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Title: The revolution delayed
Author: Charles Reeve
Date: March 2008
Language: en
Topics: interview, Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, El Libertario
Source: Retrieved on 2020-04-06 from https://libcom.org/library/revolution-delayed-10-years-hugo-ch%C3%A1vez%E2%80%99s-rule-charles-reeve-el-libertario

Charles Reeve

The revolution delayed

The origins of “Chavismo”, between caudillismo and the social

movements

Charles Reeve – we are amazed by the shallowness of political debate in

Venezuela. All discussion centres on the “dynamics of Chavismo”. Rarely

do we see it analysed through the wider perspective of the general Latin

American situation, as a specific case of left populism. Questions such

as how to characterise the current period, what explains these

developments and the temporary weakening of US political control over

the region are hardly taken into account. This despite the fact that

changes in the political space occupied by the régime will largely

depend on external factors, such as the future path of US policy,

transformations in the Cuban system and finally the cycles of oil

prices.

Miguel – There is a lot of talk nowadays of a left turn in Latin

America. There have indeed been several governments elected who belong

to traditional left tendencies. For us, there are two main currents. On

the one hand are governments brought to power after great social

movements, such as is the case in Bolivia and Brazil, countries with a

long history of struggle. Apart from these – and more particularly, in

Venezuela — the so-called “left” governments have not come to power off

the back of social movements or grassroots struggles. They belong to a

cultural set more linked to Latin American populism of the caudillo

variety. It is clear in our eyes that all such governments meet the

needs of a situation of political crisis. It is impossible to understand

the rise of Chavismo without looking back to the caracazo of 1989. These

riots in Caracas left thousands dead. The pact which had existed between

the various forces in politics was thus broken and society faced a

crisis of governability. This concern was most acute within the ruling

class itself. All the more so given that these riots opened up a cycle

of struggle in Venezuelan society, with the emergence of grassroots

organisations independent of the old left political parties. Some people

called this “a new civil society”, particularly as regards the student

movement and even the movements in the poor barrios. For example, the

Human Rights group, with which I work, came about in these years. The

same went for environmentalist groups and women’s groups. So people who

identified with leftist ideas escaped the control of the parties. For

its part the workers’ movement mostly remained dominated by social

democracy (and the Acción Democrática party), with a few fringes

controlled by groups of the authoritarian Marxist left. During the 90s

there was real turmoil in Venezuelan society, with popular struggles

organised in opposition to A. Perez, the social-democrat president

responsible for the 1989 massacres. This turmoil led to huge changes in

society. Three years later, in 1992, there was an attempted military

coup: a recurrent event in the history of this country, where the army

has often intervened in political life. Despite their failure, within a

few years these putschist army men, in particular Chávez, had managed to

recuperate the whole of this popular resistance movement. Chávez’s

appeal in part came from the fact that he was able to make himself seem

in tune with the popular movements of the 90s.

That is how this powerful resistance movement fell behind this figure

and became part of a new institutional arrangement.

This was a dialectical integration: well known activists in these

movements were also on the look-out for some institutional role: in

their eyes, indispensable for carrying out their plans.

This “civil society” was new, having existed for barely a decade and had

carved out very little space of its own in society. It had little

experience in terms of concrete social engagement and anti-authoritarian

organising. So now, rather surprisingly, we find the cadres of this new

“civil society” in power with Chávez. The blank cheque they have given

in part results from this inexperience and lack of a concrete project.

Here we find the imprint of the country’s cultural make-up. Even if

revolutions define themselves by breaking with such paradigms, we have

to say that Chávez himself is repeating the whole caudillo, statist and

militarist tradition long established in Venezuela. He has breathed

fresh life into this culture.

From the start one of the characteristics of Chavismo has been

improvisation. We should attribute this to the lack of experience on the

part of most members of the grassroots movements who have joined Chávez.

Individuals who have never organised even a small co-operative were,

like a lightning flash, possessed with the idea of “forming

co-operatives” and found themselves at the head of the Ministry of

Co-operatives… which soon after decreed the creation of 200,000

co-operatives throughout the country!

Venezuela is a society that has long lived off its oil revenue. The left

has always claimed that all is necessary for the distribution of this

revenue to be more equal is for the state to take control of oil

production… In Venezuela, controlling the state means controlling the

oil. A mechanical interpretation: once you have the oil, everything can

be sorted. Magical voluntarism!

I will return to the weakness of the theoretical analysis of “civil

society” groups which you have mentioned. We must understand that in

Venezuela we are today living through a rerun of the old Cold War left

schema based on confrontation between capitalism and the socialist

countries. Thanks to its oil resources and the importance of oil to the

world economy, the Chávez government today positions itself as one of

the leading forces in this conflict. Much as this confrontation existed

before the coming of Chavismo, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the

Eastern Bloc, the forms of imperialist domination are not the same. It

is as if reality has changed but the Chavistas haven’t realised! The

régime is trying to answer new problems with old schemas. Both the

Chavistas and the opposition, still have Cold War theoretical stances.

To put it another way: given the lack of critical thinking and

theorising, new practice or fresh reflection, they on old ideas and old

strategies.

So Chávez has created the ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin

America and the Caribbean, a new institution intended to build new

relationships between Latin American countries and become a

counterweight to US hegemony. To achieve this it seeks alliance with the

Russian Federation, Iran and China… countries which in our eyes are part

of world capitalism. But there is all sorts of propaganda about Chavista

Venezuela’s leading role in a so-called new movement for

anti-imperialist “liberation”. As if this country is in the vanguard of

some global upheaval! Always following the old model of the Cold War,

bloc against bloc… that is how this government portrays itself to the

outside world. That some comrades in Europe and elsewhere promote this

image saddens us, since it means that they cannot see beyond the

Chavista spectacle and cannot see the real contradictions of the

situation.

