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Title: The Third Revolution?
Author: Nick Heath
Date: Winter 2004
Language: en
Topics: Russian Revolution, anti-Bolshevism, peasants, resistance
Source: https://libcom.org/library/third-revolution-nick-heath
Notes: Edited by libcom  First published in Organise! #63

Nick Heath

The Third Revolution?

During the Civil War in Russia, Lenin’s government was faced with a

number of predominantly peasant uprisings which threatened to topple the

regime. Can the accusation be justified that these were led by kulaks

(rich peasants), backed by White reaction, with the support of the

poorer peasants, unconscious of their real class interests? Or was it,

as some opponents of Bolshevism to its left claimed, the start of the

‘Third Revolution’?

“All those who really take the social revolution to heart must deplore

that fatal separation that exists between the proletariat of the towns

and the countryside. All their efforts must be directed to destroying

it, because we must all be conscious of this — that as much as the

workers of the land, the peasants, have not given a hand to the workers

of the town, for a common revolutionary action, all the revolutionary

efforts of the towns will be condemned to inevitable fiascos. The whole

revolutionary question is there; it must be resolved, or else perish”

— Bakunin, from The Complete Works “On German PanGermanism”.

Orthodox Marxism discounted the revolutionary role of the peasantry.

According to the German Marxist Karl Kautsky, the small peasant was

doomed. It was tactically useful to mobilise the peasant masses. In his

the Agrarian Question, he stated that the short-term objectives of the

peasants and the lower middle class, not to mention the bourgeoisie,

were in opposition to the interest of all humanity as embodied in the

idea of socialist society. “When the proletariat [meaning the industrial

working class] comes to try and exploit the achievements of the

revolution, its allies-the peasantry- will certainly turn against

it...the political make-up of the peasantry disbars it from any active

or independent role and prevents it from achieving its own class

representation...By nature it is bourgeois and shows its reactionary

essence clearly in certain fields... That is why the proposition before

the congress speaks of the dictatorship of the proletariat alone

supported by the peasantry... Peasantry must assist proletariat, not the

proletariat the peasantry in the achievement of the latter’s wishes”.

Leo Jogiches, “The dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the

peasantry”at the Sixth Party Congress of the Polish Social Democrats

1908. (and the following discussion at the Congress where it was stated

that the “peasantry cannot play the autonomous role alongside the

proletariat which the Bolsheviks have ascribed to it”. Rosa Luxemburg

shared Jogiches’ mistrust of the peasantry, and could see them only as a

reactionary force.

Lenin himself, extremely flexible on a tactical level, and extremely

rigid on an ideological level, was conscious of what he was doing when

his Party advanced the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and

peasantry. After Bolshevik triumph “then it would be ridiculous to speak

of the unity of will of the proletariat and of the peasantry, of

democratic rule...Then we shall have to think of the socialist, of the

proletarian dictatorship”(Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the

Democratic Revolution, 1905).

For his part Trotsky had a harsher attitude to the peasantry, and was

unconvinced of even a temporary alliance with them: “The proletariat

will come into conflict not only with the bourgeois groups which

supported the proletariat during the first stage of the revolutionary

struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasants (1905,written

in 1922).

The Bolsheviks defined ‘kulaks’ as rich peasants, able to sell produce

on the market as well as produce for their own use, able to employ hired

labour and to sell their surplus products. They were seen as

representing the real petit bourgeois elements in the countryside, ready

to develop agriculture through capitalist advances. In the second stage

of the revolution, after the initial bourgeois stage, the kulaks (and a

‘substantial part of the middle peasantry’-Lenin) would go over to the

bourgeoisie, whilst the proletariat would rally the poor peasantry to

it. But as Ferro points out: “The search for the kulak was partly false,

a matter of chasing shadows, for the kulaks had often disappeared, or

sunk to muzhik level, since the Revolution of October”[1]. What is

certain is that on a practical level the Bolsheviks alienated vast

masses of the peasantry in the ‘War Communism’ years from 1918 to 1921,

in particular with grain requisitioning and the Chekist repression. The

Bolsheviks sought to bring class war to the peasantry. In doing so they

exaggerated the importance and wealth of the kulaks. Selunskaia reports

that in fact only 2 per cent could be classified as ‘clearly kulaks’[2].

One official statistic gives the following figures: in 1917, 71% of the

peasants cultivated less than 4 hectares, 25% had between 4 and 10

hectares, only 3.7% had more than 10 hectares, these categories changing

respectively in 1920 to 85, 15, and 0.5%. Another criterion, the

possession of a horse, according to the same statistics, can be used to

show relative wealth.29% had none, 49% had one, 17% had two, and 4.8%

had more than 3 (in 1917). By 1920, the figures had changed respectively

to 27.6, 63.6, 7.9, and 0.9%[3]. In fact, the number of kulaks- and here

we are referring to Bolshevik norms as to what constituted ‘wealthy’-

was diminishing, and the equalisation process was continuing. As for the

requisitioning, the leading Bolshevik Kubanin admitted that half the

food collected rotted, and many cattle died on railway carriages en

route, due to lack of water and food[4].

