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Greece s return to the markets

2014-04-15 06:49:15

The prodigal son

A bond issue is a milestone but there is still a long way to go

Apr 12th 2014

THE journey has been an epic one, but Greece has reached, if not the

destination, at least a waymark. The last time that its government raised

long-term funds was in March 2010, just weeks before the markets lost

confidence in Greece altogether, forcing its first bail-out. This week the

Greek government returned to the markets, raising 3 billion ($4.1 billion) in

five-year bonds at a yield of just under 5% in a heavily oversubscribed issue.

The amount might be small and the yield high compared with borrowing costs in

other rescued countries, such as Portugal, whose five-year notes were trading

at around 2.6%. But the notion of any bond issue at all still prompts

eye-rubbing, given the depth of the Greek crisis. Six consecutive years of

recession have seen the economy shrink by a quarter, prompting social and

political turmoil that at its worst seemed quite likely to push Greece out of

the euro zone. For most of the past four years a return to the markets on any

terms seemed inconceivable, a view underscored by vaulting bond yields (see

chart).

Over this period Greece has been wholly reliant on help from euro-zone

governments and the IMF to meet its financing needs. In May 2010 it received

its first three-year bail-out, of 110 billion. The aim then was that it should

start tapping the markets again as early as 2012. Instead within less than two

years Greece required a second and even bigger bail-out, raising the total

amount of funding from euro-zone lenders and the IMF to 246 billion by 2016,

equivalent to 135% of last year s GDP.

The scale of the rescue effort was made necessary by the delay in recognising

that Greece was bust and needed a debt restructuring; much of the early

official lending was used to repay private creditors as the bonds they held

matured. In early 2012 Greece did carry out such a restructuring, wiping out

over 100 billion of government debt. Despite this relief, the crisis

intensified. In two nail-bitingly close elections held in the summer of 2012,

the country came close to a catastrophic Grexit from the single currency.

If Greece has come a long way from those dark days, it is still far from being

able to support itself financially. Like the rest of southern Europe it has

gained as investors take a more favourable view of the euro zone and also

anticipate possible quantitative easing by the European Central Bank. Yet

though Greek ten-year bonds fell this week to below 6%, that is still much too

high to be affordable for a country forecast by the IMF to grow by only 0.6% in

2014 and experiencing deflation (with prices falling by 1% in the past year).

Greece remains in the dock compared with Ireland and Portugal, the second and

third countries to require bail-outs, whose ten-year yields are less than 3%

and 4% respectively.

Indeed, Greece would be quite unable to access the markets but for the massive

support it continues to receive from the rest of the euro area. Despite the

default, public debt, at 175% of GDP this year, is much higher than before the

first bail-out. That burden is made bearable only through concessions by the

European lenders who now hold most of the debt. Their loans are at ultra-low

interest rates. They have been extended to such an extent that the average

maturity of Greek debt is extraordinarily high, at 17.5 years. European

countries like Germany have in effect restructured their lending to Greece

without having to admit this awkward fact to voters by formally forgiving some

of it.

Even more help will be necessary. The IMF continues to insist that euro-zone

governments will have to make further concessions if Greek public debt is to be

put on a sustainable trajectory. The fund believes that relief worth 4% of GDP

is needed in the next year or so if the objective of debt of 124% of GDP by

2020 is to be achieved, with more to come if this is to be yanked down below

110% by 2022.

Even with extra help the targets are heroic. Greece has only just managed, in

2013, to achieve a surplus on its primary budget (ie, excluding interest

payments), of 1.5% of GDP. That was higher than expected and is a massive

improvement on the dire position in 2009 when there was a deficit of 10.5%. But

if the debt goals for 2020 and beyond are to be met that surplus must rise to

4.5% of GDP by 2016 and be sustained at 4% in the 2020s.

That is not wholly infeasible: Belgium managed to run an average primary

surplus of 4.3% of GDP between 1987 and 2008. But it is a tall order for a

country that has spent over half the time since it became independent in 1830

in default. More than this week s foray into the markets, what matters is

whether Greece has really changed its ways. That seems far from clear. The

latest slug of bail-out money has taken ages to be approved because the regular

programme review by the IMF and European authorities got bogged down in

ill-tempered negotiations as the government resisted more reforms.

Yet adopting those reforms and sustaining previous efforts are essential. The

IMF has estimated that reforms could boost GDP by 4% over five years and by 10%

in the long term. The reform fatigue in Athens may be understandable but it

betrays a reluctance to accept that the country was the architect of its

misfortune. Greece entered the crisis as a dysfunctional state with an impaired

economy. It is hard to imagine the country sustaining a decade or more of

self-denial if left to its own devices. The grumpy political mood in Greece

suggests that it has not fully got the message about how much more has to be

done.