In the past, the left rarely won more than 10% in presidential elections

in Venezuela. In the early 90s the left had weak social roots, testimony

to the weakness of its ideas. Today, these organisations are in power

with Chávez and are doing all they can to take up once more all the

positions they have abandoned over the years. The construction of

socialism, building popular power, the relationship between state

intervention of the market… all the debates which ran out of steam in

the 90s are now taken up again by those who are now part of the state.

We might point out that in terms of anti-globalisation and Third

Worldist groups worldwide, the lessons being learnt from Venezuela are

more than modest, particularly in comparison with the Argentinian and

Brazilian experiences. The only idea is that of the epic

anti-imperialist hero Chávez – David against Goliath. In the last

analysis, a bourgeois figure. But the theoretical elaboration on this is

practically nil.

To conclude, I will repeat the point that, looking at the political

activity taking place in Caracas, one can only say that the lessons we

have all learnt from the régime are exactly those we already knew before

Chávez came to power! They already had some history. That is the case,

for example, with the mobilisations of the “23^(rd) January” barrio of

Caracas [1] where a large number of committees had been active since

1989. Chavismo is given credit for the activity of these movements, but

they did nothing but follow their own logic.

“Chavismo”, a melting-pot

C.R. — Let us discuss propaganda and ideological struggle and its

importance for the Chavista régime. It is banal to remark on the role of

the majority of leftist groups in this project, and more original to

look at the new Chavista nomenklatura and individuals such as Barreto,

the (locally) well-known professor who is currently mayor of Caracas.

This is a man who invited Negri to Caracas, speaks of “biopolitics”,

claims the tradition of Foucault and who has developed unusual

post-modern theories. He uses post-leftist rhetoric to carry out the

same old bureaucratic measures. A vast confusion – in which Chávez

participates – citing everyone from Trotsky to Chomsky and beyond… even

more out of the ordinary is the behaviour of a man like Eduardo Rothe,

who wrote for l’Internationale Situationniste and is now the number two

in the Ministry of Information/propaganda.

M. – One of the characteristics of South American populism is its woolly

ideology! What is the content of the “Bolivarian process”? It’s totally

empty! In reality the whole “process” centres on the Chávez personality

cult. When we discuss this with comrades from abroad we always emphasise

two points. Firstly, how it is simplistic to see Chavismo as the left

and the opposition as the right: the best way of not understanding

anything! Second, to take account of the economic context: Venezuela is

experiencing one of the richest periods of the last thirty years in

terms of oil revenue. We have to go back to the ‘70s and the

nationalisation of the oil by the social democrats to find an economic

situation as favourable to the ruling powers as this. We must also note

that the structure of command in the Venezuelan armed forces, the

institution from which Chávez and most leading figures in the current

régime emerged, is less differentiated by class than in most Latin

American countries. The armed forces have allowed for a certain degree

of social mobility, and individuals from the poorer classes’ access to a

military career has been one of the ways of redistributing oil revenue.

That said, the Venezuelan army was formed during the Cold War and until

very recently was part of the American counter-insurgency school. The

armed forces were responsible for the massacre in 1989. I want to

emphasise there that there is absolutely no leftwards dynamic in this

institution. There are more conservative and more nationalist sections

of the army, and those who are both things at once. There are army men

close to the Communist Party and other left parties like “Patria para

Todos”. But many of those who initiated the movement around Chávez, and

who are today in his new PSUV, come from the old social democratic

tradition. The thing that brings this jumble together is the leadership

figure, the president! Between 2002 and 2004 this group consolidated

itself against its enemies, namely threats of an anti-Chavista coup or

United States intervention. But from 2004 onwards the rhythm of the

mobilisation of Chavista and anti-Chavista forces came to be determined

by the electoral calendar. Their central objective is to win votes.

Taking this stance, a lid was put on the significant internal

differences in the Chavista camp in order to guarantee a united front

against the enemy.

It seems that this second period came to an end with the bad results on

2^(nd) December 2007, when Chávez lost the referendum on constitutional

reform. The charm and the myth of the leader’s invulnerability took a

hit, and since then the differences among the Chavistas have been more

clearly visible. Chávez, for his part, has now done enough sloganising

to breathe new life into the iconography of the Venezuelan left. In

doing so he has counted on the support of individuals who in the past

took part in guerrilla and other such movements, legitimising his

discourse as a left discourse, as anti-conformist, as a clean break. Now

a number of personalities of the old left, as well as some from the new

left, are coming into the Chavista scene. We have mentioned the

ex-situationist Eduardo Rothe, but there have been others, like the

former guerrilla leader who became CEO of the nationalised oil company

PDVSA… I will not reduce all this to politically opportune posturing:

there is also an attempt to win ground inside a contradictory and

shallow movement in order to push their own agendas.

Isabel — the case of Barreto, the current mayor of Caracas, is

indicative. He is a man who first spread his wings politically at the

university, starting from post-modernist political precepts. It is

important to remember that Chavism has never been a monolithic movement,

but one which adapts to circumstance and whose supporters have similarly

changed attitudes according to circumstances.

That is also its strength. The Chavismo which of the initial abortive

military coup; the Chavismo which wins elections; and the Chavismo which

survived the 2002 coup are all different things. At the moment we are

again experiencing change. In 2002, at the time of the anti-Chávez coup,

many activist and political factions were directly involved in the

institutions of state. Until then Chávez had never called himself a

socialist, Marxist, Marxist-Leninist or whatever… throughout these years

he had argued for a social project quite different from traditional left

perspectives.

C.R. Do you mean to say that Chavismo is a confused ideological space, a

sort of “melting pot” where diverse tendencies co-exist and where each

current or clan looks to conquer ground to promote its ideas?

I. You could say that. Until the results of the 2007 referendum, they

remained united against the common enemy. Since then, for the first time

deep disagreements have been expressed openly…

M. I repeat, in Venezuela’s history left groups have rarely held power

and always lacked a “tribune of the masses”. Now, suddenly, they’re

experiencing a situation where there is talk of “socialism”, where there

is a charismatic figure capable of “mobilising the people”. These left

politicians now find themselves in harmony with these mobilisations.

