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Keywords: encryption secure hash algorithm
Network Working Group P. Metzger
Request for Comments: 1852 Piermont
Category: Experimental W. Simpson
Daydreamer
September 1995
IP Authentication using Keyed SHA
Status of this Memo
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document describes the use of keyed SHA with the IP
Authentication Header.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .......................................... 2
1.1 Keys ............................................ 2
1.2 Data Size ....................................... 2
1.3 Performance ..................................... 2
2. Calculation ........................................... 3
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ...................................... 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................. 4
REFERENCES ................................................... 5
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS ............................................. 6
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 1]
RFC 1852 AH SHA September 1995
1. Introduction
The Authentication Header (AH) [RFC-1826] provides integrity and
authentication for IP datagrams. This specification describes the AH
use of keys with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS-180-1].
It should be noted that this document specifies a newer version of
the SHA than that described in [FIPS-180], which was flawed. The
older version is not interoperable with the newer version.
This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the related
document "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [RFC-
1825], which defines the overall security plan for IP, and provides
important background for this specification.
1.1. Keys
The secret authentication key shared between the communicating
parties SHOULD be a cryptographically strong random number, not a
guessable string of any sort.
The shared key is not constrained by this transform to any particular
size. Lengths of up to 160 bits MUST be supported by the
implementation, although any particular key may be shorter. Longer
keys are encouraged.
1.2. Data Size
SHA's 160-bit output is naturally 32-bit aligned. However, many
implementations require 64-bit alignment of the following headers, in
which case an additional 32 bits of padding is added, either before
or after the SHA output.
The size and position of this padding are negotiated as part of the
key management. Padding bits are filled with unspecified
implementation dependent (random) values, which are ignored on
receipt.
1.3. Performance
Preliminary results indicate that SHA is 62% as fast as MD5, and 80%
as fast as DES hashing. That is,
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 2]
RFC 1852 AH SHA September 1995
SHA < DES < MD5
Nota Bene:
Suggestions are sought on alternative authentication algorithms
that have significantly faster throughput, are not patent-
encumbered, and still retain adequate cryptographic strength.
2. Calculation
The 160-bit digest is calculated as described in [FIPS-180-1]. At
the time of writing, a portable C language implementation of SHA is
available via FTP from ftp://rand.org/pub/jim/sha.tar.gz.
The form of the authenticated message is
key, keyfill, datagram, key, SHAfill
First, the variable length secret authentication key is filled to the
next 512-bit boundary, using the same pad with length technique
defined for SHA.
Then, the filled key is concatenated with (immediately followed by)
the invariant fields of the entire IP datagram (variant fields are
zeroed), concatenated with (immediately followed by) the original
variable length key again.
A trailing pad with length to the next 512-bit boundary for the
entire message is added by SHA itself. The 160-bit SHA digest is
calculated, and the result is inserted into the Authentication Data
field.
Discussion:
The leading copy of the key is padded in order to facilitate
copying of the key at machine boundaries without requiring re-
alignment of the following datagram. The padding technique
includes a length which protects arbitrary length keys. Filling
to the SHA block size also allows the key to be prehashed to avoid
the physical copy in some implementations.
The trailing copy of the key is not necessary to protect against
appending attacks, as the IP datagram already includes a total
length field. It reintroduces mixing of the entire key, providing
minimal protection for very long and very short datagrams, and
marginal robustness against possible attacks on the IP length
field itself.
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 3]
RFC 1852 AH SHA September 1995
When the implementation adds the keys and padding in place before
and after the IP datagram, care must be taken that the keys and/or
padding are not sent over the link by the link driver.
Security Considerations
Users need to understand that the quality of the security provided by
this specification depends completely on the strength of the SHA hash
function, the correctness of that algorithm's implementation, the
security of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the
strength of the key [CN94], and upon the correctness of the
implementations in all of the participating nodes.
The SHA algorithm was originally derived from the MD4 algorithm
[RFC-1320]. A flaw was apparently found in the original
specification of SHA [FIPS-180], and this document specifies the use
of a corrected version [FIPS-180-1].
At the time of writing of this document, there are no known flaws in
the SHA algorithm. That is, there are no known attacks on SHA or any
of its components that are better than brute force, and the 160-bit
hash output by SHA is substantially more resistant to brute force
attacks than the 128-bit hash size of MD4 and MD5.
However, as the flaw in the original SHA algorithm shows,
cryptographers are fallible, and there may be substantial
deficiencies yet to be discovered in the algorithm.
Acknowledgements
Some of the text of this specification was derived from work by
Randall Atkinson for the SIP, SIPP, and IPv6 Working Groups.
Preliminary performance analysis was provided by Joe Touch.
Comments should be submitted to the ipsec@ans.net mailing list.
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 4]
RFC 1852 AH SHA September 1995
References
[CN94] John M. Carroll & Sri Nudiati, "On Weak Keys and Weak Data:
Foiling the Two Nemeses", Cryptologia, Vol. 18 No. 23 pp.
253-280, July 1994.
[FIPS-180]
"Secure Hash Standard", Computer Systems Laboratory,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department Of Commerce, May 1993.
Also known as: 58 Fed Reg 27712 (1993).
[FIPS-180-1]
"Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of Standards and
Technology, U.S. Department Of Commerce, April 1995.
Also known as: 59 Fed Reg 35317 (1994).
[RFC-1320]
Ronald Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320,
April 1992.
[RFC-1700]
Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, RFC
1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994.
[RFC-1825]
Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC-1825, Naval Research Laboratory, July 1995.
[RFC-1826]
Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC-1826, Naval
Research Laboratory, July 1995.
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 5]
RFC 1852 AH SHA September 1995
Author's Address
Questions about this memo can also be directed to:
Perry Metzger
Piermont Information Systems Inc.
160 Cabrini Blvd., Suite #2
New York, NY 10033
perry@piermont.com
William Allen Simpson
Daydreamer
Computer Systems Consulting Services
1384 Fontaine
Madison Heights, Michigan 48071
Bill.Simpson@um.cc.umich.edu
bsimpson@MorningStar.com
Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 6]