has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses
the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates
MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying
parties download these certificates from the repositories. Public
key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are
distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
of locally defined criteria.
6.1.5. Key Sizes
The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A
Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure" [RFC6485].
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6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking
The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in
[RFC6485]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA generates
the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)
The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487].
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls
The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.
6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control
CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
controls it employs.
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.
6.2.4. Private Key Backup
Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
secure means to back up its private keys. The details of the
procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in the
CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.5. Private Key Archival
The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
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6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module
The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module
The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key
The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key
The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key
The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
the CPS issued by the CA.
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.3.1. Public Key Archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new
distributions. To minimize disruption, the CA key pair MUST NOT
change when INRs are added to its certificate.
If ISP and network-subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements. In any
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case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
issuing CA and described in its CPS.
6.4. Activation Data
Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install, and
protect its activation data.
6.5. Computer Security Controls
Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
for CA computer operation in its CPS.
6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls
6.6.1. System Development Controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
required by that CA, if applicable.
6.6.2. Security Management Controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls MUST be
commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
managing the INRs.
6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
and updated. This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is
handled.
6.7. Network Security Controls
The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
employed for CA operation. These MUST be commensurate with the
protection it employs for the computers used for managing
distribution of INRs.
6.8. Timestamping
The RPKI does not make use of timestamping.
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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [RFC6487].
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
The certificate policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against
which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that
they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for
the management of INRs, and the PKI simply supports verification of
the distribution of these resources to network subscribers.
Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to
ensure the security of the management of INRs is sufficient for this
PKI. The CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other
assessments are used.
9. Other Business and Legal Matters
As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as
managers of this data. They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
these distributions. Therefore, the manner in which the
organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for
this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. Since
there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
to all organizations, the topics listed in Sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11
and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
topics. Please note that the topics in the above sections of RFC
3647 become sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.17 in the CPS.
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment
The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
document.
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period
Successive versions of the CP will be published with the following
statement:
This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 31]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of
publication.
9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed
If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
will be no change to the CP OID. If the IESG judges that changes to
the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID.
10. Security Considerations
According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
in deciding whether a certificate and the binding therein are
sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
application. This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI). There are separate documents (CPSs) that
cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party
can trust the binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which
such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
practices followed by the CA in authenticating the subject; the CA's
operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
liability).
Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
CRLs under the same issuer name. Path validation implementations
that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
(see [RFC6487]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the
target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL. So, a
name collision will not change the result. Use of the basic X.509
path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
certificate being rejected as revoked. Relying parties must ensure
that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this
policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFC6487].
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RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
11. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
Robachevsky, and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile
for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile
for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
2012.
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
in the RPKI", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
November 2003.
[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 33]
RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
[RFC5736] Huston, G., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IANA IPv4 Special
Purpose Address Registry", RFC 5736, January 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
[RFC6492] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", RFC
6492, February 2012.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information
technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The
Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks", November 2008.
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RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012
Authors' Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 617 873 3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 617 873 1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 617 873 3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com
Ronald Watro
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 617 873 2551
EMail: rwatro@bbn.com
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