They are part of the authorities and have a tribune of the people as

represented by Chávez. For these groups, this development is seen as a

“gain”. Now there is no question of abandoning “the processes of

government”! They are gaining ground and continue to justify anything

and everything in the name of this or that tactic. Above all they must

avoid losing the tribune represented by the régime. These groups are

ready to legitimise and justify anything.

“Chavismo” and the neo-liberal model

I. Chavismo has another characteristic beside its links with the

traditional left. The régime’s project is tied into the current

international situation, which supports a global drive for capitalist

rule. I will explain: nowadays it is easier to implement the plans of

neo-liberal capitalism in a country with a left-wing government which

uses populist slogans without provoking real mobilisation on the part of

workers. For us, that is Chavismo’s principal role. Of course, I am not

saying that all the people and groups who support Chávez are conscious

of this. I repeat, Chavismo does not have a homogenous supporter base.

There are those who think the régime is doing the best it can to improve

the lot of the people… there are even thous who are convinced that today

we are experiencing a unique opportunity to “build socialism”. We, for

our part, think that this neo-liberal role can be seen in the régime’s

policies on oil and trade, and indeed in its whole economic agenda. This

manipulative populist rhetoric covers up the real agenda of clearing the

way for the implementation of the neo-liberal model, to a greater extent

than ever before.

C.R. — Chavismo as the spearhead of neo-liberal policies: quite an

original take on things! From this standpoint, can we see the rise — or

the creation — of a new private sector emerging from the Chávez years:

one based on the new networks of patronage and corruption?

I. — But obviously! In Venezuela such networks have always been integral

to the functioning of society. Initially the Chavistas tried to break

with this set-up. But in reality there were but minor changes in the

structures of bureaucracy, and corruption and patronage continued. There

are few studies of this issue. But at an empircal level we can state

that it is plain to see in the oil and financial sectors where the

government has introduced its plans. In the co-operative sector, for

example, cliques have identifiably appropriated projects to build

centres of economic power from which they can make personal gains.

C.R. — What is the place of the military caste in these new structures

of economic power? Do they directly control any private enterprises?

I. — Almost all ministries are under the control of the military

bureaucracy.

M. — We have to emphasise several different points here. In Venezuela,

given the importance of oil revenue to the economy, the state has always

subsidised private companies, like a sort of mixed capitalism. The

wealthiest bosses who have emerged have always had ties with the state.

Within global capitalism, Venezuela has fulfilled the role of cut-price

oil producer. With the current transformations, Venezuelan entrepreneurs

in traditional sectors like the service sector and manufacturing have

been progressively sidelined by entrepreneurs more linked to modern

industries like communication, transport and finance. These domestic

developments are linked to the evolution of globalised capitalism. The

way things are going, it looks like the new Chavista state has installed

a new capitalist caste whose role is to defend the central importance of

oil to the economy.

The top of the military bureaucracy have always finished their career in

the private sector, as landowners or executives. Today their economic

role has increased now that army men are in place at all levels of the

state apparatus. Chávez has particular reliance on the military

bureaucracy, which he has confidence in and which is charged with

stepping up efficiency in the management of the economy. It is a

well-established bureaucracy which benefits from significant material

and financial privileges and good living standards. What’s more, it

benefits from total legal impunity.

I. — The Venezuelan people have always looked upon their children’s

access to military careers in a favourable light, and as a means of

social advancement. That is why the government speaks of “soldiers, part

of the people”. But this is totally demagogic and fake: when you go into

the military, you are separated from the people.

Corruption protected by the “leader”

C.R. — Let us return to the issue of corruption. Among the masses the

recurrent explanation given for the failures of the régime is

corruption, as if were some simple dysfunction. Well, firstly,

corruption is actually a “normal” part of the capitalist system. No

capitalism without corruption exists, and the capitalist classes came

about and became strong on the basis of corruption: the history of north

American capitalism is a good example of this. So is this an attempt at

concealing the implementation of a neo-liberal model which you have

described? And people see this as a mere dysfunction?

I. — This explanation has the advantage of keeping the image of the

leader intact: Chávez is a good leader but surrounded by bad, corrupt

people. This is a lie, but a useful lie which serves to protect the

régime’s populist image and emotional ties with the leader. Things would

be different if the workers were more aware of their rights and better

understood their situation. On the contrary, the constant complaints

about corruption express ambiguous attitudes: they are addressed to the

government and accept its authority. No matter what, you can rely on the

government to resolve your problems. The idea of ‘corruption’ serves the

interests of the régime.

I will give the example of life in the barrios. All this so-called

“socialist” process has done little to increase solidarity, self-help

and co-operation between people. On the contrary! If you live in a bad

barrio, you look to move to a less run-down one. In general you look to

solve your own needs rather than improving living conditions in general.

The solution for such problems is far from being seen as a collective

effort. The solution is always The Government. The idea of corruption is

situated amid this void of independent activity by the people

themselves. It’s unfortunate, but that’s how things are.

Propaganda and reality

C.R. — It is not easy to compare the situation in Brazil with Venezuela.

The populism of the Partido dos Trabalhadores is different from

Chavismo. The story of the PT is one of a classic socialist party,

emerging from a powerful workers’ movement, whose cadre are absorbed

into the state apparatus. As we have discussed, the history of Chavismo

is more linked to the military revolt after the mass riots of 1989.

Here I shall mention the analysis of some of my friends in Brazil. They

argue that the PT’s coming to power was not the outcome of social

struggles but on the contrary brought to completion the crushing of

autonomous currents in these movements by the PT and trade union

bureaucracy. The PT’s victory was the political expression of the

normalisation of a radical social movement.

Among the people who support (”critically”, they say) the populist

régimes, in particular Chavismo, some have the idea that every

amelioration of living conditions represents a positive factor for

future struggles, and that we ought to support these régimes for that

reason. You are arguing the opposite, saying that the

institutionalisation of popular movements tends to enfeeble them.

