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Title: Slouching Toward Gautama Author: Zach Dorfman Date: 2011 Language: en Topics: Buddhism, Religion Source: https://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Toward-a-Buddhist-politics-of-freedom.php
All our attitudes, moral, practical, or emotional, as well as religious,
are due to the ‘objects’ of our consciousness, the things which we
believe to exist, whether really or ideally, along with ourselves.”
— William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
There is a central teaching in certain schools of Mahayana Buddhist
metaphysics that all phenomena are shunya, or empty of inherent
existence. Things only exist in their relation to one another, through
the myriad arising and cessation of causes and conditions. Subject and
object, self and other, the one and the many: all becoming
simultaneously through some spontaneous irruption. Life, which presents
itself as so dense — like some gossamer web of being, solid from a
distance — is in fact far more delicate than we credit it to be. Causes
beget causes and what we thought we knew, what we knew we knew, recedes
into a distant mental space that nevertheless maintains an aura of
familiarity, like the bedrooms of our infancy. This place is all
silhouettes and shadows, lacking one piece of recognizable furniture,
but it nevertheless has the capacity to absorb us completely.
While such terrible complexity underlies even the most simplest-seeming
of objects, and we may not be able to identify the essential or inherent
qualities or causes of any given phenomena, they nevertheless appear to
us as solid, real “things.” The central teaching of this school of
philosophy is also its central paradox: phenomena arise
interdependently, but they are empty. Emptiness, or shunyata,
characterizes all objects, all beings, and all processes. Where we see
stability, there is only unyielding flux. The essence of phenomena is to
have no essence at all, except the provisional meanings that we
individually and collectively ascribe to them: there is no “there”
there. Seemingly impregnable from the outside, objects cannot withstand
analysis. They disappear in the web of their own relations. Our most
coveted possessions, spaces we’ve furtively made our own, the ideas of
people we’ve loved and lusted after, all dissolve to the touch. This
fact doesn’t make these mental objects any less real, or their emotional
force any less intense. It just means we have to take these ideal types
for what they are, and, secure in the fact that they are fleeting —
transitory — accept that we are no different.
But there is another layer to this paradox. Straining for an
unattainable mental object, we end up preserving the world as it is.
Sometimes a cup is just a cup.
Simple. Perfect. The fact that objects are on one level essentially
unknowable doesn’t mean phenomena can’t (or shouldn’t) be broken down
and analyzed according to their aesthetic, sociological, technical,
religious, psychological, political, biological, linguistic, chemical,
philosophical, or economic aspects (among many others). It’s just
impossible to reduce them solely to one of these ways of seeing, or
ultimately privilege one of these modes of observation over another.
Truth and falsity remain valid and necessary categories for describing
our experiences; a pear is not a Volkswagen, the Sears tower is not Mao
Tse-tung. The fact that these associations sound absurd reflects the
extent to which our knowledge of the world is both shared and reflexive,
before our critical faculties do violence to this preexisting harmony
and the conceptual scar tissue forms. Thus reality is, in this sense,
exactly as we perceive it, as it presents itself to us as a mental
object, but also radically unknowable. But again, just because objects
are unknowable at their core does not mean that relative statements
about, say, the position and movement of celestial bodies or the
relationship between monetary policy and inflation are necessarily
incoherent. The concept of emptiness (shunyata) does not fuel the fire
of some “Eastern”-flavored obscurantist doctrine.
This essay is an attempt to bridge the gap between this theory about the
nature of phenomena — that they are empty, yet arise interdependently —
and what this knowledge means for our shared world, especially the
political sphere. Because of the difficulty of enunciating a full-blown
Buddhist theory of politics (assuming this could even exist in the
singular), my aim is to create a pathway, a sketch of what this
political consciousness might look like, given Buddhism’s unique
arguments about the nature of reality and the self. To do this, a little
more must be said about these arguments themselves.
Since according to the idea of emptiness nothing possesses any
essential, unchanging identity, the doctrine challenges some basic
theological principles that foreground a great deal of human striving.
Eternal damnation or eternal reward: these do not matter, because,
“eternal” is a concept of our own invention, and one, notably, that is
not borne out in our experience of the world.[1] Alas, if we accept the
idea that phenomena exist only in their relation to other phenomena, the
idea of an eternally existing, omnipotent Creator-God becomes a
necessary casualty.