War communism

In reaction to war communism, a number of insurrections broke out. In

the East Ukraine, the Makhnovist movement, inspired and militarily led

by the anarchist peasant Nestor Makhno, was one of the more

ideologically developed movements. It must be remembered that the

Makhnovists had controlled this part of the Ukraine before the arrival

of the Red Army and had successively defeated Austro-German and White

troops. The Makhnovists invited a number of anarchists fleeing from the

North and Bolshevik persecution or returning from foreign exile, to work

through the Nabat (Alarm) Confederation of Anarchists in propaganda,

cultural and educational work among the peasantry. The Makhnovists saw

the White threat as a greater danger than the Bolsheviks, and concluded

a series of alliances with the latter in a united front against the

White leaders, Denikin and Wrangel. In fact, there seems to be much

evidence that Wrangel would have smashed through the Ukraine and taken

Moscow and destroyed the Bolshevik government, if not for the efforts of

the Makhnovists. At the end of a joint campaign against the Whites in

the Crimea, Makhnovist commanders were invited to Red Army headquarters

and summarily shot. Makhno himself fought on for several months, before

being forced to retire over the border [5].

The Cheka and the prodrazverstksa (food requisition squads) never showed

themselves in the Makhnovist centre of Hulyai-Polye before 1919, but

peasants living in the Ekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk areas had plenty

of experience of them. In other areas of insurrection the initial

opposition was more directly a result of the ‘War Communism’ policies of

Bolshevism.

In West Siberia, (and indeed throughout the whole of Siberia — see [URL=

http://libcom.org/history/1900-1923-anarchism-in-siberia] our article A

Siberian Makhnovschina[/URL]) the regime was faced with probably their

worst threat, and it is possible that it was this, more than the

Kronstadt insurrection of the same year, that forced it to change

course. Krasnaya Armiya (Red Army, published by the Military Academy,

and aimed at a small circle of Communist readers) had to admit in its

edition of December 1921 that the carrying out of the grain collections

in spring 1920 roused the Siberian peasantry against the Communists and

that “the movement in the Ishimsk region was proceeding under the same

slogans which at one time were put forth by the Kronstadt sailors”. Red

Army had to admit that ineptitude, economic mismanagement and ‘criminal’

seizure of property had been amongst the causes of peasant

dissatisfaction. The journal recognised the effect on the morale when

they saw at first hand the food requisitioned from them rotting in

carloads. ‘Provocatory acts’ by government representatives in the

tax-gathering agencies had frequently brought about risings of entire

villages. The journal also reported on ‘a very unique’ movement in the

Don and Kuban regions, headed by Maslakov, an ex-Commander of the Red

Army, with the aim of declaring war on “the saboteurs of the Soviet

power, on the ‘commissar-minded’ Communists”[6]. In fact, this was a

whole brigade of the Red Army.

Links

Indeed Maslakov’s uprising in February 1921 in eastern Ukraine quickly

linked with the Makhnovists through the detachment of the Makhnovist

commander Brova. Red Army Commanders revolted, as with the battalion at

Mikhailovka led by Vakulin, and then Popov, in the Northern Don Cossack

territory (from December 1920) Vakulin appears to have had a force of

3,200 — six times the amount he had started out with — when he moved

east into the Ural region. He succeeded in taking prisoner a Red Army

force of 800. But on 17^(th) February 1921 he lost a battle in which he

died, and the Don Cossack F.Popov, a Socialist Revolutionary, took over.

The Popov group moved back into Samara and then Saratov provinces,

picking up strength as it went along. It was estimated by the Red Army

that it numbered 6,000 by now. It managed to capture an entire Red Army

battalion. It appears to have been eventually crushed, if we believe

Bolshevik sources. In Samara a Left-Social Revolutionary officer,

Sapozhkov, in the Red Army revolted at the head of ‘anarchistic and SR

elements’ (according to the Soviet historian Trifonov). He was himself

the son of a peasant in this province. This uprising began on 14^(th) or

15^(th) July 1920 with a force of 2,700. Sapozhkov fell in battle on

6^(th) September after 2 months of fighting. His place was taken by

Serov, who was still able to gather 3,000 combatants and who fought on

until summer of 1923, the longest time than any rebel band had fought

on, apart from Makhno.