Firstly, it makes them dependent on the state. We are not seeing any new

attitudes emerging in the popular consciousness, but rather a

reinforcement of the values of letting others have control, fatalism,

individualism and atomisation. This is also apparent in Brazil, where

the establishment of an aid system for the poor (Bolsa Familia) has made

millions of poor proletarians dependent on a miserable amount of money

set aside by the government each month and distributed to individuals by

banks. This leads to individualisation and atomisation. In these aid

systems, attitudes of solidarity do not grow, but in fact disappear.

What do you think of this argument that “despite everything, these

régimes are better than what there was before”?

I. — Solidarity is something that has to develop among communities of

workers, based on their own desires. But if everything is run according

to a state-imposed agenda, collective needs are not met, only those

determined from on high. Look at the so-called grassroots organisations

the régime talks about so much and which are often portrayed as

“People’s Power” or even “the Fifth Estate”. The organisations have

always been dependent on the state. After the 1989 caracazo we saw an

independent current among community organisations, but as we have said,

these same organisations have been incorporated into the new state and

have become vehicles of the Chavista project. Abandoning their autonomy

in order to strengthen a so-called revolutionary government, they

legitimise their stance by saying “but now things are going to get

better!”. All this expresses a number of failings. People have to

understand that they can organise independently of the state. But there

is an enormous political polarisation which dominates all these

activities: you are with Chavismo or against it. The Chavista grassroots

organisations against the oppositionist ones. The new communal councils

should, in principle, represent the communities who elect them. But in

reality there are Chavista ones where there is no place for critics and

anti-Chavista ones where Chavistas are not allowed. The form of these

councils is determined by the state. So where are the real, concrete

interests of collectives represented?

M. — For my part, I am not afraid to say that living standards have not

improved; people are living in ever worse conditions. This despite the

fact that Venezuela now has the highest GNP per capita in Latin America,

a figure comparable to some European countries. The working classes rely

on the help the government gives them. Of course, the existence of

health centres in the barrios is a good thing, when they’re running. But

in this country the situation of poor women, in particular as regards

childbirth, is deteriorating. The public health system is in a

disastrous state. Venezuelan prisons reproduce societal violence to the

extent that they are among the most violent on the continent. In 2007

alone there were 427 deaths in jails, out of a prison population of

20,000. This aggravation of social problems is the expression of a

social fragmentation which our famous “revolutionary process” does

nothing to combat. On the contrary, it reinforces individualist

attitudes. We are told that we are building “21^(st) century socialism”

and yet what we see is an increased number of shopping centres. Luxury

car sales have never been so strong… All this shows the flowering of

values which have nothing to do with the attitudes socialists have

expressed throughout history. To conclude: there are slogans and

propaganda, but this does not correspond with the concrete results and

is not related to the means actually used. The Chávez government

disposes of enormous financial means thanks to its oil wealth, and also

has immense political capital. So all the official discourse can to

explain the lack of results is that one little word: imperialism….

I. — We must look beyond the current régime and beyond Chavismo. What

should be put into question are the habits of living and consuming in a

country which has lived off oil revenue for years. Venezuela is a

society where materialist alienation is very strong. The Latin American

country with most mobile phones, where women’s cosmetics are most widely

sold, and more… It is the ability to possess such goods which gives

people the impression of increased living standards. But the quality of

food, healthcare, education, and the ecological situation, are

essentials which do not fit into this picture.

M. — The situation in Caracas is a good example of this. Urban decay and

the loss of public space, social breakdown, everyday violence and the

decline in public transport are far from corresponding to what is

materially possible for the capital of an oil-producting country.

C.R. — The capitalist class appropriates most of the oil revenue,

without the slightest interest for meeting the general interests of

society. At this level there is seamless continuity between the régimes

of the past and Chavismo.

M. — Exactly! For us, nothing essential has changed. Among the ruling

class there are some who have broken with the new authorities and others

who support it. The best example is that of Gustavo Cisneros, one of the

big modern Venezuelan capitalists, a man connected to the world market,

a “global entrepreneur”. He manages the Venezuelan Coca Cola operation

and invests in the communications sector. This man carries out all his

affairs while maintaining excellent relations with the current

government, which he has a conciliatory and even eulogistic attitude

towards. “Money has no ideology”, he says!

Co-operatives in the service of casualisation

C.R. — Now let’s talk about the co-operatives movement. A Venezuelan

friend said that the government’s co-operatives movement, in the last

analysis, amounts to a sort of institutionalisation of labour precarity

and black market work. He mentioned the recent (2007) strike by dustmen

in part of Caracas, during which the strikers asked for Barreto, mayor

of Caracas, to intervene — he who quotes Foucault and invited Toni Negri

over. The mayor told them that he could do nothing, since they had

accepted the transformation of the old company into a co-operative.

Which meant that there was no collective bargaining, since the workers

were considered to be associates of the co-operative on the same level

as the administrators!

M. — Of course, we have a totally different idea of co-operatives. For

us, a co-operative is an initiative which comes from below. For the

Chavistas, on the contrary, enterprises in what they now call the

“social economy sector” must operate in the form of state-aided

co-operatives. Every day people start organising co-operatives — people

who are totally foreign to the spirit and practice of co-operativism…

because it is the quickest way of getting contracts and state credit! In

many industries the law obliges the state to give priority of tenders to

“co-operatives” above private enterprises. So many malign people have

started creating co-operatives in order to win contracts with government

bodies. That as the case with the public roads enterprise you mentioned.

A private enterprise was thus transformed inter a co-operative to win

the tender, and at a stroke the workers lost all their rights and

bonuses. They now have three-month renewable contracts, such that the

“co-operativist” (in reality, the new name for the boss!) has no duties

towards them. Thanks to this lie, after a few months it could be said

that there were 200,000 co-operatives… All this in order to make

propaganda showing that society has changed. But it is all artificial,

created by decree.