From a Mahayana Buddhist perspective, the basic critique of a
Creator-God usually proceeds along the following lines. Say you assume
the existence of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, Creator-God. If he
were eternal he would be utterly causeless, always existing, creating
but never created, an unmoved mover. He would be beyond causation, prior
and posterior to it. But if he were in fact beyond causation, he would
be unable to himself cause anything, because only beings or objects with
causal power can affect other like objects. To exist beyond causality,
then, most likely means to not exist at all. Of course, it is possible
that a quasi-impotent God could abide outside the realm of human
perception, and be granted a sort of “permanent observer” status,
viewing the goings-on of the cosmos from afar.[2] I doubt, though, that
most believers from within the monotheistic tradition would find this
idea of God accurate or desirable. A God who cannot provide wish
fulfillment is probably not a God worth worshiping.
In the emptiness tradition the notion of “the eternal” is discarded as
incoherent, but so is the tempting proposition that because things do
not exist perpetually and independently of one another, nothing “really”
exists. The doctrine’s proponents are always quick to emphasize that the
idea that all phenomena are empty does not serve as a sophisticated
license for nihilism. At its best, the idea of emptiness can act as a
corrective of sorts, helping to soften a fundamentally human tendency:
the imposition of order and stability upon life’s chaotic undertow. That
is to say, it not only explodes the idea that there is some kind of
intangible yet essential property to any given object or being — the
eternal soul, the Godhead, Atman-Brahman, all the different essentialist
footnotes to Plato — but also emphasizes that the mundane properties
that we ascribe to ourselves are ultimately illusory.
Initially, this latter fact would seem to be the easier one with which
to come to terms. After all, we find it relatively intuitive that we are
not the person we were ten years ago, and that we will be very different
creatures a decade from now. The fact that this is self-evident is
itself puzzling: we conceive of ourselves as somehow exterior to our own
experience of the world. But not in our daily life — this sense of
disassociation would be nightmarish, and we rightly view it as
pathological. There is a certain “wholeness” to experience that is
absolutely fundamental to human life (and perhaps other sentient life as
well). Time has to be stretched out — it has to feel like a discrete
entity — for us to “look back” on it and see ourselves as an object, or
at least as a different, somewhat foreign, subject. The notion that we
possess multiple selves over a lifetime, but nevertheless maintain an
abiding, residual center to our being is sometimes called the idea of
the “transitory composite” in Buddhism. In the emptiness tradition, the
ultimate reality of the transitory composite is denied; the continuum
lacks a core. “The drop is water,” said the Sufi Frithjof Schuon, “but
water is not the drop.” To put this in more traditionally Buddhist
terms: while each individual may be the product (and cause!) of an
innumerable number of causes and conditions which are constantly arising
and undergoing cessation, the individual is not reducible to them —
because there isn’t any subject to be absolutely reduced. Things arise
dependently. We are, in essence, relational beings — essenceless.
Nevertheless, the idea that we maintain some sense of permanent identity
that underlies, or is outside of, the changes we undergo over time is
undeniably powerful. Our attraction to it is almost reflexive or
intuitive. There are few good reasons why I think this sense of
permanence-in-difference is so hard for us to shake. The first reason is
perhaps mundane and the other probably less so.
The biological and cognitive limitations of human beings have to be
considered. Humans, for all their myriad advantages over other living
creatures, simply do not possess the necessary biological equipment to
register certain changes in real time. Other animals even have a sensory
advantage over us in significant respects. Dogs, for instance, can
apparently register mutations on the cellular level in human beings
through their heightened sense of smell. Humans simply cannot grasp
these physical processes as they occur. Of course, the kinds of changes
I am referring to are not merely biological. The social life of human
beings — so much richer, denser, and more complex than any other living
creatures, by an almost inconceivable margin — helps shape and maintain
this sense of a permanent, abiding self. We are uniquely adept at
constructing complex social worlds that feel almost more fundamental to
our sense of identity than brute environmental or physiological facts.
And while it is true that we may be partially aware of changes in the
composition of our social fabric, so much of this world is inherited —
and so much of it forms the conditions that make our shared experiences
possible — that we can never wholly remove ourselves from it. No
God’s-eye view is possible; we are all leveled on the social plane. The
milieu we inherit provides a template that we can employ to express the
content of our experience in terms understandable to others. It is in
the interest of a civilization that its central concepts remain rigid or
fixed: this insures a degree of continuity and intelligibility over time
and place. Whether this society’s organizing principles conform in any
way to reality is beside the point. The goal is self-reproduction, not
truth.
Prizing self-reproduction or self-preservation over intellectual honesty
is not only a function of human beings at the social level. It very much
characterizes us as individuals. We may grasp in a highly abstract sense
that life is fleeting, that identity is largely the result of social
construction and is cruelly arbitrary: where we are born and when —
facts wholly outside of our control — have made us who we are more than
anything we have consciously done to craft our own personalities. But it
is particularly difficult for us to live with this knowledge and to
incorporate it into the way we think about ourselves and our
relationship to the world. This problem is an old one, and it is not
unique to Mahayana Buddhism or the product of my interpretation of some
of its key concepts. The idea of a fundamental remove between what
appears to be real and what is actually so, and that we should
consequently change the way we live in order to harmonize with this
newly revealed reality-as-it-is, has been a fertile one. It has formed
the backbone of many political ideologies, religious systems, and social
theories. The content of this revelation is always adjusted to fit its
social and intellectual milieu, but the basic trope remains the same.
What, then, is to be done?
In seeking out common archetypes we always risk doing violence to the
uniqueness of the phenomena we are attempting to describe and
understand. There are tremendous differences of interpretation related
to the nature of the aforementioned problem as well as the potential
solutions proffered by each system or theory. Original Sin and getting
right with God; alienation from one’s labor due to unjust relations of
production and the (temporary) institution of a proletarian
dictatorship; the radical decline and emasculation of a nation or race
through the introduction of foreign blood and ideas and the return to a
pure, edenic past — the mechanism operating here is the same, even
though the sources of discontent, and the potential solutions to it,
differ greatly. While its content can range from relatively benign to
downright iniquitous, the mechanism operating here is totally amoral.
The emptiness tradition within Buddhism offers what I think is a
particularly radical account of this problematic. Grasping or attachment
is said to lead to a kind of general malaise, or suffering. But this
“grasping,” and the upwelling of desire that accompanies it, is not
limited to our normal understanding of the term. It is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of objects. We behave as if
they are permanent, even if we know intellectually that this is
impossible. The imposition of permanence on impermanent — empty —
objects of desire is the fundamental cause of our suffering.
It is that simple, but of course, it is not all that simple.
The idea that we possess some pure, unadulterated core to our selves is
deeply ingrained in most religious traditions, presumed in many of our
political ideologies, and propped up by our own grasping egos. In other
words, it forms a basic building block of our psychic and social worlds.
But it is as wrong as it is pervasive. In order to build a reconstituted
theory of the self and the way we are in the world, we first have to rid
ourselves of this jaundiced perspective. At first, this is easier to do
when we abstract away from our own egos, and is why an essay that I
initially conceived of as a kind of personal reflection transmogrified
into an account of a type of speculative metaphysics. Process
philosophies like those from the Buddhist emptiness tradition are always
easier to grapple with, and to grasp, from some remove.
But I don’t think exercises of this type are necessarily fruitless. The
possible experience of the metaphysical is tantalizing, because it holds
the promise of the widest cognitive horizon for human beings. The
existence of some kind of greater or ultimate reality is not actually
necessary — what really matters is our own desire for it, the
irresistible impulse we have toward experiencing the “oceanic feeling”
described by Freud.[3] This longing for the eternal and basic universal
order takes many forms, only one of which is manifested in what we
consider the religious realm. We may long for the City of God, but we
plan for the City of Man, and much human activity is directed toward
perfecting this form of social organization. As diverse as they are
predictable, political orders rely on cosmic creation myths and the
promise of a transcendent tomorrow. Rome grew fat on the stories of
Romulus and Remus being suckled by a she-wolf. The American republic
burdens its sons and daughters with the promise of promise, the idea of
well-ordered liberty, the freedom of limitless choice. After the
revolution, one can hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and
philosophize at the dinner table... The sheer diversity of these
political foundation myths and desired end states say more about human
beings than the goods they promise or legitimacy they attempt to
concretize. Politics is a social activity, and it is central to who we
are. No matter what form of social organization we think ideal, we
cannot escape its grasp. If, in its most rarified form, the desire for
order and permanence is metaphysical in nature, politics forms the next,
smaller ring in the concentric circles that, emanating inward, helps
constitute the self.
If man differentiates himself from all other beings by being the
“rational animal,” willing together in some kind of social sphere —
creating a shared world — then in order to develop a better sense of the
nature of our own identity we have to reckon with this social impulse,
and more importantly, how it intensifies our sense of permanence. It may
be driven in some sense by this higher impulse, but it stands on its
own, and pushes back. We take cosmic concepts and make them vulgar, and
then the vulgar becomes transcendent.
Along with his many other keen insights, Carl Schmitt observed that that
the major organizing principles of the modern state were all theological
concepts made secular, and that, taken together, these concepts formed a
kind of “political theology.” For instance, take the idea of
sovereignty. Sovereignty has a tortured genealogy, but can be traced at
least in part to the idea of God as an absolutely powerful will.[4] A
God-as-absolutely-powerful-will — a voluntarist God — is the God capable
of miracles. But it is also the God who destroys Sodom and Gomorrah, and
who commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. This God is not only pure,
unmitigated will, but also one who can will what was previously deemed
outside the realm of the possible. In religion, this act is identified
as “the miracle.” The parallel that Schmitt drew attention to was
between the structure of the miracle in theology and “the exception” in
politics. This kind of ruler is famously described in Hobbes’s
Leviathan: endowed with absolute power, he alone prevents the inevitable
descent into chaos, the war of “all against all.” Since his rule is
absolute, he can decide whenever “exceptional measures” should be taken.
Of course, in our day, the absolute monarchy seems almost quant (when it
actually occurs, such as in North Korea, or until recently,
Turkmenistan, it feels cruelly anachronistic). In fascist Germany, this
idea of government probably saw its most complete modern manifestation;
Hannah Arendt even went so far to observe that the defining feature of
totalitarian government is its ability to rule by decree. But even in
our moderate, constitutional republics the idea of this kind of
sovereign remains potent: it is what allowed, say, Richard Nixon to
claim that when the U.S. president performs an action it is by that very
fact definitively legal.
Like his political analogue, a voluntarist God is taken to possess
unlimited rule in his Kingdom. He is able to make manna rain from the
heavens; smite whole cities that incur his wrath; and torture pious men
like a cat playfully paws at a mouse. His willpower is absolute. His
word makes law, but he can also subvert or contradict his previous
commandments on a whim, as cruel or as arbitrary as this may seem. In
short, he is a tyrant. This image of the deity, vulgar as it may be,
should be a surprise to absolutely no one with any degree of expose to
popular religion.[5] What is so striking is that so few succeed in
drawing a straight line between their (explicit) religious and
(implicit) political commitments.
For those of us who, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, believe that
liberal democracy is the best possible type of political system, the
fact that our own religious traditions feature an often — illiberal
deity sits in tension with our political commitments. How can we assent
to such unlimited power in one sphere of human affairs while advocating
for its dispersal and containment in another? Why does our ideal
political ruler differ so fundamentally from our ideal spiritual
sovereign? Particularly for those committed to the intellectual
tradition of the Enlightenment, this disjunction causes strain: a simple
“rendering unto Caesar” is insufficient. In particular, the principle of
the rule of law — a cornerstone of the modern political order — seems
irreconcilably opposed to the voluntaristic conception of sovereignty
(unless, of course, rule and law are synonymous, which would mean
tyranny). In setting laws outside the whim of individual or collective
wills, the rule of law establishes a kind of power outside individual
human power, a demarcation that cannot be violated because doing so
would tear open the social compact that permits laws and political
societies to exist, and moreover, flourish.
But perhaps we delude ourselves in thinking that power or authority can
ever be truly subsumed by some abstract impersonal notion of the law,
or, even if it were possible, that it would actually be desirable. We
can’t predict the future with absolute certainty, and neither can the
law know the outmost limit of its own applicability. The final decision
must rest with someone; the unforeseen in human affairs must be reckoned
with, because problems arise in human affairs that previously seemed not
only unlikely but completely outside of our collective field of vision.
Someone, in other words, must be sovereign. And to be sovereign, in
Schmitt’s terms, is to be “he who decides on the exception.” Thus
someone must know not just what the correct decision may be given
extraordinary circumstances, but possess the ability to decide which
circumstances warrant transcending the legal, moral, or political order
itself.
This is an idea that many find reflexively repellent. The notion that a
sovereign can somehow transcend the legal order by defining the limits
of “the legal” and — poof — employ only his volition to create law from
nothing, just to set that newfound order aflame, ad infinitum, is
unsettling. But why is it so? For centuries, kings and emperors
explicitly invoked the autocracy of the Heavenly Kingdom to justify
their own rule. Absolute monarchies gave way to their softer,
constitutional cousins, and while the range of circumstances where the
use of the exception was deemed acceptable constricted, the idea of the
exception did not. Nor did the (uneven and incomplete) global transition
to liberal democracy portend the end of the sovereign exception. In
fact, it doesn’t even appear that there is historically linear movement
in this direction. And while power may be more defuse than it was during
the age of the absolute monarch, it seems that, whether in today’s
liberal democracies or yesterday’s conservative autocracies, the
exception perseveres. The more sovereignty changes, the more the
sovereign exception remains the same.