In the Tambov region another serious insurrection began in August 1920

under the guidance of Alexander Stepanovitch Antonov. Here again the

revolt was sparked off by grain requisition. Antonov himself was an

ex-Social Revolutionary, and then Left SR, who spoke of defending both

workers and peasants against Bolsheviks. Other leading lights in this

movement included, Socialist Revolutionaries, Left Socialist

Revolutionaries and anarchists. The Antonovists were able to assemble

21,000 combatants at one time. The anarchist Yaryzhka commanded a

detachment of the Antonovist movement under the black flag of anarchism.

Whilst serving in the Army during World War I he had struck an officer

in 1916, been imprisoned and had converted to anarchism as a result of

his experiences. He began operations in autumn 1918, fighting on till he

was killed in action by the Bolsheviks in autumn 1920.

It can be seen that all these risings or oppositional movements to

Leninism amongst the peasantry occurred around about the same time, over

the period 1920–1921. Indeed, taken with the rising of the sailors at

Kronstadt in 1921, they formed in toto a grave threat to Bolshevik rule.

The aims of the Kronstadt insurgents seem to have had an echo in the

peasant movements. This is hardly surprising considering many Kronstadt

sailors had peasant origins. The west Siberia uprising adopted the

Kronstadt demands[6A], as noted by Krasnaya Armiya. After the Tambov

insurrection, the Soviet authorities found the Kronstadt resolutions at

an important Antonovist hiding place. Antonov himself was so saddened by

the news of the crushing of the Kronstadt uprising that he went on a

vodka binge, so it is alleged. It appears that some Kronstadt sailors

escaped the crushing of the insurrection and linking up with the

Antonovschina. On 11^(th) July Bolshevik cavalry fought an engagement

with a small but elite band of Antonovists, Socialist-Revolutionary

political workers and sailors. They fought with “striking steadfastness”

until the end according to the Chekist Smirnov, when the few survivors

shot first their horses and then themselves. One Bolshevik noted in 1921

that “the anarchist-Makhnovists in the Ukraine reprinted the appeal of

the Kronstadters, and in general did not hide their sympathy for

them.”[7]

Accusations

It is clear that the Kronstadters were opposed to Tsarist restoration,

and had been instrumental in bringing down the Kerensky regime. The

Makhnovists were equally implacable towards the Whites. No alliance was

even considered with them against the Bolsheviks, and indeed the

Makhnovists formed anti-White alliances with the Bolsheviks, the last of

which was to prove their downfall, as seen above. The movement was

deeply influenced by anarchism, and hardly likely to countenance

collaboration with one of its mortal foes. As for Maslakov, he had been

a trusted Red Commander, and seems to have been fighting for a communism

without commissars. Krasnaya Armiya admitted that the insurgents in the

Don and Kuban regions ‘disapprove of and fight against White Guardist

agitation’. As for Antonov, he “undertook no embarrassing action against

the Bolsheviks such as cutting communications behind the front lines,

but contented himself with combating punitive detachments sent out

against the peasants”[8]. Antonov had been imprisoned under Tsarism for

his activities as a Socialist Revolutionary during and after the 1905

Revolution with a 12 year sentence in Siberia, and his peasant movement

was unlikely to have favoured a return to the old days.

Another accusation against the peasant movements was that they were

kulak-led, dragging the rest of the peasantry in their wake. An analysis

of leading lights within the Makhnovist movement at least disproves it

in their case. Trotsky implied that the “liquidation of Makhno does not

mean the end of the Makhnovschina, which has its roots in the ignorant

peasant masses”. But all the leading Makhnovists that we have

biographical information on came from the poor peasantry, including

Makhno himself, and in a few cases the middle peasantry. As Malet says:

“the Bolsheviks have totally misconstrued the nature of the Makhno

movement. It was not a movement of kulaks, but of a broad mass of the

peasants, especially the poor and middle peasants”[9]. We have little

empirical evidence for the composition of the peasant uprisings in the

Don and Kuban areas. Radkey has provided some information on the Tambov

insurrection through research under difficult conditions, and has found

that Antonov was the son of a small-town artisan — hardly a kulak! There

is evidence that some leading Antonovists were of kulak origin, (based

on Bolshevik archives) yet one Cheka historian had to admit that a

“considerable part of the middle peasantry” supported the

insurrection[10]. There is evidence that Antonov had the support of the

poor peasantry and some workers in the province[11].

Reservations

One must have reservations over the allegations of the ‘kulak character’

of these uprisings. Even if it is admitted that some kulaks took parting

the risings, it must be granted, from the little evidence available,

that other sections of the peasantry took an active part. What can be

made of the allegations that far from being counter-revolutionary, the

peasant uprisings were the start of a ‘Third Revolution’ (leading on

from the February and October Revolutions)? This term appears to have

been developed by anarchists within the Makhnovist movement, appearing

in a declaration of a Makhnovist organ, the Revolutionary Military

Soviet, in October 1919. It reappeared during the Kronstadt

insurrection. Anatoli Lamanov developed it in the pages of the Kronstadt

Izvestia, the journal of the insurgents, of which he was an editor.