I. — I would add that, after the oil workers’ strike, the government

learned that it had to control the world of work. First it explained

that the state would create a new form of organisation based on

solidarity and where all workers would benefit from the same privileges.

The co-operatives! At a stroke the government broke the services

contracts it had with private companies (particularly for cleaning),

which by law had to pay workers ’social bonuses’. The workers were laid

off and forced to seek temporary work with these co-operatives now

dealing with the state. They lost the bonuses and rights which they had

previously (in theory at least) had. Moreover, many of these

co-operatives disappeared as soon as they were created. So we are

witnessing, as your friend is right to emphasise, the casualisation of

work.

Political pressure in the workplace

M. — All this is part of a broader tendency towards casualisation and

“flexibility” in Venezuelans’ work conditions. The government’s

recurrent discourse about trade unions is part of the same agenda. The

government never ceases to emphasise the need to integrate the trade

unions into the new party structures.

The state is one of the main employers in Venezuela. After more than six

years, 425 collective bargaining agreements for public sector workers

are still waiting to be renegotiated! So there you go: a so-called

socialist and revolutionary government which refuses to negotiate the

collective deals for its own employees. They don’t give a damn about

these workers’ needs! And here we are talking about sectors which are

fundamental to the functioning of the state, such as hospital workers

and firefighters. Add to that the fact that the régime has pushed to the

limit the loyalty of public sector workers to the state, which has

always existed traditionally. You will not be recruited if you do not

show Chavista sympathies, and you could even lose your job. The 2004

presidential recall referendum came about after a national petition,

which is a constitutional right. Thirty percent of registered voters can

demand a referendum. Oppositionists went around collecting signatures,

and — we don’t know how — they were posted on a web page “Here are the

people who signed against Chávez”! So what was meant to be private and

confidential became public. There were numerous lay-offs on the basis of

this list, and a significant degree of administrative harassment. A

nasty little affair, and the international left said nothing! From 2002

to 2004 the polarisation in society reached its height. You went into a

public office for some administrative matter or to do some papers, and

were asked “Did you sign?”: meaning, “did you sign against Chávez?”!

Since I am not even on the electoral lists, I was fine…

Sure, in all societies there is political discrimination, but in

Venezuela it is truly scandalous. If you want to work in a public

service it is absolutely essential that you can prove your sympathy

towards the régime. Another thing which you hear more and more of is the

obligation for state functionaries to participate in the big

demonstrations to support the president — sometimes on weekends — as if

it was work time.

I. — I will add a concrete example. A few months ago the president of

the Institute for Consumer Protection, INDECO, publicly stated that if a

supermarket refused to sell products under the pretext of problems with

their inventory, in fact they were hiding attempts at monopoly. This was

a lie, since there is a real lack of goods. Because of this, he was

replaced by a representative of a harder Chavista bent. This individual

had already had a number of ministerial posts and had purged everywhere

he had worked! Upon his arrival at INDECO he started again — service

directors, although mostly Chavistas — were dragged out of their offices

by heavies and were only allowed to take away their personal

possessions. My sister works for this body. Although not a Chavista, she

had never had any problems at work before. But in the mix of this

re-organisation of the institution, they forced her as well as her

colleagues to participate in the 27^(th) March 2007 march in support of

Chávez. The pressure became so unbearable that my sister ended up

resigning.

C.R. — Do you think that this hardening of the régime and this obsession

with total control will end up counter-productive, weakening its

popularity? Problems are mounting and they find ever more bureaucratic

answers.

I. — Yes, this clean-up justified in the name of the Chavista paranoia

about the next coup, in fact means strengthening totalitarian

tendencies.chavezresults

The renewal of social struggles under Chavismo

C.R. — In the first months of 2008 we saw the development of

working-class struggles in Venezuela, in sectors as diverse as steel

works and hospitals. In a society extremely polarised between pro and

anti Chavistas, the trade union movement appears sharply divided,

between the old anti-Chavista social democrat unions, the new Chavista

unions and still others who are more politically independent, like the

metalworkers’ union. In the current circumstances every struggle tends

to be characterised as ‘manipulated’. The recent strike threat by

steelworkers was immediately attacked by the Minister of Labour as

“manipulated by the opposition”. Today, what degree of autonomy is

possible for struggles?

M. — We think that the results of the 2^(nd) December 2007 referendum

represent a turning point. That day, the Chavista government announced

that it was to embark on a process of self-critique. By comparison to

what had gone before, we could say to ourselves “look, something

positive”. But the plan was never given any substance! For years we have

been living to the rhythm of the electoral process. It was said that the

referendum result could perhaps bring about a movement of struggle and

that there was at least a change for social movements to find their own

dynamics, political space and outlooks. We are indifferent to whether

the individual personnel are Chavistas or oppositionists: the state is

unable to satisfy the demands of struggles, and the space for autonomous

action has to increase.

On International Women’s Day the Chavista women’s organisations

mobilised against imperialism! What was the relationship of this with

the needs of women here: help with maternity, health conditions and

domestic violence? Similarly, the student movement that broke out in

2007 against the closure of a TV station was unable to formulate its own

demands. For their part, the Chavista students were also mobilised, but

this time in favour of the closure. That was it! And what were their

demands about the conditions of students and the socialist educational

agenda? They had none! They had no objectives of their own. On both

sides the mobilisations were organised from above. In reality, we have

to say, sadly, that the people are prisoners of the electoral calendar

and its partisanship. All energies and all mobilisations, whether

Chavista or anti-Chavista, are geared towards electoralism.

I. — It used to be that it was impossible to go on strike in an election

year without being accused of being a “guarimbero” [2]. In 2007 there

was a transport strike, the small owners demanding an increase in ticket

prices and arguing that they did not earn enough to maintain the lines.

The government paid no attention to their demands and everyone dug their

heels in. So the workers who protested against the lack of transport

were in turn accused of being “guarimberos”. What’s more, the government

threatened to create a “co-operative” (see!) which would replace the

lines on strike. Of course, there was no possibility of solidarity

emerging. The same thing happened in the strikes by teachers and by

doctors in the public health system. The doctors occupied the hospitals

and demanded the renegotiation of their deal. The government refused any

discussion and called them “guarimberos”. So then Chávez met with a

group of pro-régime doctors in a large theatre hall in Caracas and

magnanimously said to them “I’ll give you a 30% raise!”. With no

discussion of the deal! People end up defeated, giving in to the

authoritarian and demagogic methods of the government.

C.R. — So you’re suggesting that this situation is now changing…

I. — Yes, I think today attitudes are more open. People say “I am

neither of the opposition nor a “guarimbero”, I am not a Chavista — or

not — but am a worker and want to be listened to!”. We saw this recently

in the nursery nurses’ and transport workers’ strikes. “We are workers

and we want our rights respected”. These movements represent a change in

people’s consciousness.

M. There are contradictions between the leadership of the régime, who

are constantly trying to channel protests into the electoralist camp,

and the deep discontent of the base, the poorest layers of the

population who tend to pose their demands up front. We can only hope

that this divide is accentuated. It is this contradiction which can

create a space for people to win back their own sets of objectives and

their own interests. This is the only way that, in the long term,

autonomous space can be created.

Dissent among the Chavistas

I. — As we have already emphasised, the political process of Chavismo

has experienced a series of changes. Since 2007, two things have become

clear: the first is that Chávez could lose power. The second is that

Chávez does not necessarily represent the interests of the majority of

the population. In December 2007, we saw that the project Chávez argues

for has raised a number of doubts, even among the Chavista left, some

sections of which were very critical. The fragmentation was real. You

could see that Chávez’s charisma was weakening. That is why we think

that at the present time, what is most interesting politically is what

is happening inside the Chavista movement and the critiques arising in

its ranks. It represents the discontent of activists who feel that their

political space is more and more controlled from above. Since last year,

the “missions” [3] have been going very badly, with less and less

financial means. For example, half of the “Barrio adentro” [4] health

centres have been shut for want of equipment, medicine or doctors… The

“Robinson mission”, the avant-garde of the “missions”, designed to

combat illiteracy, is no more. Other “missions” have not given the

expected results. We are witnessing a crisis of expectations. The first

two years, propaganda was still able to pretend that the process was

going ahead as planned and we only had to wait. The results could be

manipulated for electoral ends. But when, after four or five years in

power, there are still no improvements… This is true with the

universities too — Chávez initially promised twelve new universities,

then thirty… but nothing ever happened… After six years of unconditional

popular support, the hopes ended up collapsing, which explains the

current implosion of the régime.

M. — The results of the December 2007 referendum confirmed our

expectations: the Chavista public had nothing to do with a “socialist

movement” and did not at all identify with the so-called socialist

project. The majority of the Chavista electorate voted against his

socialist constitution. But still Chávez continues to have strong

emotional ties to the masses. There is nothing socialist or

revolutionary about this: it is mobilisation around a charismatic

figure, Hugo Chávez.

I. — There is a joke people tell about Chávez, of coarse Venezuelan

taste. It’s the story where the fiancé asks his fiancée to go to bed

with him, and she says “No my love, not now!”. And he insists, “But yes,

but yes, but yes!”. Chávez proposes a socialist constitution and the

people say no, we don’t want it! Instead of going forward with a

positive alternative he tenses up and shows himself to be more

authoritarian. After all, this guy is a soldier. This attitude leads to

division, which is almost emotional in type, since Chávez is an

emotional figure. Notwithstanding, if Chávez happens to decide to use

authoritarian means to resolve some problem of the masses, the

charismatic ties can be patched up again.

M. — One further aspect must not go without mention — the importance

Chavismo gives to international affairs. The support he gives to

“friendly” régimes is less and less tolerated. “He is busy with others

and not us!”. “Why does Chávez say that he wants to help them build

hospitals in Nicaragua when the ones here are in such a pathetic

state?”. This is what we are accustomed to hear: “We want answers to the

problems here, and now!”. After the defeat of the December 2007

referendum Chávez did everything he could to recover his image on the

international level. So that’s why we have this constant show, the world

a stage.

The spectre of anarchy?

C.R. — In March 2008 a plain clothes policeman put a bomb in the

headquarters of the bosses’ organisation. A man linked to the régime, he

did it with his policeman’s card in is pocket! The Minister of the

Interior spoke of the actions of a “small anarchist group”… Why speak of

an anarchist group in reference to an action which was, by all accounts,

an operation of the secret services?

M. — Chávez’s Interior Minister is one of the most sinister characters

in the régime. He is a mercenary, a man who made his career in the

army’s secret services and responsible for the massacre of a guerrilla

group in 1988.

I. — This sort of talk is nothing new. Each time there are actions which

take place outside the control of the régime’s institutions and

organisations, they cry “anarchism”. Chávez himself came on TV to say

that this terrorist action was the work of “anarchist groups”. Of

course, we could get worried that this was part of a clamp-down

strategy, but I think it’s more that it’s an easy explanation. As yet

there have been no consequences for us as a result of our activism. We

are few in number, but are on our guard. In any case, at a recent

meeting of his new PSUV party Chávez said “There is no place for

anarchists in the PSUV”. There is a place for “obedient, critical

socialists” but not for anarchists (laughter).

“Revolutionary tourism”

C.R. — You often refer to “revolutionary tourism”… in early March 2008,

in the TV programme “Alo Presidente!” Chávez appeared, surrounded by a

group of young members of the German party Die Linke.

M. — What happened with the anarchist movement in Cuba is particularly

of interest, given the resemblance between the two situations. They are

two governments who present themselves to the outside world as

revolutionary and progressive. So the régime chooses a certain number of

sights for sympathisers to go and tour round. But this is quite the

caricature: they organise international conferences on occupied

factories without the participants visiting a single occupied workplace.

They organise big international Masses, the World Social Forum, the

International Camp of Anti-imperialist Youth, the International Forum of

Intellectuals for Peace, etc. All this as an attempt to constantly feed

the propaganda and publicity for the régime.

I. — There is one “revolutionary tourism” run by the state, and another

more spontaneous kind involving people who have certain hopes and

expectations about Venezuela. I think that the people who come in the

latter state of mind are more free and ultimately see more than those

who visit under the control of the state. Celebrities like Noam Chomsky

and Naomi Campell come, are led around some barrio under construction

for the benefit of the poor, to some co-operatives or to some state

farm. Their visits are filmed in order to make propaganda.

M. — We know that most people who come here want to see what they expect

to see. Like those who visit Cuba. So it all depends on their

ideological training. Visitors from more libertarian and critical

backgrounds can accept seeing the good and the bad, while those from

more traditional Marxist Leninist groups, Guevarists and Maoists, tend

to confirm in their heads what propaganda has told them. For our part,

whenever we meet comrades from abroad we tell them what we think of the

situation. But we also say that they ought not just take our word for

it, just as they shouldn’t believe the government! They have to open

their eyes, visit what you can visit, walk around Caracas and the towns

of the interior.

Debord, Bolivar and the avatars of propaganda

C.R. — Gabriel, you are a keen reader of Guy Debord. What use would you

make of his writings in order to understanding Venezuelan society?

M. — I think that thirty years ago some words had a certain meaning —

for example, if you were an anti-imperialist you aligned yourself with

one of the Cold War blocs. Today, in a period of capitalist

globalisation, you can call yourself an anti-imperialist and remain a

partisan of neo-liberalism… In Venezuela socialists’ mentality is highly

eccentric and you can’t be sure of what is being said. The spectacle as

a representation of reality greatly interests me in understanding the

situation I see. I think that the Chavista phenomenon is not analysed in

a satisfactory manner by us or anyone else. The results of the December

2007 referendum surprised all intellectuals whether of left or right. So

we must continue to reflect.

C.R. — But it is a purely electoral rejection. What it really means is

that people do not totally accept the image of reality portrayed by

propaganda and that it does not conform to the reality of social

relations. Which also implies that the forms of domination are in

crisis.

M. — Without doubt. Look at the Bolivar myth. It is the myth fundamental

to Venezuelan nationalism, the myth of the liberator. It means that

within nationalism there is this historic role for Venezuela,

predestined to fight for the liberation of the Latin American peoples.

With two corollaries: the Venezuelan has a universal epic and heroic

role; and Venezuela is a rich country with poorly distributed wealth.

Chávez perfectly embodies this culture. He is the man predestined to

fight a second independence struggle, against the United States.

I. — The hiatus came when people started to realise that the political

remedies were far from enough to meet their needs. But there was this

image of the régime and Chávez. Plans for the future collapsed faced

with the disasters of everyday life. The régime drew much of its

strength from cultural aspects: nationalism and in particular the image

of the régime abroad. “Bolivarian socialism” and “21^(st) century

socialism” were presented as being able to answer concrete questions of

hunger, housing and living conditions. In the elaboration of this

propaganda it was necessary to give pride of place to people like Juan

Barreto (mayor of Caracas) and Andrés Izarra. They knew how to sell

Chavismo and the image of the régime to the outside world. Andrés

Izarra, whose closest advisor is the ex-situationist Eduardo Rothe, is a

leading figure in the régime. He dreamt up the document “If I was

Venezuelan I would vote for Chávez” which all the “progressive” North

American and European intellectuals signed. The idea was to show that

the Chavistas weren’t alone in the world.

C.R. — But all this was just a rerun of history… it’s in the tradition

of historic Stalinism, the congresses of “progressive” artists and

intellectuals in support of this or that progressive régime…

I. — Yes, for you it’s déjà vu. But you must understand that here in

Venezuelan this is a totally new situation. The country came out of a

long reign of social-democratic rule financed by oil revenue and

directly tied to the USA. These conflicts between left and right,

neo-liberalism and anti-neo-liberalism, are new ideological struggles

for this society.

M. — My father was a rank-and-file member of the social democratic

Acción Democrática. Later he abandoned politics. The oil was flowing, he

had money and work and made his living. Today his is a Chavista and has

‘discovered’ the Cuban revolution! Chavistas’ attitudes are greatly

naive. Now they are finding out about all these questions, as if they

were experiencing some belated revolutionary adolescence…

The condition of women: advances and retreats

C.R. — Have there been significant changes in the condition of women?

I. — I am very pessimistic. Many women’s organisations have been

integrated into the state. The régime itself has created various women’s

bodies such as the Casa de la mujer. Women active in society are

integrated into the work of such institutions. Only a small number have

pursued work at grassroots level.

In Venezuela the image of women in a consumerist world is above all

characterised by association with sexual objectification. Every advert

is about woman and her body. What are presented as the needs of women

have nothing to do with women’s specific interests. So, unfortunately,

woman is reduced to reproducing sexist ideas. If we want to measure

women’s access to positions of authority, we can see that the régime has

established a certain parity. For example, if you have a job in public

administration you’ll have the same salary as a man would. The régime

has also placed several women in positions of political responsibility.

But these posts reproduce the system of oppression within the

authorities themselves. They do not smash the structures of the system,

but reproduce it with the figure of the woman-in-power.

Through cultural factors and the weight of tradition, the fact is that

in Venezuela the question of women’s conditions has up until now led to

very few demands of their own. This has left the women’s movement more

vulnerable to traditional political dynamics.

A telling example. We have a law, two of whose most significant aritcles

were revoked by the Chavista régime. According to one article, if a

woman was attacked in her home by her husband or partner, he would be

banned from returning home for 72 hours after his detention. This

article was wiped deleted from the law. Another article was revoked with

the consequence that if the home belongs to the man, the woman and the

kids have to leave if they separate. That tells you well enough the

weakness of women’s cause in the current climate.

In Venezuela the issue of contraception is not taboo, even if it is a

very religious country and we know how religion weighs on this matter.

Contraceptives are freely on sale and distributed in schools, while the

morning-after-pill is also available. There are many types of pills,

some of which are not too expensive and are relatively accessible to

young people. On the contrary, abortion is not allowed. Only miscarriage

is recognised as abortion. There is also the problem of very young women

having kids. I see that mostly as a cultural problem. Childbirth here

remains the central thing which makes a woman a woman. A couple like us,

in our thirties, without kids, are very rare. Everyone criticises you

and most people think of it as proof that we are not at all normal.

Here, childbirth is something fundamental. In the poorest layers of

society motherhood is seen as a way out. Giving birth means young girls

can leave their homes — often places of repression and violence against

women — and start their lives again somewhere else. But, of course,

violence is reproduced in the new circumstances, nothing changes and the

demands for a change in women’s conditions is let drift. However, they

do not see it like this, and for them motherhood is a means of starting

afresh. It is a contradiction which is obvious to us, but it isn’t for

young mothers.

The discovery of libertarian ideas

C.R. — How did you arrive at libertarian ideas?

I. — I studied sociology and took part in an editorial co-operative

linked to the university. I was on the left, from a social-democratic

background, but lots about the Marxist-Leninists and Trotskyists didn’t

appeal to me. I grew closer to young anarchists and was also influenced

by reading Camus.

M. — For me the crucial moment was meeting an old Spanish anarchist who

lived in my small town. As a young man I saw Guevara as a heroic Don

Quijote figure, but I didn’t understand why my here was implicated in a

political and social project involving the Soviet Union, an empire

carrying out horrors in Afghanistan and dominated over other countries.

When I found anarchist ideas, they answered my questions. I was won

over. That was when I met the old anarchist who lived an hour away from

me in a little farming town called Nirgua. He started giving me

literature. This old anarchist was the first man in Venezuela to make

pirate books — not to make money but to make them accessible to more

people. Visiting him, I appreciated his ethics, his way of life, and his

coherence. The Marxists who I knew had a clear idea of revolution but

day-to-day behaved themselves in a manner I disapproved of. They had a

double life — one as a militant, one day-to-day. There was a separation.

So I read a lot and arriving in Caracas I made contact with the small

anarchist circles. I also knew two old members of the Spanish CNT, Civil

War exiles living in Caracas and with who I established strong emotional

bonds. Later, one died and only Antonio Serrano was left. The old

comrade from my little town is still alive and a few years ago we

organised a meeting of young anarchists at his place. Venezuelan

anarchism lacks real historical roots, making it less dogmatic.

C.R. — Tell us a bit about your magazine El Libertario.

M. — At first it wasn’t easy. We were part of the milieu comprising

leftists and organisations from human rights campaigners to ecologists.

With the coming of Chavismo, everything was quickly polarised and almost

all of these organisations were integrated into Chavismo. But not us!

The first years were terrible. We were completely isolated. After 2002,

criticising the régime became an act of courage. In producing our little

magazine — 1,500 copies per issue — I lost 90% of my friends, whether

Chavista or anti-Chavista. No-one talked to me any more! If we

criticised the opposition we were taken for Chavistas, if we criticised

Chavismo we were treated like members of the opposition. And if you

criticise the state you are accused of being an imperialist agent, a

petit bourgeois intellectual and all the rest… As we were overcome with

criticism and rebuttals we were forced to refine our arguments. We went

beyond critical theory and started making analysis of concrete

situations.

I. — Those who criticised us were far from constructive. They did not

discuss our arguments and ideas. It was always at the level of personal

rebuttals and breaking emotional ties. We felt very isolated.

M. — After the 2002 coup attempt against Chávez we were explicitly

threatened with death. All this because we distributed a communiqué

where we wrote “Neither Chávez nor Carmona, for self-management and

life!”. Some went as far as saying that El Libertario had supported the

coup d’état! Today the situation has changed. The readership of El

Libertario certainly goes beyond our own milieu. The magazine is now

read by people on the left looking for an alternative. We distribute

2,500 issues every two months, 60% by face-to-face sales. Our web page

also gets a lot of hits. We’re always here, and we’ll go on!

[1] The 23^(rd) January barrio was the first high-rise estate built in

Caracas. It is high up, a stone’s throw from the presidential palace,

close to the capital’s administrative centre. This very poor barrio has

for 50 years symbolised a high degree of struggle and clashes with the

forces of order. The actions of its residents played a decisive role in

bringing down the last dictatorship on 23^(rd) January 1958… hence the

name. Since, there has been a strong presence of leftist and far-left

groups, cultural groups and various barrio associations.

[2] A “guarimba” is something concealed, and by extension, a clandestine

meeting of “wrong-doers”. In Chavista language the term “guarimbero”

applies to all those who, for one reason or another, loudly protest

against the situation. Treading them as such, it is understood that they

are subversive forces disguised as honest citizens, or else individuals

manipulated by the opposition.

[3] After the failed April 2002 coup the Chávez government launched a

programme of misiones (missions), far-reaching projects aimed at

improving various aspects of the lives of the poorest people, in

particular as regards health, education and nutrition. These misiones

are organised and directly financed by the state oil firm PDVSA. They

work outside of the control of the services of the corresponding

ministries and are not subject — even at a formal level — to any

parliamentary control.

[4] The mision Barrio Adentro (mission at the heart of the

neighbourhood) is the mission designed to improve medical awareness in

poor and rural areas (preventative medicine). This mission is based on

Health Centres — free medical offices with doctors lodging in the

district. The large majority of these doctors are Cubans (over 20,000)

put at Chávez’s disposal by the Cuban state, which is supplied with

petrol in return. An undefined number of these doctors have since

disappeared into the wild… some have found refuge in Colombia. A

particular form of set-up has been designed with the goal of supplying

the health centre and the doctors’ living space under the same roof.

Many thousands of such buildings have been set up in the barrios of the

biggest towns.