This begs the question: for all the seismic changes that the
international political order has undergone in the last fifty years —
not to mention the last hundred and fifty — what essential kernel has
remained constant? What fuels the sovereign exception? What I would like
to suggest is that since our political leaders have explicitly imitated
the structure of rule suggested by our theological ideals, and that
these ideals, centered on the common, vulgar conception of God as an
omnipotent, omniscient, trans-temporal deity, have caused us to suffer
from a pervasive kind of intellectual blindness. In permeating
everything from our theological to our political ideals, this set of
tropes forms much of the basis for our world.
It may be the case, however, that the illusion of our own permanence and
the permanence of our social world is both necessary and desirable for
us to carry about the business of our daily lives. The web of
relationships we cultivate throughout our lives and that in many ways
define us; the basic categories of knowledge that not only condition our
experience but make it coherent and transmissible to others; the whole
mass of human experience, from the profound to the mundane — all require
a certain assumption that the future will perpetually conform to the
past, that the sun will rise tomorrow. Is there any harm in our
conceiving of politics in the same manner?
Perhaps not, but only if we remain cognizant that politics essentially
requires a continuous leap of faith. Faith is required to sustain our
political institutions, which are, at best, temporal and prone to error,
in the collective imaginary that produces and sustains our “imaged
communities,” and in the generally debased but occasionally altruistic
behavior of those who we refer to as our “politicians,” as if the
activity of politics, and not its result, could be professionalized. It
may not be necessary or desirable to create the world anew with every
generation, but to lose our awareness of this possibility would be
tragic. It would mean we forgot what it meant to be political, to be
human, to be shunya.
Edmund Burke famously observed that “history is a pact between the dead,
the living, and the yet unborn.” The essential kernel of wisdom in this
idea is that politics occurs in a continuum: we are always already
impregnated with the past, even as we necessarily orient ourselves
toward the future. In this sense, there is no actual present, or,
alternatively, there is nothing but the “eternal” present, imbued in
some way with the past and future as potentiality. We feel eternally
present in our own lives. We also feel that our political communities
somehow stretch out beyond time, as a measure of our own immortality, or
as proof of our participation in something truly immortal. But actions
undertaken long ago have situated us in this present, and will at least
partially direct our future endeavors. Granted, within this individual
and collective determinism, there is always some room for choosing — for
that process of willing — that produces real, unadulterated human
action. This is at the root of the political sphere, and all the other
spheres of meaningful human activity.
I think that many well-versed in the emptiness tradition in Buddhism
would find much that is agreeable about this notion about past, present,
and future, and their relationship to human activity. After all, the
most common translation of karma is “action,” and the interplay between
what is burdensome and inherited and what is possible — what is
radically possible — forms in many ways the cornerstone of Buddhist
doctrine. Karma is a fundamental component of Buddhist soteriology — the
promise of freedom from suffering and rote, but pervasive,
dissatisfaction. This project, I think most Buddhists would assert, is
necessarily individual, but I believe it is also undisputedly
collective, and therefore political to its core. Or to put it in more
rigidly philosophical terms: liberation of the individual is necessary,
but only collective liberation is sufficient. The individual stands in
relation to his milieu, and so his individual will is in a sense imbued
with the collective, but this only necessarily shows that the collective
must be overcome for some kind of personal liberation. What I am saying
may be construed as paradoxical. To be fully human — to be an individual
in the most meaningful and fundamental sense — one must be realized as
part of a collective; but one’s actions, which cannot be reduced wholly
to personal or social causes, drive this movement toward human freedom,
and away from suffering. The individual drive toward action is central
and sacrosanct, but it is not enough.
The emptiness tradition in Buddhism is dialectical, and it shares
certain affinities with a tradition in Western philosophy that has been
venerated and despised in equal measure. Generally traced to Rousseau
and perhaps even more frequently to Hegel, this tradition sees the
individual as wholly subsumable to some abstract notion of a “general
will.” Hegel saw individual wills as mechanistic byproducts of the
dialectical movement of “History,” realized in human consciousness, and
subsequently perfected in the state. Marx grafted Hegel’s mechanism for
historical change onto a framework that privileged the material over the
ideational. All three of these thinkers — diverse, confounding and
brilliant as they are — argued for end-states that I don’t think would
be considered possible, desirable, or supported by the Buddhist
“emptiness” traditions. Rousseau saw freedom arise through one’s
fulfillment in the general will of the body politic; Hegel pinned his
hopes on the State itself; Marx believed that violent class conflict
would eventually cause the existing political order to wither away,
which would then flower into a post-messianic era. All three saw power
as something necessarily concentrated, and then only diffused in an
abstract sense, or after the real “work” of politics was completed. If
there is a political philosophy of emptiness, it is surely not statist
or voluntarist in nature. This is too unidirectional, too authoritarian
in the literal sense. If anything, a Buddhist politics of freedom may
best be conceived of as a libertarian socialism of the mind, or an
anarcho-syndicalism of the spirit.
As much as Buddhism may be conceived of as containing the seeds of a
political philosophy, these three Western thinkers, in particular, may
be viewed according to their “religious elements.” Marx in particular
thought of philosophy as a discipline that contained revealed truths
that, put in practice, could lead to human liberation. He was only half
right, though, when he said that previous philosophers had been mistaken
because they only sought to understand the world, while the goal was to
change it. His range of vision had been too narrow; he was too
constrained in his conception of the political. The Buddhist project —
the cultivation of wisdom in order to end suffering — is wholly active,
because it has the capacity to completely color our vision of who we are
in the world, and our place in it. Philosophy understood in this way is
a form of praxis, and this conception of philosophy predates most of
what is in the West commonly considered “appropriate to the discipline.”
It is a shame that until the twentieth century, most Western
philosophers and scholars of religion characterized Buddhism as
philosophically pessimistic in nature (Schopenhauer famously took this
view, and interpreted Buddhism in this way approvingly), or as an
ascetic, world-denying religious tradition, separate and removed from
the pure, rational domain of philosophy proper. It is neither. In a way,
denying the ultimate reality of the self is among the most
life-affirming of philosophies. In admitting that we are not the axis
upon which the rest of the world revolves, we free ourselves to the
world. We become nothing more — but nothing less — than everything else.
Disintegrating as that vision may be, it is also beautiful, because our
individual and collective possibilities become truly endless. Because
objects are empty, things can arise. Anything can arise.
The question becomes what kind of world we wish to create. The
Indo-Tibetan Prasangika Madhyamika school of philosophy, one of the most
important emptiness traditions within Buddhism, only employs the via
negativa mode of interrogation to uncover the nature of phenomena. In
other words, they affirm only through negation. They make no positive
statements, but purportedly clear away the underbrush of the mind
through examining what they know not to be true. Through this process
they claim to achieve a certain amount of mental clarity about their own
nature and the world’s true state of being. We must of course stand for
things, and cannot only define the ideal political arrangement through
what we consider deficient. But this process of “affirmation through
negation” is helpful and perhaps necessary when trying to sketch the
ideal relationship between man and state, oneself and others, and our
own divided selves. Through this process of continuously breaking down
and building up our psychological, social, and political worlds, we may
discover some tensions or truths previously eclipsed by others, and thus
better accept and understand the unity-in-diversity that underlies the
tremendously discordant aspects of human life. Perhaps this refined
understanding will make us suffer less, and strive toward more. Perhaps
it will make us build something better, together.
[1] How Buddhism still finds a way to posit a metaphysical enforcement
mechanism for morality through the action-driven cycle of rebirths known
as the karma-samsara complex is a different and more troublesome matter
altogether.
[2] God, according to another well-known skeptical philosopher, would
therefore be “dead.”
[3] In an instance of cross-cultural metaphorical congruence, the
idealist Yogacara, or Mind-Only, school of Buddhism posits the existence
of the alayavijnana, or universal storehouse consciousness that serves
as the foundation of law for all reality. The storehouse consciousness
is sometimes likened to an ocean, and our thoughts, desires, and
ego-driven actions compared to specific waves within it.
[4] This is in contradistinction to those thinkers who have conceived of
God in a more relational sense, like some early Catholic theologians.
Take for instance Aquinas’s famous description of a “great chain of
being” where every being from the lowliest to the most advanced form a
continuum leading up to the Creator.
[5] Of course, the idea of the willful, vengeful God is one primary
image among a few others, such as the God-as-love sometimes emphasized
in Christianity.