Lamanov was a leader of the Union of Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists

in Kronstadt, and saw Kronstadt as the beginning of a ‘Third Revolution’

which would overthrow the “dictatorship of the Communist Party with its

Cheka and state capitalism” and transfer all power “to freely elected

Soviets” and transform the unions into “free associations of workers,

peasants and labouring intelligentsia”[12]. The Maximalists, a split

from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, demanded immediate agrarian and

urban social revolution, a Toilers Republic of federated soviets,

anti-parliamentarism and distrust of parties. There is little evidence

on the links between them and the Makhnovists, though it would be

unlikely that this slogan emerged in two places totally independently.

“Here in Kronstadt, has been laid the first stone of the Third

Revolution, striking the last fetters from the labouring masses and

opening a broad new road for socialist creativity”, proclaimed the

Kronstadters[13].

The term ‘Third Revolution’ however, seems vague, with no clear idea of

how to bring this Revolution about. It had its adherents in Makhnovist

circles, and possibly in West Siberia and with Maslakov, but never

operated in a unified approach to a development of its implementation.

What distinguished the Makhnovist movement from Tambov was the former’s

specific ideology. The Antonov movement had no ideology, “knew what they

were against... but only the haziest of notions as to how to order

Russia in the hour of victory”[14]. The Antonovists were a local

movement with local perspectives. The Makhnovists were wide-ranging, and

links were formed with Maslakov. Makhno himself campaigned as far as the

Volga, going around the Don area linking up similar bands. A Makhnovist

detachment under Parkhomenko was sent off to the Voronezh area in early

March 1921 and it might have been attempting to link up with Antonovist

detachments under Kolesnikov.

But the vast expanse of the Soviet Union curtailed link-ups between the

movements. There seems to have been widespread mutual ignorance of

either the existence or the aims of the differing peasant movements.

Where there was an awareness, there seems to have been little effort to

combine the movements for a unified onslaught against the Bolshevik

government. The Kronstadt insurrection was later deemed as several

months premature by some of its leading lights[15]. Localism and lack of

a more global strategy similarly hamstrung Antonov and the movements in

the Don, Kuban and west Siberian regions, as did the very spontaneity of

the risings. The Makhnovists may have had a better grasp of the

situation, but they failed to unite the opposition, going into alliance

once more with the Bolsheviks, despite previous unhappy experiences.

Nevertheless, the sum of these risings presented a very grave threat to

the regime, forcing it to at least move from War Communism to the New

Economic Policy.

Bibliography

Avrich, P. Princeton (1970) Kronstadt 1921

Atkinson,D. Stanford (1983) The end of the Russian Land Commune

1905–1930

Lewin, M. Allen & Unwin (1968) Russian Peasants and Soviet power

Mitrany, D. Weidenfeld & Nicholson (1951) Marx and the Peasant.

Malet, M. MacMillan (1982). Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War

Palij, M. Washington (1976) The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno.

Radkey, O. Hoover (1976) The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia.

Maximoff, G. P. Cienfuegos (1976) The Guillotine at Work.

Skirda, A. Paris (1982) Nestor Makhno, Le Cosaque de l’Anarchie.

Ferro, M. RKP (1985) The Bolshevik Revolution, A Social History of the

Russian Revolution.

Getzler, I. Cambridge University Press (1983) Kronstadt 1917–1921, the

Fate of a Soviet Democracy.

Glossary

Kulak — a better off peasant

Muzhik — the poorer peasants

Whites — the reaction to the Russian Revolution, gathered around the

Tsarists

Socialist-Revolutionaries — revolutionary party that saw a key role for

the peasants and thought that Russian society could avoid capitalism and

go straight to a socialist society

Left Socialist-Revolutionaries — a more radical split from the SRs.

[1] p.138 Ferro

[2] Izmeniia 1917–20, in Atkinson.

[3] L Kritsman, The Heroic Period of the Great Russian Revolution, 1926

in Skirda.

[4] Kubanin ‘The anti-Soviet peasant movement during the years of civil

war (war communism) 1926, in Skirda.

[5] Palij, Malet, Skirda all cite evidence of Makhnovist achievement in

saving the Bolshevik capital

[6] p.148, Maximoff

[7] Lebeds, quoted by Malet.

[8] p.82 Radkey

[9] p122 Malet

[10] Sofinov, in Radkey. p106.

[11] p107-110 Radkey

[12] See Getzler

[13] p243 Avrich

[14] p.69 Radkey

[15] see